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ABSTRACT 
Self-Health examines the cultural politics of health in the United States in the decades prior to 
the professionalization of medicine, the microbiological revolution, and the development of federal 
public health policy. Arguing that early republican and antebellum health discourses located the 
burden of care not with the state, but with the embodied subject, it traces the ways in which 
American health was rendered “public” at moments of biopolitical crisis: periods of populational 
emergency during which individuals’ relations and obligations to the life of the social body were 
tried and defined. Each chapter considers a nineteenth-century etiological or epidemiological 
concept—predisposition, miasmatic transmission, racialized immunity, and hereditary degeneration
—as an organizing principle that shaped laypeople’s understandings of agency, risk, and 
responsibility. Specifically, analyzing theories of disease transmission and prevention as they were 
presented for public consumption in print media—newspapers, periodicals, domestic medical 
manuals, and novels—Self-Health illustrates the ways in which self-care was understood not only as a 
civic responsibility, but as a fundamental prerequisite for citizenship. In so doing, it investigates the 
hygienic investments of nineteenth-century fiction, exploring how American authors such as Charles 
Brockden Brown, Edgar Allan Poe, Nathaniel Hawthorne, William Wells Brown, Hannah Crafts, 
and Louisa May Alcott engaged with contemporary discourses of health and hygiene in a range of 
narrative genres, including the Gothic, the romance, the abolitionist novel, and the sentimental 
novel.  Intervening in American literary history, the history of medicine, and the health humanities, 
Self-Health seeks to illuminate the historical development of the politics, praxes, and ethics of care 




Health Care as Self-Care in the Long Nineteenth Century  
 
 
Of the three objects contemplated in the Declaration of Independence as necessary 
to be secured by government, the first named is “Life.” Higher purposes cannot be 
conceived for which governments should be instituted. 
 
—John Griscom, The Sanitary Condition of the Laboring Population of New York (1845) 
 
 
I am afraid to own a Body— 
I am afraid to own a Soul— 
Profound—precarious Property— 
Possession, not optional— 
 
—Emily Dickinson  
 
 
In January 1800, Charles Brockden Brown’s Monthly Magazine, and American Review issued the 
first installment of its four-part review of Noah Webster’s Brief History of Epidemic and Pestilential 
Diseases (1799). Undertaken in the wake of his examination of the yellow fever epidemic that had 
literally decimated Philadelphia’s population in 1793, Webster’s ambitious history attempts a “critical 
and laborious inquiry” into the “origins and causes of pestilence” (21) from biblical times to the 
threshold of the nineteenth century. The reviewer commends Webster’s efforts in supplying 
“indirect instruction” to the public on a matter “of immediate and universal importance,” yet 
remarks that the volume is “wanting in technical precision and refinement”—after all, “[t]he author 
is no physician” (30). As an illustration of Webster’s lack of scientific acumen, the reviewer cites the 
author’s prefatory remarks with added italics: “a history of pestilence, that all-devouring scourge, which 
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has swept away a large portion of the human race in every age, is yet a desideratum in our libraries”—
to which he appends an admonitory footnote: “A scourge neither devours nor sweeps” (31).  
This anonymous review was most probably authored by Brown himself—an assumption we 
might draw not only from the knowledge that Brown supplied much of his magazine’s content, but 
also from the style and tenor of its critique.1 Quibbling with the author’s verbiage, the reviewer 
points to the importance not just of historicizing disease, but of attending to disease discourse2—an 
observation Brown had similarly offered in a 1796 letter, in which he attempted to assuage his 
brother’s panic surrounding a seasonal recurrence of yellow fever: “When you talk of the necessity of 
Circumspection to escape its ravages,” wrote Brown, “I cannot but admire the exaggerations of 
rumour” (371). As Brown realized, the language with which disease is described delimits the 
epistemological parameters within which it is understood. In this letter, he suggests that his brother’s 
overblown rhetoric contributes to the perpetuation of a panic out of all proportion to actual risk; in 
his review of Webster, he suggests that to situate pestilence as a subject that acts upon an objectified 
“human race” is to produce a problematic anthropomorphism, one that grants agency to plague 
while seemingly eschewing the efficacy of human intervention.3  
The idea of human helplessness in the face of a devouring scourge rehearsed older, 
providential interpretations of plague, wherein disease was seen an instrument of divine 
intentionality—an interpretation that problematically forestalled the implementation of preventive 
1 See Axelrod’s note on authorship in Charles Brockden Brown (1983), and Limon, The Place of Fiction in the Time of Science 
(1990), 197, n23.  
2 Several pages later, in response to Webster’s scripturally-inferred contention that “Egypt originates the plague,” Brown 
supplies a similar footnote, pointing out that “[o]riginate is a neuter or intransitive, and not an active verb” (33). Since 
“originate” is intransitive, Brown implies, “plague” must be the subject rather than the object here. 
3 For this reason, Brown critiques Webster’s focus on environmental agencies over social ones. “War and political 
intrigues, the ambition of princes and demagogues, cannot be described with a disgusting minuteness,” he writes.  
“Measured by their influence on human happiness, their importance very far surpasses that of any physical agent; and, 
considered with regard to utility, it is far more proper to exhibit the mischief of ambition and misgovernment, which are 
susceptible of remedy, than the influences of comets and volcanoes, which come and go, burst forth and subside, 
without the leave, and in defiance of the wisdom of mortals” (31). Indeed, as Chapter 1 will show, Brown is chiefly 
concerned with those aspects of disease that are “susceptible of remedy.”  
3 
 
and curative measures: “In our own country,” Brown observes, “there are many persons who 
believe pestilence to be wholly a supernatural visitation; who, therefore, are inattentive to provide 
for their safety by visible means; who refuse, as impious to contend with immediate or secondary 
causes.” But to eschew preventive health measures in the name of piety, Brown contends, was to 
appeal to a shoddy logic. After all, “[i]t would be a strange imagination,” he argues, “that by 
widening streets, dispersing houses, emptying the pools, drying up the bogs, and checquering the 
surface of the whole earth with rivulets and fountains, we should rob our Maker of his weapons, and 
might sin with impunity, because our Judge is bereaved of his implements of punishment” (32). If 
public health efforts cannot forestall divine will, they can yet address the “immediate or secondary” 
causes of disease; thus, Brown continues, it is “proper to teach that there are other physical evils, the 
immediate cause of which is within our power to discover and to obviate” (33).  
Here, Brown proposes a broadening of scope that is both epistemological and ethical, 
championing humans’ ability both to acquire knowledge of disease transmission and to harness this 
knowledge for preventive or therapeutic ends. In so doing, he appeals to a reformulation of agency 
that would increasingly come to underpin disease prevention efforts in the nineteenth-century 
United States. During the Second Great Awakening of the 1820s-30s, a renunciation of the Calvinist 
doctrine of natural depravity occasioned a renewed investment in the agency of the individual, 
which, as historians such as James Whorton and Ruth Clifford Engs have noted, informed the 
strategies of antebellum reform movements broadly, and health reform in particular. 4 No longer 
imagined as ineluctably at the mercy of divine ordinance, the individual was directed “to win 
salvation from disease for himself, through the exercise of God’s gift of reason” (Whorton, Crusaders 
                                                          
4 See Whorton, Crusaders for Fitness (1982) and Engs, Clean Living Movements (2001). 
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31).5 Brown, too, promotes an agentive vision of disease prevention: since “the existence of remedy is 
as much the growth of general laws, and part of the scheme of providence, as the existence of the 
evil,” he reasons, “failing to exert our faculties to discover and to apply the means of safety, is a 
species of guilt.” Our dual capacities to ascertain and apply epidemiological knowledge, Brown 
suggests, engender implicit imperatives of care—neglect of which constitutes not a kind of 
submissive piety, but “criminal disobedience to him who gave us the love of life, the capacity of 
happiness ourselves, and the power of promoting that of others” (33). As this dissertation illustrates, 
this tripartite justification for disease prevention—obedience to divine laws, self-determination, and 
civic responsibility—would inflect antebellum health reform over the course of the next century. 
*** 
Self-Health examines the ways in which Americans conceptualized health care prior to the 
Progressive Era, when public health increasingly became the province of government regulation.6 As 
its title suggests—invoking Scottish reformer Samuel Smiles’ popular 1859 conduct manual Self-Help, 
and the industry it inspired7—its central premise is that early republican and antebellum medico-
                                                          
5 As Foucault has noted, “the relation between medicine and practice of the self directs us to the problem of ‘being 
saved and earning one’s salvation’: What is it to be in good health, to escape from illnesses, both to be lead to death and 
in a way to be saved from death?” (Hermeneutics 120).  
6 See Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine (1982) and Remedy and Reaction (2013); Engs, The Progressive Era’s 
Health Reform Movement (2002); and Burnham, Health Care in America (2015). As Priscilla Wald notes, another strain of 
Progressive Era public health policy, articulated by reformers like bacteriological researcher and onetime APHA 
President CharlesV. Chapin, called for a revision of “prevailing notions as to the sanitary functions of the state” (qtd. in 
Wald 73). Instead of state regulation, Chapin advocated for “individual responsibility and personal habits as the greatest 
weapons in the war against the microbes, and individuals as the most important units for medical focus. The shift not 
only enlisted individuals in their own care-taking,” writes Wald, “but also emphasized their social responsibility to the 
ever-widening circles with whom they were directly or indirectly in contact: personal susceptibility transformed into an 
image of community” (74). As I aim to show here, this call for self-care—what Wald calls “medical individualism”—was 
not an invention of the bacteriological age, but a reformulation of the nineteenth century’s predominant health ideology.  
7 I am not, of course, the first to coin “self-health,” but deliberately engage a term that has long been in circulation 
among lay advice writers. Consider, for instance, the 1919 guide Self-Health as a Habit by Eustace Miles, a British athlete 
who authored a number of early twentieth-century handbooks on health: “To-day, more than ever,” Miles asserts in his 
Foreward, “there is demanded, from every member of the Empire, greater all-round efficiency and economy. And the 
chief means to this efficiency and economy is Health. Now, as never before, health is a duty, and should be added to our 
list of duties towards God and our duties towards our ‘Neighbor.’” Positing health as an imperial project—one that is, 
paradoxically, “infectious” (9)—Miles anticipates the strategy of biopolitical discipline under neoliberalism: “The Self-
Healthy person naturally wants the things that are right” (10). Indeed, our own decade has witnessed a profusion of 
amateur health manuals with titles such as Self Health for the 21st Century and The Self-Health Revolution (2012). In the latter, 
5 
political discourses primarily located the burden of care not with the state, but with the embodied 
subject.8 Focusing on the period between the Philadelphia yellow fever epidemic of 1793 
(commonly considered to be the young nation’s first major public health crisis), and the first meeting 
of the American Public Health Association9 in 1873,10 it delves into the murky territory that is pre-
professional U.S. medicine in order to illustrate the ways in which health discourse relied upon 
figurations of the individual, the private, and the domestic—in short, upon discourses that 
characterize much of the period’s fiction. Charged with the responsibility to obtain physiological 
knowledge and implement preventive measures accordingly, individuals—directed and assisted by 
readers are implored to “take back what’s yours,” since “[i]f you don’t do it, there are certainly those who are all too 
happy to take control of your Self-Health for you” (Zenn 3). While its author contends that his is “not a conspiracy 
theory book,” he points out that “[t]he medical institutions, the food companies, and the pharmaceutical industry make a 
lot of money from sick people. Is it possible that they want us to be sick?” (Zenn 2). As we shall see, with this suspicion 
of medical institutions and its claim to “strongly appeal to your intuition to logic”—to “make sense to you because it 
indeed makes perfect sense” (Zenn 4)—these books reproduce the democratic rhetoric characteristic of the nineteenth-
century American domestic medical manual.  
8 To assume that medical care was readily available in the nineteenth century United States, as James Cassedy points out, 
is to ignore an “indeterminate, but for some periods sizable, minority of people who for some reason found themselves 
involuntarily alone medically when confronted with serious fevers, epidemics, and accidental injuries” (32-3). Among the 
social determinants that rendered medical self-help a necessity during this period, Cassedy includes “the geopolitical 
isolation of potential medical consumers, the expense of medical care, and the inadequate supply or performance of the 
medical profession” (31). Beyond these practicalities, however, this study explores the more entrenched ideologies that 
rendered self-help the default method of American care.  
9 The American Public Health Association is a professional organization; its government iteration, the United States 
Public Health Service, technically claims its founding date as 1798, citing the passage of “An Act for the Relief of Sick 
and Disabled Seamen” as a predecessor to what is now a division of the Department of Health and Human Services. 
Reorganized as the Marine Hospital Service in 1870, it was granted federal authority under the National Quarantine Act 
of 1878. The organization became the Public Health and Marine Hospital Service in 1902, and the Public Health Service 
in 1912. See Mullan, Plagues and Politics (1989), and Markel, Quarantine! (1999), 175-176. Given this nascent organization’s 
explicit focus on marine services during the period pertinent to this study, I do not discuss it here. 
10 At the organization’s first meeting in Cincinnati in May 1873, Dr. Stephen Smith of the New York City Health 
Department outlined methods for the acquisition and application of public knowledge about health and sanitation. 
“However we may educate the people in the art of healthy living; however carefully the medical profession may protect 
the family and individuals from the approaches of disease; and however intelligently architecture, engineering, and other 
departments of labor may plan and execute sanitary works,” argued Smith, “there is still required a central authority 
which must enforce those needful regulations which require private interest to yield to the demands of public welfare” 
(14-15). Accordingly, Smith suggested that state boards of health must be granted the power “to compel the execution 
of sanitary works in towns where they are neglected,” since “[p]rivate rights should not be allowed to create or maintain 
public wrongs” (15). Moreover, he continued, this power should also be articulated at a federal level, since “the General 
Government has an important duty yet to perform in providing for the general welfare” (15-16). The public health 
reforms of 1870s would indeed grapple with this distribution of power, as “sanitarians and politicians concerned with 
the nation’s public health turned to the problem of enforcing national standards of quarantine and medical inspection 
without infringing on the sensitive doctrine of states’ rights” (Markel 174). In 1879, Congress passed the National Board 
of Health Act, after which “the U.S. federal government gradually increased and strengthened its role in protecting the 
public health” (Markel 179).  
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medical advice literature—assumed the responsibility to care for themselves, their families, and, 
ultimately, for the broader project of national futurity.  
In one way, then, this dissertation might be understood to explore what Nancy Tomes has 
called “the private side of public health” (6): a concept she applies specifically to early-twentieth-
century personal and domestic hygiene initiatives instigated by the advent of germ theory. However, 
in casting its gaze back to the decades before the microbiological revolution, this study aims to 
complicate the public/private divide11—suggesting not that the “public health” of this period has a 
“private side,” but rather that early republican and antebellum ideologies of health were bound up in 
ideologies of individualism and self-reliance.12 Nineteenth-century health was always-already 
“public” insofar as care of the self13 was understood as a civic responsibility. American health 
discourse accordingly tended toward the production of what Kathleen Brown calls a “culture of 
individual responsibility for the body” (4)—a culture, as the pervasive paranoia surrounding 
                                                          
11 In seeking to disrupt nineteenth-century ideas of (markedly gendered) public and private spheres, it is helpful to draw 
from Gillian Brown’s theory of “domestic individualism.” Countering the long-held notion that the American ideology 
of possessive individualism is wedded to market culture, Brown argues that “nineteenth-century American individualism 
takes on its peculiarly ‘individualistic’ properties as domesticity inflects it with values of interiority, privacy, and 
psychology” (1). As Chapter 3 of this dissertation will discuss, these values of domesticity were intimately connected to 
the values of hygiene. 
12 For nineteenth-century Americans, this brand of self-reliance was not simply a modality for the promotion of health; 
rather, it was health: “I must beat my own pulse true in the heart of the world,” wrote Margaret Fuller; “for that is virtue, 
excellence, health” (163). Indeed, in “Self-Reliance,” Ralph Waldo Emerson appends his exultant assertion “we now are 
men” with a clarifying contrast: “not minors and invalids in a protected corner” (30). Emerson’s appeal to these “icons 
of bodily vulnerability,” as Rosemarie Garland-Thomson has observed, establishes a “category of otherness that 
mutually constitutes his liberal self” (Extraordinary Bodies 42): the self-reliant liberal “man” may be defined as such via an 
opposition to the dependent “invalid.” Later, Emerson draws another evocative comparison between the bodies of “the 
well-clad, reading, writing, thinking American” and that “the naked New Zealander,” arguing that “the white man has 
lost his aboriginal strength” (49). Emerson’s fetishization of “aboriginal” or “savage” embodiment responds to the 
pervasive threat of emasculating “nervousness” (or, as this pathology was later known, “neurasthenia”).  
13 Foucault’s theorization of “care of the self” is first introduced in The History of Sexuality and subsequently developed in 
his lecture series at the Collège de France. Considering the relation of Delphic dictum gnothi seauton (“know yourself”) to 
the less-attended precept epimeleia heautou (care of the self), Foucault argues that this latter “principle that one must take 
care of oneself became the principle of all rational conduct in all forms of active life that would truly conform to the 
principle of moral rationality” (Hermeneutics 9); however, in the “Cartesian moment,” Foucault argues, this principle of 
self-care was displaced by prevailing emphasis on “self-evidence,” which posited self-knowledge as a means to access 
truth (Hermeneutics 14). While in Platonic thought, Foucault explains, this imperative of self-care clearly referred to care of 
the soul rather than care of the body, with the Epicureans and Stoics, “the body reemerges very clearly as an object of 
concern so that caring for the self involves taking care of both one’s soul and one’s body” (Hermeneutics 108). 
Nineteenth-century American health discourse similarly stresses the simultaneous care of soul and body.  
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socialized medicine illustrates, that continues to inform the politics of care in our own historical 
moment.14 Indeed, it often seems that the acute American allergy to government regulation appears 
nowhere as pronounced as within the domain of health.  
Of course, health itself, as Jonathan Metzl points out in his introduction to the 2010 
collection Against Health, “is a term replete with value judgments, hierarchies, and blind assumptions 
that speak as much about power and privilege as they do about well-being. Health is a desired state, 
but it is also a prescribed state and an ideological position” (2); in the terms of this collection, health 
is a “new morality” that variously serves to stigmatize, pathologize, and normativize conditions of 
embodiment.15 For nineteenth-century Americans, health did not simply signify the absence of 
disease, but was socially inscribed with a range of judgements, standards, and meanings. 
Overwhelmingly, nineteenth-century Americans conceived of health as a state of natural equilibrium 
that could be actively achieved by hygienic practices. For my purposes here, then, “self-health” 
refers to these practices of individual circumspection, auto-interpretation and preventive care that 
physicians and health reformers championed both as a means to mitigate the threat of epidemic 
disease and as a means to ameliorate the more chronic, endemic, hereditary pathologies implicit in 
contemporary anxieties about the gradual “degeneration” of the population.  
14 As political scientist Robert Crawford has observed, “[i]n a political climate of fiscal, energy, and cost crises, self-
sacrifice and self-discipline emerge as popular themes. In lieu of rights and entitlements, individual responsibility, self-
help and holistic health move to the center of the discussion” (253). While the self-help movement “initially developed 
as a political response to the oppressive character of professional and male domination in medicine” and thus “embodies 
some of the best strands of grassroots, autonomous action,” Crawford also points out that “because the movement has 
focused on individual behavior and only rarely addressed the social and physical environment, and because it has not 
built a movement that goes beyond self-care to demanding the medical and environmental prerequisites for maintaining 
health, it lends itself to the purposes of victim-blaming” (266, n11). Crawford’s critique, written in the 1970s, resonates 
with both nineteenth-century and twenty-first century ideations of health. 
15 This categorization of health as the “new morality” is somewhat misleading—as if biomedical ideas of health and 
religious ideas of morality existed independently until one came to substitute for the other under neoliberalism. Yet 
medical and religious meanings of health and hygiene have long intersected in the American imagination, as scholars like 
Kathleen Brown have shown: “[b]y the mid-nineteenth century,” Brown notes, “cleanliness did not simply signify moral 
good but had become an important means of achieving it” (291). Moreover, as Charles Rosenberg and Carroll Smith-
Rosenberg note, antebellum public health reform was stimulated by the “intense pietism” of its champions (16).  
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In short, Self-Health seeks to offer a cultural  history of American biopolitics, which Foucault 
defines as “the endeavor, begun in the eighteenth century, to rationalize the problems presented to 
governmental practice by the phenomena characteristic of a group of living being constituted as a 
population: health, sanitation, birthrate, longevity, race” (“The Birth of Biopolitics” 73). According 
to Foucault, the late eighteenth century constitutes a critical historical juncture during which juridical 
notions of sovereign power came to be substituted by a “biopower” that was “directed not at man-
as-body but at man-as-species” (“Society Must Be Defended” 243).16 He continues:  
At the end of the eighteenth century, it was not epidemics that were the issue, but 
something else—what might broadly be called endemics, or in other words, the 
form, nature, extension, duration, and intensity of the illnesses prevalent in a 
population. These were illnesses that were difficult to eradicate and that were not 
regarded as epidemics that caused more frequent deaths, but as permanent factors 
which—and that is how they were dealt with—sapped the population's strength, 
shortened the working week, wasted energy, and cost money, both because they led 
to a fall in production and because treating them was expensive. In a word, illness as 
phenomena affecting a population. Death was no longer something that suddenly 
swooped down on life—as in an epidemic. Death was now something permanent, 
something that slips into life, perpetually gnaws at it, diminishes it and weakens it 
(“Society Must Be Defended” 243-44). 
 
Foucault’s analysis depends upon a familiar distinction between the “epidemic” and 
“endemic”: the former refers to diseases instigated by particular causes, commonly imagined to 
“invade” large swaths of a population at the same time; the latter refers to diseases that maintain a 
consistent presence within a given population, occurring at a predictable rate.17 Yet we might note 
that Foucault’s focus on continental Europe leads him to overstate this point. In the American 
colonial world, after all, epidemics were very much the issue; yellow fever, in particular, circulated 
with the Atlantic slave trade, occasioning serious outbreaks in places such as Cuba and St. 
                                                          
16 While Foucault’s theory of biopolitics has been reconceptualized and expanded by other theorists—Achille Mbembe’s 
“necropolitics,” Giorgio Agamben’s “thanatopolitics,” Nikolas Rose’s “ethopolitics”—scholars have largely tended to 
focus on biopolitical conditions of modernity and postmodernity rather than re-assessing the historical public health 
contexts of the late-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  
17 Hippocrates used “epidemic” to signify local diseases, native to particular environments and climates, and “endemic” 
to signify diseases caused by an imbalance of bodily fluids or “fluxes” (Alcabes 10-12). 
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Domingue.18 More to the point, though, Foucault’s characterization of epidemic-induced death as 
despotic force that “swooped down on life”—language of which Brown would not have 
approved—reinforces a figuration of epidemic disease that much late-eighteenth and early-
nineteenth century American medical writers sought to challenge. While diseases such as yellow 
fever and cholera indeed killed strikingly quickly in comparison to endemic diseases such as gout, 
consumption, or cancer, many physicians nevertheless insisted that these epidemic diseases initially 
persisted in the body in a latent, forming, or “premonitory” state, during which period they might be 
forestalled by maintaining proper habits of life and/or by seeking timely therapeutic intervention. 
The ideologies of care respecting both epidemic and endemic diseases thus hinged upon the fraught 
relation of individual liberty and political discipline.19  
To elaborate on this point somewhat, I will note that, in his famous discussion of the 
Panopticon in Discipline & Punish, Foucault establishes what he sees as a fundamental distinction 
between two historical models of power by juxtaposing the example of the “plague-stricken town” 
with that of “the panoptic establishment.”  The former, he explains, is “an exceptional situation: 
against an extraordinary evil, power is mobilized; it makes itself everywhere present and visible,” 
                                                          
18 See Watts, Epidemics and History (1999); Bewell, Romanticism and Colonial Disease (1999); Lee, Slavery and the Romantic 
Imagination (2004); McNeill, Mosquito Empires (2010); and McCandless, Slavery, Disease and Suffering in the Southern Lowcountry 
(2011). Of course, epidemics remained prevalent in the Old World as well: while eighteenth-century Europe was, as one 
historian has put it, “beyond the shadow of the plague” (Brockliss 345), smallpox came to assume the role of the era’s 
preeminent epidemic disease, killing an estimated 400,000 Europeans annually by the end of the century; in cities such as 
London, it was, with varying degrees of virulence, “both a constant presence and a periodic epidemic” (Hays 151). 
Yellow fever operated similarly in the United States, inciting particularly acute outbreaks (Philadelphia in 1793, New 
Orleans in 1853) and maintaining an omnipresent threat for seasonal reappearance in these cities.  
19 In his reading of nineteenth-century sexual conduct guides, Russ Castronovo draws a similar conclusion: “The 
nineteenth-century pathology of masturbation resounds with the contradictions of democracy,” writes Castronovo; 
specifically, the “array of terms to denote masturbation—‘solitary vice,’ ‘self-indulgence,’ ‘self-destruction,’ ‘self-
prostitution,’ ‘self-fornication,’ ‘self-abuse,’ ‘self-pollution’—adumbrated the pitfalls of celebrating individual liberty in a 
climate where the political infects the sexual.” Concomitantly, he continues, “this same vocabulary promised a cure: 
moral and health authorities agreed that deliverance from masturbation could be achieved only through ‘self-respect,’ 
‘self-denial,’ ‘self-government,’ ‘self-emancipation,’ and of course, ‘self-reliance’” (70-71). Castronovo’s observations 
might be extended to describe not only the political “infection” in the realm of sexuality, but in the realm of health more 
broadly.  Antebellum health reform discourse similarly depended a call to self-denial and self-discipline: resisting the 
unnatural luxuries of nineteenth-century civilization—not only the “solitary vice,” but alcohol, meat, corsets, etc.—in 
order to actively win the salvation of health.  
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whereas the latter “must be understood as a generalizable model of functioning; a way of defining 
power relations in terms of the everyday life of men” (205). Yet while Foucault’s description of the 
plague-stricken town—“traversed throughout with hierarchy, surveillance, observation, writing; the 
town immobilized by the functioning of an extensive power that bears in a distinct way over all 
individual bodies”—might aptly describe the seventeenth-century European experience of plague, it 
cannot be convincingly mapped onto the experience of epidemic disease writ large. Notably, during 
the Philadelphia yellow fever epidemic of 1793, the American government literally fled the nation’s 
capital, leaving regulatory power over the population in the hands of miscellaneous agents—the 
College of Physicians, Dr. Benjamin Rush, and The Federal Gazette—who collectively constructed a 
discourse of individual responsibility, circumspection, and self-care. This abnegation of state 
interest—one that constituted care as the variously-dispersed burden of local organizations, 
individual physicians and reformers, and, crucially, the self-disciplinary subject—might aptly be read 
as an exemplary figuration of American attitudes toward health. Perhaps, for the American 
democratic imagination, this primal scene of plague-stricken Philadelphia does indeed, like 
Foucault’s town, represent “the utopia of the perfectly-governed city” (198): a city that is not 
governed at all.  
*** 
In his 2013 study Narrative Care, Arne De Boever identifies a theoretical silence this 
dissertation seeks to address: “Although literature takes up an important place in Foucault’s oeuvre,” 
he notes, “it remains curiously absent from his lecture course on biopolitics.” And yet, as De Boever 
argues, “life, care, and the state of exception take up a prominent place in contemporary fiction, and arguably in the 
history of the novel at large” (3, italics in original)—indeed, as he goes on to observe, “historically, the 
rise of the novel coincides with the rise of what Foucault calls governmentality and biopower” (9). 
While De Boever’s study takes the contemporary Anglophone novel as its object of inquiry, this 
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dissertation examines American ideologies of health via an analysis of literature that rose 
contemporaneously with the European formulation of biopower. Like De Boever, I seek to affirm a 
“connection between the novel and care—between the novel and a critical aesthetics of existence” 
(21); however, I place more emphasis on an ethics, rather than an aesthetics, of care. 
Self-Health responds to and intervenes in three main fields of inquiry: American literary 
history, the history of medicine, and the health humanities. As a biopolitical literary history, it traces 
the hygienic investments of nineteenth-century American literature, illustrating the ways in which 
discourses of disease transmission—and, more particularly, prevention—inform the period’s fiction 
both thematically and formally. Specifically, analyzing the ways in which these “fictions of 
transmission”20 were presented for public consumption in print media, it asks how medico-scientific 
ideas about disease causation and communication concomitantly engendered a politics, a praxis, and 
an ethics of care. How did nineteenth-century print media—including domestic medical manuals, 
newspapers, periodicals, and novels—work to produce self-disciplinary subjects? How has the 
imperative of self-care been mobilized historically to demarcate or discipline race, gender, and 
sexuality? And finally, how have American authors used the imaginative and narrative resources of 
fiction to promote or critique the self-care imperative? 
In the nineteenth-century United States, as medical historians like Charles Rosenberg have 
convincingly illustrated, public understandings of health and medicine were mediated by print 
culture: domestic medical manuals, almanacs, pamphlets, broadsides, newspapers, and periodicals 
supplied guidance on the treatment and prevention of disease. As Rosenberg notes, this “relatively 
neglected if richly diverse body of printed materials” offers a rich archive that can help illuminate the 
“changing uses of medicine as a cultural ideology” as it came to shape understandings of proper 
                                                          
20 With this phrase, I harken to Gillian Beer’s observation that “[w]hen it is first advanced, theory is at its most fictive. 
The awkwardness of fit between the natural world as it is currently perceived and as it is hypothetically imagined holds 
the theory itself for a time within a provisional scope akin to that of fiction” (3). 
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embodiment and behavior (“Preface” vii, viii). Self-Health engages with this historical archive of 
medical advice literature in order to examine how nineteenth-century American health discourse 
shaped the politics of care. At the same time, it expands this archive by demonstrating that what 
Rosenberg calls “health-oriented print” (ix) was not limited to the discourse of physicians, but 
encompassed a wide range of nineteenth-century narrative genres.  
Following Émile Zola’s formulation of a medico-scientific model of narrative in Le Roman 
Expérimental (1880), critics who have considered the relationship between nineteenth-century 
literature and medicine have largely been concerned with the realm of realism. Many scholars have 
analyzed the parallels between late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century realist fiction and post-
microbiological clinical medicine; in particular, drawing from Foucault’s elaboration of the 
nineteenth-century spatialization of pathology in The Birth of the Clinic (1963), literary critics have 
noted the ways in which the realist will to visibility draws upon the fantasy of transparency and 
governability signified in the “medical gaze,” promoting what Mark Seltzer refers to as “virtually 
obstetrical form of embodiment, of turning the body inside out for inspection” (96).21 Self-Health 
ventures into the less well-trodden territory of the early republican and antebellum eras in order to 
examine how literary and medical discourses intersected in the decades prior to the 
professionalization of American medicine, the microbiological revolution, and the development of 
federal public health policy. In so doing, it enters into conversation with the work of literary scholars 
like Joan Burbick, Cynthia Davis, Nina Baym, Justine Murison, Kyla Schuller, and Sari Altschuler, 
who have begun to examine the ways in which medical ideas of embodiment have informed 
nineteenth-century genres such as the Gothic, the romance, and the sentimental novel.22 Like 
                                                          
21 Lawrence Rothfield, for example, contends that “the emergence, development, and decline of realism as an 
authoritative literary praxis can be tied to the vicissitudes of clinical medicine as an ideal profession” (xiv).  
22 See Burbick, Healing the Republic (1994); Davis, Bodily and Narrative Forms (2000); Baym, American Women of Letters and the 
Nineteenth-Century Sciences (2002); Murison, The Politics of Anxiety in Nineteenth-Century American Literature (2011); Schuller, 
Sentimental Science and the Literary Cultures of Proto-Eugenics (2009); and Altschuler, National Physiology (2012). 
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Murison, I approach “nonrealist” genres like the American romance as “continuous with rather than 
rejections of nineteenth-century scientific speculation,” particularly insofar as both depend upon 
“scrutiny of the susceptibilities and sympathies of social life” (6). Yet while previous scholarship has 
tended to focus on the authoritative, epistemological, or therapeutic functions of medicine—in other 
words, the construction and articulation of medical theory—this study is fundamentally concerned 
with how this theory shaped attitudes toward medical care.  
Self-Health builds upon the scholarship of medical and literary historians who have shown 
that the nineteenth-century United States was rife with twin suspicions: on the one hand, a suspicion 
of professionalized medicine, whose claims to specialized knowledge were anathema to Jacksonian 
democratic ideology, and, on the other, a suspicion of fiction, a medium that was understood to 
produce unfavorable moral and physical effects on “susceptible” readerships.23 The post-
Enlightenment “equation of imagination with unusual susceptibility to social influence,” writes 
Lawrence Kirmayer, “meant that a basic human faculty was displaced from its central position in our 
picture of the mind and increasingly viewed as both trivial and embarrassing” (587). Of course, such 
imaginative activity was not only embarrassing, but unhealthy, as per Thomas Jefferson’s 1811 
complaint about “inordinate passion prevalent for novels” in the United States; unlike “wholesome 
reading,” wrote Jefferson, novel-reading produced a constellation of troubling symptoms: “a bloated 
imagination, sickly judgment, and disgust towards all the real businesses of life” (qtd. in Bell 11). Self-
Health shows how, beginning with the novels of Charles Brockden Brown, American fiction came to 
be conceived as a species of healthful reading. 
23 Commenting on what Walt Whitman called “the romance of surgery & medicine,” Robert Leigh Davis has observed 
that the nineteenth-century “therapeutic skepticism of conservative medicine historically paralleled and at times closely 
resembled the philosophical skepticism of the American romance.” For Davis, Whitman’s “romance” of medicine 
promotes “a middle ground between polarities by which he sought to loosen and critique closed systems—therapeutic as 
well as political systems that were literally, massively deadening” (12). Here, I am concerned not with a romance of 
“medicine” per se, but more broadly with an American romance (or Gothic, or sentimental politics, etc.) of health.  
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For Brown, fiction served a public function—specifically, a public health function. For 
instance, in his 1799 novel Arthur Mervyn, discussed in Chapter 1, Brown explores responses to the 
outbreaks of epidemic yellow fever that had recently plagued cities like Philadelphia and New York. 
The “evils of pestilence” and “schemes of reformation to which they will give birth,” Brown writes 
in his Preface, “have already supplied new and copious materials for reflection to the physician and 
the political economist. They have not been less fertile of instruction to the moral observer,” he 
continues, “to whom they have furnished new displays of the influence of human passions and 
motives.” Staking a space for the humanist alongside the physician and the political economist, 
Brown defends the civic service of imaginative representation: “He that depicts, in lively colours, the 
evils of disease and poverty, performs an eminent service to the sufferers, by calling forth 
benevolence in those who are able to afford relief,” Brown argues; “and he who pourtrays [sic] 
examples of disinterestedness and intrepidity, confers on virtue the notoriety and homage that are 
due to it, and rouses in the spectators, the spirit of salutary emulation” (3).  
This “spirit of salutary emulation” would come to pervade the nineteenth-century “novel of 
purpose,” a genre “reformist in its faith that transforming readers was a necessary step in 
transforming the world” (Claybaugh 34). As historians such as Regina Mortantz-Sanchez have 
noted, hygiene—an umbrella term for a range of care practices that facilitated the preservation of 
health—was “an integral part of the antebellum reformist world view” (32); indeed, antebellum 
health reformers frequently shared political sympathies with promoters of other social movements 
such as abolitionism and women’s rights, and vice versa. Ultimately, however, what I seek to show 
here is not simply that hygiene was an antebellum reformist preoccupation of as well as or as much as 
education, temperance, utopian socialism, abolitionism, or women’s rights, but that ideologies of 
health and hygiene were inextricable from and integral to the broader politics of such movements.  
15 
This is not to suggest that all of the authors I discuss in this study conceived of literature as a 
vehicle for public instruction. Edgar Allan Poe, for example, notably eschewed the didactic function 
of literature, stressing the primacy of the aesthetic experience. Nathaniel Hawthorne remained 
eminently skeptical of the zealotry that attended antebellum reform, and indeed the reformers in his 
fiction consistently display “the dangerous, diabolic control of a political hubris disguised as 
idealism” (Knadler 280). Thus, following Bruno Latour’s assertion that hygiene emerges as “style” in 
French scientific writing in the age of Pasteur—one that was “cumulative and precautionary, since it 
set out to embrace everything” (49)—I suggest that hygiene might similarly be understood as “style” 
in antebellum genres like the Gothic and the romance. Specifically, I argue that authors like Poe and 
Hawthorne draw upon the prognostic and prophylactic imperatives of antebellum public health 
discourse in order to formulate an anticipatory narrative method, one that depends upon interpretive 
participation of the reader. If civic responsibility began with the care of the self, as the nineteenth-
century health discourses insisted, narrative, I argue, might be understood as an instrument of care: 
not necessarily because it serves a therapeutic function, but—as authors like Brown, Poe, and 
Hawthorne show—because it serves a hermeneutic function. In other words, I am not particularly 
concerned with whether literature makes us feel better, but with how it makes us read better.24  
24 As advocates of narrative medicine contend, cultivating critical acumen for the interpretation of texts can facilitate the 
interpretation of bodies and the physical and social environments in which these bodies are situated. See Charon, 
Narrative Medicine (2008).  In his analysis of the study of epidemiological rhetoric in Puritan New England, Cristobal Silva 
deftly answers “the question of what literary criticism has to do with epidemiology”: “the critic's role is to analyze the 
formal and thematic properties of professional and lay epidemiologies,” Silva explains, “and to demonstrate how these 
discourses are bound up in the cultural assumptions of the communities that produce them—how, for example, their 
representational practices regulate access to medicine, and define the boundaries of citizenship” (10). Silva’s study offers 
a cogent example of how one might “approach epidemiology as a literary critic would a narrative genre,” developing a 
method that “demonstrates how regional and generational patterns of illness reposition our understanding of the relation 
between immunology and ideology in the formation of communal identity” (4). Building upon this analysis, Self-Health 
demonstrates the ways in which cultural assumptions about disease causation, transmission, and prevention were integral 
to nineteenth-century American literature both thematically and formally.  
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Ultimately, by privileging the perspective of patient-reader over that of the physician, and by 
attending less to the epistemological or therapeutic than to the phenomenological or hermeneutic 
aspects of medicine, this dissertation participates in the critical shift from the interdisciplinary field 
of the “medical humanities” to what some scholars have alternatively termed the “health 
humanities”: a distinction that aims to promote a more expansive consideration of the manifold 
discourses of “health,” particularly for those who are or have historically been excluded from the 
domain of institutionalized biomedicine.25 Nineteenth-century American literature offers a 
productive starting point from which to approach historical articulations and operations of the 
health humanities not only because it embodies the resistance to disciplinary boundaries to which 
much of our contemporary scholarship aspires, but because this period prior to institutionalization 
and professionalization of American medicine allows us to explore the intersection of specialized 
and lay knowledges and practices.  
If “health” is an “ideological position” that has long relegated bodies to their proper places 
within established structures of power, it has at the same time been understood as a category of 
analysis that enables a more participatory and democratic relation to the biosocial experience of 
embodiment. This dissertation aims to keep the tension between these associations in play as it 
examines the interrelations of the disciplinary and democratic. In the following pages, I sketch a 
brief history of concepts central to this study—“health citizenship,” public health, and domestic 
medicine—before supplying an outline of its four chapters. Critical to each of these chapters are the 
ideas that nineteenth-century Americans conceived of the body as “system of dynamic interactions 
with its environment” (Rosenberg, “The Therapeutic Revolution” 12), and that health discourse 
                                                          
25 Paul Crawford has issued a call for the health humanities as “more inclusive, outward-facing and applied discipline, 
embracing interdisciplinarity and engaging with the contributions of those marginalized from the medical humanities” 
(qtd. in Jones et. al., 6). For a critique of the “health humanities” versus “medical humanities,” see Atkinson et. al., “‘The 
Medical’ and ‘Health’ in a Critical Medical Humanities” (2015). 
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promoted “a sense of dynamic interaction between individuals and the ‘community of citizens’ of 
which they were a part” (Jordanova 139). The imaginative affordances of “non-realist” fiction—
what Hawthorne would call the “license” or “latitude” of literature—render the nineteenth-century 
American novel a key medium from which to explore these “dynamic interactions.” 
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Health Citizenship in the Nineteenth-Century United States 
Over the past several decades, fields such as science and technology studies, ethnic studies, 
feminist studies, and disability studies have increasingly attended to the ways in which biomedical 
conceptualizations of the human body have constructed understandings of identity, subjectivity, 
kinship, and citizenship. The concepts of immunity and susceptibility, in particular, have afforded 
scholars from a range of disciplines an analytic with which to examine post-microbiological 
biopolitical paradigms.26 Exploring immunity’s political, sociological, anthropological, philosophical, 
legal, and affective dimensions—from Donna Haraway’s theorization of the immune system as “an 
elaborate icon for principal systems of symbolic and material ‘difference’ in late capitalism” (204) to 
Jacques Derrida’s post-9/11 meditations on democratic “auto-immunity”  to Mel Chen’s concept of 
“immunity nationalism”—scholars have illuminated how discourses of infection shape conceptions 
of identity and difference at a national level. Indeed, as evidenced by the host of theoretical 
paradigms that have proliferated of late—“biosociality,” per Paul Rabinow; “genetic citizenship,” 
per Deborah Heath, Rayna Rapp, and Karen-Sue Taussig; “embodied citizenship,” per Emily 
Russell; “biological citizenship,” per Nikolas Rose and Carlos Novas—conditions of national 
belonging are defined and delimited by concepts of embodiment.27  
In their discussion of “biological citizenship,” Rose and Novas note the ways in which 
“biological presuppositions, explicitly or implicitly, have underlain many citizenship projects, shaped 
conceptions of what it means to be a citizen, and underpinned distinctions between actual, potential, 
troublesome, and impossible citizens” (440).  Over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, they explain, practices such as racial classification, eugenics, and demography “produced 
26 For example, see Haraway, “The Biopolitics of Postmodern Bodies” (1991); Patton, “What Science Knows” (1990); 
Martin, Flexible Bodies (1994); Odgen, “Cold War Science and the Body Politic” (2000); Derrida, “Autoimmunity” (2003); 
Wald, Contagious (2008); Esposito, Bios (2008); Cohen, A Body Worth Defending (2009); and Chen, Animacies (2012).   
27 See Rabinow, “Artificiality and Enlightenment” (2002); Heath et al, “Genetic Citizenship” (2004); Rose and Novas, 
“Biological Citizenship” (2005); and Russell, Reading Embodied Citizenship (2011).  
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citizens who understood their nationality, allegiances, and distinctions, at least in part, in biological 
terms” and “made certain kinds of ethical demands possible: demands on oneself; on one’s kin, 
community, and society; on those who exercised authority” (441). 28 Biological citizenship is thus an 
active, participatory iteration of citizenship, operating within a “political economy of hope” (452): a 
system whose optimistic future-orientation places demands upon individuals to act in the present for 
the sake of an imagined future.  
If biological citizenship proves especially salient in the twenty-first century, particularly as 
increased access to genetic knowledge comes to dictate possibilities for preventive care, its 
nineteenth-century iteration might be understood in the somewhat more amorphous terms of 
“health citizenship”—a concept whose emergence Dorothy Porter traces to post-revolutionary 
France, where the 1792 Committee on Salubrity and the National Convention declared that ensuring 
the health of citizens was the responsibility of the democratic state; at the same time, this 
revolutionary ideology held that the citizen-patient29 was obliged to care for his own body for the 
good of the state. This reciprocal notion of health citizenship was notably promoted by Constantin-
Francois de Chasseboeuf, comte de Volney, in his 1793 treatise La Loi Naturelle; as Ludmilla 
Jordanova has explained, Volney proposed that “individuals had to actively manage their bodily 
well-being, for their own sake, that of their family and of the nation to which they belonged” (131): 
in other words, “[c]ivic responsibility is health-seeking behavior” (136).  
28 In their study of the “new public health,” Alan Peterson and Deborah Lupton observe that health “has come to be 
viewed as a kind of shorthand for signifying the capacity of the modern self to be transformed through the deployment 
of various ‘rational’ practices of the self…It is in the process of working on the self, and of demonstrating the capacity 
for self-control of the body and its emotions, that one constitutes oneself as a dutiful citizen, and hence as governable” 
(xiv). While these Australian scholars suggest that this “contemporary focus on self-regulation, transformation, and 
personal body 'maintenance' as a primary strategy to achieve public health goals is a relatively recent phenomenon”—
one that replaces the “overtly coercive element” of old public health (65)—I argue here that this kind of disciplinary 
individualism has in fact been the primary strategy of American “public” health for the past two centuries.  
29 See Weiner, The Citizen-Patient in Revolutionary and Imperial Paris (1993). 
20 
 
The antebellum era was a critical period of “health-seeking behavior” in the United States, 
fundamentally concerned with the relationship of individual health to the literal and metaphorical 
health of the social body. 30 “Beginning in the antebellum period,” Morantz-Sanchez observes, “self-
help in health matters, public hygiene, dietary reform, temperance, hydrotherapy and physiological 
instruction merged as ingredients in a coherent and articulate campaign to save the nation by 
combating the ill-health of its citizenry” (32). The Jacksonian period, in particular, ushered in an age 
of “hygienic optimism” (Whorton, Crusaders 14): heartened by a theological revaluation of human 
agency, “Christian physiologists”31 such as William Alcott, Elizabeth Blackwell, and Sylvester 
Graham asserted that individuals could actively achieve health by adhering to the physiological “laws 
of life,” which dictated proper practices of individual, domestic, and sexual hygiene.32  
Like Volney, antebellum Christian physiologists promoted “a revitalized conception of sin” 
(Jordanova 141), championing self-disciplinary hygienic habits as a failsafe remedy for the 
postlapsarian degeneracy they saw as rampant in nineteenth-century society: a marked declension 
from a salutary state of nature that was apparent in everything from the nondescript ugliness of the 
general population to the scourge of “female diseases” fast unfitting American women for the civic 
duty of motherhood. These reformers’ approach was primarily prophylactic, eschewing therapeutic 
intervention for the “nobler work of prevention” (Alcott, Laws of Health 349)—work that was 
understood to produce effects in three concentric spheres of influence: self, family, and nation. But 
                                                          
30 A concept developed by scholars like Michel Foucault and Mary Poovey, the “social body” reformulates older notion 
of the “body politic,” describing the way in which the population was imagined “as a unified and specifically corporeal 
whole.” As Pamela Gilbert explains, the concept of the social body “took on a particular importance in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century,” coincident with “a new view of the role of the state as manager of physical 
health and facilitator of social cohesion.” Aided by the rise of statistical analysis as a mode of population measurement 
and discipline, “the social body came to be understood increasingly as a mass of standardized and deviant bodies, 
making up a whole whose health was dependent on the essential equivalence of its parts” (xiv). 
31 See Whorton, “Christian Physiology” (1975). 
32 This idea of hygiene is largely reliant upon the Galenic notion of the “six non naturals” (air, sleep, food and drink, 
movement and rest, evacuations, and passions), proper management of which facilitates the maintenance of health and 
avoidance of disease. 
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if these self-care practices facilitated the individual’s relation to the state, conspicuously absent from 
most of the nineteenth-century discourse of American “health citizenship” is the corresponding 
component of state responsibility.   
 
Public Health and/as Personal Health 
According to the “heroic” 33 narrative of Western public health—one notably promoted by 
historians such as George Rosen and later reformulated by Foucault in his theorization of 
biopolitics34—the health of individuals was increasingly rendered the responsibility of democratic 
states over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. As evidence for this claim, Rosen 
points to the eighteenth-century German Medizinischepolizei, or “medical police”—a regulatory model 
reconstituted, in the hands of nineteenth-century sanitary reformers such as Rudolf Virchow in 
Germany and Edwin Chadwick in Great Britain, as “social medicine.”35 This trajectory toward 
government intervention seems especially salient in Victorian Britain, where reformers like Thomas 
Southwood Smith and Edwin Chadwick worked to render the health of the working classes an 
urgent matter of government attention. Chadwick’s Report on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring 
Population of Great Britain (1842), in particular, has been understood as a watershed in the history of 
public health and sanitation: following its publication, as Mary Poovey notes, “public health became 
the next great object of government concern and the next site of government growth.” However, 
                                                          
33 See Cole et. al., Medical Humanities (2015), 89-102.  
34 As Foucualt writes, “The development, starting in the second half of the eighteenth century, of what was called 
medizinische Polizei, public health, or social medicine, must be written back into the general framework of a ‘biopolitics’; 
the latter tends to treat the ‘population’ as a mass of living and coexisting beings who present particular biological and 
pathological traits and who thus come under specific knowledge and technologies. And this ‘biopolitics’ itself must be 
understood in terms of a theme developed as early as the seventeenth century: the management of state forces” 
(“Security, Territory, and Population” 71). Examining the development of “public” health during this same period in the 
United States, this dissertation asks how the peculiarly American ideology of self-health might also be written into a 
biopolitical framework. 
35 See also Rosen, “Cameralism and the Concept of the Medical Police” (1953), “The Evolution of Social Medicine” 
(1979), and From Medical Police to Social Medicine (1974). 
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Poovey complicates this narrative by pointing out that the 1848 Public Health Act subsequently 
“limited the central government’s authority to compel compliance with national sanitary standards.” 
Accordingly, Poovey argues that the Public Health Act of 1848 promoted not government discipline 
but a version of Foucauldian “disciplinary individualism,” or the “paradoxical configuration of 
agency whereby freedom is constituted as ‘voluntary’ compliance with a rationalized order” (Poovey 
99).   
As Poovey’s analysis illustrates, to posit nineteenth-century European health reform as 
uniform narrative of progress—particularly one that depends upon a hegemonic articulation of state 
power—would be to engage in a radical over-simplification of this history. Yet while acknowledging 
that the development of public health across the Atlantic was indeed less unilateral and less 
authoritative than histories like Rosen’s suggest, it nevertheless appears clear that a fundamental 
distinction exists between public health in Victorian Britain and its contemporaneous iteration in the 
United States. After all, the very existence of “national sanitary standards” in the mid-nineteenth 
century, regardless of the efficacy of their implementation, demonstrates that Great Britain had 
begun to situate public health as national concern in ways that the United States had not. In the U.S., 
public health was the province of local authorities and renegade reformers; individuals strove to 
comply not with national standards, but with a panoply of competing recommendations issued by 
allopaths, homoepaths, hydropaths, physiologists, and phrenologists who vied for authority during 
this notorious era of unregulated medical practice.  
In his history of American public health, John Duffy notes that health reform is often 
precipitated by the attempt to account for and control epidemic disease.36 In the 1790s, in the 
                                                          
36 If “public health” in its nineteenth-century sense consisted primarily of sanitary reform as a means to mitigate 
infectious disease, what some scholars have referred to “new public health” focuses more broadly on “the categories of 
‘population’ and ‘the environment,’ conceived of in their wider senses to include psychological, social, and physical 
elements,” and is accordingly “at its core a moral enterprise, in that it involves prescriptions about how we should live 
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absence of health initiatives at the federal level, recurrent yellow fever epidemics in Philadelphia and 
New York City stimulated the formation of urban health committees: voluntary citizens’ 
organizations that sought to address the urgent threat of invisible disease agencies in the 
environment. However, Duffy finds this incipient development of public health consciousness 
thwarted by the burgeoning ideology of “rugged individualism” (53). Positing American 
individualism as the enemy of medical progress, Duffy argues that the comparatively small and 
homogeneous population in places like Britain—a population, he contends, “more docile and 
obedient to authority than that of the United States”— lent itself more readily toward 
implementation of a centralized national health agency, while Americans’ prevailing preference for 
local rather than federal government—and indeed self-government above all—meant that “[p]ublic 
health measures could be imposed upon them only with difficulty” (139).  
While Duffy is rather heavy-handed in his presentation of the European population as so 
many Foucauldian “docile bodies” upon whom power is enacted—a schema, as we have seen, that 
scholars like Poovey have resisted—he nevertheless identifies several key ideological factors that 
contributed to American exceptionalism in matters of health. In addition to the nebulous bugbear of 
individualism, Duffy points to the importance of regionalism, as health and disease were understood 
as dependent upon “[s]ectional variations in climate, terrain, economic system, and cultural patterns” 
(139). The idiosyncratic climate of the plantation South, in particular, was commonly held as an 
exemplar of regional distinctiveness, culminating in the advent of “states’ rights medicine”: a theory 
and practice that depended upon ideas of both environmental and embodied difference to justify the 
notion that African Americans were “naturally” suited for enslavement. Throughout the majority of 
the century, prevailing anticontagonist, environmentalist, miasmatic theories of disease transmission 
                                                          
our lives individually and collectively” (Peterson and Lupton ix, xii). This dissertation complicates these categories by 
illustrating the ways in which epidemic discourse also situated health as a “moral enterprise.”  
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would posit public health as primarily the problem of states and cities. American medical 
epistemologies were firmly grounded in “[i]mmediate and local experience” (Valencius 179), and 
accordingly resistant—not only ideologically, but “scientifically”—to federal regulation. 
Of course, the nineteenth-century United States was not entirely devoid of efforts for 
comprehensive health reform, particularly in light of the increasing problems of urbanization that 
plagued cities like New York and Boston much as they did Paris and London. Remarking upon the 
effects of the British sanitary reform initiatives, Rosen boldly proposes that “nowhere was this 
influence more pervasive than in the United States” (233). Yet how exactly he assesses the 
movement’s “pervasiveness” remains unclear.37  On the one hand, the influence of Chadwickian 
sanitation reform is clearly evident in the efforts of American reformers like John Griscom, 
Chairman of the Standing Committee on Public Health and Legal Medicine at the New York 
Academy of Medicine; shortly after the appearance of Chadwick’s Report on the Sanitary Condition of the 
Labouring Population of Great Britain, Griscom authored his own volume, The Sanitary Condition of the 
Laboring Population of New York (1845). On the other hand, though, the mere appearance of volumes 
like Griscom’s did not necessarily precipitate actionable reform—as demonstrated in the example of 
Lemuel Shattuck’s Report of a General Plan for the Promotion of Public and Personal Health (1850).  
A co-founder of the American Statistical Society, Shattuck advocated for the expansion of 
that crucial biopolitical technology, vital statistics, to assess and analyze the health of the American 
population.38  His survey of the sanitary condition of the population of Massachusetts had led him 
                                                          
37 Federal efforts to assess the nation’s health were largely ineffective; as Rosen notes, the medical department of 
National Institute in Washington DC attempted to conduct a survey nation’s health in 1845, “but with small success” 
(240). The nascent American Medical Association established a hygiene committee in 1848.   
38 For more on Shattuck, see Rosenkrantz, Public Health and the State (1972); Cassedy, American Medicine and the Rise of 
Statistical Thinking (1984); and Bynum, Science and the Practice of Medicine in the Nineteenth Century (1994). In addition to 
Griscom and Shattuck, Dr. Benjamin McCready is often heralded as a pioneer of American public health for his essay 
“On the Influence of Trades, Professions, and Occupations in the United States in the Production of Disease,” awarded 
a prize offered by Medical Society of New York in 1837.   
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to conclude that “the conditions of perfect health, either public or personal, are seldom or never attained, though 
attainable.” Focusing on “preventable evils,” Shattuck asserted that achievable means existed for the 
“mitigation or removal” of the agents that engendered these evils (10, emphasis in original). However, 
upon its publication, as Rosen acknowledges, Shattuck’s Report “had practically no effect” (242); his 
recommendations for the implementation of a state board of health would not be realized until 
1869.39  
If the European sanitary reform movement “made surprisingly little progress in the United 
States,” as Duffy declares (and as Rosen somewhat more reluctantly acknowledges), it was not for 
lack of effort, then, but for lack of cohesive institutional and governmental support. Thus, although 
antebellum health and diet reform movements were plentiful during this period, as Duffy notes, they 
principally emphasized “individual health rather than community health” (66). For Duffy, the eclipse 
of public health reform might also be attributed to the contemporaneous ascendance other reform 
movements, including temperance, women’s rights, and above all abolitionism—which, he argues, 
“became an all-consuming issue in American public life” in the three decades before the Civil War, 
“relegating other reform movements to insignificance” (67). However, my argument here is not that 
antebellum health reformers emphasized individual health rather than community health, nor that 
public attention focused on sociopolitical reform movements like women’s rights and abolitionism 
instead of health reform; on the contrary, I aim to illustrate the ways in which individual health was 
conceived as a modality of community health, and that women’s rights and abolitionist movements 
were continuous with the ideologies and arguments of health reform. American “private” health was at 
the same time “public” health, and wider antebellum reform movements were not only 
sociopolitical, but also biopolitical.  
                                                          
39 Technically, Louisiana established a board of health in 1855 in response to the threat of recurrent yellow fever 
epidemics, but scholars including Duffy, Rosen, and Rosenkrantz acknowledge Massachusetts as the first effective state 
board of health.  
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American health reformers like Shattuck and Griscom labored over the partition of 
“personal” and “public” in the realm of health. “The word sanitary means relating to health,” explained 
Shattuck; “When applied to the inhabitants of a town or district, in their social capacity, it relates to 
public health; when to individuals, it relates to personal or private health” (10). Yet even the most 
quotidian practices of the individual in the private sphere—domestic hygiene, reproduction—had 
implications upon his or her “social capacity”: a realization Griscom articulates in the opening 
paragraphs of his 1845 report. As “the health of the people affect[s] the capacity and interests of the 
state,” he reasons, “so upon the state or city, must rest, not only the expenses of removing an 
unsound condition of public health, but also, from the attendant loss of character, a diminution of 
its resources” (1). Griscom goes on to complicate the “distinction between Public Health and 
Individual Health” (3), noting the necessary inextricability of these categories.  
When placed in its broader social and epidemiological contexts, Griscom suggests, a disease 
may no longer seem—to borrow the language of Oliver Wendell Holmes’s landmark 1855 essay on 
puerperal fever—a mere “private pestilence.”40 At the same time, while diseases like yellow fever and 
cholera were clearly attributable to “causes which affect large numbers at the same time,” physicians 
also theorized that the presence of disease agents in the atmosphere could be exacerbated by habits 
of life, and accordingly encouraged individuals to control for “exciting causes” of disease, such as 
cleanliness, temperance, diet, and mental state. As Dr. C.R. Gilman asserted in his Hints to the People 
on the Prevention and Early Treatment of Spasmodic Cholera (1832), the “subtle poison” prevalent in the 
                                                          
40 Like the Hungarian physician Ignaz Semmelweis, Holmes had correctly theorized that the scourge of puerperal or 
“childbed” fever that claimed the lives of so many women did not arise from some innate condition of the postpartum 
body, but was in fact transmitted to these women by physicians. “Whatever indulgence may be granted to those who have 
heretofore been the ignorant causes of so much misery,” Holmes argued, “the time has come when the existence of a 
private pestilence in the sphere of a single physician should be looked upon not as a misfortune but as a crime; and in the 
knowledge of such occurrences, the duties of the practitioner to his profession, should give way to his paramount 
obligations to society” (58). Puerperal fever demanded the publicization of so-called “private pestilence”: a broader, 




atmosphere was “not of itself sufficient in all cases to produce disease,” but would “most assuredly 
do so, if errors in diet co-operate with it” (9). This dispersal of causality—environmental “poison” 
compounded by hygienic “errors”—in turn produced a dispersal of responsibility. As Gilman 
suggested, the disease’s “preventive means” could be demarcated by two categories: “Those which 
devolve on the Public Authorities,” and “Those which are to be performed by individuals, for their 
own protection” (5). Yet while “public authorities” in cities like New York advanced tentative street 
sanitation efforts, the majority of the discourse surrounding the disease placed emphasis on an ethic 
of individual prophylaxis. Insisting that cholera was “emphatically the scourge of the filthy” (8), 
Gilman, like many of his contemporaries, situated disease as the just deserts of the careless: 
cleanliness, temperance, and corporeal circumspection were jointly heralded as the civic duties of the 
environmentally endangered. 
In prioritizing the preventive agency of the individual—a tactic that conveniently distracted 
from the inefficacy of therapeutic intervention—epidemic discourse echoed the more quotidian 
discourse of the nineteenth-century conduct manual, which situated care of oneself and one’s family 
as modalities of a broader kind of social care.41  Indeed, an emphasis on self-care became particularly 
pronounced at mid-century, in response to widespread anxieties about the transmission of disease 
through both environmental and hereditary means. If environmentally-perpetuated poisons like 
cholera-causing miasmas could be remedied by practices of domestic hygiene, physicians suggested, 
so too could the supposed “degeneration” of the Anglo-American race be remedied by practices of 
                                                          
41 In The Young Man’s Guide (1833), for example, William Alcott outlines five essential “motives to action” for his 
readership, the first of which is “a regard to your own happiness,” followed by “a regard for the family in which you 
belong” (21). Further, Alcott continues, one’s obligations are thirdly “due to society, particularly to the neighborhood or 
sphere in which you move, and to the associations to which you may belong” and fourthly “due to the nation and age in 
which you belong” (22). Finally, of course, all of these ought to be motivated by “the desire of obeying the will of 
God”—for after all, Alcott claims, “He it is…who has given you the name American” (24). Indeed, the identity category 
American forms the crux of Alcott’s argument: “This word, alone,” he writes, “ought to call forth all your energies, and if 
there be a slumbering faculty within you, arouse it to action” (22-23). It is by way of his membership in this social group 
that the individual’s actions are ultimately rendered meaningful.  
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sexual hygiene. Like the discourse of domestic hygiene, this proto-eugenic discourse emphasized the 
primacy of personal as an antecedent to social change. “Society is made up of individuals—begins 
with individuals,” as William Alcott reasoned in his manual The Physiology of Marriage (1856); “The 
work of declension or deterioration must have begun with individuals; why shall not a work of 
reform begin there, too?” Alcott wondered (96).42  
 
“Every Man His Own Doctor” 
In 1805, Benjamin Rush reflected upon the changes in American public understanding of 
medicine that had been wrought since the 1760s. “From the diffusion of medical knowledge, among 
all classes of our citizens, by means of medical publications, and controversies,” Rush noted, “many 
people have been taught so much of the principles and practice of physic, as to be able to prescribe 
for themselves in the forming state of acute diseases, and thereby to prevent their fatal termination. 
It is to this self-acquired knowledge among the citizens of Philadelphia that physicians are in part 
indebted” (Medical Inquiries 402-3). As Rush suggests, the democratic “diffusion” of specialized 
knowledge, through print media in particular, facilitates practices of self-care that prove mutually 
beneficial to the individual and the medical institution. Moreover, for Rush and others, the mediated 
autonomy individuals achieved via the acquisition of medical information produced effects that 
transcended the health of the body: “The diffusion of knowledge,” as the physician Samuel 
                                                          
42 This attitude, of course, is characteristic of much antebellum reform discourse; in her feminist meditation Woman in the 
Nineteenth Century (1845), for example, Margaret Fuller resists the “assault upon bad institutions, and external ills,” 
arguing that “the only efficient remedy must come from individual character.” While Fuller concedes that the 
relationship between the individual and the institution is necessarily reciprocal, she nevertheless emphasizes the primacy 
personal reform: “Could you clear away all the bad forms of society, it is vain, unless the individual begin to be ready for 
better,” she argues; “There must be a parallel movement in these two branches of life” (45). Health reformers advocated 
for this kind of “parallel movement,” aligning the health of the body with the health of the nation. “Whilst we live in 
society, we cannot really increase our own happiness without increasing the happiness of others,” the hydropathic health 
reformer Mary Sargeant Gove Nichols reasoned in her Lectures to Ladies on Anatomy and Physiology (1842); in other words, 
she continued, glossing Pope’s Essay on Man: ‘True self-love and social are the same’” (284). 
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Stanhope Smith had asserted in a 1783 letter to Rush, “is the diffusion of virtue and freedom” (qtd. 
in Murphy 27).  
The will toward a redistribution of medical knowledge in the first half of the nineteenth 
century is evident in the prospectus of the inaugural issue of Philadelphia’s Journal of Health (1829), in 
which the authors “propose laying down plain precepts, in easy style and familiar language, for the 
regulation of all the physical agents necessary to health,” motivated by the proposition “that 
mankind might be saved a large amount of suffering and disease, by a suitable knowledge of the 
natural laws to which the human frame is subjected” (“Prospectus” 1). Asserting that “Hygeia is ever 
the companion of true liberty, not less than of orderly habits and pure morals,” the journal situates 
physical health as the cornerstone of democratic society, declaring it “very evident that a knowledge 
of the rational precepts for the preservation of health, or, as they are technically called, the laws of 
Hygiene, must be of paramount value to guide to the enactment of good laws. This is a question of 
high interest to every citizen, whether he regard his individual welfare, or the flourishing condition 
of the body politic” (“Prospectus” 3). In contrast to the eighteenth-century model of “heroic 
medicine,” which championed the therapeutic intervention of the physician, nineteenth-century 
American health movements increasingly sought to democratize scientific knowledge, thereby 
equipping the public to take care of themselves.  
This self-care imperative would prove especially pronounced in the Jacksonian period, which 
many historians of medicine have approached as “a Dark Age of the profession” (Kett vii): an era of 
conspicuous homeopathic quackery and promiscuous lay practice that was disciplined into 
submission by the implementation of medical licensing laws in the latter half of the century. In his 
seminal history of the American medical profession, Paul Starr notes that the democratic impulses of 
the Jacksonian era occasioned widespread resistance to the professionalization of medicine, 
fomenting what he refers to as the “continuing conflict in American life between democratic respect 
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for common sense and professional claims of specialized knowledge” (32). As foreign-educated 
physicians like Jacob Bigelow, James Jackson, and Oliver Wendell Holmes attempted to bring the 
influence of the Parisian Clinical School to bear on American medical training and practice in the 
1830s and 40s, they found their efforts hampered by Jacksonian democracy’s “emphasis upon 
egalitarianism, and its corollary, a suspicion of learning” (Duffy, From Humors to Medical Science ix). An 
acknowledgment of this suspicion was central to the would-be egalitarian genre of the domestic 
medical manual, which was less a didactic vehicle than an intermediary between laypeople and the 
“natural” laws of health that were accessible by “common sense.”43 As it “catered to the anti-
monopoly, sometimes anti-intellectual, common-man democracy of the Jacksonian era” (Blake 27), 
the American domestic medical manual championed the individual’s ability to acquire physiological 
knowledge, and apply this knowledge in the service of self-care. 
Though a number of European-authored medical manuals were regularly printed in the early 
American colonies— most notably Nicholas Culpepper’s English Physician; and Complete Herbal (1652), 
the anonymously-authored sexuality guide Aristotle’s Masterpiece (1684), George Cheyne’s Essay on 
Health and Long Life (1724), John Wesley’s Primitive Physick (1747), S.A. Tiscot’s Advice to the People in 
General, with Regard to Their Health (1767), John Armstrong’s The Art of Preserving Health: A Poem 
(1768), and Luigi Cornaro’s Discourses on a Sober and Temperate Life (1776)—the first popular medical 
manual authored by an American resident was the Scottish-born Virginian physician John Tennent’s 
Every Man His Own Doctor: or, The Poor Planter’s Physician (1734). Essentially an herbal remedy guide, 
                                                          
43 For more on the American domestic medical movement, see Blake, “From Buchan to Fishbein” (1977); Haller, 
American Medicine in Transition (1981); Murphy, Enter the Physician (1991); Burbick, Healing the Republic (1994); and 
Rosenberg, ed., Right Living (2003). If this infamous resistance to the institutionalization of knowledge constituted an 
unfortunate hindrance to scientific “progress,” as historians like Duffy suggest, it also illustrates how medical knowledge, 
per Steven Epstein, “emerges out of credibility struggles” (3). As Epstein contends, “[t]he victory of medical authority” in 
the United States—that is, its achievement in winning credibility from a skeptical public—“required the popular 
abandonment of an earlier, Jacksonian belief that the healing arts were accessible to ‘common sense’ and the 




Tennent’s manual promised “Plain and Easy Means for Persons to cure themselves of all, or most of 
the Distempers, incident to this Climate, and with very little Charge, the Medicines being chiefly of 
the Growth and Production of this Country” (see fig. I.1). It was, in his own estimation, “a Work of 
great Charity and Publick Spirit,” allowing for the dissemination of specialized knowledge to “the 
poor Inhabitants of this Colony” (6). As Tennent suggests, the physician’s “Publick Spirit” consists 




Fig. I.1. Title page, John Tennant, Every Man His Own Doctor: or, The Poor Planter’s Physician. 2nd ed. Williamsburg:  





In the late eighteenth century and throughout much of the nineteenth, the most popular 
medical manual in the United States was Scottish physician William Buchan’s oft-printed, 
plagiarized, and pirated Domestic Medicine. First published in Edinburgh in 1769 and reprinted in 
Philadelphia by 1772, Buchan’s text was regularly reissued in the United States for over half a 
century, sometimes with Americanizing revisions; a 1795 edition, for instance, was “revised and 
adapted to the diseases and climate of the United States of America.”44 If the nature of these 
adaptations aptly illustrate the period’s prevalent belief in the environmental specificity of disease—
as evident in Tennent’s advertised interest in diseases “incident to this Climate”—the title of an 
1816 New Haven edition of Buchan’s text, Every Man His Own Doctor, intimates the beginnings of 
what would, in the Jacksonian period, become a particularly pronounced ideological specificity of 
American domestic medicine: a democratizing endeavor that complicated the boundaries between 
professional and lay knowledge and practice.45  
Competing texts by American authors began to appear in the first decade of the nineteenth 
century, including The American Herbal, or Materia Medica (1801) by Massachusetts native Samuel 
Stearns, Means of Preserving Health, and Preventing Diseases (1806) by Quaker physician Shadrach 
Ricketson, and The Medical Companion, or Family Physician (1807) by James Ewell, “a native American 
of long and successful practice in the Southern States.” Previous texts, Ewell argued, had “greatly 
failed of usefulness to AMERICANS; because they treat of diseases which, existing in very foreign 
climates and constitutions, must widely differ from ours” (xv). Over the course of the following decades, 
                                                          
44 The 1795 edition was edited by Samuel Powell Griffitts, professor of materia medica at the University of Pennsylvania; 
another American edition was published 1797, edited by Isaac Cathrall. See Murphy, 15-16.  
45 While Buchan had argued that the study of medicine ought to be the subject of gentlemanly education as much as 
religion, law, philosophy, or natural history, he is somewhat careful to maintain a distinction between the specialized 
knowledge of the physician and that of his lay readership. “We do not mean that every man should become a physician,” 
he explained in his preface; “This would be an attempt as ridiculous as it is impossible. All we plead for is, that men of 
sense and learning should be so far acquainted with the general principles of Medicine, as to be in a condition to derive 
from it some of those advantages with which it is fraught; and at the same time to guard themselves against the 
destructive influences of Ignorance, Superstition, and Quackery” (xxi). As Buchan suggests, the influence of his text was 
limited to a constrained sphere: to the reader’s own body and those in his household.  
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in volumes such as Thomas Ewell’s American Family Physician (1824), Thomas Cooper’s Treatise of 
Domestic Medicine (1824), Josiah Richardson’s New England Farrier and Family Physician (1828), and 
Anthony Benezet’s The Family Physician (1826)— “calculated particularly for the inhabitants of the 
western country, and for those whose navigate its waters”—physicians promoted the development 
of a “native American” medicine. 46  None of these, however, would approach the fantastic success 
of Gunn’s Domestic Medicine, or Poor Man’s Friend47 (see fig. I.2).   
 
 
Fig. I.2. Title page, Gunn’s Domestic Medicine, or Poor Man’s Friend. 9th ed. Xenia, OH: J.H. Purdy, 1837. 
                                                          
46 See Gevitz, “‘But all those authors are foreigners’” (2002). For a discussion of domestic medicine in the American 
South, see Keeney, “Unless Powerful Sick” (1989).  
47 Other guides were addressed specifically to women concerning the care of infants and children; The Maternal Physician 
(1811), authored by anonymous “an American matron,” later identified as Mary Hunt Palmer Tyler, is ostensibly the first 
American medical manual by a woman.  Later guides like Lydia Maria Child’s The Family Nurse (1837) and Caleb 
Ticknor’s Guide for Mothers and Nurses (1839) aimed to offer a useful aggregate of knowledge drawn from medical sources; 
however, Child warned in a prefatory disclaimer that her volume was “simply a household friend” that was “by no 




Initially printed in Knoxville in 1830 and, nominally at least, in its one hundredth edition by 
1870, John Gunn’s manual is, in Rosenberg’s words, “an assertively indigenous text” (Right Living 7): 
an American manual that not only renders medical knowledge generally accessible by explicating a 
host of maladies in “plain language, free from doctor’s terms,” but one that “outlines a social theory 
of knowledge that becomes imperative for a republican form of government” (Burbick 36-37). 
Insisting that “when we take from the learned sciences all their technical and bombastic language 
they immediately become plain common sense, very easily to be understood by all ranks of men” (133), 
Gunn promotes a democratization of knowledge that Jacksonians deemed as essential to medicine as 
to other areas of American life. “Real knowledge,” Gunn explains, “consists in understanding both 
what is useful and what is injurious to mankind; and true wisdom amounts to nothing more than 
appropriating to our use whatever is beneficial, and avoiding whatever is injurious to our enjoyments 
and happiness; this is the true distinction between common sense and nonsense; or if you will have the 
same idea in finer language,” he continues, “between wisdom and folly” (135).  
As his vilification of “technical and bombastic language” suggests, Gunn conceives of the 
epistemological dilemma of medicine as fundamentally a rhetorical one. If only the obfuscating 
language of scientific discourse could be eliminated, his critique implies, then the murky milk of 
elitism would give rise to the cream of “common sense” (or, “in finer language,” wisdom). His task, 
then, is effectively one of translation (itself, incidentally, a practice that relies upon its own kind of 
epistemological privilege). In his prefatory remarks, Gunn repeatedly promises to remain “as plain as 
possible in point of language,” preemptively dismissing “any of those petty critical remarks, which 
may be made on such language, provide I succeed in adopting language which can be understood by 
those for whom this work is intended”—namely, the “unlearned” (139). While affirming “all the 
mysteries and technical language of the science of medicine must be made plain to the people of this 
country” (140), he acknowledges that in eradicating jargon, one may be left with legitimate 
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“mysteries.” Admitting that some medical inquiries lie “beyond the reach of investigation,” Gunn 
accordingly vows “not to vail [sic] my ignorance of what is most likely hidden from us by divine 
wisdom, by long sounding words which when explained would make men of common sense laugh 
at medical quackery, and by technical language which means next to nothing” (131).48 Better to face 
unflinchingly this precipice of uncertainty, Gunn suggests, than to paper over the epistemological 
abyss with scientific gibberish.  
The self-taught herbalist Samuel Thomson, whose rebuke of allopathic medicine would 
spawn the influential botanic medical movement that bore his name, similarly expressed frustration 
with such perceived medical doublespeak. In the life narrative he appended as an introduction to his 
New Guide to Health; or Botanic Family Physician (1822), Thomson complained that regularly-educated 
physicians had “learned just enough to know how to deceive the people, and keep them in 
ignorance, by covering their doings under a language unknown to their patients” (50). Attacking 
what he saw as the anti-democratic and monopolistic practices of regular physicians, Thomson and 
his followers argued that the specialization of knowledge had engendered fatal effects: “what is at 
this day called medicine,” Thomson declared, “is deadly poison” (8).49 Accordingly, Thomsonianism 
and other mid-century botanic and homeopathic movements would promote a radical overhaul of 
therapeutic methodology. For Gunn, on the other hand, the primary purpose of domestic medicine 
was not identifying the most appropriate therapies, but rather promoting prevention by inculcating 
                                                          
48 Other domestic medical authors, such as Daniel H. Whitney, took a somewhat different approach to medical 
epistemology. “In the science of medicine, I assure you, that there is no mystery, and that it may all be as easily obtained 
as any other science,” Whitney writes in his own volume, The Family Physician, and Guide to Health (1833). “What reason, 
therefore, there can be for neglecting the subject of health, while all are vigorously prosecuting every other pursuit which 
offers profit or pleasure, is unknown to me,” he continues, “THAT HEALTH, which is of more consequence to every 
human being than all other earthly considerations put together, is neglected and treated as if a knowledge of the 
prevention, symptoms and means of cure of diseases, was an impenetrable mystery, is astonishing to the enterprising and 
philanthropic” (iv). 
49 For more on botanic medicine in the nineteenth-century United States, see Hand, ed. American Folk Medicine (1976); 
Berman and Flannery, America’s Botanico-Medical Movement (2001); Whorton, Nature Cures (2002); and Haller, The History of 
American Homeopathy (2005). 
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public understanding of the underlying causes of disease: specifically, the enervating influences of an 
overstimulating “civilization,” which had driven man away from his original state of health: “The 
greatest number of diseases and infirmities are of our own begetting,” Gunn asserted, “because we 
have infringed the healthy laws of nature” (11). If nineteenth-century Americans had brought disease 
upon themselves as a result of this primal infringement, it stood to reason that they could exert the 
agency to adhere to “healthy laws” and thereby extricate themselves from self-imposed infirmity.  
Despite the proliferation of popular texts that had aimed to render Americans legible to 
themselves, the physician’s lament for the layperson’s paucity of self-knowledge is something of a 
generic conceit of the nineteenth-century American domestic medical manual. In his 1854 manual 
Health Made Easy for the People, for example, Dr. Joseph Bentley would lodge this complaint 
capaciously: “we have nearly reached the middle of the 19th century,” Bentley lamented, “without so 
much as preparing plain elementary books, from which to teach self-knowledge, Physical, Religious, or 
Moral, and the LAWS on which it is founded. Indeed,” he continued, “we seem anxious to teach 
every thing in our schools but this kind of knowledge” (7).  Positioning “physical” education 
alongside “religious” or “moral” education, Bentley suggests a fundamental interrelation of these 
epistemologies: physical knowledge, after all, helped to facilitated obedience to divine laws of life.  
As Boston physician Ira Warren asserted in his own manual of 1859, “[s]elf-knowledge ought to 
extend to the body as well as the mind….Without this knowledge, one cannot know how to take 
care of the health; and without health,” he continued, “life loses most of its value” (14). As texts like 
these make clear, self-knowledge was not prized for its own sake, but insofar as it facilitated the 
development of an ethics of self-care.50  
 
                                                          
50 We might thus note parallels with the philosophical practice of ascesis, which is, Foucault explains, “a certain way of 
constituting the subject of true knowledge as the subject of right action” (Hermeneutics 485). 
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Outline of Chapters  
The first half of this dissertation analyzes the “health-oriented print” surrounding two major 
early American epidemics: the yellow fever epidemic of 1793 and the Asiatic cholera epidemic of 
1832. I approach these epidemics as biopolitical crises not because they represent states of 
exception—that is, examples of the hyper-visibility of disciplinary power Foucault attributes to the 
“plague-stricken town” of seventeenth-century Europe—but rather because they dramatize and 
magnify the regularizing operations of biopower implicit in American ideologies of self-health. By 
placing responses to these epidemic events in conversation with more quotidian discourses of risk—
hereditary disease and domestic hygiene, respectively—these chapters illustrate the ways in which 
American responses to epidemic disease were not radically divergent from, but rather continuous with, 
responses to endemic disease.  
Chapter 1 offers a new reading of Charles Brockden Brown’s oft-discussed fever novel 
Arthur Mervyn: Or Memoirs of the Year 1793 (1799), arguing for a reconsideration of contagion as an 
etiology and a metaphor. As this chapter shows, figurations of yellow fever as a conspiratorial agent 
that indiscriminately invades the passive body politic fundamentally misrepresent the disease’s 
etiology as Brown, Rush, and many of their anticontagionist contemporaries understood it. 
Contextualizing the novel within the neo-Hippocratic, anticontagionist understanding of disease 
causation to which Brown ascribed, this chapter suggests that to re-situate fever metaphors in terms 
of a crucial but largely ignored etiological concept—“predisposing” and “exciting” causes— 
may accordingly shift our understanding of causality, agency, and moral responsibility in Brown’s 
fiction. Pairing an “anticontagionist” reading of epidemic disease Arthur Mervyn with an analysis of 
Brown’s representation of endemic (hereditary) disease in his earlier novel, Wieland (1798), I develop 
an analysis of what I am calling Brown’s “biological Gothic”: a genre that attends not only to the 
operation of external agents, supernatural or terrestrial, but to the agency of the body itself. 
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Chapter 2 expands this analysis of causality to illustrate the ways in which antebellum 
Americans conceptualized self-care as a set of practices including not only care of the body, but care 
of domestic space—specifically, domestic atmosphere. Through an analysis of the public health advice 
that circulated in New York print media during the Asiatic cholera epidemic of 1832, it 
demonstrates that the anticontagionist preventive agenda was dependent upon the promotion of 
both domestic hygiene measures and a program of self-circumspection: specifically, the imperative 
for laypeople to participate in the diagnostic and prognostic process by detecting and interpreting 
the disease’s “premonitory symptoms.” It then explores the relation of this hermeneutic practice—
what I call “premonitory reading”—to the representation of pestilential domestic atmospheres in 
Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Fall of the House of Usher” (1839) and Nathaniel Hawthorne’s The House of 
the Seven Gables (1851). While both tales have often been read as exhortations against inherited 
property and heritable pathology, this chapter demonstrates the ways in which these family maladies 
are complicated by environmental etiologies that might be remedied by domestic hygiene. By 
examining the ways in which “atmosphere” was jointly conceived as a physical medium for the 
communication of disease and an imaginative medium for the communication of meaning, this 
chapter explores how a host of nineteenth-century negotiations—between diseases and bodies, 
individuals and communities, authors and readers—were dependent upon the idea of 
“atmospherical” mediation. 
The second half of this dissertation demonstrates how two seemingly sociopolitical 
institutions—slavery and marriage—were also construed as biopolitical crises in the mid-nineteenth 
century. These chapters explore the ways in which abolitionist and feminist authors responded to, 
resisted, and/or strategically repurposed biosocial pathologies, illustrating how antebellum 
abolitionism, feminism, and their discontents approached race, gender, and sexuality as problems of 
population. Central to both abolitionist and women’s rights movements, as the final two chapters 
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aim to show, was a strategic engagement with dominant ideologies of health, and the concomitant 
development of a politics of care. 
Examining the ideologies of health and disease that underpin abolitionist and pro-slavery 
discourses, Chapter 3 shows how both slavery and emancipation were figured as public health crises 
in the antebellum period. While previous scholarship has tended to focus on the ways in which 
“scientific” justifications for American chattel slavery played out within the pseudoscience of  
ethnology, this chapter focuses on the burgeoning uses of immunology in the formulation of an 
antebellum biopolitics. Advocates of “states’-rights medicine” cited African Americans’ supposed 
immunity to diseases of the Southern climate as evidence that they had been divinely designed for 
plantation labor and, by extension, enslavement; at the same, time, discourse of racialized immunity 
was concomitantly matched by a discourse of susceptibility: chief among white supremacist 
rationalizations for slavery was the notion that African Americans were unable to “take care of 
themselves.” Countering abolitionist arguments that the inhumanity of slavery was evidenced in its 
neglect of vulnerable subjects—in particular, the elderly and the sick—pro-slavery ideologues 
contended that the preeminent virtue of the slave economy was the caretaking function it afforded 
for subjects like these. Yet although Southern paternalism has been extensively analyzed from 
sociological and economic perspectives, less attention has been paid to the ways in which self-care 
was also understood as a pressing public health problem. This chapter investigates how the fantasy 
of mutual care plays out in Caroline Lee Hentz’s “anti-Tom” novel The Planter’s Northern Bride (1854), 
and is challenged in Hannah Crafts’s The Bondwoman’s Narrative, the fictionalized slave narrative 
authored by a formerly-enslaved woman in the 1850s and recovered by Henry Louis Gates in 2002. 
By exposing what she terms the “legitimate effects” of environmental injustice, psychological 
violence, and systemic neglect, I suggest, Crafts establishes health as an essential analytic for the 
American slave narrative.  
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Drawing from previous chapter’s examination of racialized anxieties about the future of the 
American population, Chapter 4 shifts from analysis of epidemic discourse in order to explore the 
primary endemic pathology that plagued the nineteenth-century United States: “degeneration.” In the 
1840s and 50s, the pervasive idea that the population was plagued by the declension of mental and 
physical capacities—and the attendant notion that this pathological decline might be remediated by 
prudent, proto-eugenic reproductive pairings—occasioned a reformulation of the concept of self-
care, expanded to signify care for hypothetical future progeny. This future-oriented concept of care 
in turn inflected debates surrounding marriage, as free-love feminists like Mary Sargeant Gove 
Nichols strategically employed degeneration anxieties to argue for women’s increased agency in 
partner selection. Examining how American women authors mobilized these anxieties in the mode I 
call “hygienic sentimentality,” this chapter argues that the writings of Louisa May Alcott—in 
particular, her understudied 1864 novel Moods, and its 1882 revision—can be productively read in 
conversation with the discourse of degeneration as a queer critique of the biopolitics of American 
marriage. For Alcott, I argue, hygienic sentimentality offered not only an opportunity for feminist 
critique of the mid-century American marriage “experiment,” but enabled a space for queer 
resistance to heteronormative kinship structures broadly writ.  
 Of course, essential to the historical period I discuss here, but not explicitly addressed within 
the analytical scope of this project (save for Chapter 3’s coda on the Freedman’s Bureau), is the 
impending presence of the Civil War. The cataclysmic impact of the war on American medicine, 
health, and disability merits more attention than the purview of this dissertation affords—and 
indeed, a number of studies published in the past decade have made important strides in addressing 
this critical area of inquiry, including Jim Downs’s Sick From Freedom (2012), Gretchen Long’s 
Doctoring Freedom (2012), Margaret Humphreys’s Marrow of Tragedy (2013), Shauna Devine’s Learning 
from the Wounded (2014), and John M. Kinder’s Paying with Their Bodies (2015). Moreover, it is precisely 
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because the Civil War has been so widely understood as a “watershed in the history of American 
public health” (Duffy 126) 51 that I have elected to focus on early republican and antebellum politics 
of care, resisting the discourse of exceptionalized crisis in order to examine the more regularized, 
quotidian, and chronic states of emergency that perpetuated an American ideology of self-health.  
Ultimately, this dissertation aims to illustrate how self-care was construed in the nineteenth-century 
United States as an essential precondition of citizenship: one’s ability to manage and protect 
property in one’s body was not simply a measure of political autonomy, but the very grounds upon 
which this autonomy was granted. 
 If nineteenth-century Americans imagined the body as a kind of property—one that was 
implicitly rendered the property of others should the individual be deemed incapable of caring for it 
properly—then it will perhaps seem a small wonder that Emily Dickinson writes, “I am afraid to 
own a body.” The body is, in Dickinson’s terms, “precarious Property,” temporarily commended to 
auspices of the individual by an authority to whom it more properly belongs. Dickinson’s speaker’s 
fear of corporeal ownership, then, is perhaps more properly a fear of corporeal care—of custodianship 
of the “Double Estate” of body and soul bequeathed to an “unsuspecting Heir.” Self-Health engages 
this intersection of responsibility and vulnerability as it examines the politics of care in American 
print.  
                                                          
51 In particular, the 1861 installation of the US Sanitary Commission, which became—somewhat unwittingly—a major 
relief agency for the Union Army, has been assumed to have precipitated a revolution in American sanitation, including 
the postbellum establishment of state boards of health and the passage of health bills in cities like New York. For more 
on the Sanitary Commission, see Giesberg, Civil War Sisterhood (2000), and Humphreys, Marrow of Tragedy (2013). Of 
course, the Sanitary Commission was not the first federal interest in sanitation; four National Quarantine and Sanitary 
Conventions were held between 1857 and 1860 at the urging of William Jewell of the Philadelphia Board of Health. See 





Invisible Agency: Charles Brocken Brown’s Biological Gothic  
 
 
Then, for the way by which they think these Invisible Agents wrought their effects; 
that is to say, what immediate causes they used, in bringing things to pass, men that 
know not what it is that we call causing (that is, almost all men) have no other rule to 
guess by, but by observing, and remembering what they have seen to precede the like 
effect at some other time, or times before, without seeing between the antecedent 
and subsequent Event, any dependence or connexion at all: and therefore from the 
like things past, they expect the like things to come; and hope for good or evil luck, 
superstitiously, from things that have no part at all in the causing of it. 
 
—Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651) 
 
Narratives, whether fictitious or true, may relate to the processes of nature, or the 
actions of men. The former, if not impenetrable by human faculties, must be 
acknowledged to be, hitherto, very imperfectly known. Curiosity is not satisfied with 
viewing facts in their disconnected state and natural order, but is prone to arrange 
them anew, and to deviate from present and sensible objects, into speculations on 
the past or future; it is eager to infer from the present state of things, their former or 
future condition. 
 




The summer of 1793 was a “sickly time” for Philadelphia, as diarist Elizabeth Drinker 
observed (494). Yellow fever, the acute viral disease that would continue to instigate seasons of 
inexplicable sickness in the United States over the course of the following century, had first been 
reported in the nation’s capital in mid-July; by November, between four and five thousand of its 
55,000 residents had died.  Meanwhile, some 20,000―including George Washington and his 
government―fled the infected city, as a divided American medical community struggled to demystify 
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the disease’s etiology.1 While physicians like William Currie insisted that the fever was contagious, 
transported to the United States from the West Indies alongside circum-Atlantic slave traffic and 
refugees from the revolution at Saint-Domingue,2 the early republic's preeminent medical authority, 
Dr. Benjamin Rush, asserted that the disease was endemic to the United States, and transmitted not 
by physical contact, but by pestilential effluvia arising from the putrefaction of organic matter.3 But 
regardless of whether the fever was transmitted by foreign bodies, local environments, or some 
other uncanny combination of causes, its virulence inspired a widespread social panic that medicine 
could not remedy.4 Toward winter, as the printer Mathew Carey recalled in his best-selling account 
of the epidemic the following year, this “sickly time” concluded just as it had begun: “without any 
visible cause” (112).5 
The opacity of the fever’s causality accounted for the greater part of its terror, as Charles 
Brockden Brown observed in a 1796 letter to his brother James: “Plague,” he explained, “operates 
                                                          
1 For a history of the Philadelphia epidemic of 1793, see Powell, Bring Out Your Dead (1949); Kornfeld, “Crisis in the 
Capital” (1984); Estes and Smith, eds, A Melancholy Scene of Devastation (1997); and Taylor, “We Live in the Midst of Death” 
(2001). For further history of the disease in the nineteenth-century United States, see Coleman, Yellow Fever in the North 
(1987); Ellis, Yellow Fever and Public Health in the New South (1992); and Crosby, The American Plague (2007). For 
examinations of eighteenth century fever etiology, see Bynum and Nutton, eds., Theories of Fever from Antiquity to the 
Enlightenment (1981), and James C. Riley, The Eighteenth-Century Campaign to Avoid Disease (1987). 
2 For an account of yellow fever epidemics in St. Domingue, see McNeill, Mosquito Empires (2010).  
3 As Chapter 2 of this dissertation discusses in greater detail, “effluvia” or “miasma” had been understood as primary 
agents of disease causation Hippocrates’s On Air, Water, and Situation. Initially, Rush hypothesized that the atmosphere in 
Philadelphia during the especially-sultry summer of 1793 had been vitiated by the “putrid effluvia” arising from a cargo 
load of decaying coffee festering in a Philadelphia wharf (Account 27). “It is no new thing for the effluvia of pestilential 
vegetables to produce malignant fevers,” Rush reminded Philadelphians in an August 29, 1793 letter printed in the 
American Daily Advertiser. “Cabbage, onions, black pepper, and even the mild potatoes, when in a state of putrefaction, 
have all been the remote causes of malignant fever” (Account 25).  
4 Rush had drawn his understanding of the “epidemic constitution” of the atmosphere from the celebrated seventeenth-
century physician Thomas Sydenham, the “English Hippocrates”—who was, in contagionist William Currie’s estimation, 
“a very erroneous philosopher” who had been “misled by vague and erroneous notions, respecting influential 
constitutions of the atmosphere” (11). Lambasting the medico-theoretical backwardness of Rush and others, Currie 
wrote, “When I reflect that philosophy was only beginning to emerge from gothic darkness, in which it had long been 
sunk, at the time Sydenham published his observations; I am willing to make due allowance for his errors:—But the 
present aera, when philosophy has arrived at a state of improvement, which approaches to perfection, such errors are 
not entitled to the same toleration” (13). Currie’s conceptualization of etiological uncertainty as “gothic” is evocative for 
my purposes here. 
5 In 1901, U.S. Army physician Walter Reed would confirm Cuban physician Carlos Finlay’s 1881 hypothesis that yellow 
fever was communicated by mosquitoes (Aedes aegypti). It was the intervening agency of the insect, then―not direct 
bodily contact or the agency of the atmosphere―that facilitated the disease’s transmission. 
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by invisible Agents. We know not in what quarter it is about to attack us. No shield, therefore can be 
lifted up against it” (371). As Brown suggests, knowledge of an epidemic’s causal mechanism enables 
its prevention: by its tracing effects back to some originating source, we might protect ourselves 
against its ravages. But in the absence of perceptible evidence, as Gothic authors like Brown knew 
all too well, the imagination tended toward precarious conjectures: “We fear [yellow fever] as we are 
terrified of the dark,” Brown analogized; “our defenceless condition, and the invisible approaches of 
danger, may contribute to our alarms” (371). 6 
James, it appears, was something of an alarmist. “He seems to think and dream of little else 
than the yellow fever,” Brown complained the following summer in a letter to his friend, the 
physician Joseph Bringhurst, Jr; “I think he may be charged with timidity, & this principle has 
somewhat tinctured his reports of the Condition of this City. Thou knowest, from the nature of this 
subject, the incurable defects of rumour” (389). As Brown suggests, public discourse surrounding 
disease had material, often deleterious effects; as Carey lamented in his account of the epidemic, that 
“[t]he hundred tongues of rumour were never more successfully employed, than on this melancholy 
occasion” (34). Rebuking the public panic that continued to be produced by “the exaggerations of 
rumour” in 1796, Brown gently chastised his brother’s paranoiac hypervigilance, counseling him to 
remain steadfast in the face of so-called “invisible Agents” of “yellow fever, and the like imaginary 
spectacles” (371).  
In our post-virological, post-microbiological moment, Brown’s “invisible Agents” might 
seem to read as an anticipation of discovery, intimating the infectious agents of disease causation 
                                                          
6 Brown admits that he is “not even wholly uninfected by this disease”—that is, the disease of fearfulness—since “so 
strong is the influence of early associations.”  Invoking the ideas of eighteenth-century associationism—a philosophical 
school developed by thinkers like John Locke, David Hume, David Hartley, John Stuart Mill, Archibald Alison, and 
Henry Home, Lord Kames, which held that thoughts succeeded as a series of associated mental states—Brown 
accordingly suggests that epidemics supply “a striking example of the importance on stamping on the infant mind, right 
impressions” (371), as evidenced in his apparently poorly-impressed brother. For discussions of the relationship of 
associationist philosophy to literature, see Davis, Formalism, Experience, and the Making of American Literature (2007), and 
Craig, Associationism and the Literary Imagination (2007). 
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that would eventually be unveiled by the advent of microscopic visual technologies.7  However, as 
the tenor of his letter suggests, these “invisible Agents” are more appropriately read as an ironic 
rejoinder to superstitious figurations of causation that would attribute material effects to suspected 
intervention of “invisible Agents,” divine and demonic—a strategy exemplified in the seventeenth-
century witchcraft narrative.8 Indeed, Brown’s letter echoes Hobbes’s meditation on religious 
superstition in Leviathan: “perpetual fear, always accompanying mankind in the ignorance of causes, 
as it were in the dark, must needs have for object something,” writes Hobbes—and thus, he 
continues, do we attribute fearful effects to “some power or agent invisible” (57). Of course, for 
Brown to class yellow fever, a disease that had killed thousands in his midst, as an “imaginary 
spectacle” akin to the apparitions of infantile fantasy surely seems strange, as critics like Bryan 
Waterman have remarked.9 Yet Brown does not deny the ontological existence of yellow fever; 
                                                          
7 Melvin Santer responds to this post-microbiological preconception in his recent history of disease etiology by 
requesting that his readers “temporarily suspend judgment about the causes of contagious disease” as “initiated by the 
invasion of a host by various microscopic agents” (xii). For explorations of biological “invasion,” see Otis, Membranes 
(2000), and Wald, Contagious (2008). Early modern medical theory hypothesized the existence of microorganisms, or 
“animalculae.” For more on the animicular theory of disease, one notably espoused by Cotton Mather, see Silva, 
Miraculous Plagues (2011), 157-62.  
8 For example, drawing on Mather’s Wonders of the Invisible World (1693), Daniel Neal recalls in his History of New-England 
(1720) that the Salem “Distemper” of 1691 began when colonists “complained of being bitten and pinched by invisible 
Agents” (496). The investigation of these claims of invisible agency importantly depended upon the intervention of 
medical science, as Norman Gevitz has observed; examining the influence of medical epistemology in seventeenth-
century witchcraft trials, Gevitz notes that physicians served as the “principal professional arbiters for determining 
natural versus preternatural signs and symptoms of disease” (7). Enlightenment science, in turn, increasingly 
reconstituted supposedly-supernatural agency as endemic to the physical world; in a 1755 essay on Robert Boyle’s air 
pump, for example, the British physician Benjamin Martin remarked that “[s]uch Experiments as these naturally tend, by 
Degrees, to abate the Wonder we usually express at some mighty Effects we observe produced by invisible Agents” 
(372). But this abated wonder was not necessarily a refutation of divine agency, as Thomas Paine suggests in The Age of 
Reason: “The man who proportions the several parts of a mill uses the same scientific principles as if he had the power of 
constructing a universe,” writes Paine, “but as he cannot give to matter that invisible agency by which the component 
parts of the immense machine of the universe have influence upon each other, and act in motional unison together, 
without any apparent contact, and to which man has given the name of attraction, gravitation, and repulsion, he supplies 
the place of that agency by the humble imitation of teeth and cogs. All the parts of man's microcosm must visibly touch; 
but could he gain a knowledge of that agency, so as to apply it in practice, we might then say that another canonical 
book of the word of God had been discovered” (36). 
9 Waterman argues that “Brown's focus on the relationship between the fever and imagination...suggests that he was 
already consider the fever's potential as a fictional device to generate interest, suspense, or even sublime terror in an 
audience” (Republic of Intellect 190). Like Waterman, I approach Brown’s connection between disease and the imagination 
as foundational to his Gothic; however, I focus not on the generation of interest, suspense, or terror, but on the ways in 
which imagination is crucial to hypothesizing causation: a concept that is key to both narrative and medicine.   
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rather, he points out that, for healthy people like James, the fever was a future possibility and hence 
could be nothing but imaginary: a constant source of speculation and dread. 
This chapter argues for a revision to long-engrained critical approaches to Brown’s writings on 
fever—and to literary depictions of disease more generally—that take disease, and contagion in 
particular, as a self-evident metaphor for all manner of sociopolitical mechanisms. Illustrating what 
Stephen Shapiro has termed the critical “obsession” with exposing Brown’s depiction of the 
epidemic “as a message about commerce, the national imaginary, and so on,”10 critics such as Jane 
Tompkins, Shirley Samuels, Philip Gould, and Julia Stern have explored yellow fever in Brown’s 
novels as a symbolic trope for benevolence, sexuality, economy, and sympathy, respectively; more 
recently, Sian Silyn Roberts has argued that, in Arthur Mervyn, yellow fever serves as “an apt 
metaphor for” an “alternative social organism,” as “Gothic tropes effectively displace the 
Enlightenment individual with one that is porous, fluid, and projected beyond the metaphysical 
boundaries of the body…Just as the disease invades people and changes the way they are 
constituted,” Roberts analogizes, “so this social body invades and transforms other models of 
community” (41). For Waterman, the plethora of indexical readings of fever in Brown’s oeuvre 
demonstrates that “contagion and disease are too easy as metaphors”; accordingly, he somewhat 
quixotically advises an audience of literary historians to resist the impulse to read metaphorically 
(“Arthur Mervyn’s Medical Repository” 219).  
                                                          
10 Jane Tompkins reads Brown’s depiction of benevolence as “contagious,” suggesting that “[i]t may be no accident that 
the disease from which most of the rescued characters die or are saved in the novel is contagious also” (71).  Samuels 
argues that Arthur Mervyn exemplifies a “contemporary conjunction of a fear of sexuality and a fear of contagion” 
(“Infidelity and Contagion,” 189). For Gould, Arthur Mervyn exploits an “economics of contagion” (165). Stern contends 
that in Brown’s other fever novel, Ormond, “[c]ontagion and containment, medical terms describing the course of the 
disease, function as supple figures for sympathy and liberty…becoming, in fact, almost analogues for fictive form itself” 
(156). Countering these readings, Shapiro argues that, “[d]espite its sensationalism, Brown uses the plotting of the 
plague…as a nonallegorical mechanism for staging and amplifying already existing social dynamics regarding property 
(class) and sex (gender) and their intersection in race” (270). This chapter similarly takes up the fever plot as “a 
nonallegorical mechanism,” but focuses on the biological dynamics of predisposing and exciting causes.  
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 Metaphor indeed has a contentious relationship with medicine, from Susan Sontag’s seminal 
polemic against “metaphoric thinking” about illness (3) to pioneering medical historian Oswei 
Temkin’s assertion that “[a]nalogies are not in good usage among modern scientists. And of all 
analogies the metaphor is almost the worst” (271).11 Yet this chapter suggests that the main problem 
with readings that have attended to fever as an “apt metaphor” for other socio-political or affective 
processes is not the inefficacy of metaphor per se, but the inaptness of the metaphor. Specifically, 
previous readings of Arthur Mervyn have tended to rely upon the concept of contagion as a metaphor 
for manifold kinds of communicability. Crucially, however, yellow fever is not contagious, nor did 
Brown believe it to be: “[t]o imagine this disease to be contagious,” as his eponymous protagonist 
comes to realize, “was the height of folly” (122); for Brown, contagion proved ineffectual both as 
etiology and as allegory. If his “invisible Agents” are not intended to suggest an ontology of disease, 
but rather to rebuke a rhetorical tradition of misplaced suspicion, then it follows that we must 
fundamentally rethink the logic of transmission with which we have been wont to (mis)read his 
representations of fever.  
As medical historian Christopher Hamlin has argued, the “preoccupation with contagion” in 
the received history of pre-microbiological medicine arises from an anachronistic impulse: “We find 
infectious disease the most interesting part of public health,” Hamlin observes, “and see the most 
interesting questions about infectious disease as having to do with the means by which a particular 
disease agent invades the body to engender a specific disease” (50).  Indeed, scholarship on the 
yellow fever epidemics of the 1790s—as on the history of eighteenth and nineteenth medicine more 
broadly—has tended to focus on “contagionist” versus “anti-contagionist” (or “climatist”) theory, 
                                                          
11 Both Sontag and Temkin find metaphoric language an obfuscation of some essential scientific reality. For Sontag, 
metaphoric depictions of disease are less “truthful” than their clinical counterparts; Temkin dismisses metaphor because 
it “smacks of rhetoric rather than of sober and factual description of things” (271). 
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and on the political suspicions and ideologies engendered or reinforced by these etiologies.12 But 
myopic attention to the contagion debate, Hamlin notes, precludes more complex understandings of 
eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century etiological theory—specifically, the notion that diseases like 
yellow fever were directed by “predisposing” and “exciting” (or “occasional”) causes: respectively, 
conditions of the constitution that rendered some individuals especially susceptible to certain 
maladies, and behavioral or environmental factors by which disease agents were endowed with their 
lethal force.13  As Rush’s mentor, the renowned Edinburgh physician William Cullen, had explained 
in his Practice of Physic (1777-1785), “the human body is at different times in different conditions with 
regard to its fitness for being acted upon by particular agents; such a condition is called a 
Predisposition, and the causes which produce it are termed predisposing causes. All those agents, on 
the other hand, which produce their effects only under certain conditions, are called occasional or 
exciting causes” (475). 
For literary and cultural historians, the concept of contagion has proved no less alluring, 
insofar as it affords an “apt metaphor” for other modes of transmission, communication, and 
                                                          
12 As medical historians such as Charles Rosenberg and Martin Pernick have demonstrated, contagion debates inflected 
political as well as medical policy in the decades prior to the advent of germ theory; contagionism has been understood 
to feed isolationist agendas, scapegoating particular persons and populations via the institution of quarantine, while 
anticontagionism has been linked to a heroic narrative of public health reform as environmental variables became 
increasingly implicated in understandings of disease transmission. Pernick has notably illustrated the ways in which 
etiological debate occasioned by the Philadelphia yellow fever epidemic of 1793 was divided along marked partisan 
political lines: Republican physicians like Rush and Jean Deveze advanced the theory of local origin, whereas non-
partisan physicians like Currie, Adam Kuhn, and Isaac Cathrall, as well as Edward Stevens, “Philadelphia's lone 
confessed Federalist physician,” ascribed to an importationist agenda (122). See Pernick, “Politics, Parties, and 
Pestilence” (1997). 
13 The theory of predisposing and exciting causes elaborated on the notion of “remote causes” proposed by Aristotle 
and developed by Galen; unlike the “proximate causes” of disease, which might be ascertained with immediacy, the 
“remote causes” of disease instigated a more complex chain of causation. In his analysis of the Chadwickian public 
health movement in Victorian Britain, Hamlin argues that what has historically been understood as turn from 
contagionism the mid-nineteenth century ought to be understood more particularly as a turn from predisposing to 
exciting causes. As Hamlin explains, “contagionist and anticontagionist miasmatic explanations were neither mutually 
exclusive nor essentially in opposition. Contemporary use of such terms as 'contagion', 'contagious', 'miasm', and 
'miasmatic' may seem appallingly loose, and certainly sometimes was. But references to 'contagious miasms' or to 




interrelation; as Priscilla Wald notes, contagion is “a foundational concept in the study of religion 
and society, with a long history of explaining how beliefs circulate in social interactions” (2)—one 
that has lent itself especially readily to what Richard Hofstafter has famously called “the paranoid 
style in American politics.”  For, Hofstadter the “heated exaggeration, suspiciousness, and 
conspiratorial fantasy” (3) that has tended to characterize American political rhetoric aptly captures 
the conspiratorial imaginary of early American republic in an age of Illuminati anxieties and the 
Alien and Sedition Acts. 14  In his classic study Conspiracy and Romance (1989), Robert Levine examines 
the trope of conspiracy-as-contagion in the 1790s, noting that yellow fever “was regularly portrayed 
as a duplicitous form of foreign infiltration and subversion”; accordingly, Levine understands 
Brown’s phrase “invisible Agents” an “anthropomorphic imagining of fever as a martial corps of 
stealthy saboteurs,” one that “conveys a social anxiety similar to that of numerous contemporaneous 
countersubversive texts” (34).15 More recently, political historian Jason Frank has explored the 
“popular trope of liberty’s contagion” (24) in the early American republic, examining the ways in 
which eighteenth-century theories of sympathetic communication proposed a process of 
“contagious bodily mimesis” (35). Yet while disease was employed as a metaphor for revolutionary 
insurrection—or indeed for what John Adams deemed the “distemper” of democracy (qtd. in Frank 
                                                          
14 Bernard Bailyn’s The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (1967) and Gordon S. Wood’s “Conspiracy and the 
Paranoid Style” (1982) similarly explore the early national conspiratorial imagination, which was preoccupied with 
revolutionary threats such as the infiltration of the Bavarian Illuminati. As Ed White explains, Bailyn’s and Wood’s 
histories “raised conspiracy theory to an integral component of an all-encompassing idea system…Both viewed 
conspiracy thought as constitutive of eighteenth-century thought, the ‘logic of rebellion,’ the Declaration, even 
Enlightenment metaphysics. Revolutionary era conspiracy theories were not prompted by some crisis, but helped bring it 
about” (4). For further histories of rebellion and conspiracy, see Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment (1975) and Durey, 
Transatlantic Radicals and the Early American Republic (1997).  For additional analysis of conspiracy and the early American 
novel, see Bradfield, Dreaming Revolution (1983).  
15 As evidence for his claim, Levine points in particular to Abbé Augusin Barruel’s Mémoires pour servir à l'Histoire du 
Jacobinisme (1797), which presents the French Revolution as an Illuminati conspiracy: “as the plague flies on the wings of 
the wind,” Barruel writes, “so do [the Illuminati's] triumphant legions infect America” (qtd. in Levine 34). Tellingly, 
however, Barruel’s depiction of this microscopic Illuminati evokes not contagionist, but anticontagionist theory: its 
transmission “on the winds of the wind” suggests that the infectious substance is incorporated not by contact, but via 
the intercession of the atmosphere. The notion that Illuminati “infection” depends upon an intermediary “atmosphere” 
significantly complicates the metaphor.  
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112)—an anachronistic understanding of contagion as the mechanism of transmission has tended 
toward oversimplification. In order to analyze this medico-political discourse, we must look past the 
primal scene of infection to consider alternative models of causality that depend upon the complex 
interrelation of body and environment.16  
Contagionism presupposes a kind of democratic endangerment: all bodies are understood as 
equally susceptible on the basis of mutual exposure. Yet as many late eighteenth and nineteenth-
century physicians noted, the idea of universal susceptibility could not adequately account for the 
material effects of disease; as Noah Webster noted in his Brief History of Epidemic and Pestilential 
Diseases (1799), some bodies were “naturally more susceptible of disease than others” (274).17 
Countering the theory of contagionists like Currie, Rush contended that the fever “acted differently 
in different constitutions, according to previous habits, to the degrees of predisposing debility, or to 
the quantity and concentration which was applied to the body” (27-28).18 The notion that “the 
                                                          
16 Following Hofstadter, critics have been wont to remark upon the parallels conspiratorial imaginaries of the Cold War 
and early republican eras; we can also observe parallels between their immunological imaginaries. As critics such as Daryl 
Ogden, Cindy Patton, Emily Martin, Ed Cohen and Priscilla Wald have observed, Cold War political discourses drew 
upon emergent medico-scientific discourses of virology and immunology to as a way to conceptualize the threat the 
American body politic. The discipline of virology, as Martin explains, was grounded in a “warfare/defended-self model 
of the body” that centrally depends upon a “self/nonself distinction,” whereas immunology promoted a willingness to 
“think in terms of complex systems” (Martin 108, 109). Like virology, contagionism focused on mitigating the threat of 
external invasion; like immunology, anticontagionism presented a more expansive understanding of pathology, one that 
included the threat of the body’s own subversion. 16 In other words, the prevailing early republican etiological theory 
situated disease within a series of neo-Hippocratic negotiation between constitution and climate. Thus, rather than 
replicating the virologist/contagionist fantasy of foreign invasion—the fear, in Wald’s words, of “agents penetrating 
from without and converting susceptible insiders to their cause”—Brown’s novels offer a “holistic and anticipatory 
approach” (173) to the “complex system” of disease by probing the notion of susceptibility itself.  
17 “Those who oppose the doctrine of contagion, not only produce as authority the silence of Hippocrates, with 
Avicenna, and other Arabian physicians, on the subject, but they allege, that if the plague was a contagious disease, it 
would always infect those who have communication with the diseased. But this they aver to be contrary to fact,” Webster 
explained; “and they instance the escape of many physicians, grave-diggers, hearsemen and others. They argue further, 
that as the breath and effluvia of persons in health will not expel the poison of the plague from the diseased, so, on the 
other hand, the effluvia from the infected cannot infuse the seeds of the disorder into a healthy body” (214).  
18 Although a particularly virulent atmospheric “contagion,” Rush conceded, was capable of producing what he called 
“indirect debility”—a weakened somatic state produced solely by environmental stimuli—“[i]n ninety-nine cases out of a 
hundred,” Rush insisted, “I could distinctly trace the formation of the disease to [predisposing and exciting] causes, 
acting separately, or in greater or less combination” (28-29). For Rush, it stood to reason that more Philadelphians had 
been exposed to the “contagion”—a term used loosely, somewhat confusingly, by both contagionists and climatists to 
signify disease agents that existed externally to the human body—than had exhibited symptoms of the disease; 
predisposing and exciting causes were thus integral to understanding such idiosyncrasies.  
51 
 
disease invades people and changes the way they are constituted,” then, is not the premise under 
which Arthur Mervyn operates. Instead, it is something rather like the reverse: the way people are 
constituted changes the disease.19  
During the late eighteenth century, the idea of predisposition or “diathesis” began to figure as 
an essential concept in the medical sciences, emphasizing a “tendency to latency, recidivism and 
metastasis” (Ackerknecht 321).20 The idea that pathological agencies could remain latent in the body 
until activated by “exciting causes” informed medical understandings of diseases commonly 
considered to be hereditary—including consumption, gout, scrofula, and insanity—as well as of 
infectious diseases like yellow fever.21 Physicians thus identified disease not only in terms of 
ontology, but in terms of probability; a hereditary predisposition, for instance, indicated not “the 
necessary emergence of a particular disease but rather the potential for it, and the occasion for early 
and thoughtful prophylaxis” (Rosenberg, “The Bitter Fruit” 195).22  Accordingly, although the 
eighteenth century is commonly understood as the era of “heroic medicine”—an approach, 
                                                          
19 See Finger, The Contagious City (2012), for an extended analysis of the eighteenth-century understanding of 
“constitution” as a condition of simultaneous singularity and plurality that “made the rhetoric of political medicine a 
versatile tool for implementing policy and for articulating a shared identity through that idea” (6). 
20 “Diathesis” continued to preoccupy medical writing on hereditary disease throughout the nineteenth century. In his 
1851 treatise On the Transmission from Parent to Offspring of Some Forms of Disease and of Morbid Taints and Tendencies, James 
Whitehead defined “diathesis” as “an exaggerated temperament or idiosyncrasy, or to a morbid state of the circulating 
fluid; and signifies a more or less permanent susceptibility to disease of some particular nature; it may thus be regarded 
indeed as disease in a latent form” (7). 
21 These early models of disease causality can be understood in relation to contemporary biopolitical and bioethical 
concerns, as scholars such as Nikolas Rose have noted. As Rose observes, post-genomic notions of susceptibility offer 
“an extension of two other modes of thought that have a long history—that of predisposition and that of risk. A 
predisposition, since at least the eighteenth century, was an inherited taint or flaw that would, in the right (or wrong) 
circumstances, manifest itself in illness or pathology”—a concept that gained especial currency, he continues, “in the 
second half of the nineteenth century, as all manner of problems of social pathology and danger came to be understood 
in terms of degeneracy” (18-19). Chapter 4 of this dissertation will address degeneracy; this chapter considers the 
predominant idea that predispositions “might lurk unseen until triggered by external events ranging from excessive 
drinking to accident or age—and might be averted by adopting a careful and moderate way of life”: an idea that remains 
salient as the discourse of genetic predisposition recapitulates these “well-established technologies of risk assessment, 
risk prediction, and risk management” (Rose 19). 
22 A “predisposing cause” referred to a variable condition of the constitution (eg temperature); “predisposition” referred 
to an inherited condition of the constitution. As Sir James Clark explained in The Influence of Climate in the Prevention and 
Cure of Chronic Diseases (1830), hereditary predisposition denoted “a peculiar organization of the system, depending upon 
its original conformation and organization, and derived from parents, which renders the individual more susceptible, or 
more liable to lapse into certain diseases, than other persons endowed originally with a more healthy organization” (322).  
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associated with practitioners like Rush, that valorized the therapeutic agency of the physician—this 
chapter demonstrates the ways in which public health relied not only upon the intervention of 
medicine, but upon practices of individual risk assessment and the concomitant implementation of 
prophylactic measures. Early American public health, in other words, was as much about self-
management as it was about managing the environments in which disease agencies were invisibly 
located. 
Taking seriously Hamlin’s call for renewed attention to eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century 
theories of predisposing and exciting causes and, concomitantly, “the larger question of the relations 
between medical theories and the distribution of power” (45), this chapter seeks to shift the 
emphasis from tropes of contagion and invasion in epidemic discourse, to tropes of predisposition 
and latency. If the concept of contagion has offered a convenient theoretical framework in which to 
analyze early republican conspiracy, the undertheorized concept of predisposition offers an 
alternative framework within which to analyze American political subjectivity; under this framework, 
American subjects are not the passive receptors of foreign infiltration, but agents variably 
susceptible or resistant to its influence. 23 
In what follows, I argue that this reorientation of causal agency aptly describes Brown’s 
intervention in the Gothic genre. Echoing the subgenre some critics have called the “EcoGothic,”24 
which construes the natural environment as an object of terror, what I am calling Brown’s biological 
Gothic, or bio-Gothic, complicates previous Gothic figurations of causality by attending not simply 
                                                          
23 In AIDS and Its Metaphors, Sontag observes that “[n]otions of conspiracy translate well into metaphors of implacable, 
insidious, infinitely patient viruses” (35). The eighteenth and nineteenth-century understanding of latency, as this chapter 
shows, focused less on the insidious disease agent itself than on the bodies these agents invaded.  
24 See Roberts, “The EcoGothic” (2008); Smith and Hughes, eds., EcoGothic (2013); and Del Principe, “The EcoGothic 
in the Long Nineteenth Century” (2014). Dongshin Yi has also proposed a “cyborgothic”—“a literary genre that 
emphasizes the necessity of an imaginary/imaginative approach to posthumanism, the current discourses of which are 
limited by the practicalities of technosciences and the dictates of anthropocentrism and, therefore, incapable of 
envisioning an aesthetical ethics for non-humans” (3).   
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to “invisible Agents” that operate on the body from the outside in, but to the invisible agency of the 
body itself. 25 For an exemplar of the revisionary causal model, I turn to an analysis of Brown’s first 
published novel, Wieland, or The Transformation: An American Tale (1798). As Charles C. Bradshaw has 
noted, the novel might readily be understood as “a narrative investigation of the concept of 
causality” (370).26 But while Bradshaw argues that Wieland self-consciously mobilizes randomness as 
a narrative technique in order to expose the inadequacy of “[t]he contemporary epistemological 
vogue of cause and effect reasoning” (370), I argue that the animating conflict of Wieland is 
essentially etiological.27 Countering a “contagionist” reasoning of Brown’s novel—one that would 
diagnose the novel’s tragic events as occasioned by the machinations of Carwin the biloquist—my 
analysis draws upon contemporaneous medical discourses to illustrate how Brown’s novel relies 
upon the intersection of “vertical” and “horizontal” models of disease transmission: respectively, 
“the transmission of hereditary traits from parents to offspring,” and transmission “mediated by 
infectious agents” (Gaudillère and Löwy 1).  In Wieland, Brown offers a narrative etiology that 
depends upon the dynamic interrelation of hereditary predisposition and “exciting” causes.  
Brown, of course, was well versed in the medical theory of his day, both through his close 
personal relationships with physicians Elihu Hubbard Smith and Samuel Latham Mitchill, and by 
                                                          
25 Jean-Baptiste Lamarck and Gottfried Treviranus are generally credited with having (independently) coined the term 
“biology” in 1802: defined by Lamarck in Hydrogéologie as a type of “terrestrial physics” including “all which pertains to 
living bodies,” and by Treviranus in Biologie as, simply, “the science of life” (qtd, in Bynum et. al. 43). Karl Friedrich 
Burdach had used the term slightly earlier, in 1800; even earlier, in 1799, Thomas Beddoes used “biology” as a more 
specific demarcation of “physiology,” referring to “the doctrine of the living system in all its states” (4). I retroactively apply the 
term to characterize Brown’s novels because, although he does not employ the term himself, his preoccupation with the 
processes of life is contemporaneous with the emergence of this science.  
26 If Brown employs the character of Carwin to evoke contemporary anxieties about Illuminati conspiracy, Bradshaw 
suggests, he ultimately “point[s] to the futility of using conspiracy as a plausible explanation for political and cultural 
strife. Just was Wieland was ultimately forced to do,” he explains, “Americans must look upon themselves as agents of 
their future” (377). Edward Cahill has argued Brown’s exploration of causal forces at work in Wieland can be traced to 
his engagement with Godwin’s concept of “necessary causality,” a concept grounded in the notion of “an unswerving 
moral law that subordinated the freedom of individual thought and action to the greatest good” (186), and thereby 
contained dangerous deterministic implications. 
27 For an examination of how scientific concepts of causality inflected fiction in the nineteenth century, see Stephen 
Kern, A Cultural History of Causality (2009).  
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way of his engagement with the writings of English physician Erasmus Darwin, grandfather of 
Charles Darwin, whose nosological opus Zoonomia (1794) Brown would explicitly cite in both 
Wieland and Edgar Huntly.  Yet as even the most casual reader of Brown will realize, his novels do 
not provide any more of a coherent concept of causality than American medical discourse did in 
accounting for yellow fever. This, I would argue, is no coincidence: Brown’s infamously convoluted 
narrative style reproduces Hippocratic model of disease causation, which imagines an 
interdependent tangle of contingent causes, in contrast to the Paracelsian model, which hypothesizes 
the existence of a specific contagion. It is appropriate, then, that Brown’s causal logic takes a 
particularly circuitous route in his famous fever novel Arthur Mervyn, or Memoirs of the Year 1793 
(1799).  
 Building from this analysis of Wieland, my reading of Arthur Mervyn explores the novel’s nearly 
unnoticed invocation of hereditary disease, a detail that has been subsumed by critical attention to its 
rendering of the 1793 yellow fever epidemic. Yet crucially, the eponymous protagonist’s hereditary 
predisposition to consumption conditions his response to the threat of yellow fever; as in Wieland, 
an overly determinist understanding of disease forestalls the possibilities for agency. Wieland and 
Arthur Mervyn, in short, might be understood as fundamentally concerned with the same process: 
how the “invisible agency” of the body can promote—or, alternatively, prevent—the pathological 
development of “invisible Agents.”  
 
Seeds and Arrows: Toward an American Bio-Gothic 
In the summer of 1793, at the order of Philadelphia Mayor Matthew Clarkson, the College of 
Physicians developed and circulated public health regulations aimed at preventing the spread of 
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yellow fever. Printed in the Federal Gazette on August 26,28 the College’s eleven-step directive advised 
Philadelphians not only how to avoid contracting the fever, but how to avoid developing it, since “the 
contagion of the disease may be taken into the body and pass out of it without producing the fever, 
unless it be rendered active by some occasional cause.” 29 By mitigating “exciting” or “occasional” 
causes—environmental influences like exposure to the sun or evening air, as well as somatic 
stressors such as fatigue, intemperance, and fear—an already-infected readership was invited to 
claim the agency to “prevent the contagion from being excited into action in the body.” Since fear 
itself was widely considered not only as an effect of fever, but, paradoxically, a cause, the College 
counseled the city to “put a stop to the tolling of the bells” (Proceedings 3); the near-constant death 
knells served as morbid reminders of the omnipresence of death, inciting already-anxious citizens 
into an anticipatory frenzy. 
Brown illustrates this pathological feedback loop in his anecdote of the anxiety-addled 
“Baxter,” originally published in his 1798 Weekly Magazine serial “The Man at Home” and later re-
incorporated into the plot of Ormond. The case of Baxter “may be quoted as an example of the force 
of imagination,” Brown notes, as “[h]e had probably already received, through the medium of the 
air, or by contact of which he was not conscious, the seeds of this disease. They might have perhaps 
have lain dormant, had not this panic occurred to endow them with activity” (Ormond 55). In other 
words, the issue of whether Baxter has contracted the fever by climate or contagion—“through the 
medium of the air, or by contact of which he was not conscious”—is ultimately inconsequential; 
what matters is that the infection operates in conjunction with a mediating physical state: Baxter’s 
                                                          
28 As David Paul Nord has noted, Andrew Brown’s Federal Gazette served an integral “civic function” in fever-infected 
Philadelphia (20). Carey lauded the Gazette in his account of the epidemic, deeming it “of utmost service in conveying to 
the citizens of the United States authentic intelligence of the state of the disorder, and of the city” (22). 
29 Entitled “Directions for preventing the further progress of the Malignant, contagious Fever,” the College’s 
instructions draw from both contagionist and anticontagionist etiologies—recommending both avoiding “all 
unnecessary intercourse” (2) with infected persons, as well as “keep[ing] the streets and wharves of the city as clean as 
possible” (3).  
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imagination manipulates his physiology in such a way that that the disease’s latent “seeds” are 
induced to germinate. Morbid thoughts, Brown explains in Ormond, “had a tendency to prostrate the 
mind, and generate or ripen the seeds of this fatal malady, which, no doubt, at this period of its 
progress, every one had imbibed” (45). Infection, then, was only one part of the epidemiological plot.30  
Brown’s depiction of the fever’s precarious latency—of a dormant disease “rendered active” by 
the cooperating agency of the body in which it invisibly lodged—complicates the geographic 
imaginary commonly mobilized by epidemic events, wherein sickness is envisioned as an entity that 
exists outside the skin, infiltrating bodies in an impetuous act of boundary violation. Early American 
depictions of disease transmission illustrate this externalized violence with an arsenal of 
metaphorical weaponry. In his Brief and True Report of the New Found Land of Virginia (1588), for 
instance, Thomas Harriot famously contends that the indigenous Roanoke fear the English colonists 
are “shooting invisible bullets into them” (63).31 Similarly, in his Wonders of the Invisible World (1693), 
Puritan minister (and early inoculation advocate) Cotton Mather would explain of “Pestilential and 
Contagious Diseases”: “‘tis the Devil who does oftentimes invade us with them”—specifically, by 
“impregnat[ing] the Air about us” with “Arsenical Fumes, which become Venemous Quivers full of 
                                                          
30 On September 21, the Federal Gazette printed a letter from a New York physician, which similarly affirmed that, “for 
the propagation of this frightful malady, something else is necessary besides its contagion.” Specifically, its author 
continued: “There must be previously formed a predisposition in the bodies of men to receive it...Fear or anxiety of 
mind being a debilitating power, greatly assists in forming the pre-disposition” (“Extract of a Letter”).  
31 While critics such as Stephen Greenblatt have argued that this passage stands as commentary on English colonizers’ 
political exploitation of native religion, Joyce Chaplin has instead re-situated Hariot’s “invisible bullets” within the field 
of natural philosophy, arguing that, as an adherent of controversial corpuscular theory of matter, Hariot―who had, 
Chaplin notes, elsewhere employed the word “bullets” to describe these particles that composed the cosmos―believed 
that matter was constituted by discrete particles that were “hard, unalterable, and not apparent to human sight” (30). As 
Chaplin illustrates, Hariot’s Report can be read as deconstructing the natural world by parsing its invisible constituencies. 
Kelly Wisecup has further observed that scholars who have attempted to situate Hariot’s “invisible bullets” within early 
modern medical philosophy have found his description “at odds with prevailing Galenic medical philosophies, which 
posited diseases not as discrete entities that entered and diseased the body but rather as interior conditions or imbalances 
stimulated by the environment” (39). In response, Wisecup draws our attention to the ways in which the notion of 
“disease as an ontological entity” had been advanced by both Native and Western (Paracelsian) medical philosophies 
prior to the moment of colonial contact (40). 
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Terrible Arrows” (52).32 Both of these early modern texts posit disease as an agent, which, as James 
Block reminds us, by definition “exists only with reference to a principal, a designator, an 
author/ity” (23).33 Disease itself does not invade; rather, embodied subjects are “invaded with” 
disease, the emissary of a commanding conspirator—the Devil, in Mather’s case; white colonizers, in 
Hariot’s.34 Although the sixteenth-century Swiss physician Paracelsus had articulated an etiological 
theory that chimed with this notion of disease “agents,” suggesting that illnesses arose from specific 
external causes, Hippocratic and Galenic understandings of disease as systemic imbalance would 
prevail in American medicine throughout the eighteenth and much of the nineteenth century.35 For 
Brown and his climatist contemporaries, the epidemiological quest for a referent gestured ever 
inward, to the body’s own pathological agency to “generate or ripen the seeds of this fatal malady” 
(Ormond 45).  
Ontologically similar to the “seeds” invoked in medical theorizations of human generation,36 the 
                                                          
32 In his translation of the lliad, Pope also uses the metaphor of “arrows” to describe disease transmission: “On mules 
and dogs th’infection first began; / And last, the vengeful arrows fix’d in man” (69-70). 
33 By noting the ways in which the idea of “free agency” is thus essentially oxymoronic, Block resituates foundational 
notions of American agency, arguing that “individuals shifted from being servants of God and society carrying out 
rigidly defined duties on behalf of distantly formulated but fully designated ends. They became agents, that is, individuals 
participating actively in shaping the worldly means to be employed for realizing divine and collective purposes” (22). 
Rather than reproduce the “naive liberal claim” of self-authorizing individualism, Block defines agency as the capacity to 
navigate among “available preferences within a structure of organized preferences” (23). This chapter illustrates how, for 
Brown, existence within “structure of organized preferences” also describes the experience of embodiment. 
34 Henry Home, Lord Kames, articulates a similar (mis)conceptualization of agency in an address entitled “Of the Laws 
of Motion,” read before the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 1754. “[I]t is maintained by the bulk of our philosophers that 
matter is altogether incapable of active powers; that activity is confined to immaterial substances, and that inertness is 
implied in the very conception of matter,” Kames notes; “This moves them to ascribe to some invisible agency, all that 
activity which we discover in matter. In every one of the above instances, matter, they say, does not act, but is acted 
upon by the deity, who interposes by general laws, to preserve the uniformity of nature. Thus, when a stone falls, it is 
not the stone which acts, but the deity…and, when a plague infects the world, it is the deity who spreads the infection, 
and directs inert matter of ravage and destroy” (10). 
35 At the same time, as Thomas A. Horrocks observes, “[a]lthough the Paracelsian challenge failed to replace traditional 
humoralism in American lay and professional practice, its influence is readily apparent in the various chemical 
ingredients that appeared in early American pharmacopoeias, professional medical texts, professional medical guides, 
family recipe books, and…almanacs” (126).  
36 Paracelsus used the word “seed” to denote agents of disease causation as well as agents of procreation. See Pagel, 
Paracelsus (1982) and Cislo, Paracelsus’s Theory of Embodiment (2010). In his Anatomical Exercises on the Generation of Animals 
(1651), William Harvey likened the mechanism of generation to contagion, proposing that animals were “propagated 
from elements and seeds so small as to be invisible” (qtd. in Müller-Wille and Rheinberger, A Cultural History of Heredity, 
26). Kant would notably appeal to the figure of the seed (Keim) in his theorization of human generation in Anthropology 
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“seeds of disease” have long been a central metaphor in medical discourse.37 Insofar as the “seed” 
operates as a correlative for an agent of disease causation, it is apt, argues medical historian Vivian 
Nutton, “in the fact that it emphasizes three things: that the object posited is a living entity; that it is 
in origin very small; and that it contains within itself the potentiality for growth” (3). Building upon 
Nutton’s observations, we might add that the seminal metaphor also suggests the temporal 
contingency of cultivation. Unlike “invisible bullets” or “Terrible Arrows,” which intimate an 
immediate kind of violence, the metaphor of “seeds” implies a gradual germination, one that is 
dependent upon a panoply of causes.38 If fever persisted in the body in a nascent or latent seminal 
state, as Brown’s “Baxter” anecdote and the College of Physicians’ directions jointly illustrate, then it 
might be cultivated or curtailed by circumstance—and moreover, to a certain extent, by self-care.39  
                                                          
from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798). For further discussion of Kant’s theories, see Figal, Heredity, Race, and the Birth of the 
Modern (2008), 55-76. The correspondence between generative and pathological “seeds” is particularly pronounced in the 
British physician Thomas Fuller’s 1730 treatise Exanthematologia, which proposes the concept of the “innate seed” whose 
fertilization gave birth to the disease process: “The Ovula of each particular Fever, are all, and every individual one of 
them, usually impregnated at once,” writes Fuller; “And when these have been impregnated, and delivered of their 
morbid Foetus, there is an End of them” (qtd. in Silverstein 14). 
37 The seminal metaphor can be traced as far back as the pre-Socratic philosopher Anaxagoras, who in turn influenced 
the theory Galen advances in Of Initial Causes (ca. AD 175), which states that disease is not caused solely by the climatic 
manipulation of the humoral body, but by the mediating mechanisms he deems “seeds of fevers”: entities capable of 
persisting even in asymptomatic patients, awakening to activity if not curtailed by proper regimen.  Exactly how Galen 
conceptualized the ontology of these “seeds” is unclear, Nutton admits—but it is apparent, he insists, that the “seed” 
figures as more than a “strangely flowery” metaphor for humoral predisposition, but rather seems to intimate “some 
independent existence” (Nutton 4). Yet it was the Italian physician Girolamo Fracastoro who “first gave formal currency 
to the ideas not only that disease was caused by small seeds (seminaria) but that the contagion might spread directly from 
person to person, indirectly by means of clothing, etc., or even at a distance” in his 1546 essay De Contagione et Contagiosis 
Morbiss (Silverstein 8). Unlike Galen, Fracastoro postulated specific causes, and accordingly a specific, rather than 
systemic, remedy. For more on Galen’s use of the seed metaphor, see Jouanna, Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen 
(2012), 132-34 and Santer, Confronting Contagion (2014), 48-50. 
38 Climatists contended that the “seeds” of yellow fever arose from putrescent matter. In an essay on the New York 
yellow fever epidemic of 1795 published in Noah Webster’s edited Collection of Papers on the Subject of Bilious Fevers Prevalent 
in the United States for a Few Years Past (1796), for instance, Dr. Valentine Seaman professed to “have discovered a fruitful 
matrix generating the seeds of this complaint”—namely “refuse water and offal substances…left to stagnate and putrify” 
(33). Considering the “fermentation of putrefactive materials” in the city’s docks, Seaman asserted, “there can be no 
wonder, that the seeds of the disease should ripen in such a hot bed of putrefaction” (35). In the “Concluding 
Observations” to his Collection, Webster thus advises American settlers “to guard against the first effects of clearing moist 
land,” at which time “all the latent seeds of disease are set in motion and impregnate the surrounding atmosphere” (239). 
Webster’s description recalls Mather’s miasmas, which “impregnate the Air about us” with diseases of demonic 
induction; in Webster’s account, however, illness is the result of terrestrial rather than supernatural agency—from the 
human disruption of an ecological balance.  
39 This would remain the prevailing interpretation of yellow fever into the nineteenth century. In 1817 manual American 
Domestick Medicine; or Medical Admonisher, for instance, Horatio Gates Jameson warmed that “when the atmosphere is 
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The idea that individual behavior might arrest the development of latent disease agents offers a 
revision to an earlier model of pathology, which posited the human experience of disease as 
divinely-ordained.40 For instance, in his domestic medical guide Primitive Physick (1747)—a popular 
reprint in the American colonies—John Wesley had posited the tendency to disease as an essential, 
irremediable feature of the postlapsarian human condition: “The Seeds of Weakness and Pain, of 
Sickness and Death, are now lodged in our inmost Substance: Whence a thousand Disorders 
continually spring, even without the Aid of external violence” (iv). An etiology dependent upon the 
operation of “exciting causes,” on the other hand, suggests that the development of pathological 
“seeds” might indeed be aided by “external violence.” The attempt to determine the extent to which 
disorders of the flesh were attributable “inmost Substance” or “external violence”—to the innate 
predisposition of the embodied constitution, or to environmental or behavioral exigencies—was 
medicine’s primary diagnostic problem. As I argue here, these pathological models of causality 
similarly describe narrative models of causality in the Gothic novel.  
Brown is commonly credited with having inaugurated the American Gothic—for, in Leslie 
Fielder’s somewhat heady terms, having “single-handed[ly]…solved the key problems of adaptation” 
(145) by reconciling the European genre to its transatlantic environs.41 In his oft-cited preface to 
Edgar Huntly, Brown articulates a vision of his literary project as seeking “new springs of action, and 
new motives to curiosity” that “differ essentially from those which exist in Europe.” Like the 
                                                          
loaded with the seeds of an epidemic, any irregularity may excite the prevailing disease” (123). Accordingly, Jameson 
noted, “many persons who breathe the vitiated air, and have the seeds of yellow fever lurking in the body for weeks, 
often escape an attack of fever by avoiding fatigue and irregularities” (149).  
40 This emphasis on human agency in health in some ways parallels the Enlightenment ideas of causes of racial diversity 
Dror Wahrman examines in The Making of the Modern Self (2008). “Whereas climactic and environmental views, as well as 
those focusing on religion, have been around long before the eighteenth century,” Wahrman observes secular human 
agency—in the forms of education, custom, and civilization—appears to have been a more peculiarly eighteenth-century 
addition to the mix.” Hume’s essay “Of National Characters,” as Wahrman points out, strove “to assert the primacy of 
‘moral’ causes—those involving human agency—over the ‘physical’ causes of air and climate in the shaping of 
differences between people” (101). 
41 For further discussion of Brown’s Gothic, see Gross, Redefining the American Gothic (1989); Chrisopherson, The 
Apparition in the Glass (1993); and Kafter, Charles Brockden Brown's Revolution and the Birth of the American Gothic (2004). 
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nascent genre of the American domestic medical manual, which held that peculiarities of the 
American climate engendered different diseases (and necessitated different treatments) than those 
detailed in Old World medical texts,42 the Gothic novel demanded Americanization. Critiquing the 
“[p]uerile superstition and exploded manners, Gothic castles and chimeras” (3) that characterize 
plots of European importation, Brown professes to find more appropriate fodder in American 
materials—specifically, in Edgar Huntly, in “incidents of Indian hostility” (4).43 Yet Brown’s most 
striking adaptation of the European Gothic, I suggest, is his complication of its causal logic.  
In its most familiar iterations, the Gothic might be called a contagionist genre, insofar as it tends 
to explain causation in terms of “external violence”—either via the machinations of supernatural 
agents, as per the tradition of Horace Walpole’s Castle of Otranto, or via the intercession of disguised 
human agents, as per Ann Radcliffe’s revisionary explique. 44  For Brown, however, the body was not 
merely the receptive medium on which disease’s agency was inscribed; instead, the bodies in 
Brown’s novels—sickening, somnambulating, spontaneously combusting—operate with a strange 
agency of their own. They do so not because they are possessed, Brown suggests, but because they 
are peculiarly predisposed. 45  By directing the Gothic’s hermeneutic of suspicion away from external 
                                                          
42 See Gevitz, “‘But all those authors are foreigners’” (2002). The Americanization of medicine would continue 
throughout the nineteenth century; in 1848, Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes complained in a Committee on Medical 
Literature Report: “It cannot be denied that the great forte of American Medical scholarship has hitherto consisted in 
'editing' the works of British authors.” And yet, he continued, “[t]he American constitution must be studied by itself—it 
differs from the European in outline, in proportions, in the obvious characters of skin and hair—why should it not 
differ in the susceptibilities which, awakened, become disease?” (qtd. in Davis, Bodily and Narrative Forms 25). 
43 Brown’s gothicization of racial violence has generated decades of critical debate regarding the American Gothic’s self-
conscious mobilization of political anxieties in general, and racial anxieties in particular. See Goddu, Gothic America 
(1997) and Edwards, Gothic Passages (2003).  In Edgar Huntly, though, the threat of Indian conspirators parallels another 
kind of conspiracy, one that plays out in its somnambulist-protagonist’s body, rooted in his own inscrutable physiology. 
Evocatively, the idea of pathological latency at the level of the individual species was in turn mapped on to the level of 
species; in a 1797 letter, statesman James Wilkinson predicted of Native Americans” “the seeds of their extinction, 
already sown, must be matured” (qtd. in Sheehan, 2). See Sheehan, Seeds of Extinction (2013).  
44 Critics have also noted the tendency of the Gothic to utilize tropes of contagion more specifically; perhaps most 
notably, genres like vampire fiction make use of tropes of “invasion and contagion” to “symbolically figure the 
apocalyptic return to the community of reciprocal violence” (Chaplin 41). For example, Eve Sedgwick analyzes “the 
attributes of the veil, and of the surface generally” as “contagious metonymically” in Gothic novels (256). For a 
discussion of “contagious animality” (2) in the American Gothic, see Niles Tomlinson, Animal Crossings (2008).  
45 Brown’s interest in the agency of the predisposed body harkens to Johann Friedrich Blumenbach’s concept of 
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agencies and toward the agency of the body itself, Brown develops a mode that posits the body not 
simply as the site upon which causal agents operate, but a cause in its own right.  
The problem of embodied agency is the primary preoccupation of Brown’s Wieland, in which 
the Gothic’s traditional causal paradigms fail to offer an adequate explanation of the novel’s strange 
occurrences. When Theodore Wieland begins to hear inexplicable voices at his ancestral estate, he 
suspects supernatural intervention; his sister Clara, however, maintains “the suspicion of human 
agency” (68). Echoing Hobbes's assertion that “invisible agents, so fancied” are not to be mistaken 
for “real and external substances” (57), Clara “believe[s] the agency to be external and real” (163). 
Although the quest for a terrestrial explanation is admittedly “[m]ixed up with notions of 
supernatural agency,” she directs her suspicions toward the stranger Carwin; after all, as family friend 
Henry Pleyel observes, the emergence of the voices “were coeval with Carwin’s introduction.” For 
Pleyel, the correlation ineluctably implies causation: “Is not this man the agent?” (122).  
However, the tragic plot on which the novel turns—Theodore Wieland’s murder of his wife and 
children, and his attempted rape and murder of his sister—is ultimately not entirely explicable in 
terms of Carwin’s intermediation. While Carwin has, he admits, used his singular talents as a 
ventriloquist to wreak havoc with the Wielands, he does not issue the final fatal instructions, and 
thus only partially satisfies the conditions of a Radcliffean explique—and it is due to her inability to 
match physiological effects to a corresponding cause that Clara Wieland is “cast upon a sea of 
troubles” (64). Although the agency at work in Wieland is not supernatural, neither is it entirely 
“external and real.” As the novel’s plot of hereditary predisposition to mania intimates, another 
                                                          
Bildungstreib, or “vital force,” which “conceived of heredity as a force acting at a distance, analogous to Newtonian 
gravitation” (Müller-Wille and Rheinberger 21).  Brown’s familiarity with Blumenbach is evidenced by his publication of 
Blumenbach’s “Observations on the Conformation and Capacity of Negroes,” which appeared in the September 1799 
issue of The Monthly Magazine and American Review between the publication of Arthur Mervyn’s two volumes.   
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agency is at work in Wieland, one that is “internal and real”: the agency of the embodied 
constitution.46   
Outrageous Fortunes: Wieland  
At almost the same moment as Brown was attempting to assuage his brother’s fears of fever, 
his close friend, Dr. Elihu Hubbard Smith, was attempting to work through another aspect of 
disease transmission: “[t]he medical doctrine of hereditary diseases.” In a 1796 letter, Smith noted 
that the idea of pathological heritability offered “a new theory of the theological doctrine of Original 
Sin”—one, he admitted, that “did not long satisfy [him]” (260). How, Smith wondered, might the 
idea of human agency be reconciled with the unsettling, antidemocratic notion of biological 
predetermination? “Man is an animal created with certain capacities,” he reasoned; “These are not 
unlimited; for then, he would cease to be man; but they are improveable; & this in two ways: First, 
culture or exercise—which we call Education; secondly, by an hereditary propagation of that 
culture—to a certain degree” (263).  
Smith’s notion of an “improveable” human condition, remediable “to a certain degree” by 
both nature (“hereditary propagation”) and nurture (“Education”), rehearses the eighteenth-century 
understandings of human “perfectibility”: a term that, as Jenny Davidson notes, had been coined by 
Turgot and popularized by Rousseau to refer to the potential for the advancement of the species. 
Godwin’s Enquiry Concerning Political Justice (1793), for instance—a major influence on Smith, Brown, 
and the other members of their intellectual circle—famously makes the case that “[m]an is 
                                                          
46 Beverley Voloshin has written that “Brown’s method resembles Radcliffe’s identification of natural cause, except that 
Brown’s explanation, more technical and more tantalizing, is not quite an explanation after all. The means are 
supposedly natural but are so little understood as to be awe-inspiriting” (353). As this chapter argues, Wieland engages 




perfectible, or in other words susceptible of perpetual improvement” (11).47 Brown, too, resisted 
deterministic notions of the fixity of human conditions, both physiological and political—like 
Godwin, framing humans’ eminent malleability within a rhetoric of susceptibility.  Re-imagining the 
Gothic’s preoccupation with conditions of suspended, attenuated, or evacuated agency, Brown’s 
biological Gothic ultimately negotiates a space for the agency of the embodied subject to manage the 
conditions that determine his or her own susceptibility. 
Wieland has often been read as a kind of national allegory: a meditation on early republican 
political agency, liberty, and (self-) government. The contested agency of the eponymous family—
and, by extension, the nation they are commonly understood to allegorize—has formed the crux of 
most of the critical debates on the novel, from Tompkins’s argument that Wieland offers a 
“reflection of Federalist skepticism about the efficacy of religion and education to prepare citizens 
for self-government” (53), to Samuels’s claim that the novel offers a cautionary tale of the American 
“family-republic” that is “destroyed from within, though agency is ascribed to outside forces” 
(Romances of the Republic 57). Yet while readings of Wieland have identified its central tension between 
individual agency and external circumstance, they have largely ignored the importance of its premise: 
that Theodore Wieland’s descent into madness recapitulates the narrative of the father to whom 
bears an “obvious resemblance” (22).  
As Brown notes in the novel’s prefatory “Advertisement,” Wieland is based on an “authentic 
case”—presumably that of James Yates, a New York Shaker who brutally murdered his wife and 
children in 1781 at the apparent instigation of supernatural forces.48 In his fictional re-imagining of 
                                                          
47 “[P]erfectibility is one of the most unequivocal characteristics of the human species,” Godwin writes, “so that the 
political, as well as the intellectual state of man, may be presumed to be in a course of progressive improvement” (11). 
For further discussion of the New York Friendly Club and Godwin, see Waterman, Republic of Intellect, 99-105.  
48 The Yates case had been re-introduced to the American public in the summer of 1796, when the New-York Weekly 
Magazine published a two-part account of the murders; Yates had been induced to his deeds, the article claimed, by the 
apparent urging of “Spirits.” As Maggie Kilgour reminds us, another model for Brown’s novel was Schiller’s Ghost-Seer 
(1787-89), which features a prince who Prince suffers from a “servile and bigoted education” that “had impressed 
frightful images upon his tender brain, which, during the remainder of his life, he was never able to wholly obliterate. 
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the Yates case, Brown makes a particularly significant revision by presenting Wieland’s homicical 
“transformation” not as an isolated instance of religious mania, but as the perpetuation of a 
pathological lineage. Critics have tended to interpret the hereditary plot in Wieland as a critique of 
aristocratic social forms—what Jay Fliegelman has called “the American revolution against 
patriarchal authority” (5)—but have largely ignored the ways in which this plot participates in 
emergent medical inquiries into hereditary pathology, even despite Brown’s explicit prefatory 
“appeal to Physicians and to men conversant with the latent springs and occasional perversions of 
the human mind” (3).  
In the years before Wieland’s composition, hereditary disease had begun to preoccupy medical 
discourse as a pressing public health problem. Concurrent with dismantling of aristocratic social 
order in revolutionary France, the medical sciences experienced a surge of interest in hereditary 
diseases, as evidenced by essay competitions on the topic sponsored by the Parisian Société 
Royal de Médecine in 1788 and 1790.49 As Staffan Müller-Wille and Hans-Jörg Rheinberger explain, 
in the late eighteenth century,  “[n]ew responsibilities of physicians for public hygiene led to the 
definition of dangers such as heritable diseases, which lay hidden in the populace and which, 
consequently, only the expert could address” (19). Like infectious diseases, then, hereditary diseases 
enabled the epistemologically-privileged physician to assume a social role in identifying latent 
dangers—ultimately transferring this knowledge, and concomitant prophylactic responsibility, to the 
public. In his popular manual Domestic Medicine, for instance, William Buchan warned readers to take 
                                                          
Religious melancholy,” Schiller writes, “was an hereditary disorder in his family” (qtd. in Kilgour 144). In Wieland, 
however, Theodore’s mania is not cultivated solely by external impression, but engendered by the cooperating force of 
predisposition. 
49 See Quinlan, “Inheriting Vice, Acquiring Virtue” (2006), and López-Beltrán, “The Medical Origins of Heredity” 
(2007). In his contribution to these competitions, Dr. Alexis de Pujol argued that hereditary diseases were like racial 
traits: “once introduced into a family,” he wrote, they “remain tightly attached to it; and, by continuing to perpetuate 





care against the perpetuation of hereditary taints. “Family constitutions are as capable of 
improvement as family estates,” Buchan insisted, “and the libertine, who impairs the one, does 
greater injury to his posterity, than the prodigal, who squanders away the other” (9).  
The perpetuation of hereditary disease was indeed a scourge of the age, as Erasmus Darwin 
lamented in his posthumously-published poem The Temple of Nature, Or the Origin of Society (1803):  
E’en where unmix’d the breed, in sexual tribes 
Parental taints the nascent babe imbibes; 
Eternal war with the Gout and Mania wage 
With fierce uncheck’d hereditary rage; 
Sad Beauty’s form foul Scrofula surrounds 
With bones distorted, and putrescent wounds; 
And, fell Consumption! thy unerring dart 
Wets its broad wing in Youth’s reluctant heart (177-184).  
 
With Miltonic tenor, Darwin situates “hereditary rage” as a kind of malevolent agency, seemingly 
“uncheck’d” by the counter-agency of human intervention.50 Importantly, however, what physicians 
like Darwin understood as heritable was not the disease itself, but rather a predisposition or susceptibility 
to disease. Accordingly, Darwin called for renewed attention to “temperament,” which he defined as 
“a permanent predisposition to certain classes of disease” (354). 51 In his 1809 treatise on “nervous 
temperament,” Darwin’s fellow English physician Thomas Trotter would further define 
“predisposition” as “an original conformation of the body, transmitted from the parent to the 
offspring; by reason of which, when particular causes are applied, a similar train of morbid 
                                                          
50 In the verse’s accompanying “philosophical notes,” Darwin makes recourse to evidence afforded by investigations in 
botany and animal husbandry to caution against degeneration; citing findings on “the sexual progeny of vegetables,” 
Darwin proposes that humans “may be less liable to hereditary diseases, if the marriages are into different families, than 
if into the same family.” After all, he observes, “this has long supposed to be true, by those who breed animals for sale” 
(252). In Darwin’s rendering, consistent with what has come to be called a “soft hereditarian” perspective, hereditary 
diseases might be passively “imbibe[d]” not only during the seminal moment of conception, but during later processes of 
gestation and nursing: “The clime unkind, or noxious food instills / To embryon nerves hereditary ills,” Darwin writes; 
“The feeble births acquired diseases chase, / Til Death extinguish the degenerate race” (163-6). For further discussion of 
Darwin’s approach to hereditary disease, see Wilson, “Erasmus Darwin and the ‘Noble’ Disease (Gout)” (2007). 
51 Predisposition necessitated hereditary transmission, as William Saunders Hallaran, physician to the Lunatic Asylum of 
Cork, explained in his Practical Observations on the Causes and Cure of Insanity (1818): “[i]f the predisposition, or the 
susceptibility, be acknowledged,” wrote Hallaran, “so must be the hereditary claim” (39). 
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phenomena takes place in the child as was experienced by the parent.” By this logic of “particular 
causes” that instigate the “train of morbid phenomena,” Trotter explained, “[a] predisposition may 
therefore appear long before any symptom of actual disease has shown itself” (169). Predisposition 
was latent, but permanent—an always-extant condition of pathological possibility.  
Wieland explores one such “similar train of morbid phenomena,” tracing the emergence of 
mania across two generations of its eponymous family. As Clara Wieland suggests in her epistolary 
exposition, “the events that have lately happened in [her] family” (5) must be understood in relation 
to “[her] father’s ancestry” (6).52 The senior Wieland, Clara explains, was a German immigrant of 
half-noble parentage who “gradually contracted a habit of morose and gloomy reflection” (7)53 after 
relocating to Pennsylvania with ill-fated designs of ministering to American Indians. Having grown 
increasingly unsettled by a kind of religious hypervigilance, her father was felled by an apparent act 
of spontaneous combustion at an hour of his own prognostication, thereafter perishing of a “disease 
thus wonderfully generated” (17).54  
                                                          
52 The most extensive consideration of Wieland’s preoccupation with ancestry explores the idea in a legal, rather than 
biological context. Elizabeth Jane Wall Hinds argues that the novel “dramatizes an inheritance of property and a 
suggestion of incestuous, gentried isolation.” For Hinds, the novel’s concurrent concern with “inherited, material 
consequences” provides a kind of foil for the more pressing, gendered question of property inheritance (112). These two 
domains are historically related, as López-Beltrán has observed, since the notion of hereditary transmission of biological 
material—first conceived in terms of the transmission of disease, and later extended to encompass more benign 
inherited characteristics—developed as an extension of the logic of property inheritance. Later texts like Poe’s “The Fall 
of the House of Usher” (1839) and Hawthorne’s The House of the Seven Gables (1851) are often read as an illustration of 
this dual logic, as Chapter 2 of this dissertation will discuss. 
53 Tompkins argues that this account of ancestry illustrates “in telescopic form, Europe’s passage from an aristocratic, 
agrarian, feudal order…to a middle class commercial society,” as grandfather Wieland’s “marrying outside his kinship 
group records the weakening of the social codes that held that aristocracy together and protected its power” (56). If the 
“social codes” dictated by hereditary aristocracy come to collapse in this historical refiguration of kinship structures, 
Brown illustrates the way in which biological “codes” of pathological heredity still constitute an urgent threat to the 
American middle class.   
54 The elder Wieland’s death, like his son’s homicidal “transformation,” problematizes the Gothic causal motifs that had 
been entrenched in the American imagination in the 1790s. Citing “the purity and cloudlessness of the atmosphere, 
which rendered it impossible that lightning was the cause,” and noting that the combustion occurred in a temple 
“composed of combustible materials” but “without detriment to the structure,” Clara clearly establishes that “the fatal 
spark” that causes this combustion—and, concomitantly, his “disease”—cannot be attributed to environmental electrical 
phenomena (17, 18).  
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Clara offers two interpretations of her father’s bizarre end. On the one hand, she suggests that 
these circumstances may index “the stroke of a vindictive and invisible hand,” furnishing “a fresh 
proof that the Divine Ruler interferes in human affairs, meditates an end, selects, and commissions 
his agents, and enforces, by unequivocal sanctions, submission to his will.” But this conventionally 
Gothic account of causation is quickly supplanted by an alternate etiology: the suggestion that her 
father’s death can be attributed to “the irregular expansion of the fluid that imparts warmth to our 
heart and our blood, caused by the fatigue of the preceding day, or flowing, by established laws, 
from the condition of his thoughts” (18). While her brother Theodore ascribes to the former theory 
of his father’s death “as flowing from a direct and supernatural decree” (33), the latter hypothesis—
that Wieland’s destruction was not due to an accident of the atmosphere or an “invisible hand” from 
a supernatural realm, but a vital “fluid” in his own body—is substantiated by the Wieland’s maternal 
uncle, a surgeon whose “testimony is peculiarly worthy of credit,” Clara claims, “because no man's 
temper is more sceptical [sic], and his belief is unalterably attached to natural causes” (18).55  
Like her skeptical surgeon-uncle, Clara appears “attached to natural causes” in the narrative 
post-mortem she performs on her father. For Clara, the chain of unlikely events—combustion, 
disease, death—can be traced to “exciting causes”: specifically, the debilitating “fatigue,” or the 
disordered “condition of his thoughts” that render Wieland susceptible to the “fatal spark.”56 
Drawing from the generally accepted view that acquired diseases could be transmitted to offspring, 57  
a concept that would famously be developed by Lamarck, Brown suggests that the elder Wieland 
                                                          
55 An explanatory footnote from Brown further stresses the veracity of the biological explique, noting “[a] case, in its 
symptoms exactly parallel to this” published, apparently, “in one of the Journals of Florence” (18).  
56 Although this “wonderfully generated” disease is, in Galenic terms, the “proximate cause” of Wieland’s demise, a 
more comprehensive explanation of his pathology might delve further backward, toward a “remote cause”: namely, the 
“habit of morose and gloomy reflection” that was “gradually contracted” in his youth, and concomitantly cultivated by 
his religious obsessions upon his immigration to the United States. 
57 John Hunter, for instance, had proposed in his 1786 lecture series that hereditary transmission “may be divided into 
two kinds: the transmission of natural properties, and the transmission of diseased, or what I shall call acquired or 
accidental properties” (354).  
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acquires (“contracts”) an insalubrious “habit” that is later articulated in his son’s predisposition to a 
similar temperament. In this way, ancestral past wreaks its pathological influence on the New World 
Wielands.  
In a 1796 letter to a medical student, Brown’s friend and interlocutor Dr. Samuel Latham 
Mitchill had mused on the topic of hallucinatory phenomena: “conditions of the body occur,” 
Mitchill theorized, “in which organs of sense do from internal causes and without the aid of external 
agents, take upon themselves a configuration or impression, similar to that which is induced by the 
action of material objects and occurrences from without” (qtd. in Voloshin 351). Yet in Wieland, the 
distinction between “internal causes” and “external agents” is not readily identifiable: Carwin is not 
entirely incidental to the events that transpire, but neither is he entirely culpable. 58 Carwin’s 
instigation is only efficacious insofar as it works in cooperation with Theodore Wieland’s established 
predisposition to mania; in etiological terms, then, Carwin supplies an “exciting cause.” 
As if to ensure that Theodore Wieland’s pathological “transformation” will be read in terms of 
hereditary predisposition, 59 Brown codes the same disorder into both sides of Theodore and Clara’s 
genealogy.60 As we later learn, it was not only their father, but their maternal grandfather who 
experienced an “extraordinary” death; suffering auditory hallucinations, he “waited from day to day 
                                                          
58 Countering earlier critics like Samuels, Laura Korobkin has argued for an understanding of causality that admits 
Carwin’s culpability by placing the novel in conversation with contemporary legal understandings of criminal 
responsibility; “it is the critics who need to deny Carwin’s agency,” Korobkin asserts, “because to admit it would destroy 
the force of interpretations that depend on Wieland’s violence having been produced solely from within his own 
damaged mind” (722). While Korobkin’s consideration of early American legal structures offers interesting insight into 
questions of agency and responsibility, it leaves room to consider the way in which these same questions are 
conceptualized by contemporary medicine—a domain with which Brown explicitly engaged.  
59 Although Clara suffers certain inherited peculiarities—she claims, for instance, to be “actuated by an hereditary dread 
of water” (76)— Theodore appears markedly more predisposed toward “gloomy reflection” than his sister: the memory 
of their father’s death, Clara notes, “vitiated his meditations oftener than it did mine. The traces which it left were more 
gloomy and permanent” (33). With his mind thus “vitiated,” Theodore is left especially susceptible to malevolent 
influences. When Theodore first hears the voices in the garden, Clara reports, “[t]he incident had a visible effect in 
augmenting his gravity” (33).  
60 Eighteenth-century physicians generally ascribed to the “dual seed theory” of generation, proposed by Hippocrates 




in expectation of the stroke which he predicted was speedily to fall upon him,” and eventually threw 
himself from a Cornwall cliff (162). The “illusions” from which he suffered, Clara’s uncle explains, 
“are reducible to one class, and are not more difficult of explication and cure than most affections of 
our frame” (163).61 Here, a footnote directs his readers to Darwin’s Zoonomia and its description of 
“mania mutabilis,” or “mutable madness”—a disease, in Darwin’s terms, in which “patients are 
liable to mistake ideas of sensation for those from irritation, that is, imaginations for realities” 
(Zoonomia 356).62 In other words, sufferers attribute to the “irritation” of external agents what in fact 
arises from the sensation-producing agency of their own bodies or minds. Importantly, as Darwin 
explained, in cases of mania mutabilis, it was not the “mistaken or imaginary idea” itself that 
“constitute[d] insanity,” but rather “the voluntary actions exerted in consequence of this mistaken 
idea.” Accordingly, Darwin classed mania mutabilis as a disease of “increased volition” (Zoonomia 
356), one characterized by a pathological lack of self-control. 63   
It was precisely this quality of self-control that persons predisposed to hereditary diseases like 
madness were implored to cultivate. After all, if such diseases were “never hereditary, but in 
susceptibility,” as the physician Joseph Adams claimed in his 1814 Treatise on the Supposed Hereditary 
                                                          
61 Considering that the devastating yellow fever epidemics of the 1790s were continuing to challenge medical theory and 
practice at the moment of Wieland’s composition, the proclamation that mental illness is “not more difficult of 
explication and cure than most affections of our frame” might be taken with a some amount of irony. While the 
Wielands’ uncle, possessed of specialized medical knowledge, is confident in his explanation of Theodore’s seemingly-
mysterious experience, the very plot of the novel depends upon the hermeneutic and therapeutic uncertainty that attends 
the search for “explication and cure.” 
62 With its slippage between “imaginations” and “realities,” the pathology of “mania mutabilis” lends itself to readings of 
early republican concerns about deception, conspiracy, and the epistemological limitations of sensory perception. In her 
study of visual perception and illusion in the early national period, for instance, Wendy Bellion locates political 
subjectivity “at this threshold of undeceiving and self-realization,” arguing that, “[t]hroughout the Revolutionary and 
early national periods, the capacity to discern differences between truth and falsehood was prized as a sign of able 
citizenship” (15). The pathological inability to discern between “sensations” produced by the body (like auditory 
impressions) and “irritations” produced by external stimuli (like supernatural agents) flies in the face of Scottish 
Common Sense philosophy’s valorization of individual rationality and, per Bellion, precludes the requisite conditions of 
“able citizenship.”   
63 Darwin categorizes diseases into four classes: diseases of irritation, sensation, volition, and association. The understanding of 
insanity as a volitional disorder would persist in medical discourse throughout the following century; in his Dictionary of 
Practical Medicine (1859), for example the Scottish physician James Copland asserted that insanity “usually displays itself in 
a want of self-government” (593). 
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Properties of Diseases (26), they might be forestalled by preventive practices of self-care. Adams 
accordingly offered a tentatively optimistic conclusion: “when the susceptibility amounts only to a 
predisposition, requiring the operation of some external cause to produce the disease, there is every 
reason to hope, that the action of the disease may be for the most part much lessened, if not 
prevented altogether,” he noted; “for this purpose, the hereditary peculiarity should always be kept 
in view the direction of the early studies, in the subsequent employment, and in the discipline, 
during that early period of life, which admits and requires every judicious restraint” (27). Specifically, 
predisposed persons should exercise restraint by limiting their exposure to known exciting causes. 
Conspicuously absent from Wieland, however, is such a self-disciplinary model of “judicious 
restraint.” As Clara announces to the correspondents for whom she frames her story, she believes 
herself to be emplotted in a predetermined narrative. “Futurity has no power over my thoughts,” she 
claims; “To all that is to come I am perfectly indifferent.” Clara’s indifference to “futurity” arises not 
only from her grief, but from her belief that she is incapable of volitional action, unable to take arms 
against the “sea of troubles” upon which she has been cast: “I address no supplication to the Deity,” 
she asserts; “The power that governs the course of human affairs has chosen his path. The decree 
that ascertained the condition of my life, admits no recall….It suffices that the past is exempt from 
mutation” (4). Understanding herself as thus directed by an unnamed “power,” Clara confesses the 
limitations of her agency: the immutable past has wrought an immutable future. Here, “[t]he power 
that governs the course of human affairs” is not the Deity, but heredity.64 
At the same time, though, Brown insists on the efficacy of prophylaxis through the agentive 
                                                          
64 In her profession of evacuated agency, Clara posits herself as a paradigm Gothic subject; with her anticipatory 
imagination, she reveals herself to be a paradigm Gothic reader. Gothic novels, as Deirdre Lynch explains, tend to 
mitigate causal mystery by employing archetypal characters and situations. See Lynch, “Gothic Fiction” (2008). In 
Brown’s bio-Gothic, predication is enabled not by its appeal to archetype, but by its mobilization of the prognostic 
model of medicine. The following chapter will take up this idea at greater length in its discussion of “premonitory 
reading,” a hermeneutic strategy encouraged during the 1832 cholera epidemic. 
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remediation of “exciting causes.” He accordingly offers a corrective to this overly-deterministic 
vision in the novel’s concluding chapter, in which Clara, writing at a remove of three years, realizes 
that her prognostics were mistaken. “My destiny I believed to be accomplished,” she explains, “and 
I looked forward to a speedy termination of my life with the fullest confidence” (214).65 But her 
confidently-predicted declension is not inevitable, since her health is also directed by the cooperating 
influence of her environment: as her friends insist, the mournful associations of her home “would 
tend to foster [her] disease,” and therefore a change of scene proves to be “the only method of 
cure” (215). Indeed, when Clara is forced away from her estate, by a particularly fortuitous fire, she 
dually convalesces: “Notwithstanding the shocks which my frame had endured,” Clara explains, “the 
anguish of my thoughts no sooner abated than I recovered my health” (217).66  
Clara’s recovery is crucial to Brown’s novel, as it illustrates the ways in which the vicissitudes of 
circumstance (environmental and psychological) are capable of re-shaping the seemingly-unalterable 
course of biological destiny. In other words, by recovering her health, Clara also comes to re-
evaluate how health is achieved. As the remainder of this chapter will illustrate, the eponymous 
protagonist of Brown’s following novel, Arthur Mervyn, is also problematically attached to a bio-
determinist ideology—here, one that informs his relationship to both impending infectious 
(epidemic) and hereditary (endemic) diseases. Through Arthur’s painstaking process of continual 
revisionist re-assessment, Brown illustrates how concerns with predisposition, prediction, and 
prophylaxis as strategies of health can also be understood to inform the interpretation of narrative.  
65 Clara believes her own body to betoken a latent disease: “A fever lurked in my veins” (215). Citing her symptomology, 
Clara echoes her earlier prognostics regarding her brother’s “diseased condition.” Though it remains unarticulated here, 
another malignancy potentially “lurks” in Clara. This “fever” is a kind of proxy-malady, deflecting attention from the 
more terrifying “termination” her brother’s example forebodes. 
66 Here, eighteenth-century associationist ideas are employed to a prophylactic end, as a new “train of images” arrests the 
“train of morbid phenomena” that may otherwise have been set in motion. Lisa West Norwood has similarly observed 
that Wieland “focuses more on the control of a place and the associations it generates than on tropes of invasion” (93). 
As I have been arguing here, Brown displaces “tropes of invasion” with tropes of predisposition, thus rendering 
“control of place” a way to curtail “exciting causes.”  
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Take Arms?: Arthur Mervyn  
Arthur Mervyn is, famously, a novel about infectious disease. Set during the Philadelphia yellow 
fever epidemic of 1793, its first volume is framed as a kind of patient history, an as-told-to tale in 
which the eponymous protagonist—having conveniently collapsed on the doorstep of a benevolent 
physician—endeavors to account for the “tissue of nice contingencies” (167) that have led him 
there.  But it is also haunted by a shadow-narrative of heredity, one that ultimately directs the novel’s 
circuitous plot into the heart of fever-ridden Philadelphia. Specifically, Arthur believes that he is 
“unalterably fated to perish by consumption” (104)—the disease of which Brown himself would die at 
the age of thirty-nine, and to which, as his friend and biographer William Dunlap noted, he 
“appeared to have a constitutional tendency” (85).67 While the specter of consumption in Arthur 
Mervyn has been either ignored entirely or else relegated to the realm of metaphor,68 the following 
analysis argues that this subplot of hereditary disease is essential to the prognostic hermeneutics that 
characterize Arthur Mervyn’s bio-Gothic, epitomized in a protagonist expressly self-conscious about 
the latent conspiratorial agency of his own body. 
Like Godwin, whose novel Caleb Williams is often cited as a model for Arthur Mervyn,69 Brown 
uses the mode of fiction to explore human motives—specifically, the negotiation between engrained 
tendencies and external influence—as he examines the ways in which the systematic regulation of 
human life operates at the level of the individual subject.70 But while for Godwin, the regulatory 
67 The British actor John Bernard, who met Brown during an American tour, recalled that the novelist’s face “seemed to 
have been corroded by consumption…A weak constitution,” Bernard inferred, “had been his parents’ legacy to him” 
(252).   
68 Carl Ostrowski has read Arthur Mervyn’s invocation of “consumption” in economic terms, arguing that “the yellow 
fever epidemic famously described in the novel might be seen as a judgment on economic liberalism, a vindictive 
invisible hand that punished the people of Philadelphia for their habits of conspicuous consumption” (4). 
69 According to Peter Kafer, Brown “replicate[s] the essentials of Caleb Williams almost to the point of plagiarism” (136). 
See also Dorothy J. Hale, “Profits of Altruism” (1988); Pamela Clemit, The Godwinian Novel (1993); and Samuel Otter, 
Philadelphia Stories (2010), 64-66. 
70 A character who announces himself, at the outset of his narrative, “without any precise object” and thus eminently 
“willing to be guided by the advice of others” (9), Arthur Mervyn has often been understood as “the very personification 
of Locke's famous blank slate” (Roberts 41). As Jenny Davidson reminds us, however, the critical afterlife of the 
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mechanisms in question are primarily sociopolitical, Brown explores the ways in which the systems 
that direct human experience are also biological. As the following analysis aims to illustrate, Arthur’s 
attachment to a plot that is predetermined by heredity importantly informs his understanding of his 
own embodiment and dictates the limitations and possibilities of his agency.  
The narrative of a rustic youth who ventures into urban environs of Philadelphia in pursuit of 
social advancement, Arthur Mervyn harkens to Benjamin Franklin’s seminal autobiographical account 
of self-making. But if Brown fashions his protagonist as a “latter-day Franklin,” as critics like Cathy 
Davidson have suggested (342), he offers an important revision. Franklin situates himself within a 
genealogy of corporeal hardiness, unimpeded by any pathological predisposition.71 Arthur, on the 
other hand, believes that any agency he may assert to manipulate his fate will ultimately be curtailed 
by the latent agency of his own body. Thus, while critics like Teresa Goddu have read Arthur Mervyn 
as an “Enlightenment narrative of progress, stability, and success” that is interrupted by a 
“counternarrative of disease, degeneracy, and decay” (32), Brown in fact shows that the plot of 
progress is always-already interrupted for Arthur by the Gothic conditions of his constitution.  
In the opening pages of his Autobiography, Franklin reports that his father “had an excellent 
Constitution of Body” (10); his mother, he continues, “had likewise an excellent Constitution: she 
suckled all her ten children. I never knew either my Father or Mother to have any sickness but that 
Lockean “blank slate” has tended to misrepresent his analogy in overly heady terms; Locke’s assertion is tempered by his 
simultaneous admission that children also possess innate tendencies, if not innate ideas: “various Tempers, different 
Inclinations, and particular Defaults,” or the “certain Characters” that “God has stampt…upon Mens Minds” (qtd. in 
Davidson 40). Similarly, Davidson points out that Godwin—despite his insistence on human mutability by association 
and experience—does not “think of man as altogether immune to physical causes” (171). If “[w]hat is born into the 
world is an unfinished sketch” (37), as Godwin claims, as Brown shows in Arthur Mervyn, this nascent “sketch” is at least 
partially “finished” by the congenital condition of the constitution. 
71 This unmarked body is in turn a precondition of his “bold and arduous project of arriving at moral perfection” (84), 
which, however satiric or ill-fated, presupposes a subject for whom the body is manipulable by the intervention of 
human agency. As Betsy Erkkila has argued, “Franklin’s emphasis on separation and agency rather than submission and 
dependence corresponds with an increasing concern not only with ancestry, progeny, and descent, but also with bodily 
constitution, health, cleanliness, and the care of the body” (721). In this account of the health and longevity of his 
parents, Franklin underscores the intimate relation between “ancestry” and “constitution.” 
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of which they dy'd, he at 89, & she at 85 years of age” (11). Arthur, too, commences his account 
with a medical history. Unlike Franklin’s portrait of hereditary health, however, Mervyn’s is a sickly 
lineage. “My constitution has always been frail,” he admits; his siblings, he reports, “died 
successively as they attained the age of nineteen or twenty”—tragedies he attributes to “some defect 
in the constitution of our mother.” Further, Arthur reasons, “since I have not yet reached that age, I 
may reasonably look for the same premature fate” (14). Like Clara Wieland, whose presumed 
emplotment in a hereditary narrative leads her to disavow her own “futurity,” Arthur frames his 
narrative as inexorably oriented toward the “premature fate” of his family. “The seeds of an early 
and lingering death,” he asserts, “are sown in my constitution” (104). 
The heritability of pulmonary consumption, also called phthisis and, later, tuberculosis, was 
largely a matter of consensus among late eighteenth and early nineteenth century physicians,72 who 
noted its peculiar propensity to manifest in early adulthood: “The putrid Seeds of this Disease,” Sir 
Richard Blackmore asserted in his 1724 study of pulmonary disorders, “are…born with the unhappy 
Child, though…they do not usually display themselves till he grows adult,” when “they are unfolded, 
and set at liberty, by the Ferments that accompany the Flower of Age” (36). Thus, as Joseph Adams 
reported in his Treatise, “[i]n some families, we see a number of brothers and sisters falling into 
consumption in succession as they arrive at a certain age” (15); Darwin, too, had remarked upon that 
hereditary consumption “occurs chiefly in darkeyed people about the age of twenty” (Zoonomia 294). 
                                                          
72 By 1834, when Sir James Clark penned his Treatise on Tubercular Phthisis, or Pulmonary Consumption, evidence of its 
transmissibility seemed all but indisputable: “That pulmonary consumption is a hereditary disease,—in other words, that 
the tuberculous constitution is transmitted from parent to child, is a fact not to be controverted,” Clark asserted (qtd. in 
Waller, 411). Generally, cases of consumption that were classed as “hereditary,” rather than “accidental”—engrained in 
the constitution, rather than acquired by external influences—were understood to be irremediable by therapeutic 
intervention; as Buchan noted, consumption “is often owing to an hereditary taint…in which case it is generally 
incurable” (176). For more on tuberculosis in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, see Dubos and Dubos, The White 
Plague (1987); Barnes, The Making of a Social Disease (1995); Dormandy, The White Death (2000); Lawlor and Suzuki, “The 






The eighteen-year-old Arthur’s morbid prognostics, then, are no mere manifestation of a 
hypochondriacal anxiety; drawing from the common understanding of consumptive pathology, he 
understands his body to harbor latent, invisible, and inevitable violence.  
Arthur’s professed certainty that he is fated for an early and unceremonious death is key to 
understanding the motive for his counterintuitive movement toward disease-ridden Philadelphia 
during an historical moment of panic-induced exodus. When yellow fever is first introduced in the 
novel, its protagonist is placed at a physical and epistemological distance, having already escaped to 
the countryside, where he taken in by a kindly Quaker family, the Hadwins. It is here Arthur 
becomes party to “a rumour” of the fever’s “destructive progress”: “[m]en were seized by this 
disease in the streets; passengers fled from them; entrance into their own dwellings was denied to 
them; they perished in the public ways” (99). Notwithstanding these accounts of apocalyptic 
desolation, Arthur volunteers to return to the city on something of a search-and-rescue mission for 
Susan Hadwin’s wayward fiancé: “The preservation of this man,” he explains, “was my sole motive 
for entering the infected city, and subjecting my own life to the hazards, for which my escape may 
almost be esteemed miraculous” (205).  
The seemingly-heroic (or else idiotic) self-sacrificial “motive” that mobilizes his search for this 
stranger, Arthur admits, is importantly informed by his belief that he is already marked for dead. As 
he considers his risk of contracting yellow fever, he wonders, on the one hand, whether he may 
“enjoy…exemption” from infection, but acknowledges, on the other, that he “may be condemned 
to share in the common destiny. What then?” he asks; “Life is dependent on a thousand 
contingencies, not to be computed or foreseen.” Yet in the same breath that he acknowledges these 
thousand natural “contingencies” that flesh is heir to, he asserts with certainty his impending death 
from consumption—a “common destiny” of smaller scale, but one that is, for Arthur, confidently 
“computed and foreseen”:  
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It is vain to hope to escape the malady by which my mother and my brothers have 
died. We are a race, whose existence some inherent property has limited to the short 
space of twenty years. We are exposed, in common with the rest of mankind, to 
innumerable casualties; but if these be shunned, we are unalterably fated to perish by 
consumption. Why then should I scruple to lay down my life in the cause of virtue and 
humanity? It is better to die in the consciousness of having offered an heroic 
sacrifice; to die by a speedy stroke, than by the perverseness of nature, in 
ignominious activity, and lingering agonies (104). 
For Arthur, yellow fever potentially offers a more meaningful death because it offers the 
possibility of volitional action: predetermined to “perish by consumption” by the “inherent property” 
of his heredity, Arthur can choose to expose himself to the fever. Contracting fever “by a speedy 
stroke,” Arthur believes, will facilitate his emplotment in a narrative of “heroic sacrifice,” one that is 
far more attractive than a narrative directed by the “perverseness of nature”—a small consolation, 
perhaps, but alluring for a character whose attempts at self-reliance have hitherto been curtailed at 
every turn, mainly by the unscrupulous merchant Welbeck, whose interest in Arthur lies in “the use 
that might be made of [his] agency” (79).73 But if Arthur’s volition is diminished by Welbeck’s 
influence, it is, Brown shows, no less attenuated by his own understanding of hereditary 
predisposition.74  
Notably, though, Arthur fundamentally misunderstands the fever’s trajectory. Conditioned by 
discourse—by tales of his countrymen “seized by this disease in the streets” (99)—Arthur envisages 
73 Welbeck deliberately manipulates his protégé “by slow degrees and circuitous paths” to his own sinister ends (79)—
machinations that prompt Arthur to complain about “irksome situation” of “act[ing] under the guidance of another,” 
and “wander[ing] in the dark, ignorant whither my path tended and what effects might flow from my agency” (50).After 
the crisis of conscience precipitated by assisting Welbeck in a surreptitious (and possibly live) burial, Arthur finally 
declares, “I had acted long enough a servile and mechanical part; and been guided by blind and foreign impulses. It was 
time to lay aside my fetters, and demand to know whither the path tended in which I was importuned to walk” (88). 
Immediately after making this declaration, however, Arthur rows Welbeck across the Delaware River in an act that can 
only be described as “servile and mechanical.”  
74 Brown stresses the connection between lack of agency and endangered health by suggesting that Arthur is not only 
morally compromised during his tenure with Welbeck, but constitutionally debilitated; when he first considers taking on 
the position of amanuensis, he reflects, “My life had hitherto been active. My constitution was predisposed to diseases of 
the lungs and the change might be hurtful” (39). Ultimately, as Stevens notes, the occupation of copyist proves “wholly 




a kind of hyperbolically-accelerated pathology. But as Rush explained in his Account, a period of 
asymptomatic latency always existed between the moment of infection and the “excitement” of 
disease: “[t]he seeds of the fever, whether received into the body from the putrid effluvia of the 
coffee, or by contagion, generally excited the disease in a few days,” Rush wrote; “I met with several 
cases in which it acted, so as to produce a fever on the same day, in which it was received into the 
system, and I heard of two cases in which it excited sickness, and fever, within one hour after the 
persons were exposed to it” (27). Only rarely, Rush suggests, was the disease “excited” relatively 
concurrent to receiving the “seeds”—and its development was never as immediate as these 
“rumours” would have us believe. 
Brown parodies the erroneous, paranoiac notion that one is “seized” with fever—that is, that 
the moment of infection is both immediate and perceptible—when Arthur re-enters fever-addled 
Philadelphia in expectation of an expedient death. As he approaches the threshold of a sickroom, 
Arthur perceives—or so he believes—the presence of infectious agents, as “a vapour, infectious and 
deadly, assail[s his] senses.” In the space of an inhalation, he intuits and incorporates disease agents, 
reorienting his suspicions from the external environment and toward his own internal organs: “I 
seemed not so much to smell as to taste the element that now encompassed me,” he claims; “I felt 
as if I had inhaled a poisonous and subtle fluid, whose power instantly bereft my stomach of all 
vigour. Some fatal influence appeared to seize upon my vitals; and the work of corrosion and 
decomposition to be busily begun” (111).75 Redirecting his attention from the “infectious” 
atmosphere to his infected body, Arthur situates his nascent symptomatology within an expected 
                                                          
75 The disease “seemed” and “appeared” to operate with the immediacy he describes; Arthur claims not that he has 
“inhaled” the contagious agents, but that he “felt as if” he has. Here, Brown exploits dual connotations of “feeling”: on 
the one hand, a phenomenological sensation that, in a Lockean epistemological paradigm, supplies the grounds for 
knowledge, and, on the other, an uncertain epistemological state that calls into question the very possibility of that 
knowledge. He literally feels he has “inhaled a poisonous and subtle fluid” in that he experiences a discomfiting sensation 
in his stomach; yet he also “feels” insofar as he cannot know—that is, he only feels. 
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trajectory. Like Clara Wieland, who erroneously “look[s] forward to a speedy termination of [her] life 
with the fullest confidence,” Arthur expresses unflagging faith in his self-diagnosis and subsequent 
prognosis, anticipating the impending course of “decomposition.”76   
“Concerning my own destiny I entertained no doubt,” Arthur asserts; “My new sensations 
assured me that my stomach had received this corrosive poison. Whether I should die or live was 
easily decided. The sickness which assiduous attendance and powerful prescriptions might remove, 
would, by neglect and solitude, be rendered fatal.”  He thus offers a grim prediction: “My sickness 
being suspected, I should be dragged in a cart to the hospital; where I should, indeed, die” (118).  
But of course, as Brown’s readers already realize, he does not “indeed, die.” At the moment of his 
retrospective narration, he is convalescing in the care of Dr. Stevens; Arthur’s initial (literal) “gut 
feelings,” then, do not necessarily indicate or betoken what he believes. The phenomenology of 
disease, in other words, proves a poor substitute for an epistemology. 
 Indeed, Arthur’s so-deemed “easily decided” destiny will prove subject to continual revision 
over the course of the following pages. He is swayed, for instance, by the medically-enlightened 
Medlicote, a climatist who “combatted an opinion which [he] had casually formed, respecting the 
origin of this epidemic, and imputed it, not to infectious substances imported from the east or west, 
but to a morbid constitution of the atmosphere” (123). As Arthur’s etiological sympathies shift from 
contagionism to climatism, he experiences an abatement not only of his “sense of danger,” but of 
the very sensation of sickness: “I felt confidence revive in my heart, and energy revisit my stomach” 
(124). In other words, this epistemological reorientation produces a partial remission.  
Eventually, Arthur does fall ill. But according to the etiology promoted by Rush and others, his 
sickness would not have been generated by exposure to “tainted air” (125) alone, but rather by 
76 “Decomposition” of the digestive system was understood as the central pathological mechanism of yellow fever, and 
was, as Waterman notes, the “single-word self-diagnosis” (2) Elihu Hubbard Smith uttered before succumbing to the 
disease in 1798. 
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compounding this exposure with predisposing or exciting causes. “In leaving a place infected by 
miasmata,” Rush counseled in an 1805 treatise on seasonal diseases, “care should be taken not to 
expose the body to great cold, heat, or fatigue for eighteen to twenty days, lest they should excite the 
dormant seeds of the disease into action” (Inquiry 21). Shortly after Arthur returns to Philadelphia, 
he encounters Mr. Hadwin; beset with anxiety for his friend’s safety, Arthur experiences a 
recurrence of “morbid indications”: “The emotions produced by this incident,” he realizes, “were, in 
the present critical state of my frame, eminently hurtful.”77 At this point, Arthur’s forebodings signal 
not the incorporation of disease agents, but the activation from exciting emotional extremes. While on 
the one hand, Arthur Mervyn seemingly valorizes the heroic agency of the physician by whose 
“assiduous attendance” (118) its protagonist recovers, on the other hand, Arthur’s own account of 
his infection suggests that a physician’s intervention would not have been necessary had Arthur 
steeled himself against the fever’s “exciting causes” in the first instance.  
As Arthur begins to experience what he believes to be symptoms of fever, he offers us a familiar 
reassurance: “These prognostics were easily interpreted” (129). By now, though, we ought to know 
that Arthur is not the best judge of what is or isn’t interpretable. In Arthur Mervyn, Brown offers us a 
protagonist who is almost always getting it wrong—who acts, as he explains, “before I had time to 
ponder” (29); who is consistently denied “time of power to deliberate” (84) amid near-constant 
chaos, though he maintains a striking epistemological confidence nonetheless. His narrative is rife 
with abortive assumptions and wrongheaded hunches: he no sooner lays eyes on Clemenza Lodi, for 
example, than he suspects that their exchange “might foster love and terminate in—marriage!” (46). It 
doesn’t. And even though he recounts his tale after the fact, with full hindsight of what actually 
                                                          
77 As Arthur’s companion Maravegli warns him, “Nothing will sooner generate this fever than fatigue and anxiety” (116-
17). Of course, Arthur’s encounter with Hadwin is not the first time he succumbs to states that climatists like Rush 
considered “eminently hurtful” in predisposing the body to yellow fever. Early in his journey, for instance, he is beset 
with fear; soon afterward, he is moved to “a passionate effusion of tears” (115-16).  
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happened, Arthur does not elect to edit out these overconfident prognostics, but leads his 
interlocutors through the twists and turns of every convoluted labyrinth of logic, every ill-informed 
supposition, every insensible inference, until it is all but impossible to determine which details are 
what we might call “relevant” and which will ultimately dissipate into insignificance or meander into 
a ratiocinative cul-de-sac. As Brown suggests, neither bodies nor narratives are “easily interpreted.”  
This quality of excruciating tortuousness in Brown’s fiction has prompted many of his critics to 
approach him, in Fiedler’s words, as “a writer careless to the point of shamelessness” (155)—a claim 
that seems all too readily evidenced by the two-volume Gordian knot that is Arthur Mervyn. “Charles 
Brockden Brown wrote slipshod plots,” Caleb Crain declares, “and Arthur Mervyn contains one of his 
worst” (119). Michael Warner confirms that the plot of Arthur Mervyn “cannot be summarized 
intelligibly” (152); in Bill Christopherson’s words, it accordingly “threatens to become a tale told by 
several idiots, signifying nothing” (88). But to suggest that Arthur Mervyn contains useful fodder for 
analysis if only we can slog through the hermeneutic convolutions of its narration is to miss an 
essential point about what Brown conceived as both the essential problematic of medicine and the 
discursive function of literature. With both the thematic content and formal properties of his texts, 
Brown dramatizes the simultaneous necessity and danger of “conjecture,”78 offering models of how 
(not) to read.  
If conjecture is, in the worst case, a disastrous practice of misplaced suspicion—and, as 
Darwin warned, in cases of madness, “immoderate suspicion is generally the first symptom” (433)—
it is also an essential interpretive tool, necessary for the tentative organization of seemingly-
                                                          
78 Both Wieland and Arthur Mervyn are preoccupied with the speculative hermeneutic of “conjecture.” In Wieland, “[a]ll is 
wildering conjecture” (163): because Carwin offers “no ground on which to build even a plausible conjecture” (66), it 
follows that the “conjectures” Clara does form are “vague, tumultuous, and sometimes fearful” (74). Similarly, Arthur 
Mervyn is a patchwork of “remote inferences and vague conjecture” (74). Regarding the actions of others, Arthur 
confidently identifies that which is “easy to conjecture” (92); with reference to his own behavior, on the other hand, he 
suspects the inefficacy of “speculation and conjecture” in unveiling his “true motives” (105). 
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inexplicable occurrences. This, at least, is what Brown argues in his essay on narrative method, “The 
Difference Between History and Romance” (1800). Here, Brown explicates what he sees as the 
essential distinctions between these two representative modes. The historian, he notes, is a kind of 
“observer or experimentalist…who carefully watches, and faithfully enumerates the appearance 
which occur,” while the romancer “adorns these appearances with cause and effect, and traces 
resemblances between the past, distant, and future, with the present.” Embellishing observable 
phenomena with hypothetical causal connections, the romancer strives less to make his 
representations truthful than to make them meaningful: “He is a dealer,” Brown explains, “not in 
certainties, but in probabilities” (341). The conjectural “empire of romance” thus widens the scope 
of “history,” which necessarily “must be limited to what is known by the testimony of our senses” 
(343). Of course, as Wieland aptly illustrates, “the testimony of our senses” is not necessarily a 
reliable index of any empirical truth; this is similarly shown to be the case in Arthur Mervyn, in which 
the protagonist’s gastric sensibilities corroborate whatever etiological schema he happens to be 
laboring under at the moment.  
While the romance’s traffic in probabilities will prove unsatisfactory to the staunch 
empiricist, the faithful enumeration of mere appearances, Brown suggests, will prove unsatisfactory 
to almost everyone else: “Curiosity is not content with noting and recording the actions of men. It 
likewise seeks to know the motives by which the agent is impelled to the performance of these 
actions; but motives are modifications of thought which cannot be subjected to the senses. They 
cannot be certainly known. They are merely topics of conjecture,” which “comes with the province, 
not of history, but romance” (342). And it no less comes with the province of medicine: hypothesizing 
upon the relation between the body’s invisible interior and the “invisible Agents” of disease, 
physicians conjecture both backward and forward, speculating on the cause of disease and 
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attempting to anticipate its course.79 But conjecture, as Arthur Mervyn illustrates, proves problematic 
in the hands of the ill-informed. In his attachment to wrongful anticipations, Arthur imposes 
limitations upon his own ability to act otherwise.   
 
Coda: The Name of Action  
As the early republic’s most accomplished novelist, Brown has shouldered a considerable 
burden in his critical afterlife; as even a cursory review of extant scholarship illustrates, his novels 
have been presumed to articulate manifold theories of citizenship, conspiracy, and American 
political agency. These interpretations, of course, build from Brown’s self-professed positionality as 
“moral observer” (Arthur Mervyn 3)—an argument he elaborates in his essay “Walstein’s School of 
History” (1799), published in The Monthly Magazine and American Review between the serial publication 
of Arthur Mervyn’s two volumes. Here, by way of the invented philosopher Walstein, Brown 
proposes that “the narration of public events, with a certain license of invention, [is] the most 
efficacious of moral instruments” (336). For one such exemplary “fictitious history” (337), Brown 
offers the plot Arthur Mervyn, thinly veiled as an apocryphal Italian tale entitled “Olivo Ronisca.” 
Although the mode of “fictitious history” cannot reproduce circumstances “perfectly similar to that 
of an actual being,” Brown admits, its “usefulness” is nevertheless mimetic: “suggesting a mode of 
reasoning and acting somewhat similar to that which is ascribed to a feigned person” (338).   
What “mode of reasoning,” we might ask, and what model of action, does the “feigned person” 
Arthur Mervyn suggest? “Nothing, indeed,” Arthur admits while reflecting upon his decision to 
enter into fever-infected Philadelphia, “more perplexes me than a review of my own conduct.” And 
nothing, indeed, has more perplexed critics than a review of Arthur’s conduct; readers have long 
                                                          
79 Carlo Ginzburg makes a similar point in Clues, Myths, and the Historical Method (1989), noting the ways in which both 
historical knowledge and medical knowledge are “indirect, presumptive, conjectural” (97). 
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puzzled over his opaque motives, particularly in questioning the extent to which Brown intends to 
present his protagonist as an exemplary model of republican citizenship.80  Yet as we have seen, 
Arthur’s decision to knowingly risk sickness stems from a fatalistic disavowal of futurity, motivated 
by a belief in the immutability of his biological destiny. Unlike “[n]urses and physicians,” who 
“soonest become intrepid or indifferent” to disease through continued “familiarity,” Arthur 
explains, “I was sustained, not by confidence of safety, and a belief of exemption from this malady, 
or by the influence of habit, which inures us to all that is detestable or perilous, but by a belief that 
this was as eligible an avenue to death as any other” (127). Rather than bear those ills he has, Arthur 
flies to others that he knows not of. 
By framing what might otherwise be read as a humanitarian act of selflessness—in Arthur’s 
imagining, a “heroic sacrifice” (104)—as a kind of plague-assisted suicide, Brown offers a rather 
ambivalent vision of Arthur’s moral agency. Rather than simply offering Arthur Mervyn as a model 
of moral conduct, then, we might understand Brown as probing the thornier matter of how 
narratives of “heroic sacrifice” are produced and evaluated. Specifically, Brown’s employment of a 
proto-consumptive protagonist serves to highlights the question of whether the moral value of 
“heroic sacrifice” is proportionate to perceived risk.81 Seen this way, Arthur’s peculiar situation 
illuminates another contemporary discourse that linked medical estimations of susceptibility with 
social valuations of moral agency: the theory of racialized immunity.82  
                                                          
80 Michael Davitt Bell, for instance, argues that the character’s fundamental moral inconsistency—a “profession of 
virtuous intention” paired with an “unacknowledged but persistent self-interestedness”—ought to be read as part of the 
novel’s “full, deliberate, and devastating” irony (59). Michael Warner, on the other hand, asks us to take the text’s moral 
claims seriously by attending to the ways in which printed material can be understood to participate in “a republican 
paradigm of public virtue” (151). Here, I aim to frame contested project of Arthur Mervyn specifically in terms of 
contemporary public health discourses of disease prevention. 
81 The perception, assessment, and management of risk became key to nineteenth-century public health movements. For 
further discussion of the historical development of environmental risk discourse, see Douglas and Wildavsky, Risk and 
Culture (1982); Beck, Risk Society (1992); Krimsky and Golding, eds., Social Theories of Risk (1992); Melosi, The Sanitary City 
(1999); and Freedgood, Victorian Writing About Risk (2000).  
82 As Chapter 3 of this dissertation will discuss, the theory of African immunity to tropical diseases like yellow fever was 
one biopolitical technology by which African Americans were systematically excluded from the rights of citizenship—
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During the 1793 epidemic, the widely-held belief that people of African descent were immune 
to the disease engendered an estimation of civic responsibility that existed in inverse proportion to 
corporeal risk. John Lining, the South Carolinian physician who had advanced the theory of African 
immunity in his account of the 1748 epidemic in Charleston, had promoted a system of racialized 
risk assessment: “There is something very singular in the constitution of the negroes,” claimed 
Lining, “which renders them not liable to this fever” (7). During the Philadelphia epidemic of 1793, 
Rush published excerpts from Lining's account in the American Daily Advertiser in order, he claimed, 
“to hint to the black people, that a noble opportunity is now put into their hands” (qtd. in Brooks 
153). The African Society, under the leadership of Absalom Jones, Richard Allen, and William Gray, 
assumed this “noble opportunity,” mobilizing free African Americans to serve as nurses and 
gravediggers―roles that most white Philadelphians refused to assume.83 Of course, as Rush admitted 
in his Account, “It was not long after these worthy Africans undertook the execution of their humane 
offer of services to the sick, before I was convinced I had been mistaken” (97).     
In his best-selling account of the epidemic, Carey had cursorily nodded to the African Society’s 
efforts, but nevertheless lambasted black Philadelphians with charges of extortion—a censure that 
Jones and Allen repudiated in their Narrative of the Proceedings of the Black People During the Late Awful 
Calamity in Philadelphia, in the Year 1793: and a Refutation of Some Censures Thrown Upon Them in Some Late 
Publications (1794) (see fig. 1.1). Here, Jones and Allen present a portrait of African American public 
service and self-sacrifice that not only counters narratives of black opportunism, but refutes the 
fiction of black immunity: the “generally received opinion in this city, that our colour was no so 
liable to the sickness as the whites.” Correcting both the historical and medical record, they assert: 
                                                          
and an iteration, perhaps, of what Wald, riffing on Benedict Anderson, refers to as “imagined immunities,” illustrating 
the ways in which the outbreak of epidemic disease “articulates community on a national scale” (33). 
83 For further discussion of the African Society’s public health services, see Lapsansky, “'Abigail, a Negress,'” (1997), and 
Brooks, American Lazarus (2003), 151-178.  
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“When the people of colour had the sickness and died, we were imposed upon and told it was not 
the prevailing sickness, until it became too notorious to be denied, then we were told some few had 
died but not many. Thus were our services extorted at the peril of our lives, yet you accuse us of 
extorting a little money from you” (15). Jones and Allen’s argument hinges upon debunking the theory 
of African immunity to establish the reality of risk; the moral value of these “services” is heightened, 
they suggest, by having been performed “at the peril of our lives.”  
Fig. 1.1 Title page, Absalom Jones and Richard Allen, A Narrative of the Proceedings of the Black People, During the 
Late Awful Calamity in Philadelphia, in the Year 1793. Philadelphia: William W. Woodward, 1794. 
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As the estimation of African American moral agency was bound up in this practice of 
immunological risk assessment, so too did the assessment of constitutional and environmental 
dangers direct one’s ethical obligation to the wider social body—whether by striving to prevent the 
latent “seeds” of disease from being “excited into action” by evaluating and mediating the influence 
of predisposing and exciting causes or by exercising self-restraint to curtail the perpetuation of 
hereditary “taints.” As Buchan asserted, “Those who inherit any family disease ought to be very 
circumspect in their manner of living. They should consider well the nature of such disease, and 
guard against it by a proper regimen. It is certain,” he insisted, “that family diseases have often, by 
proper care, been kept off for one generation; and there is reason to believe, that, by persisting in 
the same course, such diseases might at length be wholly eradicated” (9).84  In Wieland and Arthur 
Mervyn, Brown illustrates how prophylactic imperatives of “proper regimen” and “proper care” can 
re-direct one’s biological future. It is a repudiation of “futurity” that contributes to these characters’ 
sufferings in the first place, Brown suggests: both Clara and Arthur fall sick with “fever” as a result 
of their willful self-exposure to environmental “exciting causes”; both fail to take precautions 
because of their deterministic beliefs in the biological agency of their own bodies to exact a 
hereditary “destiny.”  
As we have seen, Brown’s bio-Gothic replicates anticontagionist etiology, figuring “invisible 
Agents” not as bullets or arrows (or, per Darwin, “darts”) but as Galenic “seeds”: latent 
potentialities that develop over time and according to circumstance. To reorient our understanding 
of this etiology, then, is to reorient our metaphors. Consider, for instance, James Dawes’s claim that 
                                                          
84 Another measure to ensure the eradication of hereditary disease, as Chapter 4 of this dissertation will discuss at length, 
was the refusal of reproduction. The threat of perpetuating hereditary mania thus makes Wieland’s intimation of incest 
particularly horrifying, and the unresolved issue of Arthur’s consumptive fate renders Arthur Mervyn’s ultimate marriage 
plot an unsettling rather than satisfying generic turn. For an examination of incest prohibitions and the rise of 




“illness and contagion” offered Brown “a model for the experience of reading” (461). For Dawes, 
disease is essentially an “experience in irresistibility” that “breaks down the distinction between 
cognition (as a willed experience) and automatic bodily processes (as a coercive, unwilled 
experience)” and “transforms the body into a series of cues for our feelings” (441). In this way, 
yellow fever seemingly replicates the involuntary reactions of reading fiction—an especial anxiety in 
the early American republic: “[i]n the 1790s in particular,” notes Roberts, “the controversy over the 
moral value of novel reading often centered on the reader’s emotional susceptibility, or the mind’s 
capacity to regulate the source and direction of its feelings” (38). But for Brown, disease was not “an 
experience in irresistibility.” Instead, it was an exercise in managing susceptibility through self-care. 
 If this politics of self-care is the public health message of Brown’s fiction, we might also say 
that Brown’s fiction replicates a public health method: resisting the seemingly-inevitable by learning 
how to interpret evidence in order to arrive at the most appropriate mode of conjecture. Although 
“an ethic organized around the ideals of health and life produces anxiety, fear, even dread,” as 
Nikolas Rose notes, “it frequently also generates a moral economy in which ignorance, resignation, 
and hopelessness in the face of the future is deprecated. At least in part, fears and anxieties about 
morbidity and mortality are being reframed within an ethos of hope, anticipation, and 
expectation” (27). Ultimately, then, Brown’s revisionary Gothic might be read as expressing more 
than merely the anxiety, fear, and dread characteristic of the genre. Instead, novels like Wieland and 
Arthur Mervyn participate, both thematically and formally, in an American health discourse that 
increasingly sought to transfer responsibility from the medical authority to the embodied subject, 
promoting (cruelly, perhaps) this ethos of optimism. Brown’s characters, and his readers, must 
negotiate between conditions of constitution and contingencies of care; by the latter, they are 




CHAPTER TWO  
Atmospherical Media: Cholera, Domestic Hygiene, and the Miasmatic Imaginary  
 
 
It is generally acknowledged as a law of epidemic diseases, that they spread more 
rapidly and assume a more malignant aspect in an impure state of atmosphere. The 
season has already arrived when various causes, combined with the prevalence of 
great heat, produce in this city nauseous effluvia, a vitiated state of the 
atmosphere...in which the destroying angel, should he visit our city, would walk 
unseen in the midst of us, enveloped in a pestilential vapour. 
 
—“Report of the Committee on Cholera,” Commercial Advertiser, June 20, 1832 
  
 
I had so worked upon my imagination as really to believe that about the whole 
mansion and domain there hung an atmosphere peculiar to themselves and their 
immediate vicinity—an atmosphere which had no affinity with the air of heaven, but 
which had reeked up from the decayed trees, and the gray wall, and the silent tarn—a 
pestilent and mystic vapor... 
 
—Edgar Allan Poe, “The Fall of the House of Usher,” 1839 
 
 
In an 1841 notebook entry extolling the “effervescent atmosphere” of the New England 
seaside, Nathaniel Hawthorne, en route to the utopian community at Brook Farm, rejoiced in the 
experience of “breathing air which had not been breathed in advance by the hundred thousand pairs 
of lungs which have common and invisible property in the atmosphere of this great city. My breath,” 
he reflected, “had never belonged to anybody but me” (284-5). Rewriting the Lockean notion of 
“property in one’s person,” perhaps, in terms of this “common and invisible property in the 
atmosphere,” Hawthorne stakes his claim on the unadulterated air—anticipating Melville’s Ishmael, 
who cites the “pure air of the fore-castle deck” among his several motivations for sailing: “the 
89 
 
Commodore on the quarter-deck gets his atmosphere at second hand from the sailors on the 
forecastle. He thinks he breathes it first; but not so,” Ishmael explains; “In much the same way do 
the commonalty lead their leaders in many other things, at the same time that the leaders little 
suspect it” (15).  
As Hawthorne and Melville suggest, the atmosphere is a kind of democratic commons, a 
locus of communication and exchange. As environmental historian Vladimir Janković writes, the 
atmosphere is “a site of the encounter of the intimate and the universal,” one that is “equally the 
property of experts and the public” (“Introduction,” x).1  For Hawthorne, however, such aerial 
encounters prove discomfiting precisely because of the communal interchange they enable. After all, 
he suggests, air is not only assimilated, but mediated by its multitude of breathers; as John Arbuthnot 
had observed in his 1733 Essay Concerning the Effect of Air on Human Bodies, “The Air near the Surface 
of the Earth, in which all Animals live and breathe, contains the Steams, Effluvia, and all the 
Abrasions of Bodies on the Surface of the Earth, when they are so small and light as to float in it” 
(2).2 For Hawthorne, air is a precarious inheritance, contaminated by contact with the commonalty. 
Hawthorne’s aversion to air “breathed in advance” illustrates his understanding of the 
reciprocal process of respiration, wherein air both reconstitutes and is reconstituted by human 
bodies3—intimating a dynamic interchange akin to what environmental humanities Stacy Alaimo has 
                                               
1 Air, per its entry in Webster’s 1828 American Dictionary—“the fluid which we breathe”—is indeed communal by 
definition, marked by the mutuality of the first person plural. While air refers to one discrete “fluid,” atmosphere refers a 
collectivity: “the whole mass of fluid, consisting of air, aqueous and other vapors, surrounding the earth.” For my 
purposes here, I follow nineteenth-century usage, employing “atmosphere” to denote a consolidation of elements. 
2 For further discussion of seventeenth and eighteenth-century experiments on air, see Porter, Flesh in the Age of Reason 
(2003); Shapin and Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump (2011); and Lewis, Air’s Appearance (2012). 
3 “It is proper to consider air which has been once breathed, as unfit for further respiration, or spoiled,” noted William 
Alcott; indeed, he continued, “we spoil the air for the purposes of breathing, at the rate of more than a gallon a minute. 
So Dr. Franklin used to say, fifty years ago” (The House I Live In 235). Franklin’s observations on respiration developed in 
conversation with those of English chemist Joseph Priestley, whose 1775 Experiments and Observations on Different Kinds of 
Air included commentary upon “Air infected with Animal Respiration, or Putrefaction”: “when one any quantity of air 
has been rendered noxious by animals breathing in it as long as they could,” Priestley remarked, I do not know that any 
methods have been discovered of rendering it fit for breathing again” (37).  
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called “trans-corporeality,” which understands the human body as “always intermeshed with the 
more-than-human world” (2). Of course, the notion of the mutual interpenetration of body and 
environment was also simply the sine qua non of environmental humoralism, which posited the 
human body as eminently susceptible to the operations of air. Indeed, the idea that the atmosphere 
was invisibly and perniciously populated by the pestilential effluvia of organic matter was the 
foundational tenet of miasmatic theory, the etiology articulated in Hippocrates On Airs, Waters, and 
Places (ca 400 BCE), which persisted as a widely-accepted explanation of disease transmission 
throughout the majority of the nineteenth century.4  
The atmospheric anxieties of the antebellum period rendered breathing and its discontents 
popular preoccupations of domestic medical texts. Women, in particular, were charged with the 
solemn duty “to keep the floor and the walls of every room perfectly clean, and the air perfectly 
sweet” (246), as physiologist William Alcott affirmed in his guide The Young Wife: Or Duties of Woman 
in the Marriage Relation (1837). This task, Alcott suggested, was more than rote domestic labor, but 
necessitated a scientific education: “[h]ow can we hope to urge [the housewife] forward to the work 
of ventilating and properly cleansing her apartments and her furniture,” Alcott challenged, “until she 
understands not only the native constitution of our atmosphere, but the nature of the changes, 
which this atmosphere undergoes in our fire rooms, our sleeping rooms, our beds, our cellars, and 
our lungs?” (307).  
Domestic advice manuals such as Catharine Beecher’s Letters to the People on Health and 
Happiness (1855) similarly stressed the necessity of scientific knowledge for the proper management 
of houses and bodies, educating their audiences in matters such as the anatomical function of the 
                                               
4 As Margaret Pelling has observed, “[m]iasmatic theory is only inappropriately applied without specification to signify a 
single theory, and is best used of a type of theory, or for a particular component of theories” (62). For more on 
miasmatic theory and Hippocratic medicine, see Cassedy, “Meteorology and Medicine in Colonial America” (1969); 
Sargent, Hippocratic Heritage (1982); Hannaway, “Environment and Miasmata” (1997); Cantor, ed., Reinventing Hippocrates 
(2002); and Mitman and Numbers, “From Miasma to Asthma” (2003).  
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lungs (see fig. 2.1). In particular, readers were encouraged to remain attentive to the detrimental 
effects of breathing “vitiated air”: that is, air that had been depleted of healthful oxygen or otherwise 
contaminated by pestilential effluvia. 5 “If persons will go on, from day to day, and year to year, 
exposing themselves to unhealthy influences,” Catharine Sedgwick warned young women in her 
manual Means and Ends, or Self-Training (1839), “they must not wonder when the lungs, impaired by 
the poison that has been taken into them, show disease, nor when they are added to the multitude 
going down to the grave prematurely, not cut off by Providence, but by their own ignorance of their 
frames and the laws that govern them” (68). Rehearsing the ideology of nineteenth-century 
American writing on health, Sedgwick attributes disease to a lack of self-knowledge and a 




Fig. 2.1. Windpipe and lungs. Catharine Esther Beecher, Letters to the People on Health and Happiness. New York: 
Harper & Brothers, 1855.  
 
                                               
5 In his Inquiry into the Propagation of Contagious Poisons, by the Atmosphere (1839), the physician Somerville Scott Alison 
explained the subtle differences between air containing “contagious matter,” which tended toward the production of 
“exclusively one disease,” and “vitiated” or impure” air, which proved “productive of deranged health” more broadly 
(23). As Henry Ancell would later not in his Treatise on Tuberculosis (1852), “The expression 'a vitiated atmosphere' has 
frequently been employed indefinitely; it is generally understood as one in which not only the quantity of oxygen gas is 
diminished, and the quantity of carbonic acid gas increased,” he explained, “but which contains impurities, detectable or 
not by the instruments of science” (489). It was, of course, precisely the undetectable nature of atmospheric impurities 
that rendered them especially dreadful.  
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This chapter examines the antebellum period’s preoccupation with the putrefaction and 
purification of domestic air, and its related imperatives of care, through an analysis of two of its 
most famous literary houses. Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Fall of the House of Usher” (1839) and 
Nathaniel Hawthorne’s The House of the Seven Gables (1851) have commonly been read for their 
critiques of inherited property, and the dissolution of anti-democratic, hereditarian forms of 
association more broadly—a dissolution seemingly paralleled in the physical degeneration of their 
sickly, anachronistic aristocracies.6  Readings of “Usher” and Gables often appeal to what Robert 
Blair St. George calls the “metaphoric equivalency drawn between the dwelling house and the 
human body, between architecture and the extended range of meanings attached to the concept of 
embodiment”: a notable trope in Anglo-American literature, and the American witchcraft narrative 
in particular (14). However, as Poe takes pains to point out, his eponymous “House” refers to “both 
the family and the family mansion” (319), simultaneously signifying the hereditary lineage and the 
physical environment in which these consanguineous bodies are situated.  
The “metaphoric equivalency” between house and body is also a salient feature of 
nineteenth-century medical texts, perhaps most memorably exemplified by Alcott’s popular anatomy 
manual The House I Live In (1837), which depicts the structure and functions of the human body in 
terms of corresponding architectural components (see figs. 2.2 and 2.3).7 Yet Alcott does not merely 
                                               
6 Many critics have examined the symbolic symmetry between house and body in these works, noting, for instance, how 
Hawthorne’s pseudo-patrician Pyncheons dramatize contemporary concerns about racial degeneration, or the ways in 
which Poe’s house allegorizes the psychic deterioration of its narrator. For example, Thomas Cooley reads “Usher” 
through the lens of nineteenth-century faculty psychology, contending that “the matching facades of Usher and his 
dilapidated house” illustrate Poe’s parallels between Usher’s psychological and the house’s physical decline (29). 
Readings that concentrate on the presence psychological metaphors, as this analysis of “Usher” will suggest, ignore the 
ways in which Poe’s text draws from discourses of communicable (specifically, miasmatic) disease. 
7 For further discussion of Alcott’s “anatomical domesticity,” see Sappol, A Traffic of Dead Bodies, 168-211. Other health 
reformers employed the metaphor of the anatomical edifice in their writings; as Elizabeth Blackwell analogized, “we 
might as well attempt to build a marble edifice on rotten arches as strive for perfection with a disordered stomach or 
weak nerves; but this organic health is not the end, even of our bodily life” (The Laws of Life 24). Similarly, Charles 
Caldwell reasoned that “[i]f the stamina of the child be defective, it is not to be expected that the health and vigor of the 




mobilize the house as a metaphor, but also addresses the dangers inherent in literal domestic space: 
in particular, the ill effects of “sitting in and breathing the bad air” (236).8 In The House I Live In, 
then, the house functions as something other than pure allegory: not only a symbol for the body, but 
an extension of and an agency that operates on body. The same, I suggest, may be claimed of “The 
Fall of the House of Usher” and The House of the Seven Gables. In this chapter, I read the relationship 
between Poe’s and Hawthorne’s degenerating houses and their inhabitants not as illustrating a logic 
of symbolic correspondence, but a logic of causation: in other words, an etiology. As these texts 




Fig. 2.2. “Frame of the House I live in.” William Alcott, The House I Live In: Or the Human Body. For the Use of 
Families and Schools. Second Edition. Boston: Light & Stearns, 1837.  
 
                                               
8 Alcott accordingly cautions “not to have our rooms in which we sit or sleep too tight, or too long closed! What pains 
ought we to take to ventilate (purify) them often, by opening the doors or the windows!” (235). In Alcott’s text, 
“windows” both refer to a literal architectural feature of the domestic dwelling—one that proves essential to the health 
of inhabitants—and function a metaphor for the human eye. The dual signification is an apt one; as this chapter aims to 
show, nineteenth-century medical and literary discourse strove to render the atmosphere visible by illustrating its effects 




Fig. 2.3. “[T]he frame of a wooden dwelling house.” William Alcott, The House I Live In: Or the Human Body. For 
the Use of Families and Schools. Second Edition. Boston: Light & Stearns, 1837.  
 
 
For antebellum Americans, the threat of atmospheric peril had been rendered especially 
salient by the appearance of “Asiatic” cholera, the deadly and as-yet inexplicable disease that had 
first surfaced in India in 1817 and devastated the European continent in 1831.9 In some ways, the 
American cholera epidemic of 1832 reanimated the etiological debates that had raged during the 
Philadelphia yellow fever epidemics some three decades earlier; overwhelmingly, however, 
physicians believed that the disease was endemic to local environments and transmitted via the 
mediation of the atmosphere.10 John Snow’s 1854 map of London’s Broad Street outbreak would 
                                               
9 For histories of nineteenth-century cholera epidemics in North America and Europe, see Rosenberg, The Cholera Years 
(1962); Longmate, King Cholera (1966); Durey, The Return of the Plague (1979); Bilson, A Darkened House (1980); Delaporte, 
Disease and Civilization (1989); Baldwin, Contagion and the State in Europe, 1830-1930 (1999); Evans, Death in Hamburg (2005); 
Hamlin, Cholera: The Biography (2009); and Adler, Cholera in Detroit (2013). 
10As Amariah Brigham noted in his Treatise on the Epidemic Cholera (1832), some physicians attempted to negotiate an 
etiological middle ground by proposing a theory of “contingent contagionism,” arguing that “although the disease arises 
from some aerial or terrestrial influence, of which we at present know nothing, and over which we have no control,” 
cholera could “acquire a character of communicability” in particularly unventilated or “filthy” environs (296). For more 
on contingent contagionism, see Rosenberg, The Cholera Years, 78-79. 
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retroactively be heralded as an illustration of its communicability by waterborne bacteria;11 these 
insights, however, would not find a foothold in the scientific community for several decades.12  For 
the majority of the century, cholera would remain the stronghold of anticontagionists who, while 
differing on the finer points of its etiology, essentially agreed upon its atmospheric properties: 
“Whether the materies morbi of cholera claims a sidereal or telluric origin,” John Wakefield Francis 
asserted in his 1832 Letter on the Cholera Asphyxia, Now Prevailing in the City of New-York, “the 
atmosphere is the medium through which it operates” (2).  
As a “medium,” atmosphere was not a static entity, but manipulable by methods both 
pernicious and salutary; if it could be putrefied, so too, anticontagionists argued, could it be 
purified.13 In other words, atmosphere enabled not only mediation, but remediation. Medical historians 
such as Charles Rosenberg, following Erwin Ackerknecht’s influential essay on nineteenth-century 
anticontagionism, have accordingly proposed that miasmatic theory supplied a workable political 
alternative to the “decidedly antisocial” implications of contagionism (The Cholera Years 77); 14 
championing hygiene rather than quarantine, anticontagionists sought the sanitation of urban 
                                               
11 At least forty-four maps of cholera outbreaks were published between 1820 and 1838, as Saul Jarcho notes. Thus, 
according to Tom Koch, “Snow’s real genius lay not in the maps he made but in the questions he asked and his ability to 
combine clinical and ecological perspectives in his search for relevant data” (130).  For further discussion of medical 
cartography in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, see Stevenson, “Putting Disease on the Map” (1965); 
Jarcho, “Yellow Fever, Cholera, and the Beginnings of Medical Cartography” (1970); and Koch, Cartographies of Disease 
(2005). 
12 The bacillus Vibrio cholerae was first isolated by Fillipo Pacini in 1854, but its discovery is more commonly credited to 
Robert Koch, who publicized his findings in 1883. For more on Snow, Koch, and the discovery of Vibrio cholerae, see 
Howard-Jones, “Robert Koch and the Cholera Vibrio” (1984); Bray, Armies of Pestilence (2004); Gilbert, Cholera and Nation 
(2008); Johnson, The Ghost Map (2006); Mercer, Infections, Chronic Disease and the Epidemiological Transition (2014); and 
Farmbry, Crisis, Disaster and Risk (2015).  
13 In his 1830 Treatise on Fever, the English physician Southwood Smith famously advocated for sanitation and ventilation, 
arguing “the probability of [fever’s] extension depends very much on cleanliness, the proper ventilation of the sick 
chamber, and the purity of the surrounding atmosphere.” Accordingly, Smith concluded “that the contagious principle 
may be so diluted by pure air, as to be entirely innocuous” (316). For more on Smith and environmental health, see 
Rayner and Land, Ecological Public Health (2012). For a recent analysis of health reform movements and British fiction, see 
Wright, Reading for Health (2016).  
14 For an overview of responses to Ackerknecht’s groundbreaking essay, including counter-arguments, see Stern and 
Markel, “Disease Etiology and Political Ideology” (2009).  
96 
 
environments.15 As a consequence, epidemic cholera has commonly been understood as a watershed 
for reform, especially in its transatlantic contexts.16 For example, Pamela Gilbert, building upon 
Mary Poovey’s influential analysis of the Victorian social body,17 notes that cholera has typically been 
assigned a place of prominence in historicizing the emergence of public health in Britain “as a 
domain of knowledge and intervention as a result of the tendency toward governmentalization” 
(Cholera and Nation 7). But if in Britain, cholera served as a catalyst for state-sanctioned public health 
reform, its 1832 iteration in the United States, as John Duffy has pointed out, “had little permanent 
impact on American sanitation and public health” (The Sanitarians 91). In order to understand how 
cholera did influence the American health practices, then, we must resist the heroic narrative of 
nineteenth-century public health reform and instead explore how “public” health played out in the 
so-called “domestic sphere.”18 
                                               
15 Upon its appearance North America, writes Philip Alcabes, “cholera seemed to validate suspicions that cities in 
general and the impiety of the urban poor in particular were America's main social problems and the culprits in 
spreading epidemics.” The miasmatic theory of cholera’s transmission, he continues, was “[k]ey to this complex 
interrelation of policy and illness” (57). Although cholera was indeed an urban social problem in the United States—with 
poor, immigrant, and African American neighborhoods vilified in particular—it did not necessarily follow that this social 
problem had a social solution; reform discourse overwhelmingly focused upon individual rather than public hygiene 
practices. This is less, I suggest, because “few citizens had any sense of communal responsibility,” as John Duffy argues 
(72), but rather because individual hygienic responsibility was conceived as communal responsibility, since the shared 
atmosphere was understood as a mediator between private and public spheres. 
16 See Delaporte, Disease and Civilization; Durey, The Return of the Plague; Baldwin, Contagion and the State in Europe; Evans, 
Death in Hamburg; and Rosenberg, “Cholera in Nineteenth-Century Europe” (1992). In Great Britain, in particular, the 
cholera epidemic has been understood as “a significant backdrop” to political debates surrounding the Poor Law 
Commission, the Anatomy Act, and the Reform Bill (Bynum 76). In his Report on the Sanitary Condition of the Laboring 
Population of Great Britain (1843), Edwin Chadwick advocated for sanitation reform by insisting upon the miasmatic 
etiology of cholera. As Tom Koch explains, Chadwick supplied “a socioeconomic perspective informed by a miasmatic 
theory of disease that would hold it was less expensive to prevent disease (by promoting a healthier, less odiferous 
environment) than it was to live in an unhealthy city that promoted disease” (58). For discussion of cholera’s impact on 
British public health legislation, see Pelling, Cholera, Fever, and English Medicine (1978); Cooter, “Anticontagionism and 
History’s Medical Record” (1983); Poovey, Making a Social Body (1995); Koch, Cartographies of Disease (2005); Johnson, The 
Ghost Map (2006); and Gilbert, Cholera and Nation (2008). For an alternate analysis, which dismisses the impact of cholera 
on legislation, see Morris, Cholera, 1832 (1976). For other discussions of nineteenth-century public health reform, see 
Rosen, A History of Public Health (1958); Wohl, Endangered Lives (1984); and Hamlin, Public Health and Social Justice in the Age 
of Chadwick (1998). 
17 Poovey examines how, in James Kay’s writings on the epidemic among the Irish, “cholera provides the metaphor that 
draws all of society's problems into a single conceptual cluster” (58). In response, Gilbert argues that the “use of cholera 
as a master metaphor for all the social body’s ills was commonplace this period, even as it was used to challenge such 
values” (7).  
18 As Foucault argues, the late-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries witnessed the “development of a medicine whose 
main function will now be public hygiene, with institutions to coordinate medical care, centralize power, and normalize 
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 In the United States, I argue, cholera discourse promoted not the “governmentalization,” 
but rather the individuation and domestication of health. As Sylvia Noble Tesh has suggested, the 
“hegemony of miasma theory” in the nineteenth century might be convincingly attributed to its 
political association with “the virtues of individualism”: disease prevention efforts grounded in 
environmental anticontagionism, she explains, proved “consistent with the values of self-sufficiency 
and individual autonomy,” and thus worked to “advance the pragmatic values of efficiency, thrift, 
self-interest” (30).19 In the Jacksonian period, in particular, the ideology of democratic individualism 
explicitly resisted the kind of intervention championed across the Atlantic by medical authorities like 
the Scottish physician James Kirk, who insisted upon the “public duty” of the state to “paternally 
watch over [its] people” (6).20 This emphasis on individual agency, along with a concomitant struggle 
over the institutionalization of medical knowledge, rendered the cholera epidemic an exemplary 
occasion for promoting self-reliance. Medical advice published in print media during the epidemic 
stressed the importance of personal hygiene and domestic sanitation, touting the efficacy of cleaning 
                                               
knowledge” through, for instance, “campaigns to teach hygiene and to medicalize the population” (“Society Must Be 
Defended” 244).  What he refers to as “biopolitics' last domain” thus consists of “control over relations between the 
human race, or human beings insofar as they are a species” and “their environment, the milieu in which they live”—both 
in terms of “the direct effects of the geographical, climatic, or hydrographic environment” and “the problem of the 
environment to the extent that it is not a natural environment, that it has been created by the population and therefore 
has effects on that population. This” he continues, “is essentially, the urban problem” (“Society Must Be Defended” 244, 
245). As this chapter endeavors to show, authors like Poe and Hawthorne illustrate the ways in which this is also, 
essentially, the domestic problem.  
19 Others were wont to invoke divine forces of reform; in resolution submitted to Congress and ultimately rejected by 
President Jackson, for instance, presidential hopeful Henry Clay attempted to institute a national day of fasting. As many 
scholars have observed, cholera’s appearance in the nineteenth-century United States was attended by an outpouring of 
apocalyptic rhetoric that read the disease as a sign of divine retribution. For example, see Jortner, “Cholera, Christ, and 
Jackson” (2007). While this chapter largely brackets this rhetoric in its examination of American public health advice, the 
prevailing belief among physicians and laypersons alike that cholera was largely caused by intemperance and other 
suspect habits of life renders it impossible to meaningfully separate discourses of moral and physical purity. Indeed, it is 
precisely the interdependence of moral and physical health I address in my discussion of the ways in which the practice 
of preventive self-care, including the management of domestic space, was held as a prerequisite for meaningful 
membership in the American social body. Moreover, I suggest that the anticipatory hermeneutic of apocalyptic 
premonition in reading the appearance of Asiatic cholera as a “sign of the times” was aptly translated into secular 
readings of the body as public health officials championed suspicious self-scrutiny in the perception, prediction, and 
prevention of choleric symptomatology. 
20 Of course, medical paternalism was not universally welcomed across the Atlantic; in response to the burgeoning public 
health and sanitation movement, the Tory press raged against raged against “paternalistic government”: “A little dirt and 
freedom may after all be more desirable than no dirt at all and slavery” (qtd. in Porter, Health Citizenship 33). 
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agents like chloride of lime.  For instance, verses of public service that circulated in American 
newspapers during the summer of 1832 personify cholera as a home invader, drawing attention to 
latent dangers of domestic space:  
The Cholera cometh!—take care—take care!   
Look to thy dwelling! beware—beware! 
He breatheth corruption, and loveth the spot, 
Where offal is suffered to lie and to rot; 
Then look to thy cellar, thy closet and yard— 
For all kinds of filth he hath special regard— 
But soap he hath hated in every clime, 
And, cursing the fumes of the chloride and lime, 
He hitcheth the rats to his pestilent care, 
(As newspapers tell us) and hieth afar (“The Cholera”).21 
 
Encouraging an inspection of the Gothic spaces of cellars22 and closets, the poem invokes the 
perhaps-dubious authority of print media—“(As newspapers tell us)”—as it unites associations of 
epidemiological and rhetorical communication. Instructing the public to “beware” and “take care,” it 
articulates antebellum health discourse’s dual imperatives of circumspection and self-care: rather 
than situate health as a domain of state or federal intervention, American physicians and public 
health authorities largely waged their campaign against cholera at the level of the “dwelling,” 
                                               
21 A footnote here informs the reader that “Several newspapers have published cases, in which the free use of Chloride 
of lime, has driven away the rats by scores from the premises.” This sort of domestic hygiene verse has a long history; 
the medieval text The School of Salernum (Regimen Sanitatis Salernitanum), attributed to “John of Milano” and translated into 
English in 1608, offered the following advice:  
In houses where you mind to make your dwelling, 
That neere the same there be no evil sents  
Of puddle-waters, or of excrements, 
Let aire be cleere and light, and free from faults, 
That come of secret passages and vaults (qtd. in Temkin 462). 
In the colonial United States, public exhortations for domestic cleanliness explicitly relied upon government discipline; 
Virginia residents in 1611, for example, were “ordered to keep their houses ‘sweete and cleane’ under threat of court 
martial” (Duffy 11). The absence of governmental coercion and emphasis on individual responsibility during the cholera 
epidemic illustrates how, by mid-nineteenth century, American public health operated under the Foucauldian paradigm 
of disciplinary individualism. 
22 Cellars, in particular, were understood as problematic sites of miasmatic production. Upon the 1848 passages of the 
first British Public Health Act, Southwood Smith was appointed medical advisor under Nuisance Removal and Disease 
Prevention (Cholera) Act, which granted local boards of health the power to “regulate cellar dwellings and houses unfit 
for human habitation” (qtd. in Porter, Health Citizenship 32). 
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promoting precautionary hygienic measures to purify the domestic atmosphere for the good of one’s 
own health and the health of one’s family—and, by extension, the health of the nation.   
If nineteenth-century developments in urban sanitation gave rise to a “climatological 
citizenship” that “entailed a putative polity—a climatological state—whose boundaries reflected the 
social imagery of atmospheric powers held to structure human health and history,” as Janković 
argues (“Intimate Climates,” 2-3), in the antebellum United States, this “climatological citizenship” 
was articulated on smaller scales in the project of domestic hygiene. Following Kathleen Brown’s 
observation that “[t]he history of the body reveals a crucial and largely unexplored link between 
domestic life and public culture,” illuminating the role of women in particular in performing what 
Brown calls “body work”—“a collection of cleaning, healing, and caring labors” (5)23—I focus in 
particular on how the house was conceived as a crucial site for the manufacture of health and disease. 
As scholars such as Robert Reid-Pharr have pointed out, the idea of a hermetic nineteenth-
century “domestic sphere” is a fiction, insofar as it is always-already infected by “[t]he whole stinking 
miasma of the marketplace.” Accordingly, “cleanliness,” Reid-Pharr continues, constitutes “a 
discursive strategy, one designed to affect a bourgeois individualism and distinct from the sullied 
public market” (66). Like Reid-Pharr, I seek to examine the mutual constitution of bodies and 
households by exploring the permeability of the domestic sphere; however, I also aim to illustrate 
the reciprocities of this miasmatic traffic—the ways in which, through the medium of the 
atmosphere, the “domestic” or “private” is not simply permeated by but also permeates the 
“public.” The practices of domestic hygiene were not simply imagined as staving off the invasion of 
the insalubrious atmosphere, but as actively reconstituting it.  
                                               
23 In early modern England, notes Brown, “[t]he health of a household…depended on both its location, especially the 
wholesomeness of the air, and the meticulous housekeeping of its mistress and her female employees, whose habits 
determined the ‘special air of the house’” (37).   
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Understood optimistically, the private and the domestic offer an avenue by which we might 
“correct the whole system of our social living,” as Ralph Waldo Emerson argues in his 1860 essay 
“Domestic Life” (592). Arguing that “the real history of the world” was to be found not in “the 
state-house or the court-room,” but “in the house, in the constitution, in the temperament, in the 
personal history” (587-88), Emerson frames the project of social care as a project of domestic 
hygiene: “The progress of domestic living has been in cleanliness, in ventilation, in health,” Emerson 
writes, thus heralding a call to “be clean, be comfortable, be healthy. Let there be no unfound 
skeletons, no tangles not unraveled; open up the doors, let light and air in upon the skeletons; search 
them out, make the houses we live in pure from end to end, and depend upon it, we shall have less 
disease of mind or body” (589-590). He would do well not to open any of Hawthorne’s closets. 
This chapter investigates how the antebellum miasmatic imaginary—the envisaging of 
“atmosphere” as a “common and invisible property” that might be inherited, putrefied, and purified 
by its various shareholders24—posited the atmosphere as a medium of disease transmission and as a 
symbolic locus of democratic exchange. The atmosphere was not simply a self-contained ontological 
entity for nineteenth-century Americans; just as the lungs were understood to “hold…a mediatorial 
office between the inward world of Man, and the outward world of nature” (36), as the 
Swedenborgian ethnologist Alexander Kinmont asserted in his Twelve Lectures on the Natural History of 
Man (1839), for authors like Hawthorne, the atmosphere held a “mediatorial office” between self 
and society.  Heeding Gernot Böhme’s call to “liberate [atmospheres] from the subjective-objective 
dichotomy” (120), I aim to illustrate how theorizations of “atmosphere”—both as the medium of 
disease transmission and as mediating feature of literary texts—disrupt subject-object exchange 
24 In his Keywords, Raymond Williams makes note of the two most common uses of mediation: “interceding between 
adversaries, with a sense of reconciling them,” and “a means of transmission, or agency as a medium” (204). My 
discussion of atmospheric “mediation” encompasses both of these senses: if atmosphere was a means of transmitting 
disease, domestic hygiene as means of remediation tentatively suggested the reconciliation between private and public 
health.   
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relations (environment/body, author/reader) in favor of more dynamic, contingent, and intermutual 
models of association. Indeed, according to medical historian Roger Cooter, this is precisely the kind 
of epistemological shift that anticontagionist theory staged in the nineteenth century: in contrast to 
the “person-to-person exchange relation” promoted by contagionism, Cooter explains, 
anticontagionism relied upon “a metaphor of dynamic and indirect, pervasive plasticity,” as notions 
of social and economic relationality which were increasingly “mediat[ed] through the concept of 
atmosphere” (97).  
This chapter begins by situating “atmosphere” as both an etiological concept and a literary 
analytic before offering an analysis of the anticontagionist health advice that circulated in the print 
public sphere during the 1832 cholera epidemic. While many scholars have supplied cogent historical 
and sociological analyses of nineteenth-century cholera epidemics, this chapter argues for the 
importance of rhetorical analysis for understanding how print discourse promoted a politics of care. 
Taking the medical advice disseminated in New York newspapers as a test case,  I show how 
physicians and public health officials encouraged the reading public to detect, predict, and prevent 
cholera though near-hypochondriacal hypervigilance to their own symptomatic bodies.25 In 
particular, by stressing importance of remaining attentive to the “premonitory symptoms” of 
cholera, physicians implicated individuals as essential nodes of medicine’s interpretive circuit. 
Locating the burden of care with the embodied subject, cholera discourse inculcated an anticipatory 
hermeneutic—what I call “premonitory reading”—that can be understood as a strategy for 
interpreting both bodies and texts in the nineteenth-century U.S.  
                                               
25 I examine in New York City in particular as it was the first site of a major outbreak in the United States. While other 
scholars have addressed New York as a locus of urban public health reform, my focus here is on the discursive 
implication of the individual subject. For more on urban public health reform in the United States, see Szczygiel and 
Hewitt, “Nineteenth-Century Medical Landscapes” (2000), and Lopez, Building American Public Health (2012). For further 
discussion of public health in New York City in particular, see Duffy, A History of Public Health in New York City (1968); 
Rosner, ed., Hives of Sickness (1995); Nash, Inescapable Ecologies (2006); and Sze, Noxious New York (2006). 
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The second part of this chapter provides analyses of Poe’s “The Fall of the House of Usher” 
and Hawthorne’s The House of the Seven Gables, examining the ways in which these engage 
“premonitory reading” as they trace the gradual, cumulative effects of pestilential domestic 
atmospheres on susceptible bodies. Seeking an etiology for his symptomatology, Poe’s narrator 
proposes that Roderick Usher’s agitation operates upon him by a kind of contagion: “It was no 
wonder his condition terrified—that it infected me,” he claims; “I felt creeping upon me, by slow yet 
certain degrees, the wild influences of his own fantastic yet impressive superstitions” (330). Yet the 
fact the narrator is affected—indeed infected—by a similar species of superstition even before he 
encounters Usher suggests an anticontagionist (and anti-hereditarian) explanation: that this 
“condition” is transmitted by the atmosphere they both inhabit.26  Similarly, when Phoebe 
Pyncheon, recently arrived at her ancestral estate, first learns of the history of “lunacy” in her family, 
she asks the question that consumed nineteenth-century etiological debates: “is it contagious?” (132). 
Yet as Hawthorne shows, the affliction plagues the Pyncheons is not contagious, nor is it entirely 
hereditary. The primary pathological agency in the romance, I argue, is not the genealogical “house,”  
but the physical one—not heredity, but environment; not blood, but air.27 
 
  
                                               
26 Critics who have remarked upon the pervasive trope of “atmosphere” in “Usher” have tended to read the operations 
of air as symbolic of Roderick Usher’s psychological interior. Leonard Tennenhouse, for instance, claims that 
“Roderick’s mental disorder is one and the same as the general miasma of the place” (115); John Limon similarly argues 
that “[t]he infectiousness in the atmosphere of Usher's home is the moral condition of Roderick himself” (76). Yet 
readings of “atmosphere” as an index of Usher’s mental or moral state fail to explain the grasp of the environment upon 
the narrator. I argue that the influence of atmosphere on the narrator illustrates the ways in which Poe mobilizes 
“atmosphere” not merely as a symbol, but as a functional formal property. Moreover, as in “The Sphinx,” the 
“impressive” influence of atmosphere is augmented by the influence print media—not news in this instance, but 
romance, whose “influence upon the hypochondriac” (328) is clearly evidenced in the tale’s climactic scene of reading. 
27 This argument challenges Holly Jackson’s recent claim that Hawthorne’s House serves as a paradigmatic illustration of 
“the mechanisms by which blood paradigms powerfully reemerged at midcentury, despite their antidemocratic 
implications” (32). For Jackson, “[t]he romance’s central conflict binds together a family’s real estate, their ‘blood,’ and a 
curse” (33). As this chapter suggests, atmosphere is a key mediating agency in this conflict.  
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The American Romance: Immediacy, Mediation, Immunity  
Cholera crossed the Atlantic in the summer of 1832, surfacing in Montreal on the ninth of 
June. “We are not alarmists,” William Cullen Bryant’s New York Evening Post insisted on June 16. 
Yet since the disease had surmounted “the great barrier relied upon to protect us from that fatal 
scourge of Europe and Asia,” an outbreak, they claimed, was all but inevitable in the United States: 
“the distance between this and Canada is too little, [and] the faculties of communication too great.” 
The Post's prognostication was apt, of course; the first U.S. case of cholera had in fact already been 
reported in Whitehall, New York. Despite the quarantine measures that had been set in place in 
Atlantic seaports, the disease had ostensibly made its way into the United States via the same water 
networks that had allowed for the liberal transmission of goods and information in the antebellum 
era. In his report to New York Governor Enos Throop, Lewis Beck would chart the epidemic’s 
advance across the state—from the Hudson River to the Erie Canal, from Sing Sing prison to a 
Johnstown almshouse—ultimately concluding “that the disease has generally passed from place to 
place along the main channels of communication” (256). 
Hawthorne explores the process of pathological communication in “Lady Eleanore’s 
Mantle,” a tale first published in The United States Democratic Review in 1838 and later collected as one 
of the four “Legends of the Province House” in Twice-Told Tales, which relates the story of a prideful 
English aristocrat who incites a smallpox outbreak in the American colonies. Initially contained to 
the aristocratic classes with whom Lady Eleanore Rochcliffe associates, the epidemic “soon cease[s] 
to be exclusively a prerogative of aristocracy” as it exerts its influence over the New World body 
politic more widely, occasioning a kind of pathological democracy that “compel[s] rich and poor to 
feel themselves brethren” in their mutual infection (57).28  Mapping the spread of disease “by tracing 
                                               
28 Critics such as Michael Colacurcio and Shirley Samuels have suggested that Hawthorne symbolically unites notions of 
epidemiological and political infectiousness. As I am arguing, though, “Lady Eleanore’s Mantle” does more than explore 
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its footsteps back,” colonists eventually identify the eponymous mantle as the source of the 
epidemic; initially imagined to be “invested with magic properties” (50), the mantle is in fact infested 
with miasmatic properties.29 In turn, Lady Eleanore becomes an instrument of atmospheric 
putrefaction; as her physician declares, “her breath has filled the air with poison” (59).30   
Hawthorne explicitly invokes the 1832 American cholera epidemic in “Lady Eleanore’s 
Mantle” as a way to render atmospheric peril present, drawing his readers out of the imagined 
colonial moment to reanimate the miasmatic discourse that had circulated in the print public sphere 
earlier that decade. By the mid-nineteenth century, as Hawthorne acknowledges, small pox was 
merely a “fangless monster” in comparison to its colonial counterpart; to conjure for his antebellum 
readership “the affright which this plague inspired of yore,” Hawthorne alludes to a more immediate 
danger, prompting them to recall “with what awe we watched the gigantic footsteps of the Asiatic 
cholera, striding from shore to shore of the Atlantic.”31 Here, Hawthorne recalls the pervasive dread 
of the element posited, perversely, as both necessary and inimical to human life: “There is no other 
fear so horrible and unhumanizing,” he writes, “as that which makes man dread to breathe heaven's 
vital air lest it be poison” (56).32 Atmospheric anxiety, he suggests, is a kind of transhistorical affect.  
                                               
the metaphorical mechanism of infection; as its title suggests, the tale draws particular attention to the medium in question. 
See Colacurcio, The Province of Piety (1995), 422-53, and Samuels, Romances of the Republic (1996), 81. 
29 While scholars have tended to associate the practice of nineteenth-century quarantine with contagionist ideology, 
focusing in particular on the xenophobia seemingly implicit in isolationist endeavors, as historian David S. Barnes has 
recently argued, most early American quarantine regulations were not based upon a belief in contagion per se, but rather 
upon “a loosely articulated but firmly held conviction that foul or contaminated air could be imported from overseas in 
vessels and goods” (76). Insisting that disease was transmitted by contaminated air rather than by interpersonal contact, 
anticontagionist quarantine regulations directed suspicion less toward foreign bodies than toward atmospherically-
infected (and infectious) cargo. For further discussion of nineteenth-century quarantine and its relation to 
anticontagionist etiology, see Bezio, “The Nineteenth Century Quarantine Narrative” (2013). 
30 In “Rappacini's Daughter,” the pestilential heroine is similarly rendered a vehicle of miasmatic disease transmission: 
she “taint[s] the atmosphere with death” (251), slaying small insects with “the atmosphere of her breath” (237).  
31 Indeed, his eponymous heroine’s name contains the evocative anagram “cholera.” 
32 Scottish physician-poet John Armstrong had similarly described this atmospheric anxiety in his long poem The Art of 
Preserving Health (1744): “The all-surrounding heaven, the vital air, / Is big with death” (520-21). 
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In response to the imminent arrival of cholera predicted by New York newspapers in June 
1832, many of the city’s residents fled for the presumed salubrity of the countryside, despite the 
media’s exhortations otherwise.33 “You cannot imagine how dreary the street looks,” one New 
Yorker reported; “those who remain,” he noted, “keep their houses shut the livelong day to exclude 
I suppose the pestilential air” (Bayley, “Letter”). Although physicians were wont to remark upon the 
latent dangers inherent in air, the specific process by which “vital air” was rendered deleterious to 
the human constitution would remain a matter of speculation for decades. Writing in the Western 
Journal of Medicine and Surgery in 1855—the year after John Snow had attempted to offer evidence of 
its waterborne etiology—a Kentucky physician insisted that cholera was caused by “substances or 
particles of matter of animal origin…subjected to certain chemical laws (atmospherical media)” (Hall 
175). Of course, the precise nature and meaning of these “atmospherical media” remained, as it 
were, up in the air. Yet it was precisely the amorphous indeterminacy of miasmatic theory, historian 
Conevery Bolton Valencius contends, that bolstered its providence as a concept: as Valencius 
suggests, miasma “functioned usefully precisely because it was so flexible and protean,” supplying a 
“useful catch-all for disease worries” (114).  
For literary critics, “atmosphere”—a term perhaps most notably employed in this context by 
Coleridge34—has similarly proven to be a notoriously slippery analytic: a “useful catch-all” for 
                                               
33 The Commercial Advertiser attempted to dissuade New Yorkers from fleeing the city by asserting an anticontagionist 
position: “In common with the ablest medical men in Asia, Europe, and America, we believe the Cholera is not a 
contagious, but is an atmospheric disease,” the paper noted on July 12; “It follows, therefore, that there is no safety in 
flight, since every current of air may beat upon its wings the subtle poison of the malady to seize upon each human 
system predisposed for its reception. Hence we should greatly have preferred that our citizens should remain engaged in 
the tranquil discharge of their business avocations, and their social and religious duties. But since a large portion of the 
public is of a different opinion, and great numbers of our citizens are daily leaving the city,” the Advertiser conceded, “the 
next best advice we can give them is to select the best places of retreat in the country. Among these, we desire specially 
to commend the Mountain-house of the Kaatskills, kept by Mr. Webb, and the extensive hotel of Messrs. Hull and 
Bentley, at Lebanon Springs....The atmosphere, at both places, is bracing and salubrious; and we believe that even the 
wide-spreading Cholera has seldom if ever halted in mountainous regions, or appeared in isolated country residences” 
(“Retreats to the Country”). 
34 In Biographia Literaria (1817), Coleridge remarks upon Wordsworth’s “original gift of spreading the tone, the 
atmosphere, and with it the depth and height of the ideal world around forms, incidents, and situations” (80). Of course, 
the use of “atmosphere” as a literary, moral, and intellectual concept in the nineteenth century also drew attention to its 
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expressing those elements of a text that supersede discrete identification.35  Like Benjamin’s aura, 
that “strange tissue of space and time” threatened with “decay” in the age of mechanical 
reproduction (23), atmosphere is sometimes understood as a way of rendering a text present to an 
audience, working in the service of “aesthetic immediacy” (Gumbrecht 12). This “immediacy” is 
precisely the aim of the romance as Hawthorne explains it in his Preface to The House of the Seven 
Gables, as it “attempt[s] to connect a bygone time with the very present that is flitting away from 
us…bringing along with it some of its legendary mist, which the reader, according to his pleasure, 
may either disregard, or allow it to float almost imperceptibly about the characters and events for the 
sake of a picturesque effect” (4).36 While professing his intent “to keep undeviatingly within his 
immunities,” Hawthorne famously defends the romancer’s right to claim the imaginative “latitude” 
to “manage his atmospherical medium” (3).37   
                                               
corrupting potential. For example, an essay on Coleridge in 1835 issue of the North American Review comments upon the 
“unwholesome atmosphere” of materialism, noting the ways in which “false philosophy” operates as “a malaria to the 
general intellect, a brooding fog over the whole mind of the age, scarce noticed but by some few, who have climbed up a 
great eminence where the air is pure, yet undermining the constitution, and diffusing everywhere a pestilential, 
stupefying power” (334). 
35 William Empson, for instance, memorably deemed it “very necessary for the critic to remember about the 
atmosphere”—a property of a text that ought not be understood as a protean presence “conveyed in some unknown 
and fundamental way as a by-product of meaning,” but rather as “the consciousness of what is implied by the meaning” 
(17-18). More recently, theorists like Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht have argued for renewed attention to concepts such as 
atmosphere. Gumbrecht argues in particular for a recuperation of the German concept of Stimmung, which is often 
translated in English as either “mood” or “climate.” Each of these translations, he argues, carries misleading 
implications: while mood “stands for an inner feeling so private it cannot be precisely circumscribed,” climate “refers to 
something objective that surrounds people and exercises a physical influence. Only in German does the word connect 
with Stimme and stimmen. The first means 'voice,' and the second 'to tune an instrument'; by extension, stimmen also means 
'to be correct'” (3-4). 
36 Hawthorne’s “legendary mist” in some ways anticipates Benjamin’s “On the Concept of History,” which proposes 
that air contains “secret index” of the past: “Doesn’t a breath of the air that pervaded earlier days caress us as well?” 
Benjamin asks; “If so, then there is a secret agreement between past generations and the present one” (qtd in Ford 68). 
As Thomas Ford suggests, “[t]he aerial terminology Benjamin uses to describe this index from the past to the present 
links Benjamin’s philosophy of history to his analysis of aesthetic aura.” Accordingly, Ford proposes a conceptualization 
of aura as “an atmospheric medium of transhistorical communication” that “introduces cuts, discontinuities, into the air 
we breathe” and “reformulates atmosphere in temporal terms, as a disjunctive and heterogeneous period of air” (68-69).  
37 In his Preface to The Blithedale Romance, published the following year, Hawthorne would similarly plead for “a license 
with regard to every-day probability” in order to create the “atmosphere of strange enchantment” that characterizes the 
romance. “This atmosphere,” Hawthorne insists, “is what the American romancer needs” (38). For Hawthorne, one of 
the key advantages of the romance was the way in which it allowed him to explore the risks and possibilities of science 
and medicine without remaining tethered to the represenshadwotational demands of realism. For a discussion of the 
American romance and the suspicion of imaginative fiction, see Bell, The Development of the American Romance (1980). For 
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The interdependence of “atmosphere” and “mediation,” as Leo Spitzer demonstrates in his 
classic essay “Milieu and Ambience,” might be traced to what Newton deemed the “aetherial medium: 
the air flowing between bodies.” The “aetherial medium” does not merely operate as “a spatial 
reference” for Newton, Spitzer explains, but instead intimates “the functional properties of this 
ether” (203-4). Like Newton’s aetherial medium, Hawthorne’s “atmospherical medium” assumes 
“functional properties” as kind of intervening agency, a technology of perception that alters the 
aesthetic “circumstances” under which the tale’s “truth” is presented. Like the physical atmosphere 
he envisaged, to his chagrin, as “common and invisible property,” literary atmosphere, Hawthorne 
suggests, is a means of intercession and transformation.  
Many nineteenth-century Americans were infamously wary of the transformative effects of 
fiction, particularly insofar as imaginative literature was understood to upset the moral and physical 
health of “susceptible” readerships; accordingly, as Justine Murison notes, “formal choices—most 
especially the balance between romance and realism—carried moral and medical weight” (5). Yet 
while Murison reads “nonrealist” genres like the Hawthornian romance as articulating a 
“neurological vision of the body and mind” (6), Hawthorne’s Preface clearly articulates an 
immunological vision: harking to the romancer’s “immunities” from realist demands of referentiality, 
Hawthorne not only evokes the legal association of “immunity,” but hints at the romance’s hygienic 
agenda—one that was centrally dependent on the management of “atmospherical media.”  
Of course, “atmosphere” itself is not an ahistorical aesthetic category, but one that emerged 
in Enlightenment-era British fiction interdependently with the reconceptualization of air in the field 
of natural philosophy, as Jayne Elizabeth Lewis has demonstrated. Examining the eighteenth-
century rise of the novel in confluence with the aerial experimentations of chemists like Robert 
                                               
analysis of Hawthorne’s relationship to pseudoscience and social science in these texts and others, see Stoehr, 
Hawthorne’s Mad Scientists (1978). 
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Boyle and Joseph Priestley, Lewis explores the “sense of being in a mediated world,” which is, she 
notes, both epistemological and phenomenological, occasioned by both “new technologies of 
communication and knowledge” and “the immediate, atemporal experience of the body in a sensed 
environment” (7). In conversation with scholars like Lewis, the following section examines the ways 
in which “technologies of communication” attempted to shape the “experience of the body in a 
sensed environment” during the 1832 cholera epidemic. However, it challenges Lewis’s 
characterization of this embodied experience as “atemporal.”  
As Janković notes, the reconceptualization of atmosphere as “the source of virtually all 
diseases” in the mid-eighteenth century raises a question of reoriented temporality: “Why fear of the 
possibility of disease, not disease per se?” (Confronting the Climate 17).38 In the following section, I 
illustrate that such an emphasis on possibility and contingency offered a way for physicians and 
public health officials to extend agency to the threatened public: by predicting what pathological 
changes might be wrought upon their bodies, individuals could participate in epidemic prevention. If 
the symptomatology of nineteenth-century “nervousness” offers “a reminder that ‘symptomatic 
reading,’ the hallmark of critical approaches to literature in the twentieth century, has a somatic pre-
history,” as Murison argues (6), I suggest that cholera discourse offers not a “pre-history” of 
symptomatic reading as such, but rather the genealogy of an alternative tradition, one that is not so 
much “symptomatic” as pre-symptomatic. 
 
                                               
38 An understanding of such temporal exigencies informs the work of environmental humanities scholars like Timothy 
Morton; expanding upon Böhme’s suggestion that atmosphere inaugurates an “originally spatial” self-awareness, Morton 
insists that atmosphere “is inevitably not only spatial but also temporal”—an observation, he contends, that “is a matter 
not only of ontological nicety, but of political urgency” (166). Nineteenth-century health discourse similarly situated 
changeful atmospheres—and the impressibility of the bodies that inhabited them—as matters of “political urgency,” 
particularly as the appearance of Asiatic cholera on North American shores in 1832 ushered in a major public health 
emergency.  For more recent scholarship on the aesthetic and political discourses of climate change, see Ford, “Aura in 




In Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Sphinx” (1846), a tale of distorted reading, a man mistakes a 
moth for a monster.39  This misperception is conditioned, Poe shows, by a particular historical 
circumstance: the tale takes place “during the dread reign of the Cholera in New York” (843). The 
narrator has fled upstate, where he waits in anxious anticipation of “fearful intelligence” from the 
city. “Not a day elapsed which did not bring us news of the decease of some acquaintance,” he 
recalls; “Then as the fatality increased, we learned to expect daily the loss of some friend.” The 
narrator’s morbid expectation structures his experience, until he at last comes to conflate 
communication with contamination: “At length we trembled at the approach of every messenger. 
The very air from the South seemed to us redolent with death,” he explains; “That palsying thought, 
indeed, took entire possession of my soul. I could neither speak, think, nor dream of anything else” 
(843). Positing “the very air” as a macabre object, Poe both evokes miasmatic etiology and 
comments on the infectious potential of print itself.40 As Poe’s tale suggests, air is a medium of both 
                                               
39 In the letter to his brother discussed in Chapter 1, Charles Brockden Brown similarly reflected on “the multiplying and 
enlarging efficacy of distance” respective to epidemics: “Physical objects are diminished by distance, and even vanish as 
we go farther from them. Not so the yellow fever, and the like imaginary spectacles, which cling closer, and grow into 
gigantic dimensions, in proportion to their actual distance from us” (371). This perceptual failure recalls Ursula Heise’s 
theory of environmental risk perception: “The geographical scope of a potential hazard also affects perceptions of its 
magnitude,” Heise explains; “At times, these kinds of variables in risk perception do not operate in isolation but 
correlate with each other in individuals’ perceptions through an underlying evaluative perspective that statisticians 
uncover by means of the technique called ‘principal component analysis.’ One of these factors is ‘dread,’ an almost 
intuitive fear that some risks may be less dangerous than other, nondreaded ones” (125). In “The Fall of the House of 
Usher,” Poe indexes environmental risk precisely by employing the sensation of dread.  
40 As Katherine Ellison has argued, “information emerges as a concept” in the late seventeenth century, “and almost 
immediately it is imagined as a physically and psychologically threatening entity, at once material and immaterial, with the 
capability of overloading the human body and intellect” (1). In his Treatise, Brigham suggests a correlation between fear 
of disease and the preponderance of information in print media; the idea of fear an “exciting cause,” Brigham notes, 
“been much more frequently alluded to by the medical men in England, France, and the United States, than by those of 
India.” Brigham finds an explanation for this cultural discrepancy in the idea that “the people of India are not, in general, 
a reading people, whilst the Europeans and Americans are so, and by means of newspapers and other periodicals...every 
man, woman, and child, hears daily of the progress and the ravages of the disease.” (331). Brigham's classification of 
Westerners as “a reading people” seemingly anticipates, by way of Benedict Anderson, Michael Warner’s theorization of 
the early American republic as “a reading public” (39). For further analysis of the nineteenth-century American 
periodical press, see Pasley, “The Tyranny of Printers” (2001). 
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epidemiological and rhetorical communication: a source of infection and as a source of 
information.41  
Throughout the summer of 1832, cholera occupied the print public sphere in New York City 
with the utmost urgency. Information and speculation on the epidemic circulated in a range of print 
media, including specialized periodicals like The Cholera Bulletin—a New York publication issued 
thrice-weekly by “an Association of Physicians”—as well as pamphlets, broadsides, and, most 
notably, newspapers. “People talk of little else but Cholera, and read little else but Newspapers,” as 
Charles Fenno Hoffman, founder of The Knickerbocker, complained in a letter, “—& only the Cholera 
parts of them.”42 Indeed, New York newspapers soon seemed like a patchwork of “cholera parts”: 
mortality reports from the Board of Health (see fig. 2.4) shared space with editorialists who lauded 
the curative powers of camphor; physicians' case studies were printed alongside advertisements for 
preventative medicines or cleaning agents like chloride of lime, which eliminated or attenuated the 
risk of infection, according to the druggists who sold them (see fig. 2.5).  
 
                                               
41 The dual meanings of “air” are implicit in its etymology; in his 1828 American Dictionary, Webster defines “air” not only 
as “[t]he fluid which we breathe,” but also as “utterance abroad; publication; publicity; as, a story has taken air.” 
42 A story published in The Knickerbocker in October 1834, entitled “DON'T BE ALARMED! A transcript from the diary 
of a 'Cholera Subject,'” satirizes the paranoia produced by the epidemic, calling attention to the way in which public 
health practices can paradoxically magnify the “alarm” they purport to subdue. As in “The Sphinx,” the narrator has fled 
the city, and “learn[s] the ravages of the pestilence only by the winged messengers of the press and the post-office.” 
While Poe's narrator dreads this “fearful intelligence,” however, the “Cholera Subject” revels in it: “I devoured the daily 
bills of mortality with the feverish excitement of morbid appetite that finds a rich repast in the perusal of dangers it has 
escaped” (306-7). Having scrupulously restricted his consumption of food in accordance with physicians’ advice, he 















 Like their eminent predecessor Benjamin Rush, who had published accounts of yellow 
fever’s symptomatology in the Federal Gazette during the Philadelphia epidemic of 1793 in order, he 
claimed, “to teach people to cure themselves by my publications in newspapers” (qtd. in Nord 29), 
American physicians like David Meredith Reese used New York newspapers as fora for the 
dissemination of health advice. 43 “There is, undoubtedly, some atmospheric condition prevailing at 
present in this city, which creates a predisposition to attacks of this kind,” Reese wrote in the 
Commercial Advertiser on July 9. “The causes are to be found in our good city, and chiefly in the 
imprudence of its inhabitants,” he continued, “in neglecting the premonitory symptoms, or in eating 
or drinking immoderately of improper articles” (“For the Commercial Advertiser”).44   
If cholera was transmitted via the invisible atmosphere, as anticontagionists theorized, the 
only way to gauge its presence was to scrutinize the body for evidence of infection.45 As Valencius 
explains, miasmatic theory imagined antebellum subjects as “both empowered and endangered”: 
“[o]ne’s self was a good guide to the qualities of an environment; the body's sensations accurately 
                                               
43 See Nord, “Readership as Citizenship in Late-Eighteenth-Century Philadelphia” (1997). In one way, the example of 
epidemic discourses can be understood complicate what Michael Warner has called the early American print public 
sphere's “principle of negativity”: the erasure of the embodied individual in favor of an “abstract and universal” (42). 
Cholera discourse reintroduced the body into the print public sphere as a subject of suspicion and scrutiny: the text on 
which disease could be read.   
44 As evidence of this point, Reese offers the case study of one “Mr. R.,” noting that “it may fairly be doubted, whether 
his attack would have been thus sudden or violent or whether any malignant symptoms would have attended it, if he had 
not breakfasted on fried clams just before the attack on Friday morning.” Clams, Reese claims, were “an exciting cause, 
acting upon his previous predisposition.” Indeed, in addition to intemperance, poor diet was notably touted as an 
exciting cause of cholera by prominent reformers like Sylvester Graham. In March 1832, four months before the 
disease's appearance in the city, Graham delivered a lecture in New York, in which he suggested cholera might be 
prevented by avoiding the consumption of “offensive and disturbing substances,” such as meat and chemical additives. 
See Graham, A Lecture on Epidemic Diseases Generally: and Particularly the Spasmodic Cholera, 15. For more on dietary reform 
movements in the nineteenth-century United States, see Nissenbaum, Sex, Diet, and Debility in Jacksonian America (1980).  
45 Following scholars such as Foucault and Poovey, Gilbert notes that “the nineteenth century was obsessed with 
visibility. The city, in particular, became subject to a scrutiny which was as much devoted to actively establishing 
transparency as it was to simply recording what was already present. Modes of knowing devoted to understanding the 
urban social body, especially its poor and sick, which tabulated and described them and their way of life, were also 
devoted to managing them” (Mapping 27-28). Here, I aim illustrate an approach to the social body that focused not on 
visibility, but on phenomenology; not on spatiality, but on temporality. This symptomatic self-scrutiny might be understood as a 
form of what Richard Kearney has called “carnal hermeneutics”: a method that acknowledges “the deep and inextricable 
relationship between sensation and interpretation,” which “both are, as Aristotle once noted, modes of hermeneutic 
‘mediation’” (101). 
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registered peril” (122). In Reese’s notice, the New York reading public is positioned as both 
endangered by the imperceptible miasmata in the atmosphere, and empowered by their ability to self-
diagnose the disease’s “premonitory symptoms”: a wildly underdetermined term that came to 
encompass any gastrointestinal disturbance that might prefigure full-blown cholera.46 If detected in 
its “premonitory” stages, many physicians insisted, cholera was treatable—even curable.  Public 
health discourse accordingly suggested that individuals might learn to manage their choleric bodies 
by first learning how to read them: “the cholera is entirely within the control of medicine,” a July 6 
notice in the Commercial Advertiser insisted, “and easily cured if its premonitory symptoms are observed. 
They say that a powerful Cathartic, taken at the early stage of the disease, is a certain and infallible 
cure” (“Deserving Attention”).47  
By this account, the “infallibility” of therapeutic medicine depends upon the interpretive 
participation of the patient—or perhaps more accurately the proto-patient, who studies accounts of 
symptomatology and concomitantly monitors her body for inauspicious signs.48 Upon self-
46 The disease, explained Dr. Alexander Stevens, president of New York’s Special Medical Council, “is always or 
generally preceded by a furred state of the tongue and a deranged condition of the bowels”: namely, a looseness and 
lightening of stool, “sometimes so light as not particularly to attract the attention of the patient.” However, “[w]hen 
properly treated,” Stevens asserted, “the Cholera is usually arrested in this its forming or premonitory state” (“Familiar 
Instructions”). In his Hints to the People on the Prevention and Early Treatment of Spasmodic Cholera, C.R. Gilman similarly noted 
that, upon appearance of premonitory symptoms, “no time should be lost in obtaining proper medical advice.—If this is 
done early, the attack will often be adverted and always very much moderated and fatal or even very violent cases will 
never occur.” As he warned, “[m]any valuable lives have been sacrificed abroad to a fool hardy temerity which made 
light of there [sic] symptoms” (12). This emphasis on perceptiveness coupled with timely intervention echoes the 
broader ideology of American domestic medicine: “In an American domestic medical guide,” writes Norman Gevitz, 
“no one ever dies of a curable disease brought to the physician writer in time” (“But all those authors are foreigners,” 
241). Indeed, in the first American-authored domestic medical guide, Every Man His Own Doctor (1734), John Tennant 
writes of disorders of climate: “the Symptoms cannot easily be mistaken, nor is the Cure difficult; all the Secret lies in 
taking the Distemper in Time” (7). 
47 During the second American cholera epidemic of 1849, former Ohio congressman Dr. Thomas Edwards addressed 
the danger of distinguishing “premonitory” symptoms from symptoms proper. “I fear the premonitory symptoms has 
done much to divert the public attention from the proper time of medical interference,” Edwards wrote in a letter 
published in Barre Patriot on June 22, 1849; “I shall consider myself most fortunate by this communication, if I can aid in 
the propagation of the opinion of medical men, that the heretofore called premonitory symptoms are the disease itself; and that 
cholera in that state amenable to proper medications; whilst a neglect, by proper treatment, in which diet and rest are 
largely included, of diarrhoea and nausea, may and will ultimate in collapse as incurable as death” (“Interesting 
Narrative”). 
48 This nineteenth-century “proto-patient” echoes what anthropologist Kaushik Sunder Rajan has called the 
contemporary “patient-in-waiting,” a subject produced by genomic knowledge; as Rajan explains, “foretelling future 
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diagnosing—not with cholera proper, but with an intimation or augury of it—the forward-feeling 
subject may seek medical intervention; the cure precedes the disease. This form of self-surveillance 
was particularly urgent, given the strikingly accelerated nature of cholera’s pathology: “It is no 
uncommon occurrence to meet and converse with a neighbor in the morning in good health 
(apparently),” Albany resident John McPherson explained in a letter to his brother; “inquire for him 
in the evening and we find he is dead and buried.”49  
Addressing an audience that was not yet sick, but feared it would be, physicians exploited the 
liminal condition of “good health (apparently).” This relentless promotion of symptomatological 
circumspection can be understood as a form of what medical humanities scholar Catherine Belling 
calls “hypochondriacal reading”: an interpretive methodology constituted by the following three 
injunctions: “‘Be informed’; ‘Be responsible’; and ‘Be afraid’” (19).50 Yet in its preoccupation with 
the “premonitory,” however, cholera discourse implicitly appended an additional imperative: “Be 
prescient.”  Like their Puritan forebears, encouraged to mine the material world for evidence of 
divine intentionality, antebellum Americans attended to their stomachs to detect embodied 
providences. Moreover, though, these endangered readers were encouraged to predict the probable 
possible illness very much configures their subjectivities as consumers-in-waiting for drug development companies looking 
to increase their market” (144).  
49 McPherson relates the story of a man who had been experiencing the “premonitory symptoms” of cholera for only a 
short time: “On the morning of that day, his son a lad went out on a fishing excursion, the father assisted him to get 
ready about 9 o clock in the morning, and charged him to return befor[e] dark—he did so, but found not his father, for 
he was dead and buried, the house hold which he left in health and cheerfulness had abandoned their home and closed 
their dwelling. This altho sad picture,” he notes, “is probably not more than one in an hundred that might be portrayed.” 
McPherson goes on to supply an account of the disease’s “promonotory [sic] symptoms” for his brother in Alabama, “in 
order that when it reaches your Section of the Country (for it will be there and may you and yours be preserved from it) 
that you may be on your guard.” These symptoms, “if neglected,” McPherson warned, were “certain to terminate in 
Cholera in the Course of from one hour to three days, according to the State of the System.” 
50 These injunctions are implicit in the mission of The Cholera Bulletin, which aimed, as its prospectus states, “to allay 
unnecessary public excitement in a season of threatened peril, to communicate to the public accurate and full statements 
of the extent of evil, and to diffuse valuable and practical suggestions as to preventative measures.” The Bulletin traffics 




narrative trajectory of this premonitory symptomatology, and ultimately to prevent its progress by 
seeking the resources of professional medicine.  
The interpretive methodology that defines American cholera discourse—what I am calling 
“premonitory reading”—is a practice of care that situates symptomatology in a temporal trajectory 
to anticipate outcomes: like Heidegger’s Dasein, it “comports itself towards something possible in its 
possibility by expecting it [im Erwarten]” (306).51  Thus, if the “hermeneutics of suspicion” aims to 
expose hidden meaning, this “hermeneutics of premonition” presupposes that meaning is not so 
much concealed as it is underdeveloped, poised to unfold diachronically on the text of the body. 
Unlike suspicious reading or symptomatic reading, then—interpretive strategies that rely on a spatial 
imaginary in their preoccupations with “surface” and “depth”—premonitory reading is not simply a 
diagnostic, but a prognostic practice, one that posits bodies and texts as systems of signs to be read not 
simply for what they signify, but for what they forebode. In this way, it is akin to what Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick calls “paranoid reading”: a strategy of hypervigilance that “generates, 
paradoxically, a complex relation to temporality that burrows both backward and forward” (130).52 
Crucially, though, “premonitory reading” reconstitutes suspicion as epistemological confidence not 
merely for the sake of “unveiling hidden violence” (140), but for the sake of preventing it.  
Paradoxically, the performative extension of interpretive agency to the American public 
allowed for a continuation of the disciplinary authority of regular medicine—asserting faith in the 
efficacy of allopathy, even in the face of a public health crisis that presumably highlighted its 
                                               
51 Notably, Heidegger defines the “the Being of Dasein” as “care” [Sorge]; this “being-in-the-world” is a form of “taking 
care” [Besorgen] (157). 
52 The “complex relation to temporality” Sedgwick describes —an incessant shuttling between cause and consequence—
aptly characterizes the semiotics of medicine, as Barthes suggests: the medical “sign,” he writes, “compels a mastery of 
time, of disease as duration” (205). Self-awareness of symptomatology prompts us consider to both the future 
development and the originating source of the disease.  
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“therapeutic impotence” (Whorton 63).53 If medicine operated most effectively in conjunction with 
the interpretive participation of the patient, then the burden of care might be effectively displaced 
from the physician (or indeed the state) and relocated with the individual subject. Thus, while 
sociologist Owen Whooley has argued that the 1832 cholera outbreak precipitated an 
“epistemological crisis” for American medicine—that cholera “became a symbolic failure for 
allopathic medicine” (16)54 as a result of the profession’s inability to contain or explain it—according 
to the logic of “premonitory” symptomatology, cholera’s providence could be understood not as a 
failure of medical epistemology or therapeutics, but as a failure of individual vigilance. 
On August 17, two months after the epidemic’s initial appearance in New York City, the 
Evening Post offered a demographic overview of its collateral damage. Cholera’s “principal victims,” 
the Post reported, “have undoubtedly been the intemperate, and the filthy, inhabiting foul dwellings, 
and neglecting all the admonitions which were given to guard against the fatality of its attack; and in 
most cases,” they continued, “out of this class, those who neglected the premonitory symptoms, and 
indulged in eating improper food, were guilty of excesses, or whose constitutions being much 
debilitated, and laboring under great excitement, brought the disease upon them” (“From the Daily 
Advertiser”). A certain cohort “brought the disease upon them,” it seemed, not only because they 
were intemperate or filthy, but because they were poor readers: “neglecting all the admonitions 
which were given” by medical and civic authorities in the newspapers, they misread medical advice; 
having “neglected the premonitory symptoms,” they misread their own bodies.55  
                                               
53 During the 1820s and 30s, movements like Thomsonianism challenged the regularly-educated physician's “heroic” 
therapeutics, re-locating the agency to prevent and treat disease with ordinary individuals. For a discussion of nineteenth-
century American homeopathic medicine as a counter to “heroic” medicine as practiced by physicians like Benjamin 
Rush, see Burbick, Healing the Republic, 27-8. For an extensive account of the nineteenth-century alternative medical 
movements, see Whorton, Nature Cures (2002). 
54 This “epistemological crisis,” Whooley explains, “ushered in an era of unregulated medicine and intense competition 
among medical sects” (16) —leading, for instance, to the repeal of medical licensing laws in the United States by the 
1840s, and the assertion of increased cultural authority by alternative medical movements such as homeopathy.  
55 At the same, however—as Poe illustrates in “The Sphinx”—reading too closely could be just as dangerous as not 
reading closely enough; fearful and suspicious people could induce cholera as easily as intemperate and “filthy” people. 
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In the following section, I examine how an understanding of “premonitory reading” as a 
form of care56—and misreading as a form of neglect—informed both medical and literary hermeneutics 
in the antebellum United States. After all, a hermeneutic of premonition is crucial not only to 
Protestant theology and medical diagnostics, but to narrative fiction: as the previous chapter 
suggests, Gothic fiction, in particular, had proved conducive to this kind of anticipatory and 
participatory process; in its early iteration in eighteenth-century Europe, Deirdre Lynch notes, the 
Gothic “produced a nation of knowing readers” who “could look up from their books and issue arch 
predictions about what they clearly saw coming” (47). If health discourse implicated proto-patients 
as participants in the diagnosis and prevention of disease, authors like Poe implicated readers as 
participants in the interpretive and predictive processes of narrative.57 
 
Air of Consequence: “The Fall of the House of Usher”  
 “Some of my young friends may ask me how I know anything about the atmosphere, or that 
there is any such substance as the atmosphere, when I, nor any body else, cannot see it,” writes the 
author of an 1833 children’s science text entitled The Book of the Atmosphere. “Your question is a 
reasonable one,” the author admits; “We know that there is such a substance as the atmosphere 
                                               
A June 26 letter to the editor of the Evening Post, signed “Medicus,” accordingly chastises “the exaggerated tales 
manufactured by provincial newspaper editors as if they were in verity official statements.” Editors' production of panic, 
“Medicus” argues, comes with “laboring in their vocations.” But it was not only the printing profession that might benefit 
from perpetuating paranoia: “Doctors, Druggists, Camphor dealers, vendors of Lime, Chloride of Soda, or any other 
disinfecting material or healing drug, are all engaged in increasing the general panic, that their vocations may be 
magnified!” he cries. “Cholera! Cholera! Cholera! is cried out with vehemence as the boys cry fire! fire! fire! and with, I 
fear, very much the same general motive; the one for interest, the other for amusement, and both, no doubt, will be 
equally mortified if disappointed” (“To the Editors”).  
56 Foucault remarks upon similar practice of self-care among the Stoics: praemeditatio malorum, a meditation on future ills. 
This thought exercise, he explains, was “a matter not of visualizing the future as it is likely to be but, rather, very 
systematically imagining the worst that might happen, even if it is not at all likely to happen” (“The Hermeneutic of the 
Subject” 102).   
57 Gillian Beer makes a similar point in her discussion of Daniel Deronda; here, argues Beer, Eliot’s readers engage in 
“prophetic and speculative activity”—one that is “impregnated with dread as well as irony, since “[t]he reader 
participates in a hermeneutic task…in which the text interpreted is full of lacunae” (216).  
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from its effects” (20). In his treatise The Atmosphere and Atmospherical Phenomena (1799), the Scottish 
theologian and scientist Thomas Dick—a notable influence on Poe—had arrived at a similar 
conclusion. “We see nothing, it may be said—we feel nothing,” Dick writes (15).58 Yet as he goes on 
to show, the notion that “we feel nothing” is not quite accurate; for instance, he cites an account 
from the American Journal of Science concerning contemporary experimentation on oxygen: “The 
writer has inhaled this gas,” he notes, “and can attest to its pleasing and exhilarating effects” (76). Of 
course, as we have seen, the physiological effects of air were not always so pleasant.  Indeed, 
elsewhere, Dick extolled the importance “[p]ure atmospheric air”: “Where it is confined for want of 
circulation, and impregnated with the deleterious fumes of sulphur, putrid substances, smoke, 
dunghills, excrements, and other noxious exhalations,” he noted, “it acts as a slow poison, induces 
diseases, and gradually undermines the human constitution” (Mental Illumination 76-77).   
 Conceptualizing contaminated air as a “slow poison” that engendered gradual effects on the 
human body, Dick seemingly anticipates what Rob Nixon has called “slow violence,” a process by 
which pathological causes cumulatively produce “delayed effects” on vulnerable bodies (8).59  The 
gradual or delayed nature of atmospheric effects was a common preoccupation of nineteenth-
century medical texts; as Elizabeth Blackwell explained in The Laws of Life (1852), the systemic 
putrefaction occasioned by “[v]itiated air—air laden with human exhalations, with impure odors, 
with miasm” occurred “[s]o slowly, sometimes, that the cause is quite overlooked; but there is no 
neglect which more surely undermines the constitution than the continued breathing of vitiated air” 
                                               
58 Ultimately, Dick appeals to the scientific reality of imperceptible air to argue for the existence of the divine: “From the 
invisibility of the atmosphere, and its numerous and important effects in the system of nature,” Dick insists, “we may 
learn the folly of denying the reality of a future and invisible state of existence, because the objects connected with that 
state are not perceptible by our corporeal senses” (137-8).  
59 As Julie Sze has observed in her study of the racial politics of urban health movements, “[c]ontemporary 
environmental justice activism, especially through its belief in the relationship between air pollution and poor health, 
echoes nineteenth- and early twentieth-century claims made in highly contested and politicized debates about disease 
causation in the urban environment” (30). As this chapter suggests, antebellum American etiological debates strove to 
illuminate the risks not only of the “urban environment” writ large, but of more microcosmic domestic ecologies.  
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(78-79). Positing this enervation as a condition of “neglect,” Blackwell encourages her readership to 
become more attentive to the “quite overlooked” agency of the air.60  
 In his well-known essay “The Philosophy of Composition” (1846), Poe similarly scrutinizes 
invisible mechanisms—here, to explain the rigorously formulaic production of literary “effect,” or 
the “indispensable air of consequence, or causation” that governs a poem. This “air of 
consequence,” Poe suggests, may be achieved “only with the denouement constantly in view...by 
making the incidents, and especially the tone at all points, tend to the development of the intention” 
(13). If a poem is thus composed—if, as Poe insists, it “proceed[s] step by step, to its completion, 
with the precision and rigid consequence of a mathematical problem”—perhaps the pseudo-
algorithmic “effect” of fiction might similarly be interpreted in terms of the inevitable development 
of its elements, “especially the tone” (14-15). As Poe proposes, “tone” is intimately associated the 
notion of necessary causation: the tonal qualities of a text structure expectations within a system of 
“rigid consequence.”  
 Like Hawthorne’s “atmospherical medium,” Poe’s “air of consequence” draws from 
contemporary medico-scientific understandings of the atmosphere as an agent productive of 
predictable “effects.” 61  In “The Fall of the House of Usher,” Poe appeals to this anticipatory “air of 
                                               
60 Lucretius captures this sense of gradual atmospheric violence in On the Nature of Things (De rerum natura): “Whenever 
that air, therefore, which to us is strong poison, puts itself in motion, and an unwholesome atmosphere begins to spread, 
it creeps along, by degrees, like a mist or cloud, and disorders the whole heaven, wherever it advances, and compels it to 
alter its nature. It happens, accordingly, that when this corrupt air has at length joined our air, it infects it, and renders it like 
itself, and unsuitable for us. … the infection remains suspended in the air itself; and when, as we breathe, we inhale the air 
mingled with it, we must necessarily absorb those seeds of disease into our body” (292, emphasis in original).  
61 Poe’s abiding interest in the physical properties and physiological effects of air is perhaps most readily evidenced by 
his famous literary “hoax” of 1835, “The Unparalleled Adventure of One Hans Pfaall,” which relates the efforts of a 
Dutch man to ascend to the moon in hot air balloon, along with two pigeons, a cat, and a device intended to convert the 
upper strata of the atmosphere into breathable air. When the cat gives birth to a litter of kittens en route, Pfaall seizes 
the opportunity to test his hypothesis regarding the “habitual endurance of atmospheric pressure”: he supposes that, 
having never been habituated to the atmosphere at sea level, the kittens will exhibit less discomfort at the altitude than 
their mother. Pfaall’s observations exceed his expectations, however, when he discovers the kittens “evidently enjoying a 
high degree of health, breathing with the greatest ease and perfect regularity, and evincing not the slightest sign of any 
uneasiness.” As a result, Pfaall supposes “that the highly rarefied atmosphere around, might perhaps not be, as I had 
taken for granted, chemically insufficient for the purposes of life, and that a person born in such a medium might, 
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consequence” in order to illustrate the gradual and cumulative effects of a vitiated domestic 
atmosphere upon siblings Roderick and Madeline Usher, as well as upon the unnamed and unrelated 
narrator—the paradigmatic “empowered and endangered” subject who registers environmental risk 
by way of bodily sensation. Yet since the narrator fails to adequately interpret these pathological 
effects as indicators of environmental violence, Poe’s audience participates in the interpretive 
process by reading the narrator’s phenomenological responses as premonitory symptoms that index 
the pathological atmosphere of the house, and ultimately augur the inevitable “fall.” 
 At the outset of the tale, Poe establishes the mutual implication of heredity and environment 
as the narrator ruminates upon the family’s reproductive “deficiency”:  
It was this deficiency, I considered, while running over in thought the perfect 
keeping of the character of the premises with the accredited character of the people, 
and while speculating upon the possible influence which the one, in the long lapse of 
centuries, might have exercised upon the other—it was this deficiency, perhaps, of 
collateral issue, and the consequent undeviating transmission, from sire to son, of the 
patrimony with the name, which had, at length, so identified the two as to merge the 
original title of the estate in the quaint and equivocal appellation of the ‘House of 
Usher’—an appellation which seemed to include, in the minds of the peasantry who 
used it, both the family and the family mansion (319).  
 
Understood to signify both “people” and “premises,” the “House of Usher” exemplifies the 
etiological entanglement of heredity and environment. On the one hand, the existence of a 
hereditary malady may serve to explain why “the stem of the Usher race…had put forth, at no 
period, any enduring branch” (319); Roderick Usher himself insists that he suffers from “a 
constitutional and a family evil” (322). On the other hand, admitting the “possible influence” of 
“character of the premises” upon the “character of the people,” the narrator suggests that the 
“undeviating transmission” of hereditary peculiarities may be due not—or not entirely—to the 
family’s physiology, but to the fact that they have inhabited an insalubrious environment.   
                                               
possibly, be unaware of any inconvenience attending its inhalation” (980). The atmospherical “medium,” Poe suggests, 
produces different effects on different bodies, depending upon their degree of acclimation.   
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 The effects of this air are especially evident in Roderick Usher, illustrated in particular by 
certain “superstitious impressions in regard to the dwelling which he tenanted” (323). Namely, 
Usher has come to believe in the “sentience” of his home: 
The conditions of the sentience had been here, he imagined, fulfilled in the method 
of collocation of these stones—in the order of their arrangement, as well as in that 
of the many fungi which overspread them, and of the decayed trees which stood 
around—above all, in the long undisturbed endurance of this arrangement, and in its 
reduplication in the still waters of the tarn. Its evidence—the evidence of the 
sentience—was to be seen, he said, (and I here started as he spoke,) in the gradual 
yet certain condensation of an atmosphere of their own about the waters and the 
walls. The result was discoverable, he added, in that silent, yet importunate and 
terrible influence which for centuries had moulded the destinies of his family, and 
which made him what I now saw him—what he was (327-8). 
 
Usher’s belief in his residence’s “sentience” is connected, Poe shows, not only with the stones, but 
with the “decayed trees” and “still waters”—degenerated conditions of environment which intimate 
the production of a miasma whose physiological effects is written upon the bodies of Ushers. 
 Notably, while the narrator overtly dismisses Usher’s “superstitious impressions” as a 
symptom of his “disordered fancy,” he nevertheless “start[s]” (327) at Usher’s suggestion that the 
stones emit “an atmosphere of their own.” He does so, we know, because he has independently 
arrived at this very conclusion, having imagined the premises to exude “an atmosphere peculiar to 
themselves and their immediate vicinity…a pestilent and mystic vapor, dull, sluggish, faintly 
discernible, and leaden-hued” (319). Mobilizing the prognostic model of premonitory 
symptomatology in the narrator’s initial visceral “sickening,” Poe illustrates the unfolding effects of 
pestilential air upon the receptive body: the narrator is immediately “unnerved” by the House of 
Usher, experiencing “a sense of insufferable gloom” that manifests symptomatically as “an iciness, a 
sinking, a sickening of the heart” (317). As he enters the house, he not only intuits its idiosyncratic 
atmosphere, but incorporates it: “I felt that I breathed an atmosphere of sorrow,” he claims; “An air 
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of stern, deep, and irredeemable gloom hung over and pervaded all” (321).62   
 This “advance mention” of the house’s peculiar atmosphere might seem to be, in Gérard 
Genette’s terms, “only an ‘insignificant seed,’ and even an imperceptible one, whose importance as a 
seed will not be recognized until later, and retrospectively.” However, as Genette continues, “we 
must consider the possible (or rather the variable) narrative competence of the reader, arising from 
practice, which enables him both to decipher more and more quickly the narrative code in general or 
the code appropriate to a particular genre or particular work, and also to identify the ‘seeds’ when 
they appear” (76-77). If proto-patients were expected to predict the development of the miasmatic 
“seeds of disease,” so too are the Gothic’s readers expected to predict the development of these 
seeds of meaning. 
 If Poe’s tale exposes the exigency of latent environmental threats, it does so “by slow yet 
certain degrees” (330), tracing the effect of atmosphere upon the endangered narrator from its initial 
production of a visceral dread in the narrator, to the peculiar and horrible manifestation with which 
this “air of consequence” achieves its inevitable denouement: “the huge masses of agitated 
vapor…glowing in the unnatural light of a faintly luminous and distinctly visible gaseous exhalation 
which hung about and enshrouded the mansion” (331). Recalling certain contemporary accounts of 
“cholera clouds,” in which observers claimed to literally see the disease’s presence,63 this “distinctly 
                                               
62 Here, Poe echoes one of his earlier tales, “Shadow—A Parable,” published anonymously in the Southern Literary 
Messenger in 1835, which relates the experience of attempting to escape a dreaded disease: “There were things around us 
and about of which I can render no distinct account,” the narrator recalls, citing “heaviness in the atmosphere—a sense 
of suffocation—anxiety—and, above all, that terrible state of existence which the nervous experience when the senses 
are keenly living and awake, and meanwhile the powers of thought lie dormant” (218-19). The most distressing part of 
the affect produced by awareness of the environmental dangers of “pestilence,” Poe suggests, is that it is unanalyzable. 
63 See Mukharji, “The ‘Cholera Cloud’ in the Nineteenth-Century ‘British World’” (2012). In Daniel Defoe's Journal of the 
Plague Year (1722), the narrator similarly addresses the ostensible appearance of “apparitions in the air” by assuring his 
readership that those who claimed to have read divine messages in the heavens “saw sights that never appeared; but the 
imagination of the people was really turned wayward and possessed. And no wonder, if they who were poreing 
continually at the clouds saw shapes and figures, representations and appearances, which had nothing in them but air, 
and vapour” (27).  
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visible” appearance of “agitated vapor” renders tangible the atmosphere’s hitherto-invisible perils.64 
The narrator attempts to rationalize the ostensibly-portentous occurrence in scientific terms: “These 
appearances, which bewilder you, are merely electrical phenomena not uncommon—or it may be 
that they have their ghastly origin in the rank miasma of the tarn.  Let us close this casement,” he 
suggests; “the air is chilling and dangerous to your frame” (331-2). Yet this proposition of an 
environmental explique—the notion that the “bewilder[ing]” luminosity may be attributed to “merely 
electrical” or miasmatic occurrences—does not mitigate the dread of the phenomenon’s effects.   
A carefully engineered exercise in pathological causality, “The Fall of the House of Usher” 
mobilizes the affective phenomenon Janković calls “atmosfear” 65 —an angst, he explains, “felt in 
particular by fragile and ailing constitutions” (“Intimate Climates,” 9). 66   Indeed, it is precisely 
because of his constitutional peculiarity—his “morbid acuteness of the senses”—that Usher suffers 
so particularly. Yet he does not suffer from physiological sensations alone, but also from the 
prognoses they engender. Ultimately, he falls “victim to the terrors he had anticipated” (335) not 
because his hypochondriacal expectations somehow bring these “terrors” into being, but because he 
fails to effectively employ his premonitions in the service of prophylaxis. Poe’s readers must do what 
the narrator cannot quite manage to: anticipate the effects of environmental violence. 
                                               
64 The will to visualize miasma is evident in the public discourse of the 1832 epidemic; New York’s Cholera Bulletin, for 
instance, addressed reports of the visual perception of atmosphere in its August 13 issue; eschewing the “fanciful 
speculation with some correspondents of the Public Journals, who have endeavored to detect the aerial monster in one 
of the many disguises assumed since its departure from the Eastern clime,” the Bulletin explained, “[a] peculiar appearance 
of the atmosphere has been alluded to, as an evidence that some murky influence prevailed, capable of disturbing the 
human economy”; in response, they claimed “[i]t is scarcely possible to attempt an argument upon this subject, for there 
is not so much as a vapour whereon to build a theory.”  
65 Janković’s “atmosfear” might perhaps be understood as an iteration of what Simon Estok has more broadly deemed 
“ecophobia,” or fear of the agentive potential of the natural environment.65 See Estok, “Theorizing in a Space of 
Ambivalent Openness” (2009).  Crucially, however, for Poe, as for Hawthorne, this “atmosfear” does not simply suggest 
a dichotomizing conflict between the human and non-human, but intimates the way in which bodies, matter, and 
atmospheres exist in a complex network of interrelation and interpenetration.  
66 Indeed, as William Barnwell observed in his 1802 study of atmospheric disease, “The effects produced by breathing a 
vitiated atmosphere, are very sensibly perceived, by persons of much nervous sensibility; some are so very susceptible of 
the changes in the purity of the air, as to be soon affected with an uneasy sensation of the lungs” (90).   
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The Pursuit of Purer Air: The House of the Seven Gables  
In his review of Twice Told Tales, published in Godey’s Lady’s Book in November 1847, Poe 
admonished Hawthorne as an author “infinitely too fond of allegory”—a trait that, in Poe’s 
estimation, rendered the Salem romancer “peculiar and not original.” This prevailing “spirit of 
‘metaphor run-mad,’” wrote Poe, “is clearly imbibed from the phalanx and phalanstery atmosphere 
in which he has so long been struggling for breath” (587); his literary style, in other words, was a sort 
of Transcendentalist infection. Yet by the time Hawthorne’s reputation had been cemented in the 
American literary imagination, critics like Henry James would celebrate the “atmosphere” that 
informed his fiction: “The cold, bright air of New England seems to blow through his pages,” wrote 
James, “and these, in the opinion of many people, are the medium in which it is most agreeable to 
make the acquaintance of that tonic atmosphere” (3-4).  
Commending the “local quality” of Hawthorne’s works, James noted that romances like The 
House of the Seven Gables were “impregnated with the New England air”—unlike Hawthorne’s 
writings on Rome, James continued, in which he had attempted “to project himself into an 
atmosphere in which he has not a transmitted and inherited property” (166).67 While Walter Benn 
Michaels has read The House of the Seven Gables as an illustration of how the romance is “imagined as a 
kind of property, or rather as a relation to property,”68 James’s comments illustrate the way in which 
                                               
67 Similarly, in his 1874 Study of Hawthorne, George Parsons Lathrop remarked upon the “atmosphere of sadness and 
mystery that hangs over Salem” (37), observing that while “many absorb the atmosphere of age to their great advantage, 
there must be other temperaments among the descendants of so unique and so impressionable a body of men as the 
early settlers of this region, which would succumb to the awesome and depressing influences that also lurk in the air” 
(39). In Lathrop’s estimation, Hawthorne had been in possession of just such an “impressionable” temperament, in that 
his “genius was extremely susceptible to every influence about it” (254). For Lathrop, then, Hawthorne assumes a place 
of preeminence in American literature not simply for having “imbibed” his atmosphere, but for having insinuated 
himself into it: much as Longfellow had “absorbed into himself also the atmosphere of the United States,” Lathrop 
asserts, “[i]n such wise did Hawthorne prove to be the unique American in fiction” (163)—and indeed, it is almost 
impossible traverse the American literary canon without inhaling Hawthorne.  
68 “Where the novel may be said to touch the real by expropriating it and so violating someone’s ‘private rights,’” 
Michaels explains, “the romance asserts a property right that does not threaten and so should not be threatened by the 
property rights of others” (157). 
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Hawthorne also claims a property relation in the “atmosphere” of New England itself.  This 
“transmitted and inherited property,” as Hawthorne suggests, is at the same time a “common” 
property, mediated by the bodies that breathe it.  In the following pages, I examine the ways in 
which The House of the Seven Gables exposes the latent dangers of these inherited environments. 
In his Preface, Hawthorne famously professes to have provided his romance with a “moral”: 
“the truth, namely, that the wrong-doing of one generation lives into the successive ones” (3). 
Taking the author at his word, many readers have understood The House of the Seven Gables as 
Hawthorne’s attempt “to confront his paternal legacy”: that is, to broach the discomfiting settler-
colonial history of “class, heredity, and the all but incestuous business of living in one spot for 
generations, tyrannies and injustice handed down generation after generation like a congenital 
disease” (Wineapple 232)69 —and indeed, the apoplexy that plagues subsequent generations of 
Pyncheons seemingly literalizes this simile. Accordingly, some critics have interpreted the 
intermarriage of Hawthorne’s feuding families as a suggestion that the degenerated Pyncheon “race” 
must be regenerated by circumspect sexual selection.70  For instance, reading Hawthorne’s romance 
against the emergence of American ethnology in the 1840s and its “scientific” investigations of racial 
                                               
69 Hawthorne’s fraught relationship with forefathers has been a subject of reflection and critique at least since Melville’s 
1850 essay “Hawthorne and His Mosses,” which investigates Hawthorne’s place in Anglo-American literary genealogy, 
noting in particular his “touch of Puritanic gloom” (540). In his 1979 study, Eric Sundquist examines on the issue of 
inheritance to situate Hawthorne’s genealogical conflict within the Freudian paradigm of the “family romance,” 
proposing that “what most haunts him in the forefathers…is that they are in control of him: the past controls the 
present” (115). Critics like Michael Colacurcio have identified an implicit “problem of ‘inheritance” in Hawthorne, “for 
whom Puritanism was simply ‘there,’ as part of the inevitable heredity or environment” (20). As I argue here, Hawthorne 
illustrates that Puritan past, like any other pathology, operates at the intersection of heredity and environment. 
70 For example, Joan Burbick declares that “[t]he social message is clear: The Pyncheons or the aspiring hegemonic class 
must extend their arms in intermarriage to the ‘lower’ or artisan class to ensure the health and morality of the ruling elite. 
Otherwise catastrophic death and a debilitation of the family line through nervous disease might corrupt the rulers from 
within” (239). As I argue, the physical degeneration of the Pyncheon “race”—blatantly paralleled in the plight of their 
sickly chickens—is most convincingly attributed to the influence of their vitiated environment; after all, the fact that the 
chickens ultimately embark upon an “indefatigable process of egg-laying” (221) illustrates that their former 
“reproductive deficiency” (to borrow from Poe) is not the effect of some innate, immutable trait, but rather of a 
remediable environmental cause. 
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difference,71 Shawn Michelle Smith had argued that Hawthorne’s “focus on hereditary traits and his 
celebration of ‘healthy’ marriages prefigure the tenets of eugenics” (50).72 However, as the following 
analysis aims to demonstrate, Hawthorne’s primary engagement with medical theory in The House of 
the Seven Gables is not with ethnology, but rather with the more quotidian discourses of domestic 
hygiene. Indeed, as his Preface goes on to remind us, “[w]hen romances do really teach anything, or 
produce any effective operation, it is usually through a far more subtile process than the ostensible 
one” (4). In House, I suggest, the “ostensible” operation of hereditary transmission is in fact 
superseded by the “subtile process” of atmospheric mediation.  
In 1846, a financially-troubled Hawthorne, recently evicted from the Old Manse in Concord, 
returned to his hometown of Salem, where he would briefly work as a surveyor at the Custom 
House. “Change of air is uniformly beneficial,” as his son and biographer Julian Hawthorne would 
later explain of this relocation, “and, after a season in the rarefied atmosphere of Emerson and 
Margaret Fuller, it was wholesome to seek temporary relaxation on the levels of ordinary humanity” 
(323). But as Hawthorne explains in his preface to The Scarlet Letter, “ordinary humanity” was 
tedious; the Custom House sorely lacked “the genial atmosphere which a literary man requires, in 
order to ripen the best harvest of his mind.” Ultimately, christening himself “a citizen of somewhere 
else” (35), Hawthorne seeks an atmosphere more conducive to the operations of the imagination.  
                                               
71 For discussions of mid-century scientific racism, see Frederickson, The Black Image in the White Mind (1971); Horsman, 
Race and Manifest Destiny (1981); and Dain, A Hideous Monster of the Mind (2009). For additional criticism on Hawthorne 
and discourses of race, see Gilmore, The Genuine Article: Race, Mass Culture, and American Literary Manhood (2001). 
72 Robert Levine, on the other hand, argues that the matter of “inheritance” in The House of the Seven Gables is not 
primarily biological, but cultural. Much of Levine’s dismissal of discourses of racial differentiation relies upon an 
anachronistic understanding of scientific theory. For instance, Levine argues that, in her “hereditary reverence” for 
Colonel Pyncheon’s portrait, Hepzibah “is operating less in the mode of the evolutionary biologist (or geneticist) than of 
the romancer (or reader of romance)” (138). Here, Levine establishes a kind of false dichotomy for understanding the 
work of heredity in Hawthorne’s text. It is necessarily nonsensical to suggest that Hepzibah operates in the “mode of the 
evolutionary biologist (or geneticist),” considering that, for Hawthorne, these modes of analysis did not exist. Although 
Levine concedes that “Hawthorne holds onto notions of biological determinism or heritability as a possible way of 
thinking about Pyncheon genealogies” (143), he fails to adequately examine why heredity persists as a perpetually-possible 
explanatory paradigm for Hawthorne. Here, I suggest that Hawthorne incorporates his preoccupation with heredity into 
a miasmatic and hygienic imaginary in which air is inherited.  
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In his Prefaces, Hawthorne consistently paints himself as a kind of aesthetic tourist who 
pursues his proper atmosphere by seeking the literary “privilege” of “the old countries” (Blithedale 
38)—appealing to the model of nineteenth-century medical tourism and its search for more 
salubrious milieux. For example, in his medical travel guide Change of Air, or The Philosophy of Traveling 
(1831)— a review of which had appeared in the July 1843 issue of The United States Magazine and 
Democratic Review, where Hawthorne’s story “The Two Widows” was also published—James Johnson 
elaborated the effects of “atmospherical vicissitudes” on health, cautioning, for instance, against the 
influence of Italian siroccos, which increase “the susceptibility to malarious impressions” and 
“miasmal exhalations” (142). If manuals like Johnson’s elaborated a medical philosophy of travelling, 
though, The House of the Seven Gables articulates a medical philosophy of staying at home.   
Key to such a philosophy, as we have seen, was the importance of atmospheric purity for 
domestic hygiene. “To those who have the care and instruction of the rising generation—the future 
fathers and mothers of men,” John Griscom explained in The Uses and Abuses of Air (1848), “this 
subject of ventilation commends itself with an interest surpassing every other” (249). If cleanliness 
was indeed next to godliness, Griscom reasoned, ventilation was “not only a moral but religious duty” 
(137). Accordingly, Griscom outlines strategies for the proper ventilation of both schools and 
homes; since the state had a stake in the “rising generation,” he suggested, schools should be subject 
to external regulation (see fig. 2.6).73  Of course, it was above all American mothers who were 
charged with “the care and instruction of the rising generation.” Domestic manuals authored by and 
                                               
73 For instance, “cellar schools,” Griscom insisted, “ought to be inspected, and reported upon by the proper authorities.” 
Thus, Griscom argued that “the health of the people is the first object of legislation, and that it ought first to be secured 
as far as possible, even though private interests should suffer…but let not the next generation suffer for the benefit of a 
few of the present” (178-9).  William Alcott, whose statistics on infant mortality Griscom cites, had also considered the 
American educational environment from a more explicitly fiscal perspective in his prize-winning Essay on the Construction 
of School-Houses (1832), submitted to a competition sponsored by the American Institute of Instruction. “Health, as well as 
time, is money,” he wrote, “and it is most mistaken economy which confines a child to those arrangements, and to that 
atmospheric impurity, which render him unfit for vigorous effort, and thus slowly, though surely, impair his 
constitution” (7).  
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for women accordingly posited atmospheric purification as a gendered domain; in her Treatise on 
Domestic Economy (1841),74 for instance, Beecher aimed to supply women the scientific knowledge 
necessary to achieve an “economy of health” (258)—specially, knowledge of proper ventilation 
methods (see fig. 2.7). “The debility of childhood, the lassitude of domestics, and the ill-health of 
families,” Beecher insisted, “are often caused by neglecting to provide a supply of pure air” (311).75 
In The House of the Seven Gables, Phoebe Pyncheon assumes the role of the ideal nineteenth-century 
housewife, infusing the insalubrious environment of the ancestral house—and, by extension, her 




Fig. 2.6. A “plan…for the supply of fresh air in a more regular and systematic manner, and the removal of 
impure air, which is applied to any kind of house, but is more particularly adapted to schools, hospitals, and 
buildings of that character.” John Griscom, The Uses and Abuses of Air: Showing its Influence in Sustaining Life, and 
Producing Disease; with Remarks on the Ventilation of Houses. 3rd ed. New York: J.S. Redfield, 1854.  
 
 
                                               
74 As “a guide whose meticulous attention to the productive arrangement of domestic space has prompted at least one 
latter-day critic to read it against Foucault’s Discipline and Punish,” notes Dana Lucianom, Beecher’s treatise “emphasizes 
the kind of time that a home-space so arranged will generate— for notwithstanding the Treatise’s everyday practicality, 
the first priority of the woman who arranges the home, Beecher contends, should be her commitment to the millennial 
“regeneration of the Earth” (124-125). For further discussion of Beecher’s domestic economy, see McHugh, American 
Domesticity (1999), and Baym, American Women of Letters and the Nineteenth-Century Sciences (2002).  
75 In their co-authored volume The American Women’s Home (1869) Beecher and her sister, Harriet Beecher Stowe, cite 
testimony presented to the Public Health Commissioners in Britain, which posits “[d]eficient ventilation” as “more fatal 




Fig. 2.7. A “plan of a building for back-door accommodations.” Catharine Beecher, A Treatise on Domestic 
Economy: For the Use of Young Ladies at Home, and at School. Revised edition. Boston: Thomas H. Webb & Co., 
1843. 
 
Hawthorne modeled the character of Phoebe Pyncheon on his wife Sophia Peabody, whose 
ardent interests in homeopathy and health—an enthusiasm that spoke more widely to the 
transcendentalist belief in the efficacy of self-reform—manifested in her “deliberate control of diet 
and hygiene, [and] avoidance of unhealthy circumstances and persons” (Dunlavy 8). For example, at 
the recommendation of the homeopathic physician William Wesselhoeft,76 she insisted that her 
children sleep in separate rooms to ensure that they would “never breathe...any but their own sweet 
atmosphere” (qtd. in Dunlavy 6).77 Repurposing this rhetoric of domestic purification with 
characteristic cantankerousness, Hawthorne—who remained skeptical of all varieties of antebellum 
                                               
76 During the early part of Hawthorne’s tenure at the Salem Custom House, Sophia, pregnant with the couple’s second 
child, had elected to remain in Boston in order be near Dr. Wesselhoeft, who was something of a luminary in 
nineteenth-century New England literary circles; he would treat Emily Dickinson in 1851, and his son, Conrad, would 
later treat Louisa May Alcott. 
77 In her Letters to the People on Health and Happiness (1855), Catharine Beecher explicitly cautioned against “unhealthful 
miasmata in the night-air” that is “sent forth from the lungs and skin of sleepers. It is precisely the same evil as is found 
in proximity to grave-yards and decaying carrion,” Beecher continued; “The effluvium from the lungs and skin is 
precisely the same as that from carrion, only more diluted by the atmosphere. Those who have entered the pent-up 
sleeping rooms of persons who do not wash their skins or breathe a pure air, very well understand the close 
resemblance” (167).  
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reform, as Blithedale’s satirical take on utopian socialism illustrates—presents The House of the Seven 
Gables as a tale of domestic hygiene gone awry. Its meddlesome narrator assumes the voice of the 
antebellum health reformer, insisting that its characters might stave off incipient and seemingly-
inevitable disease through hygienic prevention and salubrious activity. 
If Hawthorne’s romance seeks to expose the dangers of endemic insularity, it paradoxically 
does so by appealing to an epidemic pathology: in other words, what proves transmissible among 
the Pyncheons are not hereditary traits or behaviors per se, but the inherited physical and social 
atmosphere they take no pains to ameliorate. In his early explication of the ancestral feud between 
the Maule and Pyncheon families, Hawthorne’s narrator shows that Maule’s curse exerts a 
contaminating influence not only upon the Pyncheon progeny, but upon the contested domestic 
space itself, “infect[ing]” the walls “with the scent of an old and melancholy house.” Colonel 
Pyncheon nevertheless elects to take possession of this “accurst” site, having dismissed Maule’s 
malediction—and yet, “[h]ad he been told of a bad air,” the narrator speculates, “it might have 
moved him somewhat” (8).   
Hawthorne’s suggestion that “bad air” is cause for more serious consideration than a bad 
omen reflects the hygienic exigencies of his historical moment: epidemic cholera had returned to the 
United States in 1849; as the Salem Observer reported that summer, nearby Boards of Health had 
responded to the outbreak by issuing “an Address…urging upon the attention of the inhabitants the 
necesity [sic] of removing all offences which may vitiate the atmosphere and afford an abiding-place 
to the approaching disease” (“The Board of Health”).  Yet if the resurgence of cholera crystallized 
atmospheric anxieties in the antebellum imagination, domestic medical discourse had continued to 
encourage awareness of the pathological effects of air even in the absence of such heightened risk; as 
the celebrated American physician Charles Caldwell reminded readers of his Thoughts on Physical 
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Education (1834), air could be rendered poisonous not only by the “deleterious impregnation” of 
miasmatic matter, but by “stagnation alone” (53).78  
Like the House of Usher, which has “rotted for long years…with no disturbance from the 
breath of the external air” (319), the Pyncheon House betrays the insalubrious effects of stagnation 
and neglect in its “cold, moist, pitiless atmosphere” where “[n]othing flourished” (158). The garden 
has grown “unctuous with nearly two hundred years of vegetable decay” (53); the well water has 
become contaminated, proving “productive of internal mischief to those who quench their thirst 
there” (9); the house is infested with a “fumy atmosphere” (72): indeed, it has “both the dry-rot and 
the damp-rot in its walls; it was not good,” the narrator dryly observes, “to breathe no other 
atmosphere than that” (124).  
For a case study in the ill effects of breathing a vitiated atmosphere, Hawthorne offers the 
wizened spinster Hepzibah Pyncheon, a “mildewed piece of aristocracy” (41) who has “dwelt too 
much alone,—too long in the Pyncheon House—until her very brain was impregnated with the dry-
rot of its timbers” (44). Her body bears the evidence of her unventilated existence: “Look at my 
face!” she admonishes her cousin Phoebe; “you see how pale I am! It is my idea that the dust and 
continual decay of these old houses are unwholesome for the lungs” (55). As Hawthorne suggests, 
though, the atmosphere of domestic decay is not only unwholesome for the lungs, but for the 
brain.79 The pestilential effect of architecture on Hepzibah’s mildewed mind is no mere metaphor; 
nineteenth-century medical theory understood atmospheric stimuli as productive of demonstrable 
mental effects: when “persons sleep in a close apartment, or remain for a length of time in a 
crowded or ill-ventilated rooms,” warned Beecher and Stowe in The American Woman’s Home, “a most 
                                               
78 As Elizabeth Blackwell would similarly assert in her 1870 address to the Working Woman’s College, How to Keep a 
Household in Health, “The great essential principle to be remembered in relation to air, is change. Stagnant air means 
death—rapid death if it be completely stagnant; disease and slower death if it be only rather stagnant” (6). 
79 For a discussion of madness and nineteenth-century “mental hygiene” in relation to The House of the Seven Gables, see 
Knadler, “Hawthorne’s Genealogy of Madness” (1995).  
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pernicious influence is exerted on the brain, and, through this, on the mind” (256). Indeed, “[t]he 
first cause of mental disease and suffering,” Beecher asserted in her Treatise, “is not unfrequently 
found in the want of a proper supply of duly oxygenized blood” (196).  
Both the perpetually-sequestered Hepzibah and her long-incarcerated brother Clifford, 
Hawthorne suggests, suffer the physical and mental effects of insufficient oxygenation; Hepzibah, 
especially, has “grown to be a kind of lunatic by imprisoning herself so long in one place” (124).80  
Harking to his own distaste for air “breathed in advance,” Hawthorne explains the Pyncheons’ self-
perpetuating pathology: “The sick in mind, and, perhaps, in body, are rendered more darkly and 
hopelessly so, by the manifold reflection of their disease, mirrored back from all quarters,” as “they 
are compelled to inhale the poison of their own breath, in infinite repetition” (102).81 The siblings 
are not merely the passive receptors of atmospheric poisons, then, but agents who perpetuate their 
domestic pestilence through the repetition-compulsion of this quasi-incestuous breath.  Yet while 
Hepzibah recognizes that her domestic environment is “unwholesome,” she does not attempt to 
ameliorate it.82 For the narrator, this failure of care constitutes a kind of auto-incarceration: “What 
                                               
80 While Clifford is literally imprisoned by the state, Hepzibah’s “imprisonment” is more tacitly enforced by the dictates 
of gender ideology. Nineteenth-century physicians warned that women were at particular risk for atmospherically-
induced complaints as a consequence of their continual enclosure in the home. In his 1830 study of female diseases, for 
instance, the English physiologist Marshall Hall identified the “chief external cause” of disorders affecting female youth 
to be “the baneful but prevalent habits of sedentariness and inactivity…Instead of having their health invigorated by a 
free and constant exposure to the open air,” Hall lamented, “young persons in the present day are enfeebled and 
disordered by a system of sedentary studies, pursued in warm and close apartments” (23). Similarly, Beecher critiqued 
“the present mode of conducting female education,” which saw young women “for a long time immured in a room, 
filled with an atmosphere vitiated by many breaths” (Treatise 60).  
81 Theories regarding the repetition of respiration and its damaging effect on the mind informed the scientific racism of 
Southern physicians like Samuel Cartwright; in an 1851 essay in De Bow’s Review, Cartwright contended that “[t]he 
common higher law abolitionist, who have not time to devote to the dissecting-room or to the Hebrew, could see the 
higher law any night of their lives, by looking at a negro asleep, breathing the mephitic air called carbonic acid gas, 
manufactured in his own lungs, being caught and confined by covering the higher law compels him to put around his 
face. The effect of confining, by covering his face, his own breath, to breathe over and over again the whole night and 
every night of his life, produced certain effects upon the blood and the brain requiring the chemist and physiologist to 
explain. But that explanation would only be repeating what comparative anatomy discloses, history tells, chemistry 
proves, and the Bible reveals, that by a higher law than the Union, the Constitution, or any other human enactments, 
that the negro is a slave” (“How to Save the Republic,” 194). 
82 Here, we might be reminded of Susan Mizruchi’s reading of Gables, in which she suggests that “[w]hat is most striking 
for a novel whose governing idea is inheritance—in which the dilemma of historical determinism is seriously 
pondered—is that most of the characters seem unaware of historical changes, and appear strangely unaffected by their 
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jailer,” he exclaims, “[is] so inexorable as one's self!” (121). Here, the narrator echoes antebellum 
domestic medical writers like John Gunn, who held that most diseases were self-fashioned. Even 
though the laws of health were self-evident—“[w]e all know very well,” Gunn noted, “that health is 
hindered by sluggardism or sedentary habits”—they were routinely ignored nonetheless: “we will lie 
in bed, or sit about in a close warm room,” Gunn lamented, “breathing an atmosphere sufficient to 
poison us” (154-5). The impediments to health, in other words, are not simply epistemic; the 
preservation of the body depends upon the active pursuit of purer air. 
Like the embodiment of chloride of lime, the enterprising Phoebe comes to function as a 
kind of sanitizing agent, radiating her “purifying influence…throughout the atmosphere of the 
household” (98).83  Though Hepzibah suspects that even the seemingly-flourishing Phoebe will 
eventually fall prey to decay—“Those cheeks would not be so rosy after a month or two,” she 
predicts—the youngest Pyncheon actively engages in preventive measures for the preservation of 
her bodily integrity, vowing to “keep [her]self healthy with exercise in the open air” (55).84 Partaking 
in such wholesome activities as walking on the beach, reading the Bible, and “attending a 
                                               
ancestors” (88). Adapting Mizruchi’s claim to a reading that suggests that the text’s “governing idea” is atmospheric 
inheritance, what seems striking is the Pyncheons’ strange indifference to hygienic practices of care.   
83 Hawthorne’s representation of Phoebe’s “purifying influence” echoes nineteenth-century discourses of women’s 
moralistic domestic duties; in her treatise Woman in Her Various Relations (1851), for example, Mrs. L.G. Abell asserted 
that a woman’s “principles and religion should be like an ‘atmosphere,’ surrounding her family” (51). Cultivation of such 
a morally-salubrious atmosphere “atmosphere” is particularly important for child-rearing, as Abell goes on to explain: 
“the child takes in at every breath impressions and ideas. The mind is affected by the mental and moral atmosphere in 
which it lives, and is imperceptibly nourished and moulded as the body is sustained, and either improved or injured by 
the air it breathes” (226). Samuel Smiles would echo this assertion in his influential manual Self-Help (1859). “So much 
does the moral health depend upon the moral atmosphere that is breathed, and so great is the influence daily exercised 
by parents over their children by living a life before their eyes, that perhaps the best system of parental instruction might 
be summed up in these two words: ‘Improve thyself’” (295).  
84 Exercise, Beecher complained in her Treatise, was a habit American women sorely lacked: “In England, regular 
exercise, in the open air, is very commonly required by the mother, as a part of daily duty, and is sought by young 
women, as an enjoyment. In consequence of a different physical training,” she continued, “English women, in those 
circles which enjoy competency, present an appearance which always strikes American gentlemen as a contrast to what 
they see at home. An English mother, at thirty, or thirty-five, is in the full bloom of perfected womanhood; as fresh and 
healthful as her daughters. But where are the American mothers, who can reach this period unfaded and unworn?” (44). 
Stowe advanced a similar position in the domestic advice writings she penned under the persona Christopher Crowfield; 
see Bluford, “A Word or Two on the Other Side” (2014).  
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metaphysical or philosophical lecture,” Phoebe implements a kind of prophylaxis against premature 
spinsterhood: “unless for such moral medicines as the above,” the narrator hypothesizes, “we 
should soon have beheld our poor Phoebe grow thin, and put on a bleached, unwholesome aspect, 
and assume strange, shy ways, prophetic of old-maidenhood and a cheerless future” (124).85 
As many critics have noted, Hawthorne presents Phoebe as a Victorian “angel of the house,” 
an exemplary housekeeper who ameliorates the moral atmosphere of the home through cheerfully-
performed domestic duties.86 Unlike Hepzibah, passively “impregnated” by the house’s 
unwholesome air, Phoebe “impregnate[s]” the Pyncheon-House “with the perfume of garden-roses, 
pinks, and other blossoms of much sweetness” (103). Gillian Brown has accordingly argued that The 
House of the Seven Gables illustrates an envisaged division between women’s labor and women’s 
bodies, as “Phoebe’s providential housekeeping serves as a model of imaginative practice and 
production in which the individual is immunized from the effects of labor,” while “Hepzibah’s 
shopkeeping demonstrates the bodily risks in labor” (81). Importantly, however, Phoebe is not 
simply imaginatively “immunized” from risk; rather, she engages in preventive hygienic as a means 
of risk management.87  As Hawthorne’s narrator suggests, it is idleness and stagnation, not labor, 
that produces these risks.  Extolling the virtues of fresh air, exercise, and industry, he thus praises 
Hepzibah’s bid for economic self-sufficiency as “the invigorating breath of a fresh outward 
                                               
85 These “moral medicines,” however, only partially explain Phoebe’s resistance to Hepzibah’s fate. Due to “the 
involuntary effect of a genial temperament,” Phoebe exhibits resistance to the house’s infection: “There was no 
morbidness in Phoebe,” the narrator explains; “if there had been, the old Pyncheon-house was the very locality to ripen 
it into incurable disease” (98). Appealing to the logic of “exciting causes,” Hawthorne suggests that latent constitutional 
pathologies “ripen” at the instigation of external stimuli.  
86 Joel Pfister, for instance, argues that Phoebe serves to expunge Gothic resonances from the romance: she is “[l]ike an 
oxygen tank,” Pfister writes, as she “fumigate[s] the malodorous damp rot and dry rot of the Gothic” (149) and 
feminizes the home “like a good domestic novelist” (148).  Here, I argue that Phoebe operates not as a model domestic 
novelist but as a model domestic hygienist—restricting not the romance’s genre, but its philosophy of health.  
87 As a Pyncheon, even Phoebe is not entirely resistant to the influence of the house: “her petals sometimes drooped a 
little,” the narrator admits, “in consequence of the heavy atmosphere about her” (103). While Phoebe is “little 
susceptible of morbid influences” (124), she is not entirely immune; Clifford, on the other hand, is conveniently 
possessed of a “native susceptibility of happy influences” (102), rendering him especially receptive to Phoebe’s 
regenerative effects in “the delight that he inhaled from her” (103). 
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atmosphere, after the long torpor and monotonous seclusion of her life”: “So wholesome is effort!” 
he exclaims; “The healthiest glow that Hepzibah had known for years had come now, in the dreaded 
crisis, when, for the first time, she had put forth her hand to help herself” (39).  
This patronizing incitement to self-help echoes the advice that physicians like Edward H. 
Dixon offered American women; in his 1847 treatise Woman and Her Diseases, Dixon considered “the 
condition of those who constitute the working classes of our population,” ultimately blaming “[t]he 
damp cellar, or the heated and stifling attic chamber, in the foul atmosphere of some by-lane or 
street” for producing a “condition of listless and wretched indifference” toward personal health 
(128). “Once let [the working classes] be independent of the will of others,” Dixon suggested, “and 
they will learn self-respect; they will purify their bodies, and the atmosphere of their dwellings; 
where each returning day now impresses its mark on their faces, as upon the dial-plate of misery. 
They will labour, it is true,” he conceded, “but that labour not exceeding their natural powers, will 
lend the hue of health to their cheeks” (129). Similarly, in Hawthorne’s hygienic romance, Hepzibah 
is not imperiled by commercial labor, but rehabilitated by it. Self-induced disease, the narrator 
suggests, can be effectively countervailed by self-care.   
 If Phoebe is a kind of quintessential purifier, her cousin, the villainous Jaffrey Pyncheon, is 
the quintessential putrefier: “There was no free breath to be drawn,” the narrator notes, “within the 
sphere of so malevolent an influence” (221). Ironically, Jaffrey makes recourse to the rhetoric of 
atmospheric peril in his attempt to evict his cousins, insisting that “[t]he town air…does not agree 
with [Phoebe’s] good, wholesome country habits,” and that the vulnerable Clifford is similarly at 
risk: “It will be a heavy responsibility, cousin,” he warns Hepzibah, “if you confine your brother to 
this dismal house and stifled air” (92). However, as Hawthorne illustrates in an extended analogy, it 
is Jaffrey himself who poisons the Pyncheon-House. As a man “to whom forms are of paramount 
importance,” Hawthorne writes, the Judge “builds up, as it were, a tall and stately edifice” (162) to 
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project his public character. Hawthorne completes this metaphor with a grotesque extension, 
dismantling the emblem of the “stately edifice” to locate the source of infection:  
Ah; but in some low and obscure nook,—some narrow closet on the ground-floor, 
shut, locked, and bolted, and the key flung away,—or beneath the marble pavement, 
in a stagnant water-puddle, with the richest pattern of mosaic-work above,— may lie 
a corpse, half decayed, and still decaying, and diffusing its death-scent all through the 
palace! The inhabitant will not be conscious of it, for it has long been his daily 
breath! Now and then, perchance, comes in a seer, before whose sadly-gifted eye the 
whole structure melts into thin air, leaving only the hidden nook, the bolted closet, 
with the cobwebs festooned over its forgotten door, or the deadly hole under the 
pavement, and the decaying corpse within (163). 
 
Like the cholera discourse that instructed the American public to “Look to thy cellar,” 
Hawthorne’s architectural rendering of Jaffrey’s character seeks to uncover the presence of invisible 
disease media in the deepest recesses of the soul. As Jaffrey’s presence perpetuates “the dim, thick, 
stifling atmosphere of dread, which filled the house as with a death-smell” (177), so too does it 
perpetuate infection: indeed, according to nineteenth-century miasma theory, this noxiousness was 
not only a nuisance, but an indication of pestilential agents in the atmosphere: as the revered British 
sanitary reformer Edwin Chadwick famously insisted, “all smell is disease” (qtd. in Hamlin, Public 
Health 6). Yet this infectious agency persists because the Pyncheon-House has lacked a so-called 
“seer” (though perhaps more appropriately here, a smeller) to expose it. For Hepzibah and Clifford 
Pyncheon, like Roderick and Madeline Usher, such effluvia has “long been [their] daily breath”; they 
are habituated to this kind of violence.  
Ultimately, Jaffrey succumbs to the fate of his forefathers: a malady initially deemed 
“‘Sudden Death’” (14), later suggested to be cerebral hemorrhage, or apoplexy—a disorder whose 
“hereditary tendency,” as the physician James Copland insisted in an 1850 treatise on the disease, 
“cannot be doubted” (205).88 However, returning to the interplay of the “ostensible” and the 
                                               
88 “This disease occurs most frequently in persons of the male sex, owing to their habits, and greater exposure to the 
exciting causes; and in the far advanced stages of life,” Copland notes, suggesting intemperance as one such exciting cause 
(205). In his 1820 Treatise on Nervous Diseases, John Cooke similarly alludes to the long history of understanding “heredity 
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“subtile” with which Hawthorne prefaces his romance, I argue that this seemingly-hereditary disease 
is activated by an environmental “exciting cause.” The malady that plagues the Pyncheons is 
strikingly similarly to a disorder Dr. Johnson describes in his Change of Air: a “formidable malady, or 
rather class of maladies, to which the Romans are peculiarly prone,” tellingly known as “sudden 
death—or, as it is coolly called, ACCIDENTE.” While the Romans are constitutionally predisposed 
to this disease, Johnson suggests, the environment that surrounds them is incendiary: “Whether this 
terrific agent of the Grim Tyrant acts through the medium of apoplexy or diseases of the heart, the 
Roman physicians have not ascertained,” he writes, “but one thing is clear, that the climate of the 
Eternal City is extremely hostile to the brain and nervous system—and consequently all who have 
any tendency to fulness about the head should be shy of residence there” (309). Transplanting 
Roman pathologies to the County of Essex, Hawthorne illustrates that while the Pyncheons may be 
peculiarly prone to this disease, the atmosphere of the Pyncheon-House hastens its appearance: 
indeed, all of the apoplectic Pyncheons die within its walls. 
Much as Phoebe’s hygienic intervention illustrates the preventable nature of pathological 
declension, the narrator suggests that Jaffrey’s death might have been forestalled by keen 
watchfulness and timely medical intervention; this “sudden” death, in other words, is not sudden at 
all.89 In his bizarre address to the Judge’s dead body, the narrator affirms that Jaffrey had neglected 
                                               
conformation” (195) as among the predisposing causes of apoplexy; further, Cooke cites the “the authority of several 
writers on apoplexy, both ancient and modern, in support of the opinion that violent passions of the mind, and other 
causes, by determining blood to the head, are capable of exciting the disease” (211-12). In his treatise Hereditary Descent 
(1847), the phrenologist Orson Squire Fowler likewise affirms that “apoplexy rarely occurs except when hereditary. And 
what is more it makes its descent at about the same AGE in the descendants, at which it appeared in the ancestry, only a 
little earlier each generation, till the race runs out. This point,” Fowler continues, “is too palpable to require proof by 
detailed facts” (83). 
89 Employing the logic of premonitory symptomatology, Hawthorne encourages his readers to anticipate the Judge’s 
decline when Phoebe “very foolishly start[s]” upon hearing “a certain noise in Judge Pyncheon's throat,—rather habitual 
with him, not altogether voluntary, yet indicative of nothing, unless it were a slight bronchial complaint, or, as some 
people hinted, an apoplectic symptom.”  Like Poe’s narrator, who “starts” at Usher’s description of his house’s 
idiosyncratic atmosphere, Phoebe is not “foolish” at all in her alarm; the “queer and aukward ingurgitation” is indeed 
indicative of a fatal apoplectic attack (89-90). 
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his symptoms due a willful misinterpretation of their urgency: “it is well, you know,” he wryly 
reasons, “to be heedful, but not over-anxious, as respects one's personal health” (192). Like 
Hepzibah’s failures of agency and industry, Jaffrey’s prognostic and prophylactic failures—his 
inability to situate his symptomatology within its probable pathological trajectory, and his refusal to 
“see his family physician, and obtain a medicine that shall preserve him” (199)—render his disease in 
part a malady of his own making.  
Following Jaffrey’s death, Hepzibah, Clifford, and Phoebe inherit the family fortune, which 
in turn enables their departure from their poisonous home. Yet critics have almost universally 
ignored the detail that facilitates the final redirection of inheritance: “the death, by cholera, of Judge 
Pyncheon's son” (220). With the inclusion of this seemingly-superfluous heir—and the seemingly-
superfluous specificity of his cause of death—Hawthorne situates his romance in a historical 
moment of atmospheric unease; as in “Lady Eleanore’s Mantle,” the invocation of cholera mobilizes 
transatlantic anxieties of pestilential air, reminding readers of the omnipresence of environmental 
risk.  Thus, although Hawthorne’s romance indeed critiques familial insularity, it does so not only by 
mobilizing deterministic, anti-democratic, “ostensible” blood-logic of hereditary transmission, but 
also by invoking the flexible, relational, “subtile” air-logic of environmental transmission: “The soul 
needs air,” Clifford realizes, “a wide sweep and frequent change of it. Morbid influences, in a 
thousand-fold variety, gather about hearths, and pollute the life of households. There is no such 
unwholesome atmosphere as that of an old home, rendered poisonous by one's defunct forefathers 
and relatives” (184). Drawing from the logic of domestic hygiene, Hawthorne suggests that if this 






Coda: An Ethics of the Air  
In an 1872 treatise on tobacco use, the physician and hydropathist Russell Trall would voice 
a question pertinent to nineteenth-century public health and sanitation debates: “has any one a 
moral right to poison the atmosphere?” The answer, he asserted, was surely self-evident: “A person 
has no more right to pollute the air which all must breathe alike with tobacco smoke, than he has to 
poison it with the fomites of yellow fever, or the infection of small-pox,” Trall declared; “And when 
we have a government which knows its duty and performs it, in the protection of person and 
property, my neighbor will no more be allowed to spit tobacco-juice in my house, or blow smoke 
into my face, than he will be permitted to strike me with felonious intent, or stab me with malice 
prepense” (63). Here, Trall articulates what Progressive Era surgeon Charles Reed would later refer to 
as an “ethics of the air”: “to breathe pure air must be reckoned among man’s inalienable rights,” 
Reed reasoned; “[n]o man has any more right to contaminate the air we breathe than he has to defile 
the water we drink,” nor “any more right to vitiate the air that sustains us than…to adulterate the 
food that nourishes us” (“A National Anti-Smoke Convention,” 561). To do so, as Trall suggests, is 
nothing other than premeditated malfeasance.  
In citing Trall’s mediation on moral responsibility of the individual, as well as of the 
“government which knows its duty and performs it,” I mean to illustrate the ways in which the 
understanding of atmosphere as “common property” implicitly made the health of the individual a 
“public” health. The tale of the Pyncheon-house and its inhabitants has consistently been 
interpreted as a microcosmic representation of broader social change: most obviously, the transition 
from aristocratic to democratic modes of association. My reading departs from this tradition in 
approaching Hawthorne’s house less as a microcosm than as a node in a broader network: a 
component in a social ecosystem. The romance’s repeated appeal to the discourses of health and 
hygiene—and to the etiology of environmental or miasmatic transmission in particular—
140 
 
demonstrates how so-called “wrong-doing” is transmitted not only vertically, through heredity, but 
horizontally, through shared environments. Like the Usheres’, the Pyncheons’ self-imposed 
insularity and stagnation breeds a miasmatic taint that, as per Jaffrey’s “death-scent,” threatens to 
transcend spatial containment. Through personal and domestic hygiene practices, nineteenth-century 
Americans strove to mitigate the risk that this unwieldly atmosphere would be “rendered 
poisonous.”  This understanding of the aerial environment as “common property,” in turn, can be 
understood to anticipate issues of health and environmental justice—including regulation, 
responsibility, and risk assessment—that have been granted especial urgency in the age of the 
Anthropocene. But rather than simply pointing out this rather obvious environmental dimension, I 
also want to gesture toward the ways in which nineteenth-century Americans understood the “ethics 
of the air” more broadly as a method of social care.   
Following the cholera epidemic of 1832, “atmosphere” increasingly assumed symbolic 
currency in other nineteenth-century American reform movements; for instance, as the following 
chapter will illustrate, calls for the extirpation of social miasma became a prominent feature of 
abolitionist rhetoric. Women writers similarly latched on to the urgency of atmosphere, expounding 
upon the literal dangers of domestic environments that had been identified by writers like Beecher in 
order to mobilize this “vitiated atmosphere” as a metonym for patriarchal culture writ large; in her 
1865 tract A New Atmosphere, for example, the essayist Mary Abigail Dodge (who wrote under the 
pseudonym Gail Hamilton) decried the “subtile malaria” (1) from which women suffered: “The 
inhale, they imbibe, they are steeped in the idea that the great business of their life is marriage” (5). 90  
The concomitant “purification” (2) of the social atmosphere, she asserted, depended upon the 
agency of individual—who “may not succeed in dispelling all the miasms of the earth,” but might 
                                               
90 For more on Dodge’s reform writings, see Sherry Lee Linkton, “Gender and the Jeremiad” (1997). Of course, women 
could vitiate the social atmosphere; as Margaret Fuller claims in Woman in the Nineteenth Century (1845), a woman who 
succumbs to vanity “creates miasma, whose spread is indefinite” (131). 
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still affect change “if he can only cleanse one little corner of it, if he can but send through the murky 
air one cool, bracing, healthy gale” (4). For Dodge, the ideal social reformer is like Hawthorne’s 
hygienic Phoebe, diligently working toward the purification of her “sphere.”91   
Finally, this valorization of individual agency is perhaps nowhere more memorably expressed 
than in Stowe’s assertion in her conclusion to Uncle Tom’s Cabin (1852): “There is one thing that 
every individual can do,” Stowe writes; “they can see to it that they feel right.” Yet while this claim has 
been cited ad nauseum in critical discussions of the public functions of sentiment in the nineteenth-
century United States,92 less commonly cited is the line that immediately follows: “An atmosphere of 
sympathetic influence encircles every human being; and the man or woman who feels strongly, 
healthily, and justly, on the great interests of humanity, is a constant benefactor to the human race” 
(624).93 This “atmosphere of sympathetic influence” is crucial to Stowe’s sentimental politics, as it 
offers a suggestion of how sentiment circulates: via the intercession of an affective “atmospherical 
medium.” Antebellum American literature’s miasmatic imaginary thus offers us not only an etiology 
or an aesthetics, but an atmospheric ethics: a way to engender change via the mediation and 
remediation of our physical, social, and psychic environments. 
                                               
91 Louisa May Alcott echoes this sentiment in her 1873 novel Work, discussed in the conclusion to Chapter 4; her 
protagonist advises a young protégée to find “something to do in in her own sphere” (341), assisting “promising young 
men” by metaphorically “creating a purer atmosphere for them to breathe” (339-40). 
92 The scope of these responses are, of course, too multifarious to encapsulate here. For examples of critics for whom 
Stowe’s “right feeling” is crucial, see Samuels, ed., The Culture of Sentiment (1992); Noble, The Masochistic Pleasures of 
Sentimental Literature (2000); Hendler, Public Sentiments (2003); Weinstein, Family, Kinship, and Sympathy (2006); Berlant, The 
Female Complaint (2008); Stokes, The Altar at Home (2014); and Pelletier, Apocalyptic Sentimentalism (2015). See Chapter for 
further discussion of sentimentality. 
93 A recent exception is Dominic Mastrolanni, who suggests that Stowe’s “atmosphere” recalls “Emersonian moods, 
evoking both Emerson’s circle and Hawthorne’s atmosphere.” As Mastrolanni notes, Stowe’s assertion also 
“presupposes that individuals can change their moods, can ‘see to it’ that they alter the ‘atmosphere’ that ‘encircles’ 
them” (171). See Mastolanni, Politics and Skepticism in Antebellum American Literature (2014). Paul Gilmore has cited this 
passage to argue that Stowe’s sentiment is “electric” (Aesthetic Materialism 116); however, as Stowe herself suggests, the 
transmission of sentiment is atmospheric. Finally, Aaron Ritzenberg has argued that “Stowe’s aesthetic…allows readers 
to acknowledge the supreme power of unmediated bodily communication” (41). As this chapter has attempted to 
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“Take care of you!” repeated Brainard, scornfully; “are you not a man, and cannot 
you take care of yourself? Who takes care of us? Who takes care of me, I want to 
know, in the name of the God who made me?”  
 
—Caroline Lee Hentz, The Planter’s Northern Bride (1854) 
 
Well, if the slaves are unable to take care of themselves, no doubt they ought to be 
taken care of—common humanity requires it. The question is, how people, who are 
supposed to be unable to take care of themselves, should be taken care of. 
 
—The Anti-Slavery Record, August 1836  
 
 
In the 1856 case of Anderson v. Poindexter et al., the Ohio Supreme Court debated the legal 
status of non-fugitive transient slaves. In a decision consistent with the ideology of “automatic 
emancipation,”1 Justice Ozias Bowen proclaimed that a slave became a free man the moment he was 
“allowed by consent of his master to step upon the soil and breathe the atmosphere of Ohio”—
though of course, he added, “[t]here is nothing in the physical properties of either the soil or the 
atmosphere of Ohio, which can have any such effect on the civil state and condition of the person. 
If any such result follows when a slave comes within the territory of Ohio,” he noted, “it is by the 
operation of law, and not that of the soil or the atmosphere” (“Recent American Decisions,” 95).2  
                                                 
1 See Middleton, The Black Laws: Race and Legal Process in Early Ohio (2005).  
2 The Court ruled against Kentucky slaveholder John Anderson, who was suing his former slave, Henry Poindexter, for 
the value of the unhonored notes Poindexter had used to purchase his freedom; since Anderson had permitted 
Poindexter to pass in and out of Ohio during the period of his enslavement, in the eyes of the Court, Poindexter had, 
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Justice Bowen’s hastiness to establish the metaphoricity of the soil and the atmosphere in 
this decision indicates the ways in which the physical environment of the free states had assumed a 
kind of preternatural agency in the antebellum period. The magical thinking of what we might call 
“atmospheric emancipation” was deeply engrained in the transatlantic abolitionist imagination. The 
Anderson v. Poindexter decision invoked (and cautiously reworked) a precept that had been employed 
in English legal proceedings as early as 1569, when it was ruled that “England was too pure an Air for 
Slaves to breathe in” (qtd. in Weiner 83).3 For example, an infamous 1827 case presented to the 
English High Court of Admiralty—one highlighted by Louisiana senator Judah Philip Benjamin in 
an 1858 speech to the Senate regarding the contested admission of Kansas into the Union—legal 
counsel invoked Cowper’s respiration-as-liberation trope to argue for the emancipation of an 
enslaved Antiguan woman named Grace James: “it was said…that, having once breathed English 
air, she was free; that the atmosphere of the favored kingdom was too pure to be breathed by a 
slave.” The celebrated jurist Lord Stowell ruled in favor of the slaveholder, however, asserting that, 
“after painful and laborious research into historical records, he did not find anything touching the 
peculiar fitness of the English atmosphere for respiration during the ten centuries that slaves had 
lived in England” (Benjamin 9).4 
Despite Stowell’s decision, the politico-mystical operation of English “atmosphere” gained a 
firm foothold in abolitionist discourse of the 1840s and 50s, prompting one Washington jurist to 
disparage England’s “pharisaical self-congratulation” in its tired proclamation “that its soil is too 
sacred and its atmosphere too pure to permit under any form and to any extent the simple existence 
of slavery; as soon as the wretched slave touches the hallowed soil, or breathes the atmosphere of 
                                                 
paradoxically, already been free at the time he sought to purchase himself. See Finkelman, An Imperfect Union (1981), 177-
78. 
3 For further discussion of this phrase’s continued history in the case of the enslaved man James Somorset, brought 
before the lord chief justice Lord Mansfield in 1771-2, see Weiner, Black Trials (2004), 70-89.    
4 For more on the “slave Grace” case, see Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution (1999).  
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England, his manacles disappear, the fetters fall from his limbs” (Coxe 516)5—an image that had 
been popularized by William Cowper’s poem “The Task” (1785): “Slaves cannot breathe in England: 
if their lungs / Receive our air; that moment they are free; / They touch our country, and their 
shackles fall” (II.40-42). William and Ellen Craft would use these lines as the epigraph for their 
narrative Running a Thousand Miles for Freedom (1860); Frederick Douglass would rework the allusion 
in an 1846 speech before a London audience: “Let the atmosphere of Britain be such that a slave 
holder may not be able to breathe it,” Douglass declared; “Let him feel his lungs oppressed the 
moment he steps on British soil” (American Slavery 18). If soil maintained an especial significance in 
antebellum political debates about the (de)territorialization of slavery in the United States, as notably 
exemplified by the platform of the erstwhile Free Soil party, atmosphere afforded abolitionist rhetoric 
particular force—for while soil served to demarcate the boundaries of slave and free states, atmosphere 
served to expose the impossibility of this kind of spatial containment.6  
Appealing in particular to public understanding of miasmatic disease transmission, discussed 
at length in Chapter 2, many abolitionists employed metaphors of infection to unmoor the “peculiar 
institution” from its Southern environs, suggesting that the social ills of slavery could not be 
effectively sequestered by geopolitical quarantine. In her 1837 Appeal to the Women of the Nominally 
Free States, for example, Angelina Grimké likened slavery to “the miasma of some pestilential pool” 
                                                 
5 Frustration with England’s self-congratulatory declaration of atmospheric emancipation was not contained to slavery 
apologists. In a series of 1853 debates about the constitution of Massachusetts, one legislator responded to “the doctrine 
that the atmosphere of Great Britain could not be breathed by a slave” with a vehement refutation: “England give us 
that doctrine? No, Sir. England gave us exactly the opposite doctrine. England gave us slavery, and fastened it upon us 
…. England gave us the institution of slavery, and for that, I do not thank her. Instead of an atmosphere in which a slave 
could not breathe, she poisoned the atmosphere of the colonies, by importing slaves, compelled to breathe it” 
(Massachusetts Constitutional Convention 191). 
6 “The crossing of boundaries is essential to the creation of panic,” as Margaret Humphreys observes. “When the edge 
of safety cannot be defined, people react in ways that are not necessarily rational—cordoning off suspect populations; 
creating artificial boundaries that create the illusion of safety; fleeing somewhere, anywhere” (847). Accordingly, 
Humphreys identifies yellow fever and cholera as paradigm nineteenth-century “panic diseases”—tellingly, both of 
which were most commonly attributed to miasmatic causes, and both of which inflected discourse surrounding slavery 
and race in the antebellum period. 
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that “spreads its desolating influence far beyond its own boundaries” (14). Similarly, in the wake of 
the defeat of the Wilmot Proviso, Unitarian reformer Reverend Theodore Parker invoked miasmatic 
etiology to point to the “subtle and unseen” influence of slavery in the ostensibly-immune North: 
“The evil increases with a rapid growth; with advancing flood it gains new territory, swells with 
larger volume; its deadly spray and miasma gradually invade all our institutions” (6). Parker’s 
mobilization of these dual temporalities—a pathology of “rapid growth” in the Western and 
Southern United States, poised to “gradually invade” the nation in its entirety—illustrates the way in 
which the crisis of slavery was imagined not only in terms of its spatial expansion, but by its more 
insidious effects to health.  
Of course, many writers had likened the institution of slavery to a sort of civic disease. In an 
1815 letter, Thomas Jefferson reflected on the gradual process by which “the slave is to be prepared 
by instruction and habit for self government, and for the honest pursuits of industry and social 
duty”: “Where the disease is most deeply seated,” wrote Jefferson, “there it will be slowest in 
eradication. In the northern States it was merely superficial, and easily corrected. In the southern it is 
incorporated with the whole system, and requires time, patience, and perseverance in the curative 
process” (456-7). Martin Delany proposed a more immediate and radical approach to “the great 
political disease with which we are affected,” offering emigration as “a sovereign remedy—a healing 
balm to a sorely diseased body—a wrecked but not entirely shattered system” (“Political Destiny” 
229). For Delany, emigration was a kind of surgical remedy, a means “to remove the disease from 
the physical system of man, skillfully and properly applied, within the proper time, directed to 
operate on that part of the system whose greatest tendency shall be, to benefit the whole” (230).  
While both Jefferson and Delany employ disease as a metaphor for the institution of slavery, African 
American minister and activist Hosea Easton was more literal in his depiction of slavery as a 
“complicated disease” (26): “The slave system is an unnatural cause,” wrote Easton, “and has 
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produced its unnatural effects, as displayed in the deformity of two and a half millions of beings, 
who have been under its soul-and-body-destroying influence, lineally, for near three hundred years” 
(24).7 All of these writers share a concern with depicting slavery as a systemic threat, a metastatic 
condition that threatened the general health of the American social body.  
The discourse of miasmatic disease aptly captured this sense of systemic infectiousness. And 
although the association of immorality and miasma was a commonly employed in reformist 
discourse broadly writ, 8 it proved especially apropos when applied to slavery, given popular 
representations of the sickly, torrid, inhospitable climate of the American South: a pestilential 
environment, in the words of John Greenleaf Whittier, “Where the fever demon strews / Poison 
with the falling dews / Where the sickly sunbeams glare / Through the hot and misty air” (5-8). Yet 
if early national print discourse had depicted the plantation South as “disease-ridden, swampy, and 
inimical to animal and human development,” Jennifer Rae Greeson contends that, “[a]round 1831… 
the South was radically reimagined in U.S. print.” According to Greeson, print depictions of the 
plantation South summarily “threw aside” earlier climatic concerns, instead-figuring the South as “an 
internalized realm of hidden depravity and vice best approached in the mode of exposé, particularly 
exposé of sexual abuse and torture” (14) at this radical juncture.  
On or about 1831, Greeson suggests, the preoccupation with climate-induced disease gave 
way to more dramatic unmaskings of violence, modeled on the proto-muckraking rhetoric of urban 
industrialization. It is significant, I suggest, that the date Greeson assigns to this sea-change concurs 
not only with the rise of American abolitionism, but with the Asiatic cholera epidemic, a public 
health crisis whose effects were principally felt in the North. If miasmatic disease transmission had 
                                                 
7 For further discussion of Easton, see Bay, The White Image in the Black Mind (2000), 46-54, and Larson, Imagining Equality 
in Nineteenth-Century American Literature (2008), 32-36. 
8 The rhetoric of miasmatic disease was also appropriated by the temperance movement. Lyman Beecher, for instance, 
warned in an 1827 sermon that the continued production and distribution “ardent spirits” would be a “moral miasma 
spread over the nation” (72).  
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been imagined as a peculiarly Southern bête noire, the devastation wrought by Asiatic cholera brought 
the perils of miasma to the forefront of Northern consciousness. Northern abolitionists did not 
simply “throw aside” concerns about the deleterious climate in favor of the urban industrialist 
“mode of exposé.” Rather, by mobilizing the rhetoric of intensification and stealth invasion that had 
characterized public discourse on cholera, abolitionists reconstituted these long-established tropes of 
Southern insalubrity as metonyms for other species of “hidden depravity.”9  
In the wake of the Compromise of 1850 and the passage of the Fugitive Slave Law—these, 
on the heels of a second devastating cholera epidemic, one that appeared almost simultaneously in 
New York and New Orleans—advocates of emancipation continued to proclaim that “[t]he moral 
miasma of this great national sin is spreading everywhere, and corrupting the life-blood of the whole 
country” (Hosmer 198-99), that “even in these States we behold the effects of a miasma wafted 
from the South” (Jay 376).  But as this chapter aims to show, slavery was not only figured as a 
metaphorical public health crisis; instead, these metaphors arose concurrent with urgent concerns 
about disease transmission, immunity and susceptibility. In what follows, I argue that biopolitical 
discourses of health, and particularly health care, were integral to both anti- and pro-slavery politics, 
as both slavery and emancipation were understood as literal public health crises for the American 
republic. While the white abolitionists like William Leggett could claim the privilege of metaphor in 
asserting “[t]here are evils which affect the moral character, and poison the social relations, of those 
who breathe the atmosphere of slavery, more to be deplored than its paralyzing influence on their 
physical condition” (231), African American writers like William Wells Brown, Hannah Crafts, and 
                                                 
9 Associations of Southern insalubrity would continue in the Reconstruction-era “sick South.” As Natalie Ring writes, 
“nationalist efforts to reunite the North and South in the post-Civil War era were hampered by a belief in the differences 
between a diseased agricultural South and a healthy industrialized North. Scientifically constructed knowledge about 
diseases, and in particular regionally specific illnesses, framed apprehension about the fate of the political economy in the 
New South and created a compulsion to pull it in line with the modern capitalist state. Further, the language of public 
health reform and the attempt to cure the sick South ultimately contributed to the nationalist agenda of reconciliation 
since a healthy part ensured a healthy whole” (72).  
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Sojourner Truth illustrate that the literal atmosphere and the diseases it engendered produced long-
lasting consequences on the “physical condition” of enslaved people.  
The antebellum investigation of biological differences between European and African races, 
as Todd Savitt points out his seminal study of Southern medical practices, “was of both practical 
and political importance: it involved not only the health care of an entire racial group in the South, 
but also the partial justification for enslaving them” (7). The miasmatic understanding of disease, in 
particular, contributed to eighteenth-century theories of racial variation, and, concomitantly, to 
rationalizations of white supremacy; in his Essay on the Causes of Variety of Complexion and Figure in the 
Human Species (1787), for instance, Samuel Stanhope Smith notably espoused the notion that “[t]he 
vapours of stagnant waters with which uncultivated regions abound” served “to augment the bile” 
that produced blackness, thus ensuring that “savages will always be discoloured” (57). Amending 
Smith’s proposition, Benjamin Rush hypothesized that “morbid blackness” was due to a species of 
leprosy inculcated by the West African climate—a malady whose effects proved mainly superficial; 
African Americans, he noted, tended to be “as healthy, and as long lived as the white people,” since 
“[l]ocal diseases of the skin seldom affect the general health of the body” (“Observations” 292, 295). 
Unlike many of his contemporaries, however, Rush explicitly resisted the conclusion that biological 
difference justified enslavement, asserting that “all claims of superiority of the whites over the 
blacks, on account of their colors, are founded alike in ignorance and inhumanity. If the color of the 
negroes be the effect of a disease,” he continued, “instead of inviting us to tyrannize over them, it 
should entitle them to a double portion of our humanity, for disease all over the world has always 
been the signal for immediate and universal compassion” (295).10 Suggestions that the African race 
                                                 
10 For more on these theories of skin color variation, see Stanton, The Leopard’s Spots (1960) and Dain, A Hideous Monster 
of the Mind (2002). According to Virginian physician John Mitchell, black bodies also produced miasma: the “perspirable 
matter of black or tawny people,” Mitchell argued, was “more acrid, penetrating, and offensive, in its effects” and “more 
apt to degenerate to a contagious miasma, than the milder effluvia of Whites” (946). For more on Mitchell, and for a 
comprehensive account of colonial “creolization” anxieties, see Parrish, American Curiosity (2006).  
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was by nature diseased, endangered, or otherwise inferior and dependent generated contentious 
debates about enslavement versus protection—or, according to the Southern paternalist view, 
enslavement as protection. 
While scholars who have charted the rise of scientific racism in the antebellum United States 
have been wont to note the influence of ethnology—from the publication of Samuel George 
Morton’s Crania Americana in 1839 to the development of the “American School” of Josiah C. Nott 
and George Gliddon, whose polygenicist ideology would find an enthusiastic advocate in the 
Harvard zoologist Louis Agassiz11—this chapter considers the ways in which the operation of 
scientific racism was more trenchant and more pronounced within the realm of public health. 
Following the foundational scholarship of historians like Savitt, Kenneth Kiple, and Virginia 
Himmelsteib King, as well more recent work by scholars including Katherine Kemi Bankole, Sharla 
M. Fett, W. Michael Byrd and Linda A. Clayton, Jim Downs, Gretchen Long, and Harriet 
Washington, I illustrate the ways in which the construction and perpetuation of theories about 
racialized immunity and susceptibility—and the attitudes toward care these theories engendered—
were harnessed as political fodder by both sides of the slavery debate. Pro-slavery and abolitionist 
writers were mutually preoccupied with matters of proof and legitimacy; while Southerners labored to 
produce scientific “proof” of racialized immunity (and concomitantly, racial inferiority), abolitionist 
writers simultaneously labored to demonstrate the ways in which African Americans were in fact 
eminently susceptible to the effects of slavery—that is, not only the effects of corporeal violence that 
were readily rendered legible in the widely-circulated ur-image of the scarred back, but the more 
systemic, cumulative effects that posed longstanding threats to their mental and physical health. 
                                                 
11 For further discussion of the American School of Ethnology, see Fredrickson, The Black Image in the White Mind (1971); 
Dain, A Hideous Monster of the Mind (2002); Fabian, Skull Collectors (2010); and Schuller, “Taxonomies of Feeling” (2012). 
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This chapter begins with a brief examination of the medical theory of racialized immunity 
and its refutation in William Wells Brown’s Clotel (1853). I argue that Brown’s representation of 
yellow fever crucially reconstitutes the popular theory of black immunity to diseases of the Southern 
climate, a theory that worked to “naturalize” chattel slavery. In an 1851 report published in the New 
Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, for instance, Louisiana physician Samuel A. Cartwright, a key 
proponent of this scientifically-racist medical theory, offered evidence as proof for what he 
considered the innate physical inferiority of the African race, which rendered its members “slave[s] 
by nature” (698). Outlining a compendium of racially-specific complaints—including the one he 
deemed “drapetomania, or the disease causing slaves to run away” (707)—Cartwright presented a 
series of bizarre arguments for the “debasement of mind, which has rendered the people of Africa 
unable to take care of themselves” (694).  
African Americans’ supposed incapacity for self-care was fundamental to pro-slavery 
ideology. Yet while scholars have analyzed the economic dimensions of this tenet, less attention has 
been paid to the ways in which this incapacity for care was also framed as a critical public health 
problem. As Southern medical theorists developed “scientific” justifications for slavery, Southern 
social theorists concomitantly drew from these medical arguments of racialized incapacity for self-
care to situate the health of the black body as integral to their political economy. In response to 
abolitionist exposé, apologists for the “peculiar institution” argued that the greatest risks to African 
American health were posed not by slavery, but by emancipation. Pitting the paternalistic care of the 
slave economy against the cruelty of free-labor capitalism, these writers posited the Southern slave 
economy as a welfare state that ensured the protection and care of its sick, disabled, and aged 
members—and indeed, the institutional failure of the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen and 
Abandoned Lands (Freedmen's Bureau) to provide adequate medical care for African Americans in 
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the wake of the Civil War seemed to usher in precisely the kind of public health emergency many 
Southerners had forecasted.  
This chapter examines iterations of this “hygienic” argument for slavery in a trio of texts 
published in 1854—the sociological treatises of George Fitzhugh and Henry Hughes, and Caroline 
Lee Hentz’s pro-slavery plantation novel The Planter’s Northern Bride—before exploring the counter-
argument to Southern claims of paternalistic care in Hannah Crafts’s The Bondwoman’s Narrative. A 
manuscript novel penned by a formerly-enslaved African American woman in the mid-1850s and 
recovered by Henry Louis Gates in 2002, The Bondwoman’s Narrative illustrates the ways in which the 
barbarity of slavery consists not only of overt corporeal violence, but of what Saidiya Hartman calls 
the “terror of the mundane and quotidian” (4). Crafts’s novel turns away from the primal scene of 
violence to illuminate the ways in which more invisible and incremental kinds of psychological and 
environmental violence also produce profound effects on the black body, arguing for a recognition 
of the “legitimacy” of risk in a culture of systemic neglect.  
In short, then, I argue that The Bondwoman’s Narrative works to expose the biopolitical 
machinery of racism, which is, in Foucault’s definition, “the indispensable precondition that allows 
someone to be killed.” As Crafts’s novel illustrates, this “killing” does not only encompass “murder 
as such, but also every form of indirect murder: the fact of exposing someone to death, increasing 
the risk of death for some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection, and so on” 
(“Society Must Be Defended,” 256). Ultimately, by investigating the immunological and public health 
discourses of enslavement and emancipation—reorienting attention from exceptionalized scenes of 
violence and death to the manifold forms of “indirect murder” that characterize antebellum 
biopolitics—this chapter seeks to contribute to a broader understanding of manifestations of the 




Burdens of Proof: Racialized Immunity and States’-Rights Medicine  
In the twenty-third chapter of William Wells Brown’s Clotel (1853), “Truth Stranger than 
Fiction,” a yellow fever epidemic sweeps through the city of New Orleans. By way of exposition, 
Brown situates his readers in the cyclical pathology of the South: “During certain seasons of the 
year, all tropical climates are subject to epidemics of a most destructive nature,” Brown writes; “The 
inhabitants of New Orleans look with as much certainty for the appearance of the yellow-fever, 
small-pox, or cholera, in the hot season, as the Londoner does for fog in the month of November.” 
Yet in this particular fever season—the year, Brown informs us, is 1831—the epidemic appears “in a 
form unusually repulsive and deadly. It seized persons who were in health, without any 
premonition” (172). The abruptness, rapidity, and virulence of the epidemic render it particularly 
terrifying as it unravels the social fabric of the city:  
Soon the breath infected the air with a fetid odour, the lips were glazed, despair 
painted itself in the eyes, and sobs, with long intervals of silence, formed the only 
language. From each side of the mouth spread foam, tinged with black and burnt 
blood. Blue streaks mingled with the yellow all over the frame. All remedies were 
useless. This was the Yellow Fever. The disorder spread alarm and confusion 
throughout the city. On an average, more than 400 died daily. In the midst of 
disorder and confusion, death heaped victims on victims. Friend followed friend in 
quick succession. The sick were avoided from the fear of contagion, and for the 
same reason the dead were left unburied. Nearly 2000 dead bodies lay uncovered in 
the burial-ground, with only here and there a little lime thrown over them, to prevent 
the air becoming infected (173). 
 
As scholars such as Lara Langer Cohen have noted, Brown’s description of this fictional 
epidemic reproduces nearly verbatim the historical account of the 1802 yellow fever outbreak in 
Saint Domingue in John Relly Beard’s Life of Toussaint L’Ouverture (1853). In employing this citation, 
Cohen argues, Brown not only paints Saint Domingue and New Orleans as similarly susceptible to 
diseases of “tropical climate,” but transplants the “revolutionary climate” of Saint Domingue to the 
antebellum South: yellow fever supplies “an especially unsettling metaphor for insurrection,” Cohen 
writes, “because it imagines the latter, as much as the former, as endemic to the plantation zone” 
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(174). Yet while Brown indeed aligns the disease landscape of the American South with that of the 
West Indies—an observation that falls in line with “the mainstream of a vigorous neo-Hippocratic 
environmentalism” (Cassedy, “Medical Men” 167) practiced by Southern medical topographers in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries—it does not necessarily follow that Brown’s citation neatly 
performs the metaphorical work that Cohen supposes. Indeed, I suggest that what is most 
significant about Brown’s incorporation of this epidemic is not in the way in which he replicates 
Beard’s text, but the ways he departs from it.  
Specifically, crucial to Beard’s account of the 1802 yellow fever epidemic is the presumed 
immunity of the black population. As Beard notes, the success of the Haitian rebellion is solidified 
because, while French troops fall victim to the fever, the native black population proves “proof 
against the pest” (218); accordingly, the epidemic functions on a “terrible punishment…on the 
predatory expedition” (218-19) of the colonizers. In Clotel, however, Brown explicitly counters this 
fiction of transmission, stating that the “[t]he Negro, whose home is in a hot climate, was not proof 
against the disease” (173). Rather than making space for black resistance, then, Brown’s imagined 
epidemic becomes an indiscriminate consumer of black and white flesh: a grotesque tableau of 
unburied bodies that renders the very air infectious. Strikingly, this putrefaction—a decay 
occasioned by neglect from fear of infection—radically reconstitutes these bodies, as they 
metamorphose from the objects to the agents of disease. In a version of what Russ Castronovo calls 
“necro citizenship,” death becomes the only condition of possibility by which the enslaved may be 
incorporated into an undifferentiated social body.12 The magnitude of this morbidity is translated 
into starkly economic terms, as Brown notes that “[m]any plantations had to suspend their work for 
                                                 
12 As Castronovo points out in his reading of Clotel’s suicide, “Death liberates the subject from the social meanings of 
race, granting her an unencumbered freedom.” However, Castronovo continues, “It must be recognized... that the desire 




want of slaves to take the places of those carried off by the fever” (173). Employing an evocative 
rhetoric of captivity, Brown suggests that the effects of this epidemic upon the enslaved are only 
remarkable in terms of an interruption to the invisible architecture of plantation labor.  
Brown’s invocation of yellow fever was a timely one; a particularly virulent epidemic had 
struck New Orleans in 1853, the year of Clotel’s publication; throughout the 1850s, nearly 20,000 
people would die from yellow fever in the city, rendering it “the single most important stimulus for 
public health reform in the antebellum South” (Patterson 162).13 In asserting the vulnerability of the 
black population, Brown explicitly confronts the issue of racialized immunity, a commonly-held 
“proof” of racial difference that circulated among the Southern medical community—and indeed, 
antebellum debates on slavery were preoccupied with the issue of “proof,” from American slave 
narrative’s “requisite act of authentication” (Stepto 12), as the veracity of the slave’s personal history 
was commonly affirmed by the paratextual material of white patrons, to the authenticating evidence 
of scientific racism, which deigned to supply “‘scientific’ proof of Negro inferiority” (Dain 225):14 
Nott and Gliddon, for instance, advertised their ethnological theories as offering “proof of the 
permanence of human types” (262). Yet rather than attending to these “positivistic standards” by 
exploring the ethnological imaginary in Clotel,15 my analysis focuses on the novel’s immunological 
imaginary: a species of scientific “proof,” I suggest, productive of more immediate and pronounced 
effects for Southern biopolitics.  
                                                 
13 For more on yellow fever epidemics in nineteenth-century New Orleans, see Duffy, Sword of Pestilence (1966) and Ellis, 
Yellow Fever and Public Health in the New South (1992). For primary accounts of the 1853 epidemic, see Fenner, History of the 
Epidemic Yellow Fever at New Orleans, La. in 1853 (1854) and the Report of the Sanitary Commission of New Orleans on the 
Epidemic Yellow Fever of 1853 (1854).  
14 During the mid-nineteenth-century, as Drew Gilpin Faust has observed, “[t]he accepted foundations for truth were 
changing in European and American thought, as intellectuals sought to apply the rigor of science to the study of society 
and morality, as well as the natural world”; proslavery ideologues thus attempted “to embrace the positivistic standards 
increasingly accepted for the assessment of all social problems” (11). 
15 Adélékè Adéèkó, for example, has examined the ways in which Brown employs “the symbolic linkage of blood and 
racial category” (117) as a refutation of the polygenetic theory expounded by ethnologists like Nott and Gliddon. 
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The theoretical musings of ethnologists, after all, were increasingly dismissed in the 1850s, 
even (and especially) by Southern Fundamentalists, whose could not reconcile the theory of 
polygenesis with the teachings of Genesis. Physicians, on the other hand, offered evidence of disease 
immunity in a way that seemingly naturalized not only the enslavement of African Americans, but 
conditions of brutality and systemic neglect on Southern plantations.16 In the 1840s and 50s, 
Southern physicians such as Samuel Cartwright, Erasmus Darwin Fenner, and E.M. Pendleton 
waged a biopolitical campaign for “states’-rights medicine,” a distinctly Southern medical ideology 
that was, as Peter McCandless claims, “more rhetorical than real” (168)—but one that would 
nevertheless produce very real consequences for the health of African American populations in the 
antebellum period and beyond.17  Merging scientific theory and the political interests of the 
Southern slave economy with “the crusading sense of a sociopolitical movement” (Warner 195), 
these physicians argued for the existence of racial differences in disease susceptibility, mortality, and 
treatment. Working from a neo-Hippocratic understanding of the relation of climate to disease 
etiology, they contended that people of African descent were innately suited to inhabit the American 
South, whose climate had long proved inimical to the European constitution.18  
                                                 
16 While Southern physicians were not entirely mistaken in observing upon the existence of some racial differences in 
disease susceptibility— many persons of African descent, for instance, indeed had genetic immunity to certain strains of 
malaria— their extension of these observations into a comprehensive explanation for the inferiority of the African race 
would both fuel the argument for chattel slavery and perpetuate disparities in care. For more on racialized immunity to 
malaria, see Patterson, “Disease Environments in the Antebellum South” (1989). 
17 As Byrd and Clayton point out, states’-rights medicine would “lead to the establishment of a pattern of 
underdevelopment in public health as the norm for most of the United States” (108). See also Marshall, “Samuel A. 
Cartwright and States’ Rights Medicine” (1940); Breeden, “States-Rights Medicine in the Old South” (1976); Warner, “A 
Southern Medical Reform” (1983); Savitt and Young, eds., Disease and Distinctiveness in the American South (1988); and 
Duffy, “States’ Rights Medicine” (1989).  
18 For example, in an 1826 article published in the Philadelphia Journal of the Medical and Physical Sciences, South Carolinian 
physician Philip Tidyman reported to his Northern colleagues that enslaved African Americans in the South were 
“generally exempt from attack of intermittent and remittent bilious fevers, which prove so fatal to the white population, 
particularly Europeans.” Accordingly, Tidyman asserted, “[t]he negroes who reside on large rice plantations and other 
places in the vicinity of stagnant water, generally enjoy through the hot months as good health as they would do if placed 
in the mountains.” 
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Yellow fever, in particular, was popularly held as a primary example of African immunity, an 
observation that dated from South Carolinian physician John Lining’s account of the 1748 outbreak 
of yellow fever in Charleston. Despite the ample evidence that the 1793 yellow fever epidemic had 
supplied to the contrary—notably detailed by Absalom Jones and Richard Allen in their 1794 
Narrative, discussed in Chapter 1—physicians in the antebellum period continued to espouse 
Lining’s position, placing African Americans in a state of immunological exception, citing this 
supposed racial difference as a justification for divinely-ordained enslavement. In his “Report on 
Diseases and Physical Peculiarities of the Negro Race,” for example, Cartwright concluded that 
while the black population was susceptible to certain varieties of disease, “they are not liable to the 
dreaded el vomito, or yellow fever. At least,” he qualified, “they have it so lightly, that I have never 
seen a negro die with black vomit, although I have witnessed a number of yellow fever epidemics” 
(701). Likewise, Josiah Nott—a physician as well as an aspiring ethnologist—supported his 
argument for racial difference with immunological evidence, arguing that while African Americans 
were more prone than their white counterparts to diseases like cholera and small pox, they were 
“infinitely less liable” (Indigenous Races 369) to yellow fever19 (see fig. 3.1).  
 
                                                 
19 In his 1844 Lectures on the Natural History of the Caucasian and Negro Race, Nott had similarly identified yellow fever as a 






Fig. 3.1. “Table Showing the Number of Deaths, for Each Year, Among the Colored Population of Charleston, 
with Some of the Causes of Death, and Their Longevity.” Josiah Nott, “Acclimation; Or the Comparative 
Influence of Climate, Endemic and Epidemic Disease, on the Races of Man.” Nott and Gliddon, eds., 
Indigenous Races of the Earth. Indigenous Races of the Earth; or New Chapters of Ethnological Inquiry. Philadelphia: J.B. 
Lippincott & CO., 1857 
 
As Nott’s reproduction of Charleston death statistics shows, this immunological imaginary 
depended not only upon individual case studies, but upon identification of broad populational 
effects. Unlike the ethnological “science” developed by erstwhile skull-collectors, aspiring 
immunologists appealed to both individual anecdotal evidence and to demographic morbidity and 
mortality data. In his contribution to the 1849 volume of Southern Medical Reports, for example, E.M. 
Pendleton includes tables intended to “indicate the susceptibility of the different races, sexes and 
ages to different forms of disease” (337), as supported by reports of disease incidence of Georgia20 
(see fig. 3.2).  
                                                 




Fig. 3.2. “On the Susceptibility of the Caucasians and Africans to the Different Classes of Disease.” E.M. 
Pendleton, Southern Medical Reports Vol. 1 (1849).  
 
 
Like many of his contemporaries, Pendleton relies on demographic data to supply statistical 
support for the divergent rates of disease occurrence between black and white races and affirm 
widespread suspicions about immunological difference. “Although more exposed to the cold dews 
and hot sun of autumn, as well as having more filth about their habitations,” Pendleton declares, the 
black race “seem[s] to be less liable to periodic fevers, and more readily recover than the white” 
(337-8). In avowing the resilience of the black constitution, Pendleton implicitly sanctions the 
conditions of neglect and degradation that abolitionists would cite as evidence of the inhumanity of 
the institution: grueling labor, prolonged exposure to the elements, squalid living quarters, etc.21 
African Americans’ seeming exemption to yellow fever, adherents of states’-rights medicine insisted, 
could be explained not only by the fact that they enjoyed immunity as a result of their hereditary 
                                                 
21 This, of course, stood in stark contrast to the understanding of the effects of these same conditions on white bodies: 
as the British traveler Robert Renny wrote in his 1807 History of Jamaica, it was precisely because white European sailors 
were “[e]xposed to the burning sun, and a sultry atmosphere by day; chilling dews, and unhealthful vapours by night” 
that they were “readily affected with those contagions, which prove so destructive to Europeans” (193). 
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association with the “torrid zone,” but could also develop additional resistance to disease through 
“seasoning” or “acclimation”: the process of habituation to the climate. 22  In turn, this popular 
understanding of acclimation carried distinct implications for the plantation economy: as E.D. 
Fenner noted in an 1858 essay, “[a]n acclimated negro, horse, or milch cow, commands a higher 
price than an unacclimated one” (459). Indeed, auctioneers advertised enslaved people’s 









Fig. 3.4. “[T]he largest lot of acclimated Negroes in the city.” Daily Picayune (New Orleans), May 9, 1852.  
                                                 
22 Acclimation was widely understood as a process that equally affected white residents of the South.  It was a truism, 
claimed E.M. Pendleton, that in Southern cities like New Orleans, “natives are exempt from endemics, where one night’s 
sleep of a stranger will often superinduce a fatal form of fever” (338); in the antebellum South, yellow fever earned the 
appellation “stranger’s fever” due to the locals’ confidence in their acquired immunity (Kiple and King 40). As Fenner 
explained, the human constitution was “capable, in the course of time, of habituating itself to the deleterious influence of 
deadly poisons” (455); thus even white Northerners who relocated to the South might eventually “become quite 
exempt” to the region’s “peculiarities of soil, climate and noxious effluvia” (459). While both white and black bodies 
could become acclimated to the Southern climate, physicians drew a sharp immunological distinction in insisting that 
white people could only acquire, but not inherit, immunity—a distinction that constituted “not only a form of racial 
boasting or a purely medical debate,” as McCandless claims, but “a matter of economics, politics, and ethics” (142). 
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In Clotel, Brown reproduces the discourse of demography that informed scientifically-racist 
estimations of immunity and susceptibility in order to offer a subtle and trenchant analysis of 
antebellum biopolitics. Although the majority of the critical discussion of Brown’s novel has 
unsurprisingly focused on its eponymous heroine, the enslaved mulatta daughter of Thomas 
Jefferson, it is also worth directing our attention to the president’s other daughter, Althesa, who dies 
in Brown’s imagined 1831 epidemic along with her white husband, Henry Morton. Unlike Clotel, 
whose iconic leap from the Long Bridge is rendered the focus of sentimental affiliation in Brown’s 
novel, Althesa’s death is not exceptionalized; indeed, she is not even named in the scene of her 
death: “Henry Morton and wife,” Brown writes, “were among the thirteen thousand swept away by 
the raging disorder that year” (173). The innominate wife of a white physician, Althesa is merely 
another anonymous body among the number desolated by the epidemic.  
As a result of Henry and Althesa’s deaths—but more pointedly, of course, as a result of the 
absence of legal protections for African Americans in the plantation South—their daughters are sold 
into slavery. Rather than performing a redemptive or revolutionary function, then, the presence of 
yellow fever in Brown’s text serves to remind his readers of the tragic instability of freedom.23 Like 
slavery itself—what Brown once deemed “the hydra-headed system that pollutes our moral 
atmosphere, and stigmatizes the national character, and proves ruinous to all that it touches” 
(“Letter” 907)—yellow fever is an atmospheric pollutant that proves ruinous to black and white 
                                                 
23 This instability is illustrated in Brown’s invocation of the famous case of Salome Muller/Sally Miller, the German girl 
sold who was into slavery in early nineteenth-century Louisiana and won her freedom in a widely publicized 1845 court 
case; in Brown’s text, Salome is a servant in the Morton’s household. Notably, Muller’s sale had been facilitated by her 
father’s death from yellow fever soon after their immigration to the American South. Brown incorporates the famous 
“white slavery” case not only to illustrate not only the ambiguity of racialization, as do William and Ellen Craft, but to 
assert the ways in which white bodies are “not proof against” the slave economy of the South any more than black 
bodies are “proof against” the diseases of its climate.  
161 
 
bodies. Far from intimating insurrection, the epidemic represents (another) kind of systemic 
injustice, perpetuating a climate of universal endangerment.24  
While Brown launches a decisive critique of racialized immunity in Clotel, he was not alone in 
his opposition to states-rights’ medicine. Despite its prevalence among physicians in the plantation 
South, theories of racialized immunity were not universally accepted in nineteenth-century 
epidemiological thought. In an 1845 article on “Diseases of the Negro Population,” for instance, 
Cincinnati physician Daniel Drake asserted that the “colored population” of the South was “by no 
means exempt from a variety of formidable diseases”—insisting, specifically, that “[t]he colored 
people are not proof against the cause of yellow fever” (34).25 In turn, if the claim of racial 
“exemption” had facilitated the justification for slavery, the claim of universal susceptibility afforded 
an argument for emancipation. For example, in his “Essay on the Character and Condition of the 
African Race” (1852), the African American Baptist pastor John W. Lewis argued that, although 
certain physical differences might be understood to exist among the races, “[a]ll human bodies are 
subject alike to the same disease, and the color of the body does not require any variation in medical 
treatment, that is, in the same locality” (195).  
                                                 
24 Drawing from historians of tropical medicine, Kelly Wisecup has argued that Brown’s presentation yellow fever works 
to unsettle Southern geographic and racial distinctions, connecting New Orleans to the West Indies as it intimates an 
“interracial and hemispheric citizenship” (“The Progress” 7). Wisecup reads Brown’s revisionary assertion that the black 
population of New Orleans, unlike its Haitian counterpart, “was not proof against the disease” as a suggestion that this 
population “might not be purely black, thus literalizing anxieties about the racial and cultural hybridizing of southern 
populations. Accordingly, in Clotel,” she continues, “the white planter Morton dies of yellow fever, while his mulatto wife 
and quadroon children, with their greater quantity of ‘black blood,’ survive” (“The Progress” 10). Of course, Wisecup’s 
assertion is patently false: as noted above, Morton’s “mulatto wife” Althesa does die in the epidemic, following the 
condition of her full-blooded black mother, Jefferson’s onetime mistress Currer, who dies of the same disease in 
Natchez. The fact that Althesa’s death is lost on Wisecup speaks to the very effect Brown’s text produces, subsuming 
the individual subject into a mass grave of statistical anonymity in a strategy that invokes large-scale populational 
argument many Southern physicians employed in their defense of African immunity. While Wisecup’s racial calculus 
understands Brown as affirming the theory of racialized immunity in order to play on contemporary miscegenation 
anxieties, I argue instead that Brown seeks to controvert the claims of states-rights’ medicine.  
25 As Drake argued, the idea of black immunity was a fallacy arising from a misunderstanding of the import of urban and 
rural racial dempgraphy; because African Americans “are not numerous in the cities and towns, where only [the yellow 
fever] prevails,” Drake explained, “the mortality from this disease is not great” (166). 
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Lewis’s unwillingness to concede racial difference in the issue of disease susceptibility and 
treatment suggests the exigency of the argument for equitable medical care—one that might be 
extended from “locality” of region to what Priscilla Wald has more broadly identified as a “link 
between national identity and physical existence.” In what might be understood as “the inverse of 
herd immunity,” Wald explains, the “common susceptibility” can facilitate the claim to shared 
national identity (59). Similarly, in Clotel, Brown’s depiction of “common susceptibility” not only 
offers a revisionary history of a disease whose victims were popularly imagined as primarily, if not 
exclusively, white, but heralds a call to African American citizenship. Like Jones and Allen, Brown 
writes black lives—and deaths—back into the Southern social body. In the following section, I will 
illustrate ways in which the politics of American chattel slavery were implicated in broader 
discourses of health insofar as they attended not only to the biomedical problem of immunity, but to 
the broader problem of care. 
 
Burdens of Care: Pro-Slavery Ideology and The Planter’s Northern Bride  
Ubiquitous in pro-slavery discourse is the paternalist contention that people of African 
descent could not “take care of themselves,” and were thus effectively protected from extinction by 
their enslavement. Northern abolitionists in turn worked to dismantle the logic of this claim, asking, 
for instance, why the “protection” for racially-determined failures of care should differ from that 
afforded other vulnerable classes; the author of an 1836 article in The Anti-Slavery Record, for 
example, appeals to “the language of the law of the state of Mississippi in regard to ‘idiots, lunatics, 
and persons non compos mentos’—i.e., who have not mind enough to take care of their bodies” in 
order to argue that, if African Americans were, like “lunatics,” incapable of self-care, then the most 
ethical relation to such subjects was guardianship rather than enslavement (“Could They Take Care 
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of Themselves?” 85).26 With a Swiftean satirical flair, another abolitionist writer refuted the idea that 
“slavery, like hospitals, alms-houses, poor-houses, and asylums, is a benevolent institution for taking 
care of those who ‘can’t take care of themselves’” by proposing that the logical social approach to 
“all idiots, the blind, the deaf and dumb, the insane, and all other descriptions of persons who ‘can’t 
take care of themselves’” should be to “turn them into property, set them on the auction table, 
knock them off to the highest bidder, make out a bill of sale for each—and overseers and 
DRIVERS will see that they are taken care of!” (“They Can’t Take Care of Themselves” 29).  
Of course, the point that these writers labor to make is that African Americans were in fact 
capable of self-care, as evidenced by their ability to care for their masters, to cultivate their own land 
(see fig. 3.5), and to “increase by natural generation” even “under all their cruel disabilities” (“Could 
They Take Care of Themselves?” 93). But if self-care was a precondition of the rights of citizenship, 
so too were health and able-bodiedness: “the fact that those states which permit emancipation, 
prohibit the emancipation of the very young, the aged and the diseased, is their testimony that all 
who are neither very young, nor old, nor of unsound constitutions—can ‘take care of themselves,’” 
the above article concludes; thus, its author continues, “[t]o say that any class of persons in this 
country, in possession of their reason, not crippled in their bodily powers, and under the protection 
of the law, ‘can’t take care of themselves,’ is not only a slander upon human nature but upon the 
Creator” (“They Can’t Take Care of Themselves” 31-32). For both pro-slavery ideologues and 
abolitionists, the question of where to locate the burden of care consistently produces two 
possibilities: with the self, or with the slaveowner—never with the state.  
 
                                                 
26 George Fitzhugh would address this particular line of critique with his assertion that the enslaved African “must be 





 Fig. 3.5. “They Can’t Take Care of Themselves.” Anti-Slavery Almanac, for 1840. New York and Boston:  
American Anti-Slavery Society, 1840. 
 
Another strain of abolitionist discourse sought to address the inhumanity of slavery by 
invoking precisely that vulnerable, liminal class that could not “take care of themselves”: “the aged 
and the diseased.” In the American Anti-Slavery Society’s bestselling 1839 volume American Slavery as 
It Is: Testimony of a Thousand Witnesses, for example—a key text for the kindling of abolitionist 
consciousness in the northeastern United States—co-authors Theodore Dwight Weld, Angelina 
Grimké Weld, and Sarah Grimké offer a collection of firsthand accounts bearing witness to the 
brutality and injustice of the institution. Garnered from oral testimony and the pages of Southern 
newspapers, these include reports of physical cruelty, punishment, and torture committed both by 
plantation masters and the Southern medical establishment.27 However, the text also addresses more 
                                                 
27 As Harriet Washington has demonstrated, the historical record reveals (and more often conceals) a long tradition of 
medical experimentation on African Americans; in the antebellum period, in particular, physicians depended upon “the 
enslaved ‘clinical material’ that fed American medical research” (26). See also Fisher, “Physicians and Slavery in the 
Antebellum Southern Medical Journal” (1968); Savitt, “The Use of Blacks for Medical Experimentation and 
Demonstration in the Old South” (1982); Blakely and Harrington, Bones in the Basement (1997). For the authors of 
American Slavery as It Is, this non-consensual clinical experimentation served as an apt illustration of the depths of 
inhumanity in the plantation South. Noting that “‘[p]ublic opinion’ would tolerate surgical experiments, operations, 
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quotidian forms of institutional injustice, beginning with illustrations of inequity and neglect in diet, 
labor, clothing, housing, and medical treatment. The combination of hard labor and poor living 
conditions, its authors suggest, are eminently conducive to sickness; in turn, they proclaim, “THE 
SLAVES SUFFER FROM INHUMAN NEGLECT WHEN SICK.”28  
While American Slavery as It Is proposes that “the neglect of the aged and sick” constitutes 
“[a]nother dark side of slavery” (45)—one that illustrated slow and insidious institutional effects 
rather than more immediate kinds of violence—pro-slavery ideologues proffered precisely the 
opposite argument: the political economy of the plantation South, they claimed, ensured the care of 
its members in the ways that the capitalist free labor economy could not.29 “Political economists 
have established as the natural standard of wages in a fully peopled country, the value of the 
laborer's existence, ” the South Carolinian jurist and political theorist William Harper explained in 
his Memoir on Slavery (1838)—a claim, he noted, which “approximates the truth. Where competition 
is intense,” he continued, “men will labor for a bare subsistence, and less than a competent 
subsistence. The employer of free laborers obtains their services during the time of their health and 
                                                 
processes, performed upon [blacks], which it would execrate if performed upon their master or other whites” (170), they 
excoriate “[t]he absolute barbarism of a ‘public opinion’ which not only tolerates, but produces such advertisements”—
including that of a Dr. T. Stillman, who infamously solicited readers of the Charleston Mercury in the 1830 with an offer to 
pay cash to “[a]ny person having sick Negroes, considered incurable by their respective physicians, and wishing to 
dispose of them” (171). Other abolitionists would seize on this example in order to expose the evils of slavery; Brown, 
for one, reproduces this advertisement in Clotel: Natchez planter John Peck must inform his puzzled Northern guest, Mr. 
Carlton, that the physician seeks not to cure these “sick Negroes,” but to kill them for the purposes of dissection. “They 
keep them on hand,” he explains, “and when they need one they bleed him to death.” When the shocked Carlton weakly 
protests the ethics of this practice, Peck replies with indifference: “Oh, the doctors are licensed to commit murder, you 
know” (102). 
28 For instance, the authors cite William Ellery Channing’s essay on slavery, in which he recalls witnessing a suffering 
woman lying on the floor of a plantation hospital: “If the sick and dying female slaves of such a master, suffer such 
barbarous neglect,” the authors assert in response, “whose heart does not fail him, at the thought of that inhumanity, 
exercised by the majority of slaveholders, towards their aged, sick, and dying victims” (44). In another anecdote, a man 
who had studied medicine in Virginia remarks on the horrifying treatment of sick slaves: “No provision was made 
against the barbarity or neglect of the physician,” he reports; “I have seen fifteen or twenty of these helpless sufferers crowded 
together in the true spirit of slaveholding inhumanity, like ‘brutes that perish,’ and driven from time to time like brutes 
into a common yard, where they had to suffer any and every operation and experiment, which interest, caprice, or 
professional curiosity might prompt,—unrestrained by law, public sentiment, or the claims of common humanity” (45). 
29 See Faust, The Ideology of Slavery (1981); Genovese, The Political Economy of Slavery (1989); and Fox-Genovese and 
Genovese, The Mind of the Master Class (2005). 
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vigor, without the charge of rearing them from infancy, or supporting them in sickness or old age,” 
while the slaveholder, by contrast, “cuts off the principal source of misery—the wants and sufferings 
of infancy, sickness, and old age” (18).30  If a pervasive strain of Southern medical theory contended 
that African Americans’ propensity to illness was a result of inability to “take care of themselves,”31 
nascent Southern sociology proposed the system of slavery as a symbiotic solution.  
Perhaps no Southern ideologue was as outspoken on this point than the Virginian social 
theorist George Fitzhugh, who appealed to the nascent discipline of sociology to rationalize the 
institution of slavery. As he argued in his Sociology for the South (1854), the “domestic affection” (43) 
that informed Southern slave economy had resulted in “a model of associated labor that Fourier 
might envy” (45); if Northern Socialists had dreamt of a civilization built upon an ideology of 
mutual care, pro-slavery polemicists like Fitzhugh pointed out that the free-labor system instituted 
no safeguards to ensure the aid of “the poor, aged, helpless, sick and unfortunate” (46). In this view, 
“neglect of the aged and sick” was a defining feature not of the Southern slave economy, as 
Northern abolitionists would have it, but of the capitalist free labor market. Extolling the 
“neverfailing protective, care-taking and supporting feature of slavery” (68), Fitzhugh insisted that, 
unlike the cutthroat (or, as he would later suggest, cannibalistic) capitalist system, the slave economy 
                                                 
30 Harper goes on to acknowledge that “[t]he poor laws of England are an attempt—but an awkward and empirical 
attempt—to supply the place of that which we should suppose the feelings of every human heart would declare to be a 
natural obligation—that he who has received the benefit of the laborer's services during his health and vigor, should 
maintain him when he becomes unable to provide for his own support. They answer their purpose, however, very 
imperfectly,” he argues, “and are unjustly and unequally imposed. There is no attempt to apportion the burden according 
to the benefit received—and perhaps there could be none. This is one of the evils of their condition” (18).  
31 In an 1837 article on cholera published in the Southern Botanic Journal, for example, D.F. Nardin, a Thomsonian 
physician from Charleston, refuted the theory that racial differences in the disease’s mortality rate could be attributed to 
“a peculiarity in the miasma” that disproportionately affected the black race, instead arguing that “the fatal effects of 
Cholera among the blacks” were “owing to their indolence and manner of living.” When white people who were 
threatened with cholera, Nardin claimed, they took care “to avert the calamity,” while black people did not; thus for 
Nardin, African American mortality was an effect of the “indolence and carelessness characteristic of the African,” 
which, he insisted, “constitutes the great mark of the diminutive intellect of that race” (25). In his History of South Carolina 
(1858), David Ramsay took a similar tack, asserting that African Americans were partially to blame for their vulnerability 
to respiratory disorders, as they were “incorrigibly careless” in matters of health (qtd. in McCandless 138).  
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ostensibly offered what amounted to health insurance benefits and social security, as it sought to 
“provide for each slave, in old age and in infancy, in sickness and in health, not according to his 
labor, but according to his wants” (245). 32 
In his Treatise on Sociology, published the same year as Fitzhugh’s Sociology for the South, the 
lawyer and future Mississippi senator Henry Hughes went further to enumerate the ways in which 
Southern slave society achieved this “care-taking” function. In what Hughes referred to as the 
“warrantee system” of slavery, “warrantors” (masters) were bound by both interest and duty to 
support the interests of “warrantees” (slaves) —a system, Hughes noted, that “is not political and 
economic only. It is hygienic” (284). According to Hughes, it was the duty of the warrantor “to act 
for the health of his warranty, as becomes the prudent head of a household” (215). These “hygienic 
duties,” he continued, could be subdivided into two heads: “(1), Preventive, and, (2), Curative, or 
sanitary and therapeutical.” Under the first fell the responsibility to “provide all sanitary necessaries 
for the prevention of disease,” to “provide wholesome food and raiment,” to “regulate the 
construction of all habitations in the warranty; enforce cleanliness and ventilation; and provide for 
purification in cases of pestilence, infection or contagion” (215); under the second fell care of the 
sick, for whom the warrantor was bound “to provide all therapeutic necessaries,” including “due 
medical skill, medical materials, nursing and all proper care and attention” (216). In this way, 
Southern warranteeism worked toward the collective betterment of the “sovereign body hygienic” 
(59). The “free-labor hygienic system,” by contrast, did not guarantee “[m]edicine, medical 
attendance, nursing, and therapeutical necessities,” and was thus, in Hughes terms, “not hygienically 
                                                 
32 As Kerry Larson explains in his discussion of Fitzhugh’s later essay Cannibals All!, “[b]ecause vindicating slavery in the 
abstract means vindicating it for all, the question of engaging the particular needs of a particular race must be bracketed 
as tangential to the conversation. If the white workers of the North needed significantly less assistance, care or 
protection than the black workers of the South — if they were, regardless of circumstance, more independent and self-
reliant by some significant margin—then Fitzhugh’s thesis would fall apart. Slavery would not be superior to capitalism 
because the cases of the two workers would not be commensurable. It is only because the two types of workers may be 
treated as equals that the defense of inequality can go forward (41).  
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syntagonistic”—in other words, he explained, the laborer’s sickness “is not a direct economic injury 
to the capitalist” (290). For Hughes, the only “care” under capitalism is economic interest: “The 
capitalists take care of the capital,” he wrote, “and the capital takes care of the capitalists” (191). 
The understanding of Southern slavery as a system in which slaveholders acted not simply 
from “domestic affection,” but from their own economic self-interest, was similarly acknowledged 
by many states-rights’ physicians, who advised the hygienic care of slaves as insurance against 
financial loss: “If Southern planters would guard against the most serious losses in the sickness and 
death of their slaves,” advised Georgia physician John Stainbach Wilson,33 “they should strictly 
regard the defective heat-generating, and cold-resisting powers of the negro, and they should 
diligently endeavor to compensate for these by providing him with comfortable houses, and proper 
food and climate” (46). Indeed, formerly-enslaved people who discussed the medical care they had 
received on Southern plantations when they were interviewed in the 1930s by the Works Progress 
Administration’s Federal Writers’ Project expressed an understanding of their health as capital.34 “If 
I got sick old miss would give me plenty of medicine,” reported Sarah Douglas, “because she wanted 
me to stay well in order to work.” Charles Hayes similarly asserted that “[i]t was always to de owner's 
interest…to have de niggers in a good, healthy condition.” What might have been read as a 
testament to the slaveholder’s humanity was in reality a testament to enslaved people’s inhuman 
status not only as producers, but also as property: “Massa, he look after us slaves when us sick,” 
noted Elige Davison, “'cause us worth too much money to let die jus' like you do a mule” (Federal 
Writers’ Project). 
                                                 
33 Wilson had advertised his intention to write a book on the diseases of African Americans, but his project was 
interrupted by Civil War. The first book on diseases particular to the African American population would be published 
in 1975. See Savitt, Medicine and Slavery, 16. 
34 As scholars such as Hartman have pointed out, it behooves us to be remain mindful of matters of power and authority 
when approaching the WPA slave narratives rather than assert “imagined access to subaltern” (11). I appeal to these oral 
histories not as testimony of the experience of enslavement, but in order to analyze patterns in the ways in which 
interviewees responded to a prompt.  
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As slaveholding Southerners sought to respond to the charges of neglect leveled by 
abolitionist exposés like American Slavery as It Is with political, economic, and “hygienic” 
rationalizations, they also strove to counter the sentimental depiction of slavery in abolitionist 
fiction. Following the sensational success of Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin (1852), slavery apologists 
hastily authored a rash of novels in response, heeding the call George Frederick Holmes had 
sounded in the Southern Literary Messenger for a “native and domestic literature” (qtd. in Meer 75); as 
the author of an 1853 Putnam’s article remarked, no sooner had Uncle Tom appeared than “dozens of 
steel pens were set at work to prove him an impostor, and his author an ignoramus” (“Uncle 
Tomitudes” 100).35 These “anti-Tom” novels attempt to expose abolitionist hypocrisy through 
cautionary tales of emancipated African Americans who are rendered helpless when left at the mercy 
of the free labor market. In W.L.G. Smith’s Life at the South; or “Uncle Tom’s Cabin” As It Is (1852), for 
instance, the “Tom” character arrives at the disappointed conclusion that he simply cannot achieve 
the status of white men: “These gemmen inherit their property,” he decides, “or else white men 
must have bigger brains, and know how to take care of themselves better than us slaves” (406). 
Even the abolitionist schoolteacher who lures Tom away from slavery ultimately betrays his 
frustration: “Blast the slaves!” he exclaims; “If they are mind to come here and live, why let them 
take care of themselves, like other people” (497).  
Published the same year as Fitzhugh’s and Hughes’s polemics, one anti-Tom novel that has 
received particular attention from literary historians for its articulation of pro-slavery ideology,36 
Caroline Lee Hentz’s The Planter’s Northern Bride (1854), similarly calls attention to the hypocrisy of 
abolitionism’s emancipatory rhetoric but concomitant refusal of care. The story of an abolitionist’s 
                                                 
35 For more on the “anti-Tom” genre, see Meer, Uncle Tom Mania (2005), and Reynolds, Mightier Than the Sword (2011). 
36 “If there were ever a literary work that confirms the presence of a political unconscious,” Larson asserts, “The Planter’s 
Northern Bride would have to be it” (60). See also Moss, Domestic Novelists in the Old South (1992), and Weinstein, Family, 
Sympathy, and Kinship (2008). 
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daughter who shakes off the fetters of fanaticism to become the mistress of a Georgia plantation, 
The Planter’s Northern Bride launches its defense of slavery and attendant critique of capitalism by 
implications of African Americans’ supposed inability to “take care of themselves” were not only 
economic, as writers like Hughes suggested, but also hygienic. Hentz presents Southern slavery as a 
symbiotic system that promotes the health and well-being of the collective “body hygienic,” while 
illuminating the biopolitical catastrophe of capitalism. 
In Hentz’s novel, sickness becomes the limit case to test the respective ethics of slave and 
free-labor societies—exemplified, for instance, by the impoverished white Northerner, Nancy, who 
quite literally works herself to death in an effort support herself and her ailing mother. While the 
Southern planter Moreland offers charity to the unfortunate girl, he rues that she cannot simply 
relocate to the South, “where the balmy air would restore [her] to health”—and where she might 
witness “sickness tenderly nursed, and helplessness amply provided for.” Wistfully, Nancy considers 
the “exemption” the slave economy offers from both economic anxiety and illness; she ruminates 
upon “the soft, mild atmosphere that flowed around those children of toil” and “wishe[s] she could 
breathe its balm” (52). Here, Hentz reverses the popular abolitionist rhetoric that conflated the 
physical and moral “atmosphere” of the South, positing both as contaminated.  
Wresting Southern “atmosphere” from the miasmatic associations it had long maintained in 
the Northern imagination is crucial to the plot of Hentz’s novel: the ardent abolitionist Mr. Hastings 
finally consents to Moreland’s marriage to his proto-consumptive Eulalia out of concern for her 
“fading health” (149), having been assured that “[t]he frail and delicate from other regions are safe 
when they breathe our genial atmosphere” (146-7). If the “genial atmosphere” of the Southern clime 
is a cure for (rather than source of) disease, Hentz suggests, so too is the social atmosphere of 
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Southern paternalism a panacea for the ills of the free-labor economy.37 Of course, while the climate 
of the plantation South may be conducive to the health of delicate white housewives, Moreland 
contends that it is still unfit for white men. “You think, perhaps, it must be a curse to work under 
the burning sun of our sultry clime,” he remarks to Eulalia; “It would be for me; it would be for the 
white man; but the negro, native of a tropic zone, and constitutionally adapted to its beat, luxuriates 
in the beams which would parch us with fever.” Having “studied [the African] physiologically as well 
as mentally and morally” (303-4), Moreland makes recourse to the theories of racialized immunity 
and acclimation, offering a familiar medico-scientific justification for the continued enslavement of 
“helpless, ignorant, reckless beings” and the slaveowner’s “duty to take care of them…to nurse them 
in sickness, provide for them in old age, and save them from the horrors and miseries of want” (83). 
This sense of what Hughes calls “hygienic duty” contrasts sharply with capitalism’s brutal 
indifference toward laborers like Nancy, and indeed like the Hastings’ own house servant, whose 
wages are consumed by “physician’s fees,” but who must toil nonetheless —for, the novel asks, “[i]f 
she didn’t take care of herself, who would?” (66).  
The problematic of care is most explicitly dramatized in Hentz’s subplot of the fugitive 
Crissy, whose Northern-born master suffers from that scourge of the Northern clime, “hereditary 
consumption”—a disease that, unlike Eulalia’s expediently-detected complaint, proves “too deeply 
seated to admit of remedy or cure” (210). When Crissy agrees to accompany her master and mistress 
to Cincinnati to consult a physician, she assures her mistress that she will not attempt to flee in the 
free state, duty-bound as she is to “take care of [her]” (222). Besides, she claims, “Don’t know how 
to take care of myself, no how” (250). This, indeed, is, a familiar refrain for Hentz; in Cincinnati, 
Crissy meets a free black woman, Judy, who is eager to return to slavery, because, she asserts, “den 
                                                 
37 Conversely, as Long points out, the novel Step by Step; or, Tidy’s Way to Freedom, published by the American Tract 
Society in 1862, “suggest[s] a powerful link between free-wage labor and healthy bodies” as it “speculates that free-wage 
labor would cure [slaves’] ailments, real and imagined” (39). 
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I’d have somebody to take care of me. Don’t know how to take care of myself” (267). Seduced by 
the false economic promises of freedom, Crissy ultimately abandons her dying master and grief-
sickened mistress, reneging on her promise to care for them. Unfortunately, however, during her 
flight across the river, Crissy catches a cold that renders her perilously ill, thus “making her a burden 
on the strangers, who had received her for the benefit of her labour.” The head of her new 
household, “who estimated every one according to their capacity for labour” and considers sickness 
“an unpardonable sin,” is “exceedingly angry at Crissy for being sick” (388), and turns her out as 
soon as she recovers. Abashed, Crissy rushes “to return to her forsaken mistress, and throw herself 
upon her forgiving love” (389). Her position has been filled by Judy.  
Invoking the familiar rhetoric of “atmospheric emancipation,” Hentz notes that Crissy had 
“expected to breathe a different atmosphere” (250) in Ohio: to quite literally feel the physiological 
effects of freedom. Perversely, Crissy feels these effects in the form of a debilitating sickness, one 
that diminishes her value in the free labor marketplace. For Hentz, Crissy’s misguided, abortive 
escape is a kind of case study that illustrates the bad faith of abolitionists, whose valorization of 
“freedom” in the abstract masks capitalism’s lack of social, legal, and indeed affective infrastructure 
to ensure the protection of its most vulnerable subjects. While Crissy is fortunate, Hentz suggests, to 
have been “thrown on the kindness of Christian people, who administered to her necessities,” she 
must suffer “the humiliation of being the recipient of favours to which she had no legitimate right” 
(392). Reduced to dependence upon charity, Crissy has forfeited her “legitimate right” to medical 
care: one of the “bare necessities of life” that the novel’s Northerners, both black and white, are 
tragically denied. Hentz thus seeks to direct her readers’ sympathies toward the “forsaken mistress,” 
who “look[s] wildly round for Crissy” (284) as she ministers to her hemorrhaging husband on his 
deathbed. In Hughes’s terms, Crissy has violated the “syntagonistic” domestic compact that binds 
the slaveholder and the enslaved in a corporation of reciprocal care.  
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Employing a combination of scientific racism and sociological critique, Hentz’s novel augurs 
a biopolitical crisis resulting from emancipation. Northerners were blind to this impending crisis, 
ideologues like Fitzhugh argued, since their faculties of reason had been damaged from “living in the 
midst of the isms”: in their desperate search for “some system of Free Love, Communism, or 
Socialism,” Fitzhugh wrote, “they have become familiarized and inattentive to the infected social 
atmosphere they continually inhale” (Cannibals All! xvi). Reversing the charge of corrupted 
“atmosphere” regularly leveled at the South, Fitzhugh decries the influence of Northern “isms” as 
infinitely more toxic than the social atmosphere of slavery; in the South, he asserts, “[y]ou feel at 
once that you have exchanged the keen air of selfishness, for the mild atmosphere of benevolence” 
(Cannibals All!  300). In her conclusion to The Planter’s Northern Bride, Hentz, too, performs this 
rhetorical reversal: “Shall we breathe its bland, delicious climate,” her narrator asks of the South, 
“and know that the noxious miasma is rising and spreading, without endeavouring to disperse its 
exhalations, or trying to counteract its deadly influence?” (578-9). Confronting the “noxious 
miasma” of abolitionist fanaticism, Hentz’s novel seeks to dramatize the ways in which the effects of 
free labor are not simply metaphorically mephitic, but quite literally inimical to the “body hygienic.” 
 
Biopolitics in The Bondwoman’s Narrative  
Henry Louis Gates’s purchase, authentication, and 2002 publication of The Bondwoman’s 
Narrative—a previously-unpublished manuscript dating from the mid-1850s, now widely considered 
to be the first extant novel by an African American woman, and the only known work of fiction by a 
formerly-enslaved woman—has afforded literary historians the opportunity for renewed 
investigation into nineteenth-century African American literary production, and the transatlantic 
world of nineteenth-century fiction more broadly. While preliminary scholarship made creative use 
of textual analysis and limited historical clues to speculate on the identity of its author, Hannah 
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Crafts,38 in 2013, Gregg Hecimovich drew upon new archival evidence to argue that the novel had 
most probably been authored by Hannah Bond, who escaped from enslavement on the plantation of 
North Carolina politician John Hill Wheeler and later settled as a schoolteacher in New Jersey. 
Hecimovich’s work in situating Crafts’s novel as indeed the production of a formerly-enslaved 
African American woman—rather than, as some early critics proposed, a free Northern black author 
or a white abolitionist sympathizer—has helped to quell the anxiety of authenticity surrounding this 
text, one that has historically attended African American authored narratives, re-opening Crafts’s 
narrative for a new wave of critical engagement. In what follows, I explore the biopolitical 
dimensions of The Bondwoman’s Narrative, analyzing the ways in which Crafts turns away from the 
Gothic trope of corporeal violence and brutality, and instead unveils the subtle, insidious, and 
systemic effects of enslavement on mental and physical health. 
As literary historians have noted, Crafts’s fictional autobiography draws upon the 
conventions of genres like the slave narrative, the Gothic, and the sentimental novel, establishing a 
complex network of intertextual connections while engaging in sustained conversation with a few 
texts in particular, most obviously Hawthorne’s The House of the Seven Gables (1851) and Dickens’s 
Bleak House (1852-3).39 Importantly, both of these interlocutors are preoccupied with the mechanics 
of transmission: of property, of hereditary qualities, and of disease. As Chapter 2 illustrates, 
Hawthorne’s romance examines the intersection of hereditary and infectious (miasmatic) pathology, 
drawing on discourses of domestic hygiene to illustrate the exigencies of atmospheric putrefaction 
and purification. Dickens’s novel, too, appeals to the overlapping logics of heredity and infection as 
it “links illegitimacy to disease through the notion of the unchecked reproduction of moral stain” by 
                                                 
38 See Gates and Robbins, eds, In Search of Hannah Crafts (2005). 
39 For discussions of Crafts’s engagement with Dickens, see Robbins, “Blackening Bleak House” (2005); Hack, “Close 
Reading at a Distance” (2008); Teukolsky, “Pictures in Bleak Houses” (2009); and Soares, “Literary Graftings” (2011). 
On Crafts’s engagement with Hawthorne, see Levine, “Trappe(d)” (2005) and Dislocating Race and Nation (2008).  
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“translat[ing] the abstract dictum of the sins of the fathers being visited on the child” into the actual 
disease of smallpox: instigating a chain of infection that ultimately connects the unfortunate Nemo 
to his illegitimate daughter Esther by way of the poor orphan Jo (Morgentaler 96).40 In the following 
pages, I will focus in particular on Crafts’s engagement with Bleak House, a novel that explicitly 
engages nineteenth-century public health debates. Translating Dickens’s degenerate aristocracy and 
disenfranchised urban poor to the Gothic milieu of the plantation South, Crafts reworks Bleak 
House’s trope of sexual “illegitimacy” and its mode of urban exposé to illustrate (and validate) what 
she calls the “legitimate effects” of institutionalized racism and systemic neglect.  
In a particularly overt re-purposing of Dickens, Crafts rewrites the iconic “Fog everywhere” 
passage from the opening paragraphs of Bleak House to describe the environs of Washington, D.C.: 
Gloom everywhere. Gloom up the Potomac; where it rolls among meadows no 
longer green, and by splendid country seats. Gloom down the Potomac where it 
washes the sides of huge war-ships. Gloom on the marshes, the fields, and heights. 
Gloom settling steadily down over the sumptuous habitations of the rich, and 
creeping through the cellars of the poor. Gloom arresting the steps of chance office-
seekers, and bewildering the heads of grave and reverend Senators; for with fog, and 
drizzle, and a sleety driving mist the night has come at least two hours before its time 
(162). 
 
Echoing Brown’s assertion that inhabitants of the South “look with as much certainty for the 
appearance of the yellow-fever, small-pox, or cholera…as the Londoner does for fog,” Crafts 
intimates the inevitable and universal reach of slavery’s contaminating influence. Re-imagining 
London fog as Washington “gloom,” Crafts employs an atmospheric trope that, as readers of Bleak 
House have noted, suggests a connection between social and physical pathology, reminding 
nineteenth-century readers of the “infectious effluvia” that “spreads disease wherever it is inhaled—
                                                 
40 In her discussion of Bleak House, Deborah Epstein Nord argues that in depicting Tom-All-Alone’s as a medium that 
“propagates infection and contagion,” Dickens not only “collapses the distinction between real infection…and all the 
invisible corruptions for which disease ordinarily figures as metaphor,” but also “collapses the distinction between the 
contagion of disease and the transmission of sexual taint” (98). 
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which is to say, as the novel insists, everywhere” (Schwarzbach 95). Crafts’s “gloom” similarly recalls 
pestilential miasma, indiscriminately insinuating itself into all strata of society.  
By substituting environmental “fog” with affective “gloom”—in nineteenth-century medical 
discourse, a word associated in particular with melancholy, insanity, and other species of mental 
disease41— Crafts points in particular to the psychological effects of enslavement. Indeed, this is the 
word that Dickens himself had used describe the South in his American Notes (1842); to Dickens, 
Richmond was a portrait of “gloom and dejection” (17); as in other places “where slavery sits 
brooding,” Dickens wrote, there appeared “an air of ruin and decay, which is inseparable from the 
system” (16). The systemic infectiousness of Southern “gloom” accordingly counters the vision of 
social symbiosis presented by pro-slavery polemicists; in his account of the plantation South, for 
instance, Union Army Chaplain George Hughes Hepworth dismissed the trope of “the light-hearted, 
merry slave” as “all rhetoric,” observing instead the “universal gloom of the negro character” (159). 
But if Crafts’s “gloom” promotes pessimism as a political position, it also intimates a pathology of 
both psychological and physical degradation, one whose source is deeply and systemically seated.42 
The Bondwoman’s Narrative most fully explores the psychological effects of slavery in a plot 
borrowed from Bleak House’s narrative of illegitimacy, suspicion, and sexual shame. Its narrator, 
                                                 
41 As James Cowles Prichard asserted in his Treatise on Insanity and Other Disorders Affecting the Mind (1835), the condition of 
“moral insanity” was primarily characterized by “a tendency to gloom or sorrow” (24)— a conclusion echoed by other 
prominent medical authorities like English physician James Copland, whose Dictionary of Practical Medicine was published 
in multiple American editions in the mid-nineteenth century; as Copland warned, “[a] state of gloom” might “give way to 
a state of morbid excitement” (515). 
42 Writing in a special issue of American Literary History on “Contagion and Culture”—published, ironically, in 2002, the 
same year as Crafts’s recovered text— Mary Burgan declares: “There is nothing like Bleak House in nineteenth-century 
American literature.” This, she continues, “may well mark some of the differences between ways that Americanists and 
Victorianists approach the representations of contagion in texts—medical, social, or literary” (837). For Burgan, 
nineteenth-century American literature is preoccupied with “the Gothic romance of the threat of the racial other,” while 
Victorians like Dickens harness the “clinical gaze” to produce “broad indictments of systemic social as well as physical 
corruption” which  prove “fruitful for the social scientist as well as the medical historian” (839). Here, Burgan seems to 
takes nineteenth-century American literature as specifically a white canon. Crafts’s reformulation of Bleak House, I 
suggest, does not simply supply an “Americanization” of Dickens’s biosocial contagion, but draws out the connection 




Hannah, begins the novel enslaved in the home of Mr. De Vincent, a Virginia planter “of aristocratic 
name and connexions” whose “estate had descended to him through many generations” (13). When 
Mr. De Vincent takes a wife, Hannah learns that her new mistress is in fact the daughter of a slave. 
Threatened with exposure by the sinister and aptly-named Trappe, who has made something of a 
career out of blackmailing mixed-race women, Mrs. De Vincent is “tortured by a suspense more 
horrible than the worst reality” (51), and decides to flee her husband’s estate. Hannah accompanies 
Mrs. DeVincent in her escape, retreating into “the free air” where the pair may “breathe freer” (65). 
But Mrs. De Vincent does not fare well in the austere conditions the women must suffer: “Want, 
fatigue, exposure, and the long agonies of mental torture, had deeply wrought on her physical 
constitution, and impaired her intellect,” until she is at last rendered “decidedly insane” (69). The 
two are eventually imprisoned, whereupon the anguished Mrs. De Vincent, threatened with capture 
by Trappe, ruptures a blood vessel. Accordingly, Trappe must report to the slave trader, Saddler, 
that his prospective chattel “did not die of disease,” but effectively of psychological turmoil. “How 
unfortunate,” Saddler responds; “But these wenches will die” (107).   
In the tale of this mulatta mistress, Crafts renders visible the psychological torment attending 
the definition and detection of race—even, or perhaps especially, for those fair-complexioned 
women like in whom “the obnoxious descent could not be readily traced” (6). As Crafts shows, 
these “long agonies of mental torture” operate in concert with the physical agonies of “[w]ant, 
fatigue, [and] exposure” to wreak havoc upon both body and mind; ultimately, though, it is mental 
agitation that pulls the trigger on Mrs. De Vincent. “True, the wants of our nature were all 
supplied,” Hannah reflects on her imprisonment; thus, “so far as outward appearances were 
concerned,” she notes, “we might have been happy. But those who think the greatest evils of slavery 
are connected with physical suffering possess no just or rational idea of human nature,” she 
continues, citing “the fear, the apprehension, the dread, and deep anxiety attending that condition 
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[slavery] in a greater or less degree” (97).43 Indeed, Hannah later reiterates this claim, insisting that 
“those that view slavery only as it related to physical sufferings or the wants of nature, can have no 
conception of its greatest evils” (134); having witnessed the psychological torture wrought by 
perpetual dread, she declares that “the worst reality is always preferable to suspense” (137). Critics 
have highlighted assertions like these in order to illustrate how Crafts’s critique of slavery largely 
focuses on its sustained psychic violence, rather than spectacles of physical brutality.44 However, as 
we shall see, Hannah has not yet been party to what she finds to be “the worst reality.”  
Following the death of Mrs. De Vincent, Hannah is eventually sold to the Wheeler family, 
who transport her from Washington, D.C. to their plantation in North Carolina. It is here that 
Hannah witnesses, to her mind, unprecedented conditions of degradation: 
There was not that division of families I had been accustomed to see, but they all 
lived promiscuously anyhow and every how; at least they did not die, which was a 
wonder. It is a stretch of the imagination to say that by night they contained a swarm 
of misery, that crowds of foul existence crawled in out of gaps in walls or boards, or 
coiled themselves to sleep on nauseous heaps of straw fetid with human perspiration 
and where the rain drips in, and the damp airs of midnight fatch [fetch] and carry 
malignant fevers (204-5). 
 
Here, Crafts rewrites Dickens’s description of the squalid London neighborhood of Tom-All-
Alone’s, where the orphan boy Jo lives—or rather, as Dickens quickly qualifies, the place where “Jo 
                                                 
43 Crafts’s description of the psychological anguish of slavery—particularly as the delirious Mrs. De Vincent believes 
herself “pursued by an invisible being” (79)—perhaps puts us in mind of a well-known passage of Douglass’s Narrative, 
in which he imagines this torment turned back onto the slaveholder:  “I would leave him to imagine himself surrounded 
by myriads of invisible tormentors, ever ready to snatch from his infernal grasp his trembling prey. Let him be left to feel 
his way in the dark; let darkness commensurate with his crime hover over him; and let him feel that at every step he 
takes, in pursuit of the flying bondman, he is running the frightful risk of having his hot brains dashed out by an invisible 
agency” (91). As Chapter 1 of this dissertation discusses, this “invisible agency” has been employed to signify both 
supernatural forces and mechanisms of disease causation. 
44 Lawrence Buell, for instance, notes that Crafts “clearly emphasizes slavery's psychological effects over its physical 
effects” (22), while Christopher Castiglia reads Crafts’s examination of the “psychic turmoil of slavery” as “anticipating 
Fanon's important work on the psychodynamics of race and colonialism” (252). Indeed, explicit physical violence in 
Crafts’s narrative is contained to her early account of the horrifying torture the slave Rose at the hands of the patriarch 
Sir Clifford De Vincent. Yet unlike the beating of Douglass’s Aunt Hester, for instance—commonly invoked as a kind 
of primal scene of the American slave narrative—Rose’s torture retains an apocryphal quality, insofar as Hannah has not 
witnessed it, but received it secondhand as an oral narrative transmitted by generations of enslaved people. 
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has not yet died.”45 In so doing, she illustrates the ways in which environmental conditions of 
systemic neglect reduce the idea of “life” to its most basic biological functions: “bare life,” to 
borrow Giorgio Agamben’s term.46 As both Dickens and Crafts suggest, it is the porosity of the 
dwellings in particular—their inability to withstand the influence of the miasmatic atmosphere—that 
imperils the health of the disenfranchised subjects who inhabit them; indeed, in her revisions to 
Dickens’s passage, Crafts makes clear that these “malignant fevers” are the result of insidious “damp 
airs.”47  These poorly-constructed structures allow the “foul existence” of disease causation to 
insinuate itself invisibly into domestic space, instigating a kind of slow violence that ultimately 
manifests in disease, degradation, and death. 48 Yet while slave huts, “ruinous with decay,” ultimately 
topple and fall, “all goes on as before. Since if a head gets bruised or a limb broken, heads and limbs 
                                                 
45 Here is Dickens’s rendering of that “ruinous place”: “It is a black, dilapidated street, avoided by all decent people, 
where the crazy houses were seized upon, when their decay was far advanced, by some bold vagrants who after 
establishing their own possession took to letting them out in lodgings. Now, these tumbling tenements contain, by night, 
a swarm of misery. As on the ruined human wretch vermin parasites appear, so these ruined shelters have bred a crowd 
of foul existence that crawls in and out of gaps in walls and boards; and coils itself to sleep, in maggot numbers, where 
the rain drips in; and comes and goes, fetching and carrying fever” (235). 
46 Agamben borrows the Roman juridical concept of homo sacer (sacred man), who exists outside the realm of the law and 
thus may be killed without impunity, as the exemplar “bare life.” Taking the Nazi concentration camp as the primary 
illustration of his point, Agamben amends Foucauldian biopolitics to argue that, “together with the process by which the 
exception everywhere becomes the rule, the realm of bare life—which is originally situated at the margins of the political 
order—gradually begins to coincide with the political realm, and exclusion and inclusion, inside and outside bios and zoe, 
right and fact, enter into a zone of irreducible indistinction” (9). 
47 In his “Essay on Some of the Distinctive Peculiarities of the Negro Race” (1856), A.P. Merrill had stressed the 
importance of keeping slave quarters warm; the admittance of too much night air, Merill warned, “induces [the slave] to 
sleep with his head covered, to avoid the painful constrictions caused by cold inhalations, and thus subjecting himself to 
the injury resulting from breathing impure air; indeed, breathing “air which has been respired before,” Merrill argued, 
“lay the foundation of a large portion of those diseases which prove fatal to slaves” (29). Cartwright had managed to eke 
out an argument about racial inferiority from this very understanding of atmospheric injury: “one of the heaviest chains 
that binds the negro to slavery,” he insisted, was “imperfect atmospherization of the blood.” Like infants, Cartwright 
explained, Africans “instinctively cover their heads and faces, as if to insure the inhalation of warm, impure air, loaded 
with carbonic acid and aqueous vapor”; in turn, he explained the “defective vitalization of the blood distributed to the 
brain” contributed to their intellectual inferiority (“Report on Diseases” 700, 695). 
48 Similarly, in her opening chapters on the intergenerational curse of the De Vincent family, Crafts mobilizes the 
invisible operation of the air on material objects to represent the historical scope of slavery’s corrupting influence. As the 
movement of air through the linden tree vocalizes the dying malediction of the tortured slave Rose, so too do the effects 
of air facilitate the symbolic fall of Sir Clifford’s portrait from the walls of the estate, as “[t]he invisible hand of Time had 
been there and silently and stealthily spread corrupting canker over the polished surface of the metal that supported it, 
and crumbled the wall against which it hung.” Here, the slow degeneration of oxidation reveals that not only time, but 
air functions as a “great leveler” that “touches the lowly hut or the lordly palace with the like decay” (30). 
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are so plentiful that they seem of small account. So true it is that if a great man sneezes the world 
rings with it,” writes Crafts, “but if a poor man dies no one notices or cares” (205): in the slave 
economy, human collateral is eminently expendable. Thus, while ideologues like Hughes insisted 
that slaveholder’s “hygienic duties” were not only therapeutic, but also prophylactic—that they were 
sworn to “prevent by all due care and prudence, any violent or unforseen [sic] privation of life or 
bodily member” (216)—Crafts illustrates the ways in which failures of care occasion, in Foucault’s 
terms, the “indirect murder” of the disenfranchised.   
In her reading of this passage, Hollis Robbins suggests that Crafts employs this extended 
citation of Bleak House in order to suggest a transatlantic “kinship of suffering, of squalor, of 
subjugation, of servitude” (81). Indeed, the condition of the English working class was commonly 
deployed in both anti- and pro-slavery rhetoric as a foil for or counter to the condition of enslaved 
African Americans, and Crafts herself extends her critique of this inhuman neglect to note that the 
“false system which bestows on position, wealth, or power the consideration only due to a man” is 
“not confined to any one place, or country, or condition” (205). However, reading Crafts in the 
context of antebellum medical theory, we can perceive an important difference between Dickens’s 
and Crafts’s depictions of their vulnerable subjects: Crafts writes against a discourse of racialized 
immunity that sought to justify institutional neglect precisely by construing black bodies as 
invulnerable to the environmental causes of disease. In other words, in transplanting Dickens’s 
“swarm of misery” to the plantation South, Crafts not only establishes parallels between the 
infectious environments of urban London and rural North Carolina, but importantly situates black 
bodies as imperiled in their exposure to those environments. If Crafts proposes a “kinship of 
suffering” among white working-class Londoners and enslaved African Americans who “toil 
beneath the burning sun, scarcely conscious that any link exists between themselves and other 
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portions of the human race” (206), this is not merely a “kinship” of social circumstance, but of 
susceptibility, one that serves to connect them to “other portions of the human race.” 
Hannah’s professed repulsion at both the squalid huts and their inhabitants establishes what 
many critics have identified as an uneasy taxonomy, distinguishing the narrator, a self-educated 
house slave, from the field hands whose “mental condition is briefly summed up in the phrase that 
they know nothing” (206). Following Robert Levine, who has predicted that this tension “will no 
doubt become one of the critical cruxes of The Bondwoman's Narrative” (290), I argue that Hannah’s 
abhorrence here indeed serves a crucial function, crystallizing the novel’s arguments for a social-
environmental view of what might otherwise be imagined as “racial” difference: the “mental 
condition” of the field hands, Crafts suggests, is not a function of race, but of enslavement and field 
labor.  
Tellingly, Hannah’s horror at the threat of her forced marriage to the field hand Bill—which 
provides the impetus for her final flight to freedom—is mainly directed toward his cabin, which is 
“reeking with filth and impurity of every kind,” situated beside “a large pool of black mud and 
corrupt water, around which myriads of flies and insects were whirling and buzzing” (215). For 
Hannah, her prospective husband is less a subject than a symptom; like Dickens’s Jo, likened to “a 
growth of fungus or any unwholesome excrescence produced there in neglect and impurity” (660), 
Bill is evocatively figured as the pathological outgrowth of his environment. Thus, it is not enough 
to say that Crafts’s narrator establishes a fraught distinction between conditions 
(knowledge/ignorance, dirtiness/cleanliness, etc); rather, she exposes the ways in which those 
conditions are socially produced. If cleaning, in Robert Reid-Pharr’s terms, figures as “a primary 
technology in the production of self and other” (66), the problems Crafts captures transcend mere 
cleanliness, exposing those manifestations of environmental violence for field laborers that lie 
outside the scope of self-care.  
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In her representation of the Wheeler plantation, Crafts illustrates the ways in which the 
violence of slavery might be represented in terms other than exceptional and grotesque scenes of 
corporeal suffering—scenes that, as Hartman explains, promote sympathetic identification “at the 
risk of fixing and naturalizing this condition of pained embodiment,” which in turn “increases the 
difficulty of beholding black suffering, since the endeavor to bring pain close exploits the spectacle 
of the body in pain and oddly confirms the spectral character of suffering and the inability to witness 
the captive’s pain” (20). In The Bondwoman’s Narrative, readers’ “inability to witness” the suffering of 
the enslaved person is due instead to the fact that the mechanism of this violence is both invisible 
and gradual. As Hannah considers these abject conditions, then, she imaginatively projects the 
perpetuation of this abjection over a period of generations: “The greatest curse of slavery,” she 
notes, “is it’s [sic] hereditary character. The father leaves to his son an inheritance of toil and misery, 
and his place on the fetid straw in the miserable corner, with no hope or possibility of anything 
better. And the son in turn transmits the same to his offspring and thus forever” (205). Re-
purposing Dickens’s assertion that “[t]here is not a drop of Tom's corrupted blood but propagates 
infection and contagion somewhere” (654), Crafts consolidates the logic of hereditary and infectious 
transmission, suggesting that the transhistorical reach of slavery’s abasement consists not only in the 
reproduction of bodies— of children who “follow the condition of the mother”—but in the infinite 
reproduction of the conditions of misery, whose consequences are clearly evidenced on the bodies 
and minds of the field hands: “Degradation, neglect, and ill treatment had wrought on them its 
legitimate effects” (205). 
Like Brown’s loaded rhetoric of “proof,” Crafts’s characterization of slavery’s mental and 
physical effects as “legitimate” evokes a nexus of associations—legal, sexual, scientific and 
narrative—reinforcing the authorization imperative that informs much of the antebellum discourse 
on American chattel slavery. If slaveholders had become so inured to “the degraded condition, both 
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bodily and mental” of enslaved people as to consider them “as legitimate subjects of property as 
their horses and cattle” (416), as Thomas Jefferson remarked in an 1814 letter (one later cited in 
American Slavery as It Is), abolitionist discourse offered a kind of counter-legitimation, exposing and 
authenticating the consequences of degradation. In Dr. Charles Grandison Parsons’s Inside View of 
Slavery (1855), for example—a volume contained in the library of John Hill Wheeler49—the author, a 
physician relating his tour of the plantation South, contends that the “legitimate effects of slavery” 
are less pronounced in urban areas, where masters tend to “care for the condition of their servants” 
(although, he concedes, “the slaves probably experience great sufferings in the best condition, which 
the stranger cannot perceive, not even the master know”). It is rather in the rural plantation South, 
Parsons asserts, that one may “see slavery as it is. No where else are its legitimate results and real 
influences so fully disclosed” (19). Parsons’s account—prefaced by an enthusiastic endorsement 
from Harriet Beecher Stowe— accordingly demarcates the plantation as the site of “legitimate” and 
“real” degradation: that is, a degradation clearly and indisputably visible to the white “stranger.”  
The Bondwoman’s Narrative follows the path Parsons prescribes when Hannah is transported 
from the protean psychosocial “gloom” of Washington, D.C. to the more visceral “swarm of 
misery” that is rural North Carolina. Having illustrated the ways in which the torment of enslaved 
people exceeds physical pain, engendering psychic repercussions that indeed tend to fall below the 
white gaze’s threshold of perception, Crafts doubles back to address more mundane “wants of 
nature.” As she suggests, the effects of “[d]egradation, neglect, and ill treatment” may be deemed 
“legitimate” insofar as they are both demonstrable and genuine—an assertion that counters a 
widespread anxiety about feigned illness and malingering among enslaved people on Southern 
                                                 
49 Wheeler’s library was sold at auction in 1882; scholars have accordingly used the accompanying catalogue to make 
claims about the books to which the author of The Bondwoman’s Narrative may have had access.  
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plantations, particularly women.50 Moreover, though, these effects are “legitimate” insofar as they 
are lawful, sanctioned, and regularized by the institutions that perpetuate them. Daniel Hack has 
accordingly argued that one of Crafts’s crucial revisions to Dickens’s novel is her erasure of the 
“rhetoric of misdirected attention”: that is, Hack explains, Crafts critiques “institutions and 
attitudes—and institutions more than attitudes—that promote subordination and exploitation rather 
than disorder and neglect, as in Bleak House.” For Hack, Crafts presents the suffering of the enslaved 
not as “the result of inattention, the way it is for Dickens’s lumpenproletariat,” but rather as “a 
matter of policy on the part of their owner” (748). 
Adapting Hack’s claim, I argue that the disciplinary function Crafts illustrates here is not 
subordination instead of neglect, but subordination by neglect. Indeed, Crafts explicitly identifies 
“neglect” as a function productive of “legitimate effects.” Yet unlike the class indifference in 
Dickens, the neglect of the slaveholder is intentional, deliberate, and exactingly rationalized. “Mr. 
Wheeler had neglected his plantation as well as his slaves for several reasons,” Hannah explains; “In 
the first place he didn’t think it worth while to take pains with such brutalised specimens of 
humanity. They could work just as well, and it might be even better to leave them alone in their 
degradation” (207). Mr. Wheeler’s presumption that enslaved blacks “could work just as well” 
                                                 
50 “The negro is prone to dissemble and feign disease,” asserted Georgia physician H.A. Ramsay in his volume The 
Necrological Appearance of Southern Typhoid Fever in the Negro (1852); “probably no race of human beings feign themselves ill 
so frequently, and are so incapable of concealing their duplicity” (qtd. in Savitt 163). The unverifiable nature of many 
gynecological complaints, in particular, was a source of anxiety among slaveholders; as Frederick Law Olmsted noted in 
his Journey in the Seaboard Slave States (1856), “The liability of women, especially, to disorders and irregularities which 
cannot be detected by exterior symptoms, but which may be easily aggravated into serious complaints, renders many of 
them nearly valueless for work, because of the ease with which they can impose upon their owners” (190). In turn, 
historians like Sharla Fett have identified the practice of feigning illness (“playing possum”) as a “strategy of resistance” 
among enslaved African Americans (182). Hartman, too, includes “feigned illness” as one of the “small-scale and 
everyday forms of resistance” that “interrupted, reelaborated, and defied the constraints of everyday life under slavery 
and exploited openings in the system for the use of the enslaved” (51). At the same time, however, slaveholders’ 
preconceptions about African American duplicity could also render them unwilling to recognize and treat illness among 
slaves. As one of Weld’s witnesses, a former Georgia resident, reported: “Many when sick, are suspected by their masters 
of feigning sickness, and are therefore whipped out to work after disease has got fast hold of them; when the masters 
learn, that they are really sick, they are in many instances left along in their cabins during work hours; not a few of the 
slaves are left to die without having one friend to wipe off the sweat of death.” Accordingly, he noted, “[s]laves complain 
very little when sick” (45). 
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regardless of the “pains” taken for their preservation typifies the logic of states-rights’ medicine:  
Southern physicians countenanced such a lack of care by touting African Americans’ immunity to 
diseases of climate and their resistance to the enervating effects of labor, rationalizing and justifying 
neglect on the grounds of racial difference: in other words, by denying that it was neglect. By 
demonstrating the ways in which these shoddily-constructed structures expose their inhabitants to 
“malignant fevers,” Crafts affirms not only “legitimate effects” but legitimate(d) neglect; what Crafts 
calls “neglect,” then, might be otherwise understood as criminal negligence.51 
While considering The Bondwoman’s Narrative in conversation with Bleak House offers insight 
into the ways in which African American authors deliberately engaged a transatlantic imaginary in 
service of abolitionist reform, demonstrating what Hack calls the “ideological malleability” of texts 
like Dickens’s (731), it is also worth examining not only how Crafts’s novel transfigures and re-
imagines Victorian concerns of class, urbanization, and public health, but also how it voices an 
investment in exposing the long-term psychological and physiological effects of enslavement 
elsewhere articulated in American slave narratives. To illustrate this claim, I would like to briefly 
point to the evocative resonances Crafts’s text shares with the Narrative of Sojourner Truth, which 
begins with a description of the cellar in which Truth (then Isabella) slept during her enslavement: 
She carries in her mind, to this day, a vivid picture of this dismal chamber; its only 
lights consisting of a few panes of glass, through which she thinks the sun never 
shone, but with thrice reflected rays; and the space between the loose boards of the 
floor, and the uneven earth below, was often filled with mud and water, the 
uncomfortable splashings of which were as annoying as its noxious vapors must 
have been chilling and fatal to health. She shudders, even now, as she goes back in 
memory, and revisits this cellar, and sees its inmates, of both sexes and all ages, 
sleeping on those damp boards, like the horse, with a little straw and a blanket; and 
she wonders not at the rheumatisms, and fever-sores, and palsies, that distorted the 
limbs and racked the bodies of those fellow-slaves in after-life. Still, she does not 
                                                 
51 As Hannah continues, Mr. Wheeler’s neglect is furthered by the fact that he is more interested in holding a 
Washington office than in maintaining a plantation, as “[h]e preferred to live at the public expense” (207). A prominent 
anxiety of pro-slavery discourse was the insupportable “public expense” of freedom: of protections, specifically medical 
care, to which they have no “legitimate right,” in Hentz’s words. Here, Crafts locates another questionable “public 
expense” in the American political system. 
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attribute this cruelty—for cruelty it certainly is, to be so unmindful of the health and 
comfort of any being, leaving entirely out of sight his more important part, his 
everlasting interests,— so much to any innate or constitutional cruelty of the master, 
as to that gigantic inconsistency, that inherited habit among slaveholders, of 
expecting a willing and intelligent obedience from the slave, because he is a Man—at 
the same time every thing belonging to the soul-harrowing system does its best to 
crush the last vestige of a man within him; and when it is crushed, and often before, 
he is denied the comforts of life, on the plea that he knows neither the want nor the 
use of them, and because he is considered to be little more or little less than a beast 
(14-15).  
 
Explicitly identifying a causal link between these contemptible living conditions—in particular, 
prolonged exposure to “noxious vapors”—and the production of disease and disability, Truth’s 
narrative proposes a distinct etiology as it elucidates the embodied effects of enslavement. With its 
temporal cues—“to this day” and “even now”— Truth’s narrative points to the ways in which she 
continues to bear the psychological burden of past violence inasmuch as the bodies of her sick and 
disabled contemporaries continue to bear witness to the slow violence of environmental even in 
their emancipated “after-life.” Like Crafts, Truth suggests that the subordination of African 
Americans via the mechanism of neglect is due not simply to the idiosyncratic “cruelty” of the slave 
master, but to the “inherited habit” of institutional racism that renders white Southerners 
“unmindful of the health” of African Americans: in other words, this subordination is not only “a 
matter of policy on the part of [the] owner,” as Hack puts it, but a matter of policy on the part of 
antebellum biopolitics more broadly, via the “power of regularization” that Foucault famously 
expresses in terms of the edict “making live and letting die” (“Society Must Be Defended” 247) 
 For many abolitionist writers, the discourse of miasmatic disease transmission offered an 
apt way to conceptualize this peculiar psychopathology of the slaveholder, attributing the ills of the 
institution not to “innate and constitutional cruelty,” but to the social “atmosphere” in which 
Southerners lived and breathed. Slavery, wrote English physiologist and abolitionist Marshall Hall, 
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“extends its influence to the planter’s family like a dire miasma” (59).52 If writers like Crafts aimed to 
show that mental and physical degradation of enslaved people was attributable not to innate, 
heritable racial traits, but to the pathological environment in which they were enslaved, a similar 
logic in much abolitionist discourse suggests that racism is not endemic to the Southern constitution, 
but an acquired ill that had been “inhaled” or “imbibed” from an invisible but virulent 
atmosphere.53 “The Southerner is brought up in the atmosphere of slavery,” a writer for the Church 
Missionary Intelligencer explained; “from earliest infancy he has inhaled it: it has become a portion of 
his being, and has intermingled itself with his very life-blood. His feelings, habits, are all tinctured 
with it”—and thus, the author concluded, was the Southerner “a coloured man in one sense” (272). 
Similarly, another Christian abolitionist declared that “no one can breathe the atmosphere of slavery, 
or live on its foulness without being discoloured by it, vitiated in their character, and covered with 
moral leprosy” (Balme 12).54  
These moral diseases were not unique to born and bred Southerners, however. As Harriet 
Jacobs illustrates in her Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl (1861), all persons were equally susceptible to 
the “contaminating atmosphere” of slavery (176). Employing the hygienist rhetoric popular among 
her abolitionist audience, Jacobs suggests that “[t]he slaveholder's sons are, of course, vitiated, even 
while boys, by the unclean influences every where around them” (80)—but so too did Northern 
                                                 
52 At the first meeting of American Anti-Slavery Society, one Southerner attested to this social contamination: “I 
breathed my first breath in the atmosphere of slavery; I was sucked at its breast and dandled on its knee.” Accordingly, 
he admitted, he had become desensitized to African American suffering by “repeated scenes of cruelty, and oft taught 
lessons of the colored man's inferiority” (American Anti-Slavery Society 6-7). 
53 The same charge, of course, was also leveled against the Northern atmosphere of abolitionist fanaticism. For example, 
in Julia Collins’s The Curse of Caste, a recovered novel by an African American woman initially serialized in The Christian 
Recorder in 1865, the slaveholder Colonel Tracy rebukes his son Richard for having “imbibed the pernicious sentiments 
of the northern demagogues” (39).   
54 For many Northerners, the proposed remedy for this poisoned atmosphere was a kind of moral purification. In an 
1859 religious tract, for instance, Reverend Henry T. Cheever acknowledged Southerners’ acculturation to the evils of 
slavery from “inhaling at every breath the noxious gases and exhalations that have become so natural to them that they 
like them…But are we of the North to concede for a moment that the air of Slavery is as good as that of Freedom?” he 
asked; “By no means. Rather let us keep pumping into the exhausted and feculent atmosphere of the South and its 
apostate Church, the vital oxygen of moral truth, by our continued act and testimony against slavery” (22).  
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transplants to the plantation South “imbibe the sentiments and disposition of their neighbors” (69). 
Affirming mutual susceptibility, Jacobs shows that even native Northerners were, in Hazel Carby’s 
words, “not immune to the effects of the slave system or to the influence of being able to wield a 
racist power” (55)—that these “sentiments” were not transmitted in Southern blood, but in the air.55  
Carby’s appeal to the concept of immunity is especially apt. As this chapter has illustrated, 
pro-slavery discourse promoted an understanding of African Americans’ immunity to diseases of the 
Southern climate and their incapacity for self-care (or, put another way, their susceptibility to 
exploitation and debasement under capitalism) as they united the interests of political economy with 
the concerns of public health. If Southerners foreboded the dangers of emancipation to the “body 
hygienic,” abolitionist writers invoked a hygienist logic memorably dramatized during the cholera 
epidemics of 1832 and 1849 in order to propose the universal endangerment of slavery. Like the 
social hygienists of the Northern abolitionist movement, Crafts seeks to demonstrate the ways in 
which slavery “blights the happiness of the white as well as the black race” (4). Crafts’s suggestion 
that all Americans are alike impressible by the affective “blight” of slavery calls upon an 
understanding of mutual susceptibility in order recognize the “legitimate effects” of the racist 
technologies of antebellum biopolitics. 
 
Coda: “What Becomes of the Free Colored People?”  
In the abrupt conclusion of The Bondwoman’s Narrative, Hannah flees from the Wheeler 
plantation and eventually reaches freedom in New Jersey, were she establishes herself as a 
schoolteacher. However, Crafts reminds her readers that not all fugitives share her protagonist’s fate. 
During her escape, Hannah crosses paths with a fellow fugitive, Jacob, and his sister, who is 
                                                 
55 Indeed, in the weeks after Lincoln’s assassination, an article in The Spectator would go so far as to cite John Wilkes 
Booth’s English ancestry as lamentable proof “that it took but a single generation of breeding in a slave atmosphere to 
make a man of Anglo-Saxon blood an assassin” (“Mr. Lincoln’s Assassination,” 52). 
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suffering from a “dreadful fever” (221) from which she soon dies. When Hannah and Jacob close 
the corpse’s eyes, they discover “the unmistakable signs of an infectious disease, at once malignant 
and dangerous.” While Crafts does not name this “infectious disease” outright, both the 
“unmistakable signs” of its symptomatology and its hypothesized mechanism of transmission—
Jacob suspects his sister “caught it in an old deserted house where they had remained a day or two, 
and in which they discovered and appropriated a bundle of old garments” (227)—indicate smallpox, 
the (similarly-unnamed) disease in Bleak House that infects Nemo, Jo, and Esther, claiming the lives 
of the former two and leaving the latter permanently scarred. Perversely, this unfortunate fugitive’s 
attempts to procure necessities for survival—shelter and clothing—directly contribute to her death.  
As The Bondwoman’s Narrative illustrates, nominal freedom was no panacea for the abject 
suffering of enslaved people. Indeed, as Jim Downs has recently illustrated, the Civil War ushered in 
“the largest biological crisis of the nineteenth century” (4), as African Americans—both those who 
escaped Southern plantations and those who were emancipated—faced threats of exposure, 
starvation, sickness, and death. While the federal government had considered emancipation’s 
“economic, legal, political, and social consequences,” writes Downs, it almost universally ignored its 
“human consequences” (22)—including, of course, its effects on public health. For example, a major 
smallpox epidemic—one that Crafts’s narrative, ostensibly penned in the mid-1850s, seems to 
uncannily anticipate—plagued the South from 1862 to 1868. The federal government did little to 
intervene in the crisis. As the epidemic dragged on, “federal officials, Southern planters, and both 
the Northern and Southern press began to interpret the high mortality rates among freedpeople as 
signs of the extinction of the black race,” thus “turning a biological crisis into a discourse about 
racial survival” (Downs 15). In January 1866, for example, a correspondent for the New York Times 
reported that the “inordinate mortality” among African Americans was due to “dirt, debauchery, 
[and] idleness” (qtd. in Downs 100-1): in short, by failures of self-care.  
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In March 1865, the U.S. federal government had established the Bureau of Refugees, 
Freedmen and Abandoned Lands (Freedmen's Bureau) under the auspices of the War Department 
in an attempt to address the circumstances of formerly-enslaved African Americans in the postwar 
South. The institution of the Bureau’s Medical Division, in particular, constituted what Downs 
deems “a watershed in the history of federal power,” as it “placed federal officials for the first time 
in U.S. history in direct and intimate contact with the bodies of ordinary people” (12).56 Yet while 
the Medical Division was ostensibly a public welfare agency, its principal if tacit aim was the creation 
of a healthy labor force; indeed, Downs notes, anxieties about African Americans’ dependence on 
government assistance “shaped every decision that federal authorities made about the construction, 
organization, and the management of medical care in the Reconstruction South” (9, 72). As the head 
of the Freedman’s Bureau, Major General O.O. Howard, declared in a circular: “The negro should 
understand that he is really free, but on no account, if able to work, should he harbor the thought 
that the Government will support him in idleness” (qtd. in Downs 73).  
Both slaveholders and enslaved people had recognized that health care was crucial to the 
progress of the plantation economy: “As long as we were their property,” John F. Van Hook 
explained in a WPA interview, “our masters were mighty careful to have us doctored up right when 
there was the least sign of sickness” (Federal Writers’ Project). Once African Americans were no 
longer legally property, the government’s impetus to see them “doctored up right” similarly took its 
cues from the economic interests of the market. At the level of policy, as Savitt notes in his analysis 
of health care under the Georgia Freedman’s Bureau, the government “encouraged white public 
                                                 
56 The Medical Division of the Freedman’s Bureau was established on June 16, 1865, in response to the rising mortality 
rate of freedman, and placed under the direction of Surgeon-in-Chief Caleb W. Homer. For more on the Freedman’s 
Bureau and medical policy in the Reconstruction South, see Gerteis, From Contraband to Freedman (1973); Legan, “Disease 
and the Freedmen in Mississippi During Reconstruction” (1973); May, “A Nineteenth-Century Medical Care Program 
for Blacks” (1973); Rabinowitz, “From Exclusion to Segregation” (1974); Hasson, “Health and Welfare of Freedmen in 
Reconstruction Alabama” (1982); Finley, “In War’s Wake” (1992); Pearson, “There are Many Sick, Feeble, and Suffering 




officials to care for blacks only in compliance with Bureau demands or in their own self-interest 
when smallpox or cholera threatened the entire population.” At the level of practice, some white 
officials and physicians complained that African Americans were resisting white medical intervention 
in the name of autonomy: an “unrealistic medical ‘self-help’ attitude” that was, Savitt suggests, not as 
prevalent as may have been imagined (“Politics in Medicine” 64, 57). Still, this subversion of white 
medical authority had its political consequences, as Bureau officials “portrayed African American 
rejection of white medical supervision as the symptom of a disordered society” (Fett ix). 
Freedpeople’s will to self-help and self-care was thus presented both as pathologically lacking and 
pathologically exaggerated.  
As this chapter has demonstrated, the biopolitics of slavery relied upon paradoxical claims: 
on the on hand, a theory of racialized immunity, which implicitly legitimated neglect; on the other 
hand, a theory of African Americans’ incapacity for self-care, which implicitly legitimated a 
paternalistic politics of care. Framing African American illness as the effect of freedpeople’s failure 
to exert appropriate responsibility over their own lives and bodies, rather than as the failure of the 
state to ensure and protect the rights to life and health, Reconstruction-era discourse effectively 
fulfilled the prophecy of antebellum pro-slavery ideologues, who grimly forecasted the decay of 
American civilization in the event of emancipation. The demographic data regarding the physical 
and mental health of free blacks supplied by 1840 census, in particular, had ostensibly granted 
statistical support to the racist argument regarding the degenerative propensity of the African 
American population. A report published in the Southern Literary Messenger in 1843 held the census 
data revealed that “the mortality of the free people of color in the United States is more than 100% 
greater than that of slaves,” and offered proof that “[t]he free colored race, in the free States, have 
been for many years deteriorating” (345) — a deterioration especially evidenced, they noted, by the 
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proportion of those designated “insane and idiots”57 (see fig. 3.6). Lambasting the “many different 
isms” (348) that had promulgated in the North, the Messenger reasoned that “the vices of free blacks 
have increased in proportion to the time which has elapsed since their emancipation,” and thus 
“general emancipation would be attended with the most injurious consequences to the country 
where it took place, and eventually prove fatal the emancipated race” (351).  
 
 
Fig. 3.6. “Reflections on the Census of 1840.” Southern Literary Messenger 9 (June 1843). 
 
  
                                                 
57 For further discussion of the significance of the 1840 census in particular, see Litwack, North of Slavery (1961); Cohen, 
A Calculating People (1999); Brown, Until Darwin (2010); and Nielsen, A Disability History of the United States (2012). For 
more on the use of census data to support the theory of African American degeneration, particularly the census of 1870, 
see Haller, Outcasts from Evolution (1970), and Fredrickson, The Black Image in the White Mind (1971).  
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African American writers had attempted to counter such bleak forebodings not only through 
rhetoric, but through this same modality of vital statistics. For example, James McCune Smith—the 
first African American to earn a medical degree—would attack the racist conclusions drawn in 1839 
by the Physicians Report on the Colored Orphans Asylum in New York, which proposed that the poor 
health of free blacks in the North was a function of their innate unfitness both for its cold weather 
and its free labor economy. In an editorial published in the Colored American newspaper that year, 
Smith appealed to the Report’s own data to refute its conclusions (Long 33). Still, both pro-slavery 
and abolitionist writers would continue to debate the fate of emancipated African Americans, asking, 
along with the author of an 1854 article in Frederick Douglass’ Paper, “What Becomes of the Free 
Colored People?” Countering the “gloomy philosophy” that held “that Slavery is the only condition 
in which the negro thrives, and that to liberate him is to annihilate him,” the author contended “that 
it has no foundation to rest on, but the unjust prejudices which have been engendered in the 
atmosphere of Slavery.”  
As the condition of freedpeople in the Reconstruction-era United States attests, the “unjust 
prejudices” of scientific racism that had been “engendered in the atmosphere of Slavery” continued 
to persist in the postbellum American atmosphere, resulting in a catastrophic failure of care at a 
federal level. Indeed, as Massachusetts Representative Thomas D. Eliot had warned when he first 
brought an Emancipation bill to Congress in January 1863, “[t]he liberation of millions of slaves 
without federal protection” was nothing less than “a crime against humanity” (qtd. in Downs 61). 
Following the Civil War, millions of nominally-emancipated African Americans would experience 
this acutely, faced with the disappointed promises of freedom. As Elizabeth Keckley reflected in her 
memoir of the years she worked in the White House as a seamstress to Mary Todd Lincoln, 
freedman who arrived in Washington in 1862 had been quickly disillusioned: “there was something 
repelling in the atmosphere,” wrote Keckley, “and the bright joyous dreams of freedom to the slave 
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faded—were sadly altered, in the presence of that stern, practical mother, reality” (112). The pure 
and healing atmosphere of freedom so often touted by abolitionists was, like so many nineteenth-
century miracle cures, merely an invented remedy for desperate times, disguising a far more deeply-
seated systemic ill. In reality, as Ohio’s Justice Bowen suggested, immunity from enslavement must 
be enforced “by the operation of law,” and not the intercession of the “atmosphere.” At the same 
time, as writers like Brown, Crafts, and Truth illustrate, the vitiating influence of literal atmospheres, 







Hygienic Sentimentality: Degeneration and the American Marriage Experiment 
 
 
I have only to say here that marriage, if discordant, unsuited, unhappy, or even 
indifferent, is of necessity the source of those idiosyncrasies, physical and mental, 
which produce disease and crime; as the union of the two sexes under the happy 
impulse of mutual love, tends to produce a healthy, harmoniously developed 
offspring. Consequently, the perpetuation of indifferent, or discordant unions, by 
indissoluble marriage, is one of the greatest social evils, and tends more than any 
other to hinder the progress of the race.  
 
—Thomas Low Nichols and Mary Sargeant Gove Nichols, Marriage: Its History, 
Character, and Results (1854) 
 
Unhappy marriages are the tragedies of our day, and will be, till we learn that there 
are truer laws to be obeyed than those custom sanctions, other obstacles than 
inequalities of fortune, rank, and age. Because two persons love, it is not always safe 
or wise for them to marry, nor need it necessarily wreck their peace to live apart.  
 
—Louisa May Alcott, Moods (1864) 
 
 
The April 1888 issue of John Harvey Kellogg’s Good Health magazine contains an obituary of 
sorts for the recently-deceased Louisa May Alcott. Nested amid reflections on subjects such as 
“Domestic Sources of Air-Poisoning” and “Murderous Fashions,” a recurring column entitled 
“Famous Women Interested in Hygiene and Temperance” memorializes the beloved American 
children’s author for her membership among these ranks—noting, for instance, that she had been 
“reared a vegetarian,” that “[h]er father’s cousin, Dr. Alcott, was one of the first to espouse the 
cause of hygiene and sanitary reform in this country,” and that “her writings abound with hygienic 





educational reformer Bronson Alcott—whose failed utopian community of the 1840s advocated 
such practices as vegetarianism and cold-water bathing, which antebellum health reformers valorized 
(and which his daughter would satirize)1—Louisa May Alcott had long been interested in health and 
hygiene; her didactic writings for girls, in particular, stress the salubrious effects of natural diet, 
physical activity, and homoeopathic remedies.2 Yet her “hygienic sentiments” also found frequent, 
and forceful expression in her trenchant critiques of marriage: an institution, she suggested, that was 
not the exclusive province of the domestic sphere, but rather a critical domain for public health.  
Seven months before her death, Alcott published an essay entitled “Early Marriages” in the 
Ladies Home Journal, in which she cautioned her readership against matrimonial recklessness.3 
Presenting marriage as inextricably bound up with “the high duty of continuing the race,” Alcott 
situates partner selection both as a form of self-care and as a civic responsibility. Urging her 
audience to heed its responsibilities as “the fathers and mothers of the coming generation,” she 
counsels them to “remember that self-knowledge, self-control, self-help are all important” in 
preventing those lamentable products of unconscientious couplings: “invalid” wives, “indifferent or 
tyrannical” husbands, and “puny” children. The power to manufacture a “stronger, wise, happier” 
generation, Alcott suggests, lies with the individual—though popular opinion too often attributed 
the preponderance of “invalid” women and their “puny” progeny to irremediable causes: “people 
console themselves by talking of the deterioration of the race, and the mysterious dispensations of 
Providence,” Alcott writes; “So the costly experiment goes on” (3).4  
                                                 
1 See Alcott’s satire of the Fruitlands experiment, “Transcendental Wild Oats” (1873). For more on the Fruitlands 
experiment, see Sears, Bronson Alcott’s Fruitlands (1915) and Francis, Fruitlands (2010). 
2 Alcott’s novel Eight Cousins (1875) offers one of the most comprehensive illustrations of her philosophy of girls’ health. 
See Eiselein and Phillips, The Louisa May Alcott Encyclopedia, 133-34. 
3 An abbreviated version of this essay was also reprinted in the November 1888 issue of Good Health.  
4 Alcott makes a similar assertion in her fragment “Diana and Persis,” in which the eponymous Diana warns a friend 





Recriminating a cohort who would complacently “console themselves by talking of the 
deterioration of the race,” Alcott alludes to certain adherents of degenerationism, the influential 
nineteenth-century bio-social theory that held that the “human” (but implicitly Anglo-American) 
race was marred by the progressive declension of physical and mental capacities, as evidenced by the 
preponderance of “idiocy,” criminality, and hereditary disease.5 Throughout the nineteenth century, 
as J. Edward Chamberlin and Sander L. Gilman observe, degeneration “seemed to develop a 
particular sort of conceptual autonomy,” as “the questions about its relationship to reality or its 
status as an idea became less important than its authority as an organizational scheme or discursive 
mode” (xi). Following these observations, this chapter approaches degeneration as “an 
organizational scheme or discursive mode” that structured both nineteenth-century biopolitics and 
the sentimental novel. In the antebellum United States, the rise of degenerationist thought was 
ineluctably bound up with contemporary miscegenation anxieties and theories regarding the 
enervation and eventual extinction of Native American and African American races.6 While 
acknowledging the ways in which nineteenth-century degenerationism remains largely inextricable 
from attendant logics of white supremacy, this chapter aims to illustrate how figurations of disease 
and disability (or, to borrow ambiguous nineteenth-century diagnostic terminology, “general 
debility”) informed the biopolitics of middle-class marriage. 
                                                 
5 While many antebellum American writings express the anxiety of degeneration, the theory was most notably articulated 
by French psychiatrist Bénédict Morel in his Traité des dégénérescences physiques, intellectuelles et morales de l'espèce humaine et des 
causes qui produisent ces variétés maladives (1857), and later by the German doctor Eduard Reich in his volume Ueber die 
Entartung des Menschen: Ihre Ursachen und Verhütung (1868). In his 1892 work Degeneration (Entartung), Max Nordau would 
famously reflect upon the degenerative effects of urbanization in modernity. 
6 Martin Delany would refute popular charges of African American degeneration in his 1854 address, “Political Destiny 
of the Colored Race on the American Continent.” “Is it not worthy of a notice here,” Delany asked, “that while the 
ingress of foreign whites to this continent has been voluntary and constant, and that of blacks involuntary and 
occasional, yet the whites in the southern part have decreased in numbers, degenerated in character, and become mentally 
and physically enervated and imbecile; while the blacks and colored people have studiously increased in numbered, regenerated 
in character, and have grown mentally and physically vigorous and active, deploying every function of their manhood, 
and are now, in their elementary character, decidedly superior to the white race?” (234). For further discussion of 
theories of racial degeneration, particularly with regard to emancipated African Americans, see Stepan, “Biology and 





Antebellum American health reformers primarily posited humanity’s degenerative bent not 
as an inevitable and inescapable condition of modernity, but, in accordance with a Lamarckian 
understanding of the inheritance of acquired characteristics, as a self-inflicted condition produced by 
refusal to adhere to the physiological “laws of life.”7 Framing degeneration as the populational effect 
of successive failures of self-care, influential Christian physiologists such as Elizabeth Blackwell, 
Sylvester Graham, and William Alcott—Louisa May Alcott’s celebrated second cousin—suggested 
that instituting reform at the level of the body could produce improvement at the level of 
population.8 Women, in particular, were imagined as both indexes and agents of degeneration, as 
evidenced by anxieties surrounding the seeming epidemic of “female diseases.”9 In her popular 1852 
treatise The Laws of Life, for example, Blackwell pointed to the correlation between “the rapid spread 
of the diseases of women” and “the degeneracy of the race, which is taking place, and which must 
inevitably be the result of a weakened and diseased state of the mothers of our land” (32). 
Accordingly, these reformers aligned of the health of American female body with prospective vitality 
and virility—or, alternatively, morbidity and sterility—of the nation. 
                                                 
7 For an overview of the antebellum discipline of physiology and health reform movements, particularly among middle-
class women, see Morantz-Sanchez, Sympathy and Science (1985). 
8 For example, anticipating Alcott’s critique of the ways in which “deterioration” was routinely pawned off on “the 
mysterious dispensations of Providence,” the Seventh-Day Adventist health reformer Ellen G. White suggested that 
those who would “charge their sufferings upon Providence” were “asleep as to [degeneration’s] real causes”: “it is 
intemperance,” she insisted, “that lies at the foundation of all of this suffering” (51). 
9 Alcott’s exhortation in “Early Marriages” echoes Ira Warren’s assertion in The Household Physician (1859) that these 
diseases of the female reproductive system were “fast unfitting woman for the high duty of continuing the race” (43). 
Edward Hammond Clarke would famously extend this anxiety into an argument against women’s education in his 
infamous antifeminist tract Sex in Education (187). Clarke contended that women’s pursuit of education had occasioned 
the “neglect” of the all-important function of menstruation, and thus “each succeeding generation, obedient to the law 
of hereditary transmission, has become feebler than its predecessor. Our great-grandmothers are pointed at as types of 
female physical excellence; their great-grand-daughters as illustrations of female physical degeneracy” (27-28). The 
following year, a collection of essays edited by Julia Ward Howe entitled Sex and Education refuted Clarke’s “pet theory of 
the incompatibility of health with intellectual activity, for women only” (24). As Howe noted, “[t]he periodical function 
peculiar to women is point upon which Dr. Clarke dwells with persistent iteration. Its neglect he considers the principal 
source of disease among the women of our land” (16). This was no physiological fact, Howe argued but rather a “fable 





In order to combat degenerative tendencies of the American “race,” reformers proposed a 
program of agentive, preventive care that began with the self and the home. For example, in his 
essay “Physical Decline of American Women,” published in The Knickerbocker in January 1860 and 
later expanded as a treatise entitled Conjugal Sins Against the Laws of Life and Health and Their Effects 
Upon the Father, Mother, and Child (1870), Dr. Augustus K. Gardner argued that women were not 
inherently inferior to men, but had been damned by “self-degeneracy”—namely, by their “slavery to 
forms, and customs, and observances, from being tied down by fashion and folly” (52). With 
characteristic antebellum optimism in the efficacy of self-reform as a counter-measure to “self-
degeneracy,” Gardner advocated for a reform grounded in an ethic of prophylaxis: “If the sins of 
the past can only be alleviated,” he writes, “in the future they may be prevented” (50). 
By the end of the century, degenerationist anxieties would reach a discomfiting crescendo in 
the advent of eugenics.10 While pioneering historians such as Carroll Smith-Rosenberg and Cynthia 
Eagle Russett illustrated the ways in which the concurrent development of evolutionary and eugenic 
theory in the late nineteenth century sought to affirm female inferiority and thereby justify women’s 
social and political subordination,11 more recently, scholars have attended to the ways in which these 
new sciences did not only supply “fuel to the antifeminist fire,” but also informed the strategies of 
women’s rights activists who approached science as “an ally, rather than as an enemy, to their aims” 
(Hayden 5). In particular, discourses of self-conscious population “improvement” offered a 
scientific basis to arguments for reproductive autonomy advanced by late nineteenth-century 
                                                 
10 A term coined by Galton in his 1883 Inquiries into Human Faculty and Development, eugenics, as Alexandra Stern affirms, 
“was sown in the soil of degenerationism.” This theory, Stern continues, was importantly informed by neo-Lamarckian 
theories of inheritance: “On the one hand, neo-Lamarckism promoted optimism in reformers who hoped that cleaning 
up urban decay and instituting public and personal hygiene could produce more vigorous ‘stock.’ On the other hand, it 
also made reformers skeptical about their ability to impede the likely and natural regression of humans back down the 
evolutionary scale” (14).  





activists like Victoria Woodhull and Juliet Severance,12 and, later, by Margaret Sanger. This fin de siècle 
“eugenic feminism”13 has often been understood as a kind of watershed for the politicization of 
reproduction, one that in turn invested white feminism with ideological ties to white supremacy.14 
However, this chapter examines the ways in which feminist arguments incorporated and 
reformulated degenerationist arguments in the decades prior to the rise of evolutionary and eugenic 
theory. While it engages with the fraught relationship of nineteenth-century women’s rights 
movements to racist and ableist ideologies, it also resists reading antebellum degeneration discourse 
as an inevitable anticipation of twentieth-century eugenic practice or “racial hygiene.” Instead, this 
chapter shows how writers like Alcott strategically (and strangely) marshalled the widespread cultural 
anxiety concerning degeneration in the service of feminist—and, I argue, queer—critique.  
This chapter begins with an examination of the ways in which antebellum medico-political 
discourses implicated American women as key agents in the physical regeneration of the nation. In 
the 1840s and 50s, scientific inquiries into hereditary transmission facilitated an extension of 
republican motherhood ideology into the realm of biology, affording contiguity between the 
regulation of sexuality and racial progress. Degenerated mothers, they warned, produced 
degenerated children: a truism, Blackwell insisted, that “should arrest the attention of a 
conscientious being, of a tender parent—voluntarily to injure our children, to degrade humanity” (32): 
                                                 
12 Woodhull ascribed in particular to the proto-eugenic theory of sexual selection known as “stirpiculture,” initially 
advanced by John Humphrey Noyes (deriving from the Latin stirpes, or “root”). See Woodhull, Stirpiculture; or, The 
Scientific Propagation of the Human Race (1888), and Severance, Marriage (1893). 
13 For more on the uneasy pairing some authors have called “eugenic feminism,” see Bland, Banishing the Beast (1995); 
Richardson, Love and Eugenics in the Late Nineteenth Century (2002); Nadkarni, Eugenic Feminism (2006); Seitler, Atavistic 
Tendencies (2008); Hayden, Evolutionary Rhetoric (2013). For further discussion on feminist alliance with, rather than 
resistance to, Darwinian theory, see Hamlin, From Eve to Evolution (2014). During the Progressive Era, as Charlotte J. 
Rich points out, the widely-circulated “attractive mass-culture image of the New Woman suggests that, despite the 
forward-looking optimism of Progressivism that this figure echoed, she largely represented an affirmation of the 
American status quo, content with her privileged position within economic and racial hierarchies” (27). For further 
discussion of the New Woman as a response to the “threatened mongrelization of the ‘pure’ Anglo-Saxon race” (73), see 
Rudnick, “The New Woman” (1991). 
14 This critique, of course, has long been foundational to black feminist scholars and intersectional feminists. For further 





“voluntarily,” Blackwell reasoned, because such diseases were “directly within our own power 
radically to cure” (33).15 Accordingly, Blackwell echoed many of her contemporaries by appealing to 
the American mother as a regenerative force: “Think of this, oh mothers!” she implored; “when you 
see your young daughters growing up around you, remember that it is in your power to render them 
healthy and strong in body, and the mothers, in their turn, of a stronger race than ours, or to subject 
them to the disease and suffering which enfeebles the present generation” (33).16  
Fear of the “enfeebling” mother in turn proved a crucial tool for mid-century free love 
feminism, a mid-century social movement that argued for partnerships based upon mutual affinity 
and consent rather than social prescription and economic necessity, eschewing state interference in 
the marriage institution.17 On the one hand, the orientation of the mid-century free love movement 
was metaphysical, deriving its theory of “elective affinities” from antebellum spiritualists like Charles 
                                                 
15 In her Letters to the People on Health and Happiness (1855), Catharine Beecher similarly complained that “the American 
people are pursuing a course, in their own habits and practices, which is destroying health and happiness to an extent 
that is perfectly appalling”—that in fact, “the majority of parents in this nation are systematically educating the rising 
generation to be feeble, deformed, homely, sickly, and miserable; as much so as if it were their express aim to commit so 
monstrous a folly” (7). This “dreadful neglect and mismanagement” on the part of American parents—evidenced, 
Beecher argued, by the fact that American children were “every year becoming less and less healthful and good-looking” 
(8)—could be corrected, she suggested, by the guidance of advice manuals like her own. “Nothing is needed,” she 
insisted, “but a full knowledge of the case, and then the application of that practical common-sense and efficacy to this object” (10). 
16 While beyond the scope of this chapter, it is worth noting that the discourse of degeneration shares much in common 
with the discourse of venereal disease. Both degeneration and venereal diseases were understood as insidious 
transmissions that infected the domestic sphere and inflicted their ravages upon innocent women and children; both 
were understood as remediable through sexual hygiene. For example, in her 1867 Sexology as the Philosophy of Life: Implying 
Social Organization and Government (1867), Elizabeth Osgood Goodrich Willard declared that the “sexual abuses” 
perpetrated in brothels “are diffused into families and transmitted to children. To curse one's self is bad enough, but this 
is a light sin compared with the crime that entails misery upon innocent babes, and curses future generations” (311-12). 
Understandings of the transmission of diseases like syphilis were indeed folded into a degenerationist paradigm by way 
of Lamarckian thought; see Lomax, “Infantile Syphilis as an Example of Nineteenth Century Belief in the Inheritance of 
Acquired Characteristics” (1979). 
17 An early influence on the American free love movement was Scottish reformer Robert Dale Owen, whose Moral 
Physiology (1830/1) advocated for birth control practices. Yet as Taylor Stoehr has noted, “free love” did not necessarily 
imply a concrete, coherent agenda, but rather became “the rallying cry for ultra-reformers who…demanded remedies for 
all the sexual evils they saw in society, whether marital unhappiness or adultery, jealousy or impotence and frigidity, 
kitchen drudgery or unwanted pregnancy, prudery or prostitution” (5). For a history of the free love movement, see 
Sears, The Sex Radicals (1977); Stoehr, ed., Free Love in America (1979); Spurlock, Free Love (1988); Perkin, Women and 





Fourier and Andrew Jackson Davis.18 On the other hand, its orientation was also physiological, 
deriving its impetus for the production of vital progeny from scientific and pseudo-scientific 
theories of hereditary degeneration.19 As we shall see, treatises like Marriage: Its History, Character, and 
Results (1854), co-authored by the hydropathic physician Mary Sargeant Gove Nichols and her 
(second) husband, fellow health reformer Thomas Low Nichols, 20 appealed to cultural anxieties of 
degeneration to illuminate marriage’s biopolitical stakes, concomitantly arguing that women’s 
conjugal autonomy was necessarily connected with the improvement of the “race.”  
This rhetorical strategy relied not only on the logos of scientific rhetoric, but upon the 
pathos implicit in scenes of suffering: the image of the sickly child, in particular, constituted an 
enduring trope for both degenerationist discourse and the nineteenth-century sentimental novel. 
Accordingly, this chapter explores the formulation of the discursive mode I am calling “hygienic 
sentimentality.” An iteration of what Nikolas Rose terms “biological ethopolitics”—“the politics of 
how we should conduct ourselves appropriately in relation to ourselves, and in the responsibilities 
                                                 
18 As Davis, the so-called “seer of Poughkeepsie,” explained in the first volume of his opus The Great Harmonia (1850), 
“the innumerable particles of what might be termed unparticled matter, which constitute man’s Spiritual principle, were 
constitutionally endowed with certain elective affinities, analogous to an immortal friendship” (166-67). Fourier 
alternately referred to these affinities as “passional attraction”; as he argued in his Theory of Social Organization (1876), 
attraction was a “perfect agent or motor in social mechanics” that “will impel and direct Humanity rightly in the path of 
its social Destiny” (111).  For more on the influence of Fourier’s philosophy in the nineteenth-century United States, see 
Guarneri, The Utopian Alternative (1994).  
19 The union of spiritualism and eugenicism is clearly evident mid-century social experiments such as the Oneida 
Community. Founded in 1848 by John Humphrey Noyes, the Oneida Community extended its system of “complex 
marriage” to a program of “stirpiculture” (selective breeding) in 1869. For further discussion of the Oneida Community 
and other nineteenth-century American communal living experiments, see Foster, Women, Family, and Utopia (1991); 
Spencer, Without Sin (1993); Carden, Oneida (1998); and Kern, An Ordered Love (2014).  
20 Hydropathy was formulated in the 1820s by the Austrian alternative healer Vincenz Priessnitz, whose theories were 
popularized in England by Captain R.T. Claridge in the 1840s. Joel Shew and Russell Thacher Trall instituted water cure 
facilities in the United States; Harriet Beecher Stowe received treatment at Dr. Robert Wesselhoeft’s water cure 
establishment in Brattleboro, Vermont. Other notable American water cure practitioners included James Caleb Jackson, 
who offered the treatment at the “Our Home Hygienic Institute” in Dansville, New York; and John Harvey Kellogg, 
who later adopted the technique at his Battle Creek Sanitarium. Mary Sargeant Gove and Thomas Low Nichols were 
frequent contributors to the Water-Cure Journal, edited by Trall. For more on the nineteenth-century water cure 
movement, see Weiss and Kemble, The Great American Water-Cure Craze (1967); Donegan, “Hydropathic Highway to Health” 
(1986); and Marland and Adams, “Hydropathy at Home” (2009). For more on Nichols’s life and career, see Blake, “Mary 






for the future,” which “forms the milieu within which novel forms of authority are taking shape” 
(27)—hygienic sentimentality illustrates the strategic importance of affect for antebellum health 
reform. The sentimental novel, I suggest, is one such “novel form of authority.”  
The latter part of this chapter turns to a reading of Alcott’s little-read and under-theorized 
first novel, Moods (1864), whose two editions—published in 1864 and 1882—offer, respectively, a 
continuation and critique of “hygienic sentimentality.” A cautionary tale about the havoc that 
capricious marriages can wreak, Moods was widely dismissed upon its initial publication as a tedious 
illustration of what one reviewer deemed “matrimonial metaphysics.” Exploring Alcott’s 
engagement with contemporary discourses of physiology, phrenology, and hygiene, I demonstrate 
how Alcott’s “metaphysics” are in fact grounded in physiology. While Alcott may have located an 
audience especially receptive to her argument for the “high duty” of population improvement in 
1887, her recommendations in “Early Marriages”—firstly, that “[f]ew girls of eighteen are ready, 
either physically or mentally, to become wives and mothers,” and secondly, that prospective spouses’ 
“[t]emperaments should harmonize” (3)21—aptly articulate the “hygienic sentiments” of her first 
novel. Indeed, the “wise man” she invokes as the utterer of her essay’s opening aphorism—
“Unhappy marriages are the tragedies of our day”—is no fin de siècle sociologist or social reformer, 
but Adam Warwick, the unlikely Transcendentalist love interest of Moods. 
 Ultimately, this chapter seeks to assess the ways in which Alcott’s “hygienic sentiments”— 
an anticipation of what later health reformers like Russell Trall and John Harvey Kellogg would call 
“sexual hygiene,” as well as the broader movement toward “social hygiene” in the Progressive Era— 
occasion not only a feminist critique of the marriage institution, but a queer critique of 
                                                 
21 Importantly, “temperament” was understood as an inherited tendency that might be managed by self-management and 
self-restrain. In an 1850 lecture on “The Temperaments,” for instance, Dr. Harriot K. Hunt discussed “the wrong 
management of mothers & others having charge of youth, & pointed out the responsibility resting on those, who have 
been enlightened on the subject of Physiology, to counteract the tendencies of present customs at variance with the laws 





heteronormative kinship structures more broadly. According to nineteenth-century degenerationist 
discourse, resistance to marriage and reproduction was not only the right, but the moral and civic 
imperative of those who suffered from hereditary disease and disability. While this was an 
undoubtedly ableist and arguably proto-eugenic position, as Alcott illustrates in Moods and—more 
successfully, I suggest—in her later novel Work (1873), it could also be a strategic one. Queered by 
their heredity, the “tainted” could ostensibly refuse heteronormative kinship structures out of civic-
mindedness, leaving to others “the high duty of continuing the race.” 
 
 “The Sins of the Mothers”: Republican Reproduction and 1850s Free Love Feminism 
In his 1856 manual The Physiology of Marriage, William Alcott reflected upon the “mighty work 
of declension” that had begun, presumably, with the disobedience of Eve. If the human race had 
been thus degenerated—through the actions of an individual—it might, he suggested, be thus 
redeemed: “every young head of a family, for whom I write, may one day have been the progenitor 
of more millions than Eve yet has. And is this not a solemn thought?” Alcott asked; “Whose heart 
does not beat high at the bare possibility of becoming the progenitor of a world, as it were, of pure, 
holy, healthy, and greatly elevated beings—a race worthy of emerging from the fall—and of 
enstamping on it a species of immortality?” (96).  
While Alcott addresses himself in particular to young men, warning his testosterone-addled 
audience against “the evils of sexual indulgence” as a means to curb “the tendencies to degeneration, 
by hereditary transmission” (74), his allusion to Eve illustrates the ways in which degenerationist 
anxieties centered on the role of women in “enstamping” future generations. Scholars have noted 
the ways in which discourses of degenerationism performed frequent and often overt continuities 
with theological doctrine; “[i]n the post-Darwinian years especially,” Charles Rosenberg observes, “a 





restate in appropriately secular form a lingering commitment to ‘original sin’ (No Other Gods 39).22 
The mythology of Eve’s seminal transgression, in particular, functioned as an organizing fiction of 
transmission, positing the female body as an object of suspicion and discipline.23 At the same time, 
American reformers like Alcott strove to re-signify Genesis, figuring the reproductive female body 
not only as a site of degeneration, but as a site of potential progress. Rather than reinforce the 
determinist logic of the Calvinist doctrine of total depravity by positing the human race as 
ineluctably susceptible to decay, Christian physiologists like Alcott, Graham, and Blackwell 
promoted the notion that abstinence from the temptations of artificial civilization would facilitate a 
return to the salutary state of nature apotheosized in Eden.24   
Many antebellum domestic conduct and medical manuals were marketed specifically to 
women, valorizing the role of the mother in the manufacture of future citizens. In fact, the first 
popular American scientific text on the topic of hereditary transmission, Facts and Arguments on the 
Transmission of Intellectual and Moral Qualities from Parents to Offspring (1843) by the health reformer and 
                                                 
22 One of these “articulate Americans” was Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr., whose 1864 novel Elsie Venner—which he 
referred to a “physiological romance,” and, later, as one of his “medicated novels”—purportedly seeks to explore “the 
doctrine of ‘original sin’ and human responsibility for the disordered volition coming under that technical 
denomination” (ix-x). For discussions of Elsie Venner, see Davis, Bodily and Narrative Forms, and Thrailkill, Affecting Fictions 
(2007).  
23 As Nancy Isenberg has noted, the story of Genesis “played a continuing, vital part in antebellum political discourse,” 
supplying “a seemingly endless variety of political paradigms for defining sexual difference” (71); the story of Eve’s 
origin in Adam’s rib and its implications, in particular, had been challenged by nineteenth-century American feminists 
including Judith Sargent Murray, Sarah Grimke, and Elizabeth Cady Stanton. Building upon Isenberg’s observations, 
Kimberly Hamlin adds that “during periods of heightened publicity or success of the women’s rights movement” — the 
1840s and 50s, and 1880s and 90s — “[r]eferences to Eve reached a fevered pitch” (29).  
24 “Who ever imagined Adam suffering from dyspepsia, or Eve in a fit of hysterics?” Blackwell asked; “The thought 
shocks us—our Eden becomes a hospital” (16). For Blackwell, the discrepancy between prelapsarian paradise and the 
dyspeptic, hysteric modernity nineteenth century was also evident in the general unsightliness of the populous: “When 
we walk down our crowded Broadway, we cannot but observe how unbeautiful, ungraceful, unattractive the human race 
has grown—what plain, mean features—what jaded, ignoble, vacant expressions—what shuffling, awkward, unstable 
gait—pretty faces are rare—grandly beautiful faces are not to be seen; and could we view the figure unconcealed by art, 
what shrunken limbs, crooked spines, weak joints, and disproportioned bodies, would greet our eyes, we should 
assuredly take the spectacle for a caricature of humanity; we could not believe that such a fatal distance existed between 
us and our Adam and Eve” (28-9). Graham similarly noted that the present ugliness of the human race indicated its 





phrenology enthusiast25 Hester Pendleton, is dedicated to “the INTELLIGENT MOTHER; Anxious 
for the IMPROVEMENT OF HER OFFSPRING.”26  Echoing the rhetorical appeals of earlier 
domestic advice manuals such as Lydia Maria Child’s The Mother’s Book (1831)—dedicated “To 
American Mothers, on Whose Intelligence and Discretion the Safety and Prosperity of our Republic 
so much Depends”— Pendleton presents her text a compendium of physiological “truths which, 
acted upon, would become the golden key to many a mother’s happiness, and many a nation’s 
prosperity” (iv). Accordingly, Pendleton situates the responsibility “to promote the happiness and 
well-being of future generations…by transmitting to them sound constitutions and virtuous 
inclinations” as “a power and a duty that devolves principally upon the mother, for the due 
performance of which she ought to be held responsible, at least by public opinion” (viii). 
Invoking that particularly efficacious mode of political discipline, “public opinion,” 
Pendleton endeavors to extend the politics of reproduction beyond the domestic sphere, considering 
its implications at a national scale. In so doing, she appeals to the pervasive contemporary ideology 
of “republican motherhood,” a theory of early American women’s political agency that drew upon 
Enlightenment philosophies of the eminent educability of children in order to position mothers as 
instruments in the cultivation of “civic virtue.”27 For example, in her Treatise on Domestic Economy 
(1841), Catharine Beecher reminded her readership that women directed “for good or for evil the 
                                                 
25 The “the principal objects of interest in the present century,” Pendleton declared, had been “[t]he power and 
application of steam in physics, and the discovery and confirmation of phrenology in metaphysics”—yet while “[t]he 
former has multiplied power to an incalculable extent, and almost annihilated time and space,” the latter, she suggested, 
remained in a rather more embryonic state: “to what great and important results this science is destined to lead,” 
Pendleton noted, “time can only unfold.” Still, phrenological “science” had afforded insights into “the means of 
perpetuating talent and virtue from parent”: a subject, she predicted, that “possibly, will occupy the attention of the 
twentieth century”—though of course, she concedes, “so general is the belief in the omnipotence of education, that it 
may require a whole century to apply its truths to the practical elevation of the race” (10). 
26 Charles Rosenberg credits Pendleton as the “author of the first widely read American book on hereditary 
improvement” (No Other Gods 254, n44). Pendleton’s Facts and Arguments was republished by Fowlers and Wells in 1876 
as The Parents’ Guide for the Transmission of Desired Qualities to Offspring. 
27 See Kerber, “The Republican Mother” (1976) and Women of the Republic (1980). For other foundational discussions of 
the republican motherhood, see Mary Beth Norton, Liberty’s Daughters (1980); Jan Lewis, “The Republican Wife” (1987); 





destinies of a nation” through their roles as sisters, wives, and, especially, mothers: “[t]he mother 
forms the character of the future man” (37).28 Yet if writers like Child and Beecher conceptualize 
mothering as a strategy of citizen-cultivation, Pendleton goes further, implicating American women 
in “the great cause of humanity—the improvement of the human race” (vi). For Pendleton, the 
mother not only shapes the “character of the future man,” but his very constitution.29 Mapping the 
logic of republican motherhood onto the reproductive body, Pendleton posits mothering not simply 
as an act of nurture, but as an act of nature, invoking hazy figurations of hypothetical children to 
posit women’s reproductive bodies as biopolitical media for a reconstituted future.30 
 Imagined as the precarious channels through which future citizens must (literally) pass, 
American women were thus incorporated as part of the biological machinery of national destiny: 
“God punishes as well as rewards mankind through woman,” the water-cure physician James C. 
Jackson wrote in 1858; “through her does God visit the iniquities of the father on the children to the 
third and fourth generations” (“To Allopathic Physicians”).31 Of course, if for physicians like 
                                                 
28 For further discussion of the position of motherhood in nineteenth-century domestic advice literature by writers such 
as Lydia Sigourney and Sarah Josepha Hale, see Theriot, Mothers and Daughters in Nineteenth-Century America (1996), 17-39.  
29 Anxieties about women’s influence upon developing children had long crystallized in maternal impressions theory: a 
folkloric notion of “marking” that attributed the existence of “monstrous” children to the pathological influence of a 
pregnant woman’s imagination. While the theory of maternal impressions has been understood to occupy a central place 
in Enlightenment-era embryology, it nevertheless continued to inform American etiological imagination throughout the 
nineteenth century. Mid-century domestic medical manuals gestured toward the hazily-understood influence of the 
mother’s emotional state upon the developing fetus, recommending efforts to shield pregnant women from “the effects 
of frightful appearances, alarming accidents, and agitating and impassioned tales and narratives” (Caldwell 33). Oliver 
Wendell Holmes would notably draw on this idea in his “physiological romance,” Elsie Venner (1861). For more on 
maternal impressions theory in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, see Wilson, “Eighteenth-Century ‘Monsters’ and 
Nineteenth-Century ‘Freaks’” (2002).  
30 Hayden contends that it was in fin de siècle eugenic feminism that the ideology of republican motherhood “received a 
scientific basis” (157).  Similarly, Angelique Richardson explains what she calls the “maternalist agenda” of the New 
Woman: “The central goal of eugenic feminists was the construction of civic motherhood which sought political 
recognition for reproductive labor; in the wake of new biological knowledge they argued that their contribution to nation 
and empire might be expanded if they assumed responsibility for the rational selection of reproductive partners” (9). As 
Pendleton’s text illustrates, though, republican motherhood and scientific theory intersected earlier in the century.  
31 In an 1864 lecture Lydia Folger Fowler—the second woman, after Blackwell, to earn a medical degree in the United 
States—traced this influence somewhat further, asserting that “woman may transmit mental and physical qualities to the 
fifth and sixth generations” (3). The implications of maternal influence were clear, as Lydia Folger Fowler noted: “The 





Jackson, woman figured less as an actor in this drama of divine intentionality than as an apparatus—
a surrogate or circuit through which the operations of power are preternaturally dispatched—for 
others, the meting-out of physiological reward and punishment was a more resolutely agentive act. 
In her 1873 essay collection Woman in American Society, for example, Abba Goold Woolson would 
reiterate the degenerationist anxieties of the 1840s and 50s, insisting that women’s unhygienic habits 
inflicted misery on their future children: “It is not the sins of the fathers alone that are visited upon 
the third and fourth generation,” Woolson warned; “the sins of the mothers entail a far surer and 
more enduring heritage of woe. If women of the present are weak-bodied and weak-minded, the 
men of the future must inevitably be weak-bodied and weak-minded also” (220).32 
In its unflinching orientation toward “men of the future,” degenerationist discourse 
demonstrated an investment in women’s health only insofar as the female body constituted an 
impressive force that shaped the physical vigor of hypothetical children; thus the oft-invoked fear 
that “ere long, there will be no healthy women in the country” (Beecher, Letters 9) was more 
pointedly a fear that there would be no healthy men. Adapting what Lauren Berlant has termed 
“juxtapolitical citizenship”—a formulation of women’s culture as existing to the side of the 
political—we might thus say that the ideology of republican reproduction necessitates a sort of 
“antepolitical citizenship”: an anticipatory relation to political participation, since the mother’s 
efforts to fabricate properly-principled and properly-embodied citizens can only be fully realized 
once her adult children are incorporated into American civic life.33 Of course, as we shall see, the 
long reach of women’s influence began not only with motherhood, but with marriage.  
                                                 
32 Woolson’s most well-known essay in this collection, “Invalidism as a Pursuit,” also rehashes concerns about chronic 
invalidism of American women that had been articulated in the 1840s and 50s by reformers like Beecher, Blackwell, and 
Nichols. For more on nineteenth-century American invalidism, see Herndl, Invalid Women (2000). 
33 Berlant analyzes the ways in which women’s culture is imagined to exist beside or “in proximity to” the realm of the 
political (The Female Complaint 2). Moreover, as Berlant has written elsewhere, American citizenship parables have 
consistently employed tropes in which “the nation’s value is figured not on behalf of an actually existing and laboring 
adult, but of a future American, both incipient and pre-historical: especially invested with this hope are the American 





In the mid-nineteenth century, a burgeoning body of medico-scientific literature on the 
mechanics of hereditary transmission increasingly prompted writers to urge prospective spouses to 
consider the hypothetical products of their reproductive pairings.34 “If society be not affected by 
hereditary influences, and if the next step after marriage were not parentage,” the phrenologist 
Lorenzo Fowler reasoned in 1846, “then it would be less important to think of, or care for the 
future, in those particulars. But as things now exist,” he continued, “it is not sufficient for those who 
intend marriage, to consult their own individual happiness, but they should also consult that of 
posterity” (136).35 Accordingly, Fowler decreed that “parents should recognize their obligations to 
understand [the] sources of hereditary influences better than they do; and mothers in particular”—a 
measure, he continued, that “would do far more towards perfecting the human race…than all the 
benevolent and moral reform societies in existence” (190). For antebellum Americans, acquiring 
knowledge of the physiological laws of hereditary transmission indeed constituted an acute kind of 
civic responsibility—one, as we have seen, that placed the burden of “care for the future” upon 
“mothers in particular.”  
The conceptual inextricability of marriage and reproduction in turn afforded a compelling 
opportunity for critique of the marriage institution itself. The 1850s witnessed a spate of American 
polemics on marriage, including Love vs. Marriage (1852) by the anarchist Marx Edgeworth Lazarus,36 
                                                 
child subject has “not yet bruised by history” (The Queen of America 6). For antebellum degenerationists, though, the 
incipient American subject was always-already “bruised by history.”  
34 Phrenologists, in particular, advocated for what Ruth Clifford Engs anachronistically calls “eugenic marriages” (74).  
35 Fowler was the husband of Lydia Folger Fowler and the brother of fellow phrenologist Orson Squire Fowler. The 
Fowler brothers founded the American Phrenological Journal in 1838, followed five years later with their firm Fowlers & 
Wells, which published of a number of nineteenth-century medical, scientific, and pseudo-scientific texts in the 
nineteenth-century United States. Orson Squire Fowler had briefly “allude[d]…to the impropriety of choosing 
companions who have any hereditary tendency to mental or physical diseases” in his own 1841 essay on marriage; 
however, the subject of parentage did not explicitly “come within the design of this essay,” he noted, because he was 
already at work on a volume on the topic, soon to be published as Hereditary Descent (Fowler on Marriage 26).  
36 Following the publication of Lazarus’s incendiary text, Henry James, Sr., Stephen Pearl Andrews, and Horace Greeley 
began a series of debates on the subject in Greeley’s New York Tribune, later collected as the volume Love, Marriage, and 
Divorce (1889). In 1852, Lazarus also published a treatise entitled Passional Hygiene and Natural Medicine, which, like Alcott’s 





the Nicholses’ 1854 free love manifesto, and Marriage and Parentage: Or, the Reproductive Element in Man, 
as a Means to His Elevation and Happiness by the abolitionist Henry Clarke Wright, also published in 
1854. Wrested from the private sphere, marriage became a critical biopolitical arena in which to 
debate the contentious future of the “race”: “There is no tyranny on earth,” Wright declared, “so 
fearfully disastrous in its results to the physical, mental, and spiritual improvement of the race, as 
that often exercised by man over woman, in legal marriage” (247).  
For the Nicholses, legal marriage indeed constituted one of the greatest public health threats 
of the nineteenth century. Like Wright’s Marriage and Parentage, their treatise relies on the rhetoric of 
sexual sustainability to argue for more conscientious partnerships: “the perpetuation of indifferent, 
or discordant unions, by indissoluble marriages,” Thomas Low Nichols asserts in his contribution to 
the volume, “is one of the greatest social evils, and tends more than any other to hinder the progress 
of the race” (105).37 The host of “hereditary evils” such unions had engendered—“sensuality, 
sickness, suffering, weakness, imbecility, [and] outrageous crime” —were, he warned, already 
“everywhere visible” (223) in nineteenth-century society. Projecting the effects of this degeneracy, 
their text betokens a dystopic vision of an American social body composed of “thieves, drunkards, 
prostitutes, and murderers” (206), as well as invalids, imbeciles, and “incurable masturbators” (223). 
Foreboding the descent of degenerated generations into a future of disease, criminality, and self-
abuse, the Nicholses articulate one of the most pressing and pervasive questions of American hand-
wringing rhetoric: “What will become of the Children?” (306).  
                                                 
harmony of man with his planet and his universe” (iv). The intersection of health and metaphysics similarly informs my 
analysis of what I call “hygienic sentimentality.” 
37 The volume is divided into three sections: the first and third, “Historical and Critical” and “Theoretical and Scientific,” 
are attributed to T.L. Nichols; the second, “Narrative and Illustrative,” is attributed to Mary S. Gove Nichols. As Patricia 
Cline Cohen explains, the Nicholses philosophy depended, principally, on three tenets: the distinction between love and 
lust, women’s ability in sexual partners, and the absence of state regulation from conjugal affairs. See Cohen, “The ‘Anti-





In casting the political crisis of marriage as the domain of hypothetical future children, the 
Nicholses might be understood to appeal to what Lee Edelman, in his foundational discussion of 
queer negativity,38 has provocatively called “reproductive futurism”: a heteronormative ideology in 
which “the fantasy subtending the image of the Child invariably shapes the logic within which the 
political itself must be thought.” The rhetoric of reproductive futurism, Edelman notes, “impose[s] 
an ideological limit on political discourse as such, preserving in the process the absolute privilege of 
heteronormativity by rendering unthinkable, by casting outside the political domain, the possibility 
of a queer resistance to this organizing principle of communal relation” (2).  While for Edelman, the 
imperative of heteronormative reproduction is figural and discursive, antebellum free love feminism 
offered an iteration of “reproductive futurism” that was quite literal: marriage, as a matter of course, 
entailed heterosexual reproduction—and reproduction, in Wright’s words, was “the Heaven-
appointed means, not only to perpetuate, but to refine, to elevate and perfect the race” (v).  
The radical rallying cry of Edelman’s No Future has importantly prompted resistance from 
those who seek a viable politics beyond this polemic. José Muñoz, for instance, has pointed to the 
ways in which Edelman’s articulation of reproductive futurism “accepts and reproduces this 
monolithic figure of the child that is indeed always already white” (95). Extending Muñoz’s critique 
into the realm of disability studies, Alison Kafer has noted that Edelman’s incitement to queer 
resistance “takes on a different valence for those who are not supported in their desire to project 
themselves (and their children) into the future in the first place” (31). Resisting Edelman’s pat 
rejection of the seemingly self-evident “presupposition that the body politic must survive” (3), these 
theorists advocate not for a refusal of futurity, but for the radical imagination of differently-
                                                 
38 For further discussion of queer negativity, see Dean, Beyond Sexuality (2000); Bersani, Is the Rectum a Grave?: and Other 





embodied futures.39 The recognition that the symbolic “Child” for whom the future is supposedly 
constituted is by default white and able-bodied aptly illustrates the unseemly undercurrent of the 
degenerationist discourse, which would later become the overt agenda of eugenics: the elimination 
of racialized, sick, and disabled subjects from the project of national futurity. Yet if queer negativity 
was (and remains) politically suspect, for some antebellum writers, degeneration exposed limit cases 
in which the refusal of the heterosexual reproduction was not only a possibility, but an ethico-
political imperative. 
Thus, while free love feminists of the 1850s strove for American women’s immediate 
liberation from the legal fetters of the marriage institution, they did so by citing an obligation to 
futurity that strategically drew on degenerationist anxieties of unlivable futures: “We live for the race, 
in all coming time,” wrote Wright, “We cannot live only for ourselves, or for the present state, 
nation, or age” (12).  Working under the reigning presupposition that the American body politic 
must not only survive, but progress, they valorized the conscientious and well-paired marriage as an 
urgent form of feminist politics. For reformers like the Nicholses, the suffering of actual or 
imagined children served as a potent articulation of the social ills that cumulatively produced this 
declension. But of course, political and public health treatises were not the only nineteenth-century 
genres to make strategic use of “the perverse invocation of the Child as the emblem of futurity’s 
unquestioned value” (Edelman 2); as the following section will show, this particular trope is 
fundamental to the biopolitical agenda of the nineteenth-century sentimental novel. 
 
  
                                                 
39 Rather than “hand over futurity to normative white reproductive futurity” (95), Muñoz’s proposes the utopian project 






“Short-gevity”: Degeneration’s Sentimental Mode 
In the mid-nineteenth-century United States, perhaps no scientific writer was more 
outspoken on the dangers of hereditary degeneration than the phrenologist Orson Squire Fowler, 
who, along with his brother Lorenzo, lectured and published prolifically on the subject for over half 
a century. In his treatise Hereditary Descent: Its Laws and Facts Applied to Human Improvement (1843), 
Fowler employed the “the principles of Phrenology and Physiology” as an “analytical crucible” (6) to 
advance the anti-Lockean postulate “[t]hat the physical and mental capabilities of mankind are 
INNATE, not created by education” (5). Offering his scientific “proof” in the form of 
phrenological case studies—such as the case of “idiot” siblings whose “narrow and retiring 
foreheads, and coarse temperaments, show that the causes of their idiocy were hereditary 
conditions” (146) (see fig. 4.1)—Fowler strove to demonstrate the ways in which the laws of 
hereditary transmission dictated everything from mental disease to “Physical Qualities of Nations 
and Races,” though frequently casting his conclusions as “too obvious to require comment” (26) or 
“too palpable to require proof by detailed facts” (83).   
In later tracts like Creative and Sexual Science (1870), Fowler attempted not only to illuminate 
the “obvious” mechanisms of heredity, but to impress upon his audience the practical applications 
and ethical implications of reproduction, “this only rationale of marriage” (v). Defining marriage as “a 
mutual contract to have children only together,” Fowler vilified supporters of “women’s rights,’” 
who would break this contract and “thereby rob their husbands of their very dearest earthly right—
legal and honorable children” (168). Although free love feminists had explicitly framed their agenda 
as working in service of racial “progress,” Fowler instead saw “women’s rights’” as a hindrance to 
this end; the movement’s “chief agitators,” he wrote, were “[d]issatisfied conjugal or unmarried 
grumblers” whose “looks and whole aspect indicate affectional disappointment, and a consequent 







Fig. 4.1. “Emerson the Idiot.” Orson Squire Fowler, Creative and Sexual Science. Cincinnati: Jones Brothers  




Fig. 4.2. “Miss Woman’s Rights.” Orson Squire Fowler, Creative and Sexual Science. Cincinnati: Jones Brothers  







Of course, the contract to produce “honorable children” applied only to white couples, as 
Fowler declared in no uncertain terms: “Mixing races, forbidden by Nature,” he asserted, “should 
not be perpetrated by man.” Echoing scientific racism that had been espoused by Southern 
physicians like Josiah C. Nott,40  Fowler argued that proof of this “natural” prohibition against racial 
admixture could be gleaned from the observation that “[m]ulattoes are weakly in constitution, and 
soon ‘run out’; each generation growing weaker the more white blood they receive” (111).41 
Similarly, the conjugal contract also applied only to those couples untainted by hereditary disease. 
With approbations that chimed with his miscegenation anxieties, Fowler railed against the 
indiscriminate pairings of sickly parents that were daily endangering the quality and endurance of the 
American population. Diseases like consumption, scrofula, and insanity, he noted, were “so 
obviously hereditary…as not to need any more than a mere mention”—and yet despite this 
conspicuous heritability, impaired parents continued to produce chronically infirm offspring: “Short-
gevity,” he complained, “is even oftener transmitted than longevity, yet less noticed” (71).42  
                                                 
40 In his 1844 Lectures on the Natural History of the Caucasian and Negro Race, Nott declared that “mulattoes are shorter lived, 
and…more liable to be diseased and are less capable of endurance than either whites or blacks of the same rank and 
condition” (34).  Hypothesizing that this “faulty stock” would “become more and more degenerate in each succeeding 
generation,” Nott reasoned that if “insanity, gout, scrofula, consumption, &c.” could be transmitted from one 
generation to another, so too could “that defective internal organization which leads to ultimate destruction.” 
Accordingly, Nott predicted “that if a hundred white men and one hundred black women were put together on an 
Island, and cut off from all intercourse with the rest of the world, they would in time become extinct” (34). 
41 “Many of them are remarkably intelligent,” Fowler conceded; “‘Fred Douglass’ in his prime had few equals as a 
speaker for clearness, force, fervor, sarcasm, argument, and long-headed sagacity, his enemies even being judges; yet all 
his distinguishing specialties are masculine traits,” Fowler continued, “showing that they are paternal. Similar remarks 
apply to other colored celebrities” (111). 
42 Like many other traits, nineteenth-century physicians understood life expectancy as heritable, yet contingent upon 
habits of life: “there are strong reasons for believing, that longevity is, in a great measure, hereditary; and that healthy 
long-lived parents would very generally transmit the same to their offspring,” noted an 1829 article in the Journal of 
Health, “were it not for the common neglect of the rules of health, which so evidently tends to the abbreviation of 
human life” (“Longevity” 111). As Thomas Low Nichols would explain in his later treatise Esoteric Anthropology (1873), 
“There are causes which operate upon the individual in both cases, to modify the effects of hereditary predisposition. A 
man, gifted with a good constitution from his ancestry, may destroy the principle of longevity in his offspring, though he 
may live to a good age himself. So a man may transmit to his children a vigorous life-principle, which he may afterwards 
undermine in himself by his own bad habits. He may die early, in spite of a good constitution; while his children, 





For nineteenth-century Americans, “short-gevity” was indeed a biopolitical crisis. Christian 
physiologists like Graham interpreted waning life expectancy as the symptom of a sort of aggregate 
depravity, indexing “all the deteriorations of six thousand years accumulated in the vital energies of 
man.” As Graham noted, “it is no marvel that the antediluvians…should average several centuries of 
life,” since these ancestors had been “unblighted with hereditary taint, with constitutions little 
enervated by ancestral sensuality,” while the infirm Americans of the nineteenth century could no 
longer hope to achieve this “primitive longevity” (Lectures 84). Free-love feminists like the Nicholses 
went further, arguing that it was not merely postlapsarian atrophy, but marriage that was to blame for 
a veritable epidemic of American “short-gevity”: “Our graveyards are filled with the corpses of 
women who have died at from thirty to thirty-five years of age, victims of the marriage institution,” 
they lamented; “The children are, from the laws of hereditary descent, ill-tempered, sick, and often 
shortlived” (84). 
To judge by degenerationist discourse, nineteenth-century American life was troubling not 
only because it was solitary, poor, nasty, or brutish, but because it was short.  Short-lived white 
women and their debilitated children were affecting indexes of the state of the nation, as well as grim 
harbingers of its future. It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that the nineteenth-century sentimental 
novel is famously preoccupied with untimely deaths of white women and children; the precipitous 
wasting fate of Little Eva in Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin (1852), in particular, has been 
understood to constitute “the archetypical and archetypically satisfying scene in this domestic gene,” 
as Ann Douglas points out in her seminal study The Feminization of American Culture (1977). While the 
death of Little Eva famously strives to expose the social contagion of slavery by mapping its ills onto 
the hyper-sympathetic white body, I suggest that the death of the female child is a particularly 





For Douglas, who famously engendered a wide-ranging critical debate regarding the political 
functions of sentimental fiction, Little Eva’s death is “essentially decorative” (4)—a patronizing and 
manipulative concession to the demands of Protestant culture. For Jane Tompkins and her host of 
second-wave followers, on the other hand, Eva’s tubercular sympathy operates as a strategy of 
resistance, signaling “an access of power, not a loss of it” (127). Helpfully, Lora Romero offers 
another position: reading Uncle Tom’s Cabin through the lens of Foucauldian bio-power, she notes, 
“renders irrelevant the power/resistance binarism” (717) central to this critical schism. Analyzing 
Uncle Tom’s Cabin as an articulation of Stowe’s hygienist ideology, 43 Romero argues that Eva’s illness 
can be read as a “bio-political critique of patriarchal power” (723) as it traces the operations of 
power on the bodies of both enslaved black men and “nervous” white women.  
Building upon Romero’s assertion that Stowe’s novel “encodes…a feminist-abolitionist 
critique within hygienist norms” (716), I argue that Stowe’s “hygienist norms” evoke not only the 
hystericization, but the degeneration of the gendered body. While Romero situates Marie St. Clair’s 
“hysterical outbursts” and her daughter’s Eva’s “slow decline” (722-23) as mutually illustrative of 
Stowe’s biopolitical critique, she does not suggest what a degenerationist reading might: that these 
conditions are critically connected; that the hysterical mother has enervated her daughter’s 
constitution.44 Conflating the “short-gevity” of the pre-reproductive white female body with the 
dissolution of national futurity, Stowe crafts an exercise in “hygienic sentimentality”: a mode whose 
affecting scenes of corporeal suffering are in a sense doubly tragic because the ills to which they 
                                                 
43 For an analysis of Stowe’s later engagement with hygienic discourses regarding the health of New England women, see 
Adams, “‘A Word or Two on the Other Side’” (2014). 
44 In her discussion of what she calls the “chronobiopolitical” aspects of antebellum fiction, Dana Luciano argues that 
scenes of grief and suffering “make time appear” (21). For example, she examines the ways in which the “much-mourned 
mother…signals at the same time timelessness and anachronism, the latter immanent within intimations or revelations 
about the mother’s prematernal history…and within the difficulties that haunt the daughter’s negotiation of generational 
repetition” (123). According to Luciano, the “challenge of the daughterly trajectory” lies in the “seemingly contradictory 
developmental imperatives of repetition and growth” (134). Here, I suggest that the death of the child instead of the 
mother, presents a radical rupture to the sentimental novel’s sense of history, suggesting not only “generational 





appeal are imagined as preventable.45  If “the death of a beautiful woman” was, as Poe famously 
declared, “the most poetical topic in the world” (“The Philosophy of Composition” 19), the death 
of the young woman—and worse, the female child —was the most sentimental topic in the world, 
eliciting the kind of feeling that Stowe famously envisaged as an antecedent to political action.   
As health reformers realized, “feeling right” was crucial not only in advancing the aims of 
abolitionism, but in stimulating reforms of all kinds. In the introduction to his treatise Woman and 
Her Diseases (1847), for instance, Edward H. Dixon made a strategic appeal to feeling in addressing 
the “many causes of physical degeneration” prevalent among American women:  
Who that has a heart to feel, or a judgment to weigh the consequences of those great 
and acknowledged errors of [woman’s] physical training, can forbear to wish her 
enlightened on those immutable laws upon which her happiness so entirely depends? 
Who can suppress the sigh that involuntarily arises, on beholding a family of 
attenuated offspring, too feeble to resist the encroachments of infantile disease, 
bending and withering beneath the slightest vicissitudes of atmospheric change, and 
constantly exciting the fears of an invalid mother for their very existence, whilst she 
herself, the unconscious cause of most of their ills, is scarce able, from exhaustion, to 
exert her position as their natural protection? (5-6). 
 
Here, feeling stands coequal to “judgment” as a technology for the promotion of public health. As 
Dixon suggests, we ought to respond to the spectacle of the degenerated family in much the same 
way that we read the sentimental novel: with spontaneous and “involuntary” sympathy that does not 
simply produce inactionable pity, but rouses us to ameliorate injustices. “I envy not the heart of that 
man who can witness without emotions deep-felt and sincere,” Dixon writes, “and an instant 
conviction of his duty to the sufferer” (6). If the production of emotion is instantaneous, so too, he 
suggests, should be the realization of “duty.”  
                                                 
45 Romero examines the “domesticity” of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, but eschews any mention of sentimentality. While 
nineteenth-century hygiene was indeed a domestic ideology, as Chapter 2 of this dissertation illustrates, I suggest here 
that reform-minded novelists like Stowe also rendered it a sentimental one. Rosemarie Garland-Thomson makes a 
related point in her analysis of the sentimentalization of disability in later nineteenth-century American women’s writing, 
noting the ways in which “[t]he disabled body was deployed to witness suffering so that disability came to visibly mark 
the anguish that characters and readers themselves were then to witness.” However, while Garland-Thomson addresses 
a view of disability as an “essential property of the body” (142), my analysis of the hygienic aspects of sentimentality 





For hygienic sentimentalists like Mary Sargeant Gove Nichols, the trope of sentimental 
“short-gevity” proved useful in advocating for the interrelated interests of women’s rights and 
women’s health. In her 1855 autobiographical novel Mary Lyndon: Or, Revelations of a Life, Nichols 
employs sentimentalized scenes of (preventable) suffering as she lambastes the tyrannical marriages 
and hygienic neglect that, to her mind, jointly inhibited women’s physiological and political 
flourishing.46 Her eponymous protagonist initially suffers ill health as a result of her mother’s lack of 
care: “I was born in sickness—amidst almost death-pangs,” Mary explains; “My mother, at the time 
of my birth, was struck with a sort of plague, that had smitten many about us. It was the reward of 
ignorance, and consequent wrong-doing” (14).47 However, in the dark days before health reform, 
Mary explains, her mother had known no better: “No one asked why my mother had the plague of 
‘spotted fever;’ or said, ‘What right have parents to give weak, puny, miserable children to the state?’ 
or ever reflected that such offspring can do no more for the commonwealth, than the 
commonwealth in its blindness can do for them” (15).  
Framing the fruits of reproduction as the property of “the state,” Nichols advocates for 
women’s health education as a measure to curtail the perpetuation of “weak, puny, miserable 
children,” and improve the health of the commonwealth. More than a mediation on private 
experience, then, Mary Lyndon strategically argues for women’s health by positing the body in a wider 
network of biosocial relations. As Dawn Keetley has observed, Nichols’s novel illustrates the ways in 
                                                 
46 For a summary and brief analysis of Nichols’s novel, see Myerson, “Mary Gove Nichols’ Mary Lyndon: A Forgotten 
Reform Novel” (1986). The novel had previously been serialized in 1854 in Nichols’ Journal, the couple’s water cure 
publication.   
47 Nichols herself had suffered from chronic sickness in her youth, and had turned to homeopathic practice after 
studying the works of Sylvester Graham, eventually founding a New York water-cure clinic. In her Lectures to Ladies on 
Anatomy and Physiology (1842), she attempted to illuminate the path to health for other American women, asserting that 
“an incalculable amount of suffering is the result of ignorance, not willful error; consequently to remove this ignorance, 
is to strike at the root.” Of course, Nichols admits that this project of hygienic education may not necessarily “save the 
present generation,” since “many have been born with feeble constitutions, in consequence of the errors of their 
parents” (11)—and the errors of their mothers in particular: “When a mother’s whole system is diseased, and under a 
vitiating influence, we cannot expect that she will give health to her child,” Nichols concludes; “In no case do the effects 





which “the female body is always already public” (119)—not the exclusive object of the domestic 
sphere, but rather “the repository of oppressive power relations and also the potential site of social 
transformation” (118). Key to achieving this transformation, as Nichols suggests, was the 
elimination of the “woful want of wisdom on the part of those who care for us”: failures of care 
whose effects had begun to appear with “a vengeance that is educating people surely, though 
expensively” (66-67). Casting women’s ill health as symptom of an invidious miseducation 
sanctioned by patriarchy, Mary Lyndon examines the causes and effects of “physiological ignorance” 
and interrogates where the burden of care—and, concomitantly, where blame—ought to be placed.  
If Nichols’s protagonist supplies an exemplary model of self-care—not only for preaching 
the gospel of homeopathy, but, like Nichols, for divorcing her abusive husband—Mary’s short-lived 
sister Emma supplies a cautionary tale of self-neglect. In a manifestation of hygienic “vengeance,” 
the adolescent Emma dies from self-inflicted physiological damage, having succumbed to that 
bugbear of nineteenth-century women’s health reform: tight lacing.48 Detailing the pre-reproductive 
girl’s beautiful and cheerfully-accepted death—this, while coughing up blood as the result of the 
continual compression of her lungs—Nichols presents what seems like the primal scene of a 
nineteenth-century sentimental novel. Yet while other adolescent sentimental heroines—Stowe’s 
Eva, Alcott’s Beth—die from an excess of sympathy (symbolically, in Stowe’s case; literally, in 
Alcott’s),49 Emma instead perishes from an excess of ignorance. On her deathbed, she is visited by a 
                                                 
48 Health reformers like Beecher had warned that “mischievous fashions in dress” (Letters 181), specifically corseting, 
produced irreparable damage to the ribs, lungs, and other internal organs; in Woman and American Society, Woolson would 
warn that such “subserviency to wicked fashions” (227) not only impaired the wearer, but her future children. Even 
Orson Fowler weighed in; in a pamphlet entitled Intemperance and Tight-lacing, Considered in Relation to the Laws of Life (1852), 
he asserted that “[t]ight-lacing has already been shows to produce partial insanity, and also to excite impure desires” (35).  
Temperance among men and modest dress among women were prerequisites of marriage, as his motto suggests: “‘Total 
abstinence, or no husbands’—‘Natural waists, or no wives.’’” For more on the nineteenth-century dress reform 
movement, see Verbrugge, Able-bodied Womanhood (1998) and Cunningham, Reforming Women’s Fashion (2003).  
49 In Little Women, Beth March contracts scarlet fever after nursing an immigrant family. Beth’s excessive sympathy 
parallels Jo’s paucity of care; Beth tends to the Hummels in the first place only because Jo refuses to go in her stead, 





minister who “ask[s] if she repented of her sins,” but “did not ask her if she repented having 
committed suicide by the torture of corsets” (36). For Nichols, willful ignorance of physiological 
“laws” is as damnable as any sin; death by preventable ills is nothing short of “suicide.” Her novel 
both employs the trope of sentimental “short-gevity” and complicates it: where readers direct their 
sympathies depends upon where they direct their reprobation.  
Upon its publication in 1855, Mary Lyndon received a scathing review in the New York Daily 
Times; which suggested that the author had penned her fictional autobiography “for the sake of a 
public crying-spell, garnished with spasms and hysterical shrieks, over the wrongs she has suffered 
and the wretchedness she has endured.” It was, the reviewer asserted, “one of a class of books 
which have recently been spawned upon the public in great profusion, and which are designed to 
push the doctrines of a school of Reformers, whose creed consists chiefly in hatred to Christianity.” 
The heretical novel’s “fundamental idea,” he continued, was “the Fourierite dogma of Passional 
Attraction”: a philosophy that sought to subjugate “[r]eason and conscience” to “mere animal 
passion.” Declaring Mary Lyndon “a book of very bad tendencies,” the review frames Nichols’s novel 
itself as a degenerated specimen—one that had been “spawned upon the public,” tainted by the 
sensual “tendencies” of “Socialists and Passionists” (“A Bad Book” 2). 
In dismissing Mary Lyndon as the “public crying-spell” of a hysterical female, this review 
seemingly suggests that Nichols’s book belongs not only to a burgeoning genre of raving reform 
novels intent on the destruction of Christian principles, but also to the maligned gendered genre of 
sentimental tear-jerkers that were no less oriented toward social and political reform. Yet this 
particular “crying-spell” generates no sympathy here, since marriage, the reviewer insists, is “a 
voluntary relation.” Any consequent failings are therefore “traceable to some fault or neglect of duty” 





own mistakes and other relations of life. It may be hard to do it: —but so is any uncongenial 
relation, —so is sickness, deception or disappointment of any kind” (“A Bad Book” 2).  
Likening marriage to a sickness that ought to be endured without protest, the reviewer (like 
Fowler) casts aspersion on women who would “voluntarily” enter a conjugal contract and then have 
the audacity to complain. Yet Nichols’s novel challenges the very notion of volition on which this 
critique hinges. Women, Nichols suggests, had long been coerced into the supposedly “voluntary” 
institution by social prescription and economic necessity, inasmuch as the reigning ignorance of 
physiological laws had coerced them into ill health. True volition, she shows, is impossible without 
knowledge; when Blackwell inveighs against those who “voluntarily…injure our children,” she 
implicates those who ought to know better. As Mary Lyndon shows, the question of what one ought to 
know dictates who should bear the burden of care—and consequently, for whom readers should feel. 
As we shall see, Alcott similarly explores the issues of volition in her short-lived heroine Sylvia Yule. 
But if Nichols engages degenerationist anxieties to argue for women’s autonomy within heterosexual 
social structures, Alcott employs these same anxieties to intimate possibilities of queer resistance.   
 
“Morbid Tendencies”: Alcott’s Moods 
Louisa May Alcott passed the month of February 1861 tirelessly revising Moods, the novel 
she had composed over the course of four frenzied weeks the previous year. Singularly focused, she 
found the feverish experience of near-constant creative labor “very pleasant and queer,” though she 
subsequently suffered from exhaustion, which she treated with characteristic nineteenth-century 
hygienic remedies, “long walks [and] cold baths.” Once she had sufficiently recovered from her 
artistic exertion, Alcott read her manuscript aloud to her family, who expressed their unflagging 
admiration of “Lu’s first novel.” Her father, apparently, was particularly pleased. “Emerson must see 





The origin of Alcott’s metaphysics may seem self-evident: born and bred amid what she 
called the “metaphysical mists and philanthropic pyrotechnics” of antebellum utopianism 
(“Transcendental Wild Oats” 370), Alcott had been bequeathed an inheritance of anti-materialist 
thought from her philosopher-father and the Concord luminaries with whom he notably 
associated.50 Moods clearly reflects this influence, deriving its title and its epigraph from Emerson’s 
essay “Experience” (1844): “Life is a train of moods like a string of beads, and as we pass through 
them they prove to be many colored lenses, which paint the world their own hue, and each shows us 
only what lies in its own focus.” Yet as Alcott suggests, her protagonist’s “moodiness” is more than 
adolescent fitfulness; rather, having inherited the “adverse temperaments” of her poorly-matched 
parents has rendered her “an enigma to herself and her life a train of moods” (84). Indeed, as 
Emerson notes in “Experience,” while this “train of moods” is transient and variable, it is 
nevertheless grounded in the embodied constitution: as his analogy above continues, 
“[t]emperament is the iron wire on which the beads are strung” (244).   
A concept deriving from Hippocratic medicine, “temperament” was broadly employed in 
nineteenth-century medical discourse to refer to an inherited condition “often connected with 
peculiarities of constitution which predispose to particular diseases” (49), as Cleveland physician 
John Ellis explained in his treatise The Avoidable Causes of Disease, Insanity, and Deformity (1870). An 
understanding of temperament was particularly foundational to phrenology;51 according to Johann 
                                                 
50 Indeed, “to live almost thirty years under Bronson Alcott’s roof without acquiring any metaphysics,” as John Matteson 
observes, “would have required fierce determination” (262). While the Concord School of American Transcendentalism 
“had no official metaphysics,” as Arthur Versluis observes, “its primary mover, Alcott, nonetheless had developed a 
metaphysics perhaps best expressible as the relationship between eternity and time” (54): a neo-Platonic (and anti-
Darwinian) alternative to the model of linear, progressive, selective development suggested by evolutionist view of 
history.  
51 Phrenology was established in the early nineteenth century by the German physiologist Franz Josef Gall and later 
popularized by Spurzheim and his Scottish counterpart, George Combe. As Robert A. Nye notes, while Gall and 
Spurzheim viewed personality traits as heritable, they also believed these traits were subject to modification, thus 
emphasizing the role of environment and the “exercise” of the faculties. In turn, Nye continues, “The optimistic aspects 
of the doctrine exercised an irresistible appeal on social and medical reformers in both England and France in the 1830s 





Gaspar Spurzheim, the German physician who helped to advance the rise of this branch of pseudo-
scientific inquiry in the United States, “the first step in phrenology” was “the study of 
temperaments” (31). As Spurzheim and his contemporaries suggested, the four temperaments—
sanguine, lymphatic, bilious, and nervous (see fig. 4.3)—manifested both physically and 
psychologically, revealing individual inclinations and potentially predicting future behavior. 52  
Phrenological analysis thus became a way to trace the transmission of both hereditary pathologies 
and genius; indeed, many nineteenth-century public figures were submitted the analysis in the pages 
of the Phrenological Journal: a profile of Louisa May Alcott published in its April 1881 issue, for 
instance, deems her “a woman of unusual force” (187), as it observes the “[m]otive temperament of 
her father…impressed upon the bodily contours, and conspicuously influencing her mental 
organism” (188) (see fig. 4.4).53   
 
                                                 
Colbert, A Measure of Perfection (1997); Tomlinson, Head Masters (2005); Smith, The New Measures (2007); and Castiglia, 
Interior States (2008). 
52 “These four temperaments are seldom to be observed pure and unmixed,” Spurzheim noted, but “are mostly found 
conjoined, and occur as lymphatic-sanguine, lymphatic-bilious, sanguine-lymphatic, sanguine-bilious, sanguine-nervous, 
bilious-lymphatic, bilious-sanguine, bilious-nervous, &c.” (17). Understood by the terms of Spurzheim’s sytem, Alcott’s 
Sylvia Yule might be understood to possess a “bilious-sanguine” temperament, as she claims to be “passionate and 
restless by nature,” but “also very sensitive to all influences” (113). 
53 Many nineteenth-century texts on hereditary transmission, including Pendleton’s, appeal to case studies example 
famous figures and their relatives as evidence for an argument for the hereditary transmission of characteristics. Galton 







Fig. 4.3. The four temperaments: sanguine, lymphatic, bilious, and nervous. Johann Gaspar Spurzheim, 











Although Transcendentalists like Emerson rejected claims to a purely empirical science,54 
they tentatively explored pseudo-sciences like phrenology, which seemingly offered a marriage of the 
material and metaphysical in its purported insights into human behavior and development. 
Emerson’s early interest in the theories of George Combe55 later gave way to skepticism and 
ambivalence, however, as his essay “Experience” illustrates. Temperament, Emerson claims, is 
complicit in the “system of illusions” that “shuts us in a prison of glass which we cannot see” (244), 
obviating unimagined contingencies in its obstinate fixedness. “I know the mental proclivity of 
physicians. I hear the chuckle of the phrenologists,” he writes: these “[t]heoretic kidnappers and 
slave-drivers” would deign “by such cheap signboards as the color of his beard, or the slope of his 
occiput” to “read…the inventory of [a man’s] fortunes and character. The grossest ignorance does 
not disgust like this impudent knowingness. The physicians say, they are not materialists,” he warns, 
“but they are” (245). 
 For Emerson, this materialist, determinist understanding of temperament troublingly 
precluded the exercise of agency: 56  “I see not, if one be once caught in this trap of so-called 
sciences, any escape for the man from the links of the chain of physical necessity. Given such an 
embryo, such a history must follow. On this platform,” he declared, “one lives in a sty of sensualism, 
                                                 
54 Bronson Alcott announced his unqualified rejection of “[a]ny faith declaring a divorce from the supernatural, and 
seeking to prop itself upon Nature alone” (qtd. in Versluis 60); similarly, Emerson considered science “sensual, and 
therefore superficial,” and accordingly insisted upon the primacy of the metaphysical: “science always goes abreast with 
the just elevation of the man, keeping step with religion and metaphysics”—in other words, he continued, “the state of 
science is an index of our self-knowledge” (“The Poet” 223). 
55 Combe founded the Phrenological Society of Edinburgh in 1820, and toured throughout the United Kingdom, 
Europe, and the United States lecturing on the topic over the following decades. In an 1830 letter, Emerson declared 
Combe’s widely-read treatise The Constitution of Man (1828) “the best sermon I have read for some time” (Letters 291). 
56 In a later essay, “Fate” (1860), Emerson would again discuss phrenology in considering the distasteful notion of 
“organization tyrannizing over character”: “Who likes to have a dapper phrenologist pronouncing his fortunes? Who 
likes to believe that he has hidden in his skull, spine, and pelvis, all the vices of a Saxon or Celtic race, which will be sure 
to pull him down, — with what grandeur of hope and resolve he is fired, — into a selfish, huckstering, servile, dodging 
animal?” Emerson asks (29). “Ask Spurzheim, ask the doctors, ask Quetelet, if temperaments decide nothing? or if there 
be any-thing they do not decide? Read the description in medical books of the four temperaments, and you will think 
you are reading your own thoughts which you had not yet told” (7). Revolting against the “tyranny” of determinism, 





and would soon come to suicide” (246). Thus, while acknowledging temperament to be “the veto or 
limitation-power in the constitution,” Emerson defends ambiguity and uncertainty as 
epistemological positions infinitely preferable to the “impudent knowingness” of the “so-called 
sciences.”  
In Moods, Alcott tests the “chain of physical necessity” with a temperamentally-tainted 
heroine whose paucity of self-knowledge limits her capacity for self-care. The novel relates the 
coming-of-age tribulations of Sylvia Yule, a willful eighteen-year-old at the mercy of her emotional 
vicissitudes. Herself product of a “loveless marriage” (82), Sylvia has inherited a tendency to 
impulsivity that leads, in turn, to an unhappy marriage of her own: she weds the well-meaning bur 
tiresome man next door, Geoffrey Moor, despite harboring desire for the brooding revolutionary, 
Adam Warwick—characters modeled, respectively, on Alcott’s Concord contemporaries Ralph 
Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau. Tortured by the gravity of her error, and unable to 
consummate her marriage, Sylvia soon suffers a swift and convenient illness, fatally undone by her 
“too early womanhood” (161).  
While Alcott purported to have envisaged Moods as a kind of character study, in the wake of 
its 1864 publication, she discovered that her readership had received it rather differently: “I find 
myself accused of Spiritualism, Free Love, Affinities & all sorts of horrors that I know very little 
about & don’t believe in,” she lamented in an 1865 letter (Letters 108). The following month, she 
responded to one reader who had written to her suggesting as much: “if there is any thing I heartily 
detest,” she informed him, “it is the theory of Affinities, also Spiritualism & Free Love, though I am 
grieved to find myself accused of all three.” The novel’s purpose, she insisted, had been “to show 
the effect of a moody person’s mood upon their life,” and had not intended “to settle or unsettle 





Without deigning to declare that she protests too much here, it is worth noting that, 
regardless of whether or not Alcott envisaged herself as espousing the philosophy of free love, her 
public certainly believed that she had. Many contemporary reviews posited Moods as symptomatic of 
a broader cultural phenomenon: “matrimonial metaphysics,” a review in the Independent observed, 
was seemingly a subject “of which it is the fashion to write a great deal nowadays” (Clark 31). 
Another reviewer remarked that Moods “propound[ed] a theory with regard to marriage which 
appears to be gaining ground; according to the new philosophy,” this reviewer explained, “marriage 
is an experiment” (Clark 27).57 In particular, several reviewers pointed to Moods’ uncanny parallels to 
Emily Chester, a tale of disappointed marriage that had been published earlier that year by Baltimore 
author Anne Moncure Crane (later Seemüller); indeed, these similarities that would prove so striking 
as to later prompt Mark Twain to cite the near-simultaneous appearance of these publications as 
evidence of “mental telegraphy.”58 But the co-production of these two novels was more than mere 
coincidence, the Boston Evening Transcript suggested; instead, they indexed the development of a 
critical consciousness among young middle-class white women. 59  Both novels, the reviewer noted, 
“are expressive of the state of feeling among the women of America” that had “reached a climax in 
transcendentalism,” intriguing “our young people, who have a tendency for metaphysics.” But 
Moods, this same reviewer predicted, would primarily appeal to “[m]inds with morbid tendencies” 
(Clark 31).60   
                                                 
57 As a primary example of this “new philosophy,” this reviewer cites A New Atmosphere by Gail Hamilton, discussed in 
the conclusion to Chapter 2.  
58 See Twain, “Mental Telegraphy” (1891). Upon reading Crane’s novel in 1867, Alcott pronounced it “an unnatural 
story, yet just enough like ‘Moods’ in a few things to make me sorry that it came out now” (Journals 132).   
59 By the end of the Civil War, the vogue for unhappy and ill-matched marriages in American women’s fiction; 
something of a zenith; something, it seemed, was in the air. As Alfred Habegger points out, Adeline Whitney’s The 
Gayworthys and Elizabeth Stoddard’s Two Men, both published in 1865, also share similar plots—though it was Crane, he 
contends, who “came closer to writing a New World Madame Bovary than anyone else before Kate Chopin” (104).  
60 A review in Harper’s Weekly offered a contrasting assessment: “‘Moods’ is neither sentimental nor morbid nor 
extravagant,” it asserted; “It has freshness and self-reliance” (Clark 29). Caroline Healey Dall had declared Moods “a far 
healthier story” than Emily Chester (qtd. in Deese 448, n15); “It doubtless is,” the Boston Evening Transcript conceded, “but 





But in Moods, “morbid tendencies” are precisely the point; as Alcott shows, her heroine’s 
own “morbid tendencies” are not only the cause of loveless marriages, but the effect. While many 
reviewers remarked that both Moods and Emily Chester seemed indebted Goethe’s 1809 novel Elective 
Affinities (Die Wahlverwandtschaften), in which he presented romantic attraction as governed similarly to 
the law of chemical affinity, Alcott’s novel suggests that what she would later call the “costly 
experiment” of marriage was directed not by chemical laws, but rather by the “laws of life.” In other 
words, marriage was only “costly” insofar as it was an “experiment.” Experiments, after all, seek to 
test unproven hypotheses; for antebellum health reformers, “laws of life” were more than mere 
hypotheses, but rather unyielding injunctions that determined the regulation of sexual praxes; the 
effects of these laws’ transgressions of were clearly evident in the state of the population. Moods, 
then, is not only a meditation on “matrimonial metaphysics,” but on matrimonial physiology. 
In order to grasp the perplexity that is Sylvia Yule, as Alcott suggests in a chapter wryly 
entitled “Dull But Necessary,” readers need look no further than her heredity. Professing to offer 
the “key” to the heroine’s character here (82), the narrator explains that, in submitting to a “loveless 
marriage,” Sylvia’s father had “mar[red] the integrity of his own soul by transgressing the great laws 
of life,” thereby “entail[ing] upon himself and heirs the inevitable retribution.” The punishment for 
his “self-inflicted wrong” manifests as a “direful stamp of imperfection” in each of his three 
children, who become “visible illustrations of the great law broken in his youth” (82). His youngest, 
Sylvia, is especially affected, becoming a kind of an overdetermined text on which her father’s 
transgressions may be read:  
                                                 
style and humor of its execution, others were less generous. A particularly patronizing reviewer for the North American 
Review, for instance, seized the opportunity to declare himself “utterly weary of stories about precocious little girls.” This 
same reviewer—a precocious young Henry James, who would go on to make something of a career for himself out of 
“stories about precocious little girls” —had been both intrigued and repelled by Emily Chester; in his lengthy review of 
Crane’s novel, James took particular exception to its “would-be psychological mode”: that is, its focus “upon the 






As if indignant Nature rebelled against the outrage done her holiest ties, adverse 
temperaments gifted the child with the good and ill of each. From her father she 
received pride, intellect, and will; from her mother passion, imagination, and the 
fateful melancholy of a woman defrauded of her dearest hope. These conflicting 
temperaments, with all their aspirations, attributes, and inconsistencies, were woven 
into a nature fair and faulty; ambitious, yet not self-reliant; sensitive, yet not keen-
sighted (84). 
 
Sylvia’s hereditary deficiencies in self-reliance and keen-sightedness prime her to repeat her parents’ 
crime against nature; her hasty decision to marry Moor seemingly indexes a kind of ingrained 
conjugal repetition-compulsion: “as if the father's atonement was to be wrought out through his 
dearest child,” Alcott writes, “the daughter also made the fatal false step of her life” (106).  
Alcott’s novel first broaches the matter of marriage and divorce from an ethical perspective 
only after Sylvia’s “fatal false step,” as her sister, Prue, gossips about a woman who has left her 
husband. When Sylvia and would-be lover Warwick, defend the woman’s decision to extricate 
herself from an unhappy marriage, Prue is “scandalized to the last degree,” for she considers 
marriage “a law which ordained that a pair once yoked should abide by their bargain, be it good or 
ill.” Echoing Thomas Low Nichols—who, in a chapter of his treatise rather dramatically titled “The 
Murders of Marriage,” condemned “fidelity to an arbitrary law” to insist that “fidelity to a higher law 
is needed” (241)—Warwick advocates for a kind of civil disobedience to the social scripts that 
regulate the nineteenth-century marriage institution: “there are truer laws to be obeyed than those 
custom sanctions.” Yet Warwick does not advocate for the sexual free-for-all Prue fears. Echoing 
the dominant methodology of antebellum health reform,61 Warwick recommends “prevention rather 
than a dangerous cure” in matrimonial matters: “Because two persons love,” reasons, “it is not 
always safe or wise for them to marry” (146).  
                                                 
61 The constitution of American Physiological Society, founded by Sylvester Graham and William Alcott in 1837, 
asserted “'prevention is better than cure,' is our favorite motto” (qtd. in Whorton, Crusaders for Fitness 110). In 1871, 





Flailing in the attempt to explain her neglect of preventive measures to Warwick, Sylvia 
defers to the tautology of temperament: “I am what I am, too easily led by circumstances” (158). But 
if Sylvia “is what she is”—not a blank slate, but a kind of temperamental template—then she is unfit 
to marry, according to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century medical advice manuals, which are rife 
with supplications to those “tainted” by disease and disability to practice prophylactic abstinence: 
“No person who labours under any incurable malady ought to marry,” William Buchan asserted in 
his seminal domestic medical manual. He thereby not only shortens his own life,” Buchan warned, 
“but transmits misery to others” (8). As Warwick’s impulse to assess the “safety” of sexual 
partnership suggests, ill-matched marriages produced distinct physical risks. 
Physiologists and phrenologists in the antebellum United States, wary of degeneration of the 
race, sought to curtail the threat of transmitted misery by bringing these scientific laws to bear on 
marriage. In seeking to delimit degenerative tendencies, these discourses stressed the individual 
subject’s moral obligation to the wider social body. Those who suffered from any “hereditary taint, 
such as consumption, epilepsy, insanity, or other chronic disease whatsoever, even sick or nervous 
headache,” were, as Lorenzo Fowler intoned, “culpable in a high degree” (161). Blackwell, too, 
declared that “the hereditary transmission of many and fearful maladies” was “a fact so well 
established” that to ignore is constituted “a criminal neglect of duty.” But if prospective spouses 
ought to attend to their physical health, she continued, they should no less consider the “relation of 
their temperaments” (145).62 Indeed, some phrenological lecturers specifically united the interests of 
phrenology and matrimony, marketing their science as a guide to partner selection (see fig. 4.5). 
                                                 
62 According to many physiologists and phrenologists, one’s sexual partner ought to possess a temperament that was 
neither radically dissimilar nor identical (as in the case of near relatives). In his 1866 guide Sexual Physiology, for instance, 
water-cure physician Russell Thatcher Trall asserted that “[p]hrenologists teach that temperaments which are extremely 
alike, or extremely unlike, are not the best adapted for the conjugal relation.” Deeming this position “a ‘fiction grounded 
on fact,’” Trall notes that the phrenological “doctrine of Temperaments” refers only to “abnormal conditions,” insider 
as it “implies unbalanced organization” (Sexual Physiology 277-278). Trall’s primary concern, then, was the balance of 







Fig. 4.5. “Lecture on Matrimony & Phrenology.” Exeter: C.E. Clark’s Press, 1849. American Broadsides and 
Ephemera. Web. 
 
In Moods, Sylvia becomes cognizant of these matrimonial biopolitics through a sobering 
consultation with her friend Faith Dane, a wise and kindly spinster in possession of that enviable 
Transcendentalist commodity, “a self-reliant soul” (144). Faith counsels Sylvia to choose neither 
Moor nor Warwick, but to instead become “a law to [her]self” (182). If Warwick’s rhetoric of 
prevention over cure is primarily metaphorical, Faith goes further to situate Sylvia’s predicament as a 
crisis of sexual hygiene: “If you were blind, a cripple, or cursed with some incurable infirmity of 
body,” she challenges Sylvia, “would not you hesitate to bind yourself and your affliction to 
                                                 
the one most favourable for true greatness and a general genius, for balance and consistency of character, and for 





another?” When Sylvia agrees that she “should not only hesitate, but utterly refuse,” Faith serves her 
some “seeming harsh advice”:  
There are diseases more subtle and dangerous than any that vex our flesh; diseases 
that should be as carefully cured if curable, as inexorably prevented from spreading 
as any malady we dread. A paralyzed will, a morbid mind, a mad temper, a tainted 
heart, a blind soul, are afflictions to be as much regarded as bodily infirmities. Nay, 
more, inasmuch as souls are of greater value than perishable flesh (179). 
 
With this unsettling grhetoric, Faith declares Sylvia “one of the innocent unfortunates, who have no 
right to marry till they be healed, perhaps never.” Abstinence, Faith suggests, is Sylvia’s moral 
imperative, and a chastened Sylvia quickly agrees: “thank God that I have no child to reproach me 
hereafter,” she exclaims, “for bequeathing it the mental ills I have not yet outlived” (179).63  
Characteristic of nineteenth-century health reform discourse, Faith’s diagnosis does not 
entirely foreclose the prospect of cure. Decreeing that Sylvia’s ethical obligation to celibacy extends 
“till [she] be healed” (though this hypothetical time, of course, is “perhaps never”), Faith leaves 
open the possibility that Sylvia might yet “outlive” her temperamental taint, and, with a neo-
Lamarckian logic, overcome the “mental ills” she would otherwise transmit. Accordingly, Faith 
advises Sylvia to “remember that for every affliction there are two helpers, who can heal or end the 
heaviest we know—Time and Death. The first we may invoke and wait for,” she continues; “the last 
God alone can send when it is better not to live” (184). However, the novel only briefly entertains 
these two paths of action before the latter strategy is employed as a panacea for Sylvia’s “affliction.” 
Soon after her conversation with Faith, Sylvia falls ill, consults a physician, and is pronounced “past 
                                                 
63 Sylvia has no child, of course, because she has not consummated her marriage with Moor: she is unable to offer him 
“a woman’s love,” but only “a girl’s” (136). The newlyweds perform their sexual innocence in one of the novel’s stranger 
scenes, as they “play at being children” (133); here, the pigtailed Sylvia becomes a kind of grotesque literalization of the 
searing claim Fuller had made in Woman in the Nineteenth Century (1845): “Now there is no woman, only an overgrown 
child” (103).  Decrying “the contemptuous phrase ‘women and children’” (20), Fuller had argued that the infantilization 
of women by the marriage institution, in particular, hampered their effectiveness as parents. Yet Sylvia readily acquiesces 
to her own infantilization throughout the novel, and especially in this scene of performative pre-adolescence, precisely, I 
would suggest, in order to resist sex and, implicitly, motherhood. Of course, this kind of compromise—heterosexuality 





help.” For her particular set of ills—she “had been born with a strong nature in a feeble frame, had 
lived too fast, [and] wasted health ignorantly”—he suppliess a discomfiting prescription: “go home 
and prepare to die” (212).  Like a good patient, Sylvia dutifully complies, suddenly invested with the 
requisite skill set of the nineteenth-century sentimental heroine: “Sylvia had not known how to live,” 
Alcott writes, “but now proved that she did know how to die”—and is, in death, “strengthened, 
purified, and perfected by the hard past, the solemn present” (213). 
 This sudden rush of sentimentality affords Alcott’s heroine absolution from the moral taint 
of adultery or divorce only in the disembodiment of death. At the same time, Alcott’s rhetoric of 
purification and perfection simultaneously harks to the project of nineteenth-century hygiene in the 
face of degeneration: Sylvia’s sentimental death is precipitated, apparently, by having “wasted health 
ignorantly.”64 On the one hand, Sylvia’s sentimental “short-gevity” might be understood as an act of 
resistance—even an iteration of queer negativity, if, as Sharon Holland suggests, “what makes a 
subject queer is his his/her relationship, both performatively and literally with death” (391).65 
                                                 
64 This statement might be taken with a heavy dose of irony on Alcott’s part. Tellingly, Alcott’s readers are first 
introduced to Sylvia Yule as she flings a bottle of chamomilla out of her bedroom window: a petulant reply to her sister 
Prue’s attempt to remedy “one of these perverse fits” that are apparently characteristic of her peculiar humor. While 
Sylvia professes that she “tired of everybody and everything, and see[s] nothing worth getting up for”—expressing 
sentiments contemporary psychiatric analysis might see as indicative of a mood disorder, if not simply the vicissitudes of 
adolescence—Prue encourages her sister to behave “like a civilized being” (15), namely by sedating her. When Prue 
threatens to send for a physician, she receives a querulous retort: “Dr. Baum will follow the chamomilla, if you bring him 
here,” Sylvia snaps; “What does he know about health, a fat German, looking lager beer and talking sauer-kraut? Bring 
me bona fide sugar-plums and I'll take them,” she remarks, “but arsenic, mercury, and nightshade are not to my taste” 
(17). Her stubborn refusal of therapeutic intervention, resisting medical frameworks that would deign to explain and 
modify her “moods,” humorously indexes the widespread skepticism of “regular” or allopathic medicine in the 
nineteenth-century United States. Proponents of the botanic, homoepathic, and Thomsonian medical movements 
offered a provocation to proto-professional physicians: one that resonates in Sylvia’s skepticism of her German doctor. 
The proposed curative, chamomilla, is perhaps particularly unpalatable to Sylvia, as it was a common nineteenth-century 
treatment for the gendered infirmity of “nervousness.”    
65 Here, Holland responds to the briefly-addressed specter of death in Lauren Berlant and Elizabeth Freeman’s 
important essay “Queer Nationality” (1992). Holly Jackson has recently latched on to this suggestion in order to claim 
that the “tragic mulatta” plots in antebellum African-American authored novels are, in Edelman’s terms, “no-future 
narratives, foretelling, and even embracing, a crisis of reproduction in the white national family.” Countering commonly 
accepted readings that see characters like William Wells Brown’s Clotel as “utopian figures for an integrated future 
American society”—an interpretation that “tacitly relies on a eugenic solution to sociopolitical problems”—Jackson 
suggests that the suicidal mulatta might alternatively be understood “as an antagonistic force against white national 
reproduction” (49). Yet if the sentimental death was also employed as an “act of biopolitical subterfuge” (63), as the 





However, the fate of Moods’s Sylvia Yule, as Alcott explained in an 1864 letter to the feminist writer 
and reformer Caroline Healey Dall, had mainly been motivated by a different kind of death drive: “I 
intended to have [Sylvia] spend the rest of her life alone, busy & happy,” Alcott confessed; “But 
people said I’d better have her die, for she had had enough to wear her out.” If public opinion 
dictated that Sylvia could not live out this original vision, this editorially-induced death sentence, 
Alcott continued, was at the very least preferable to a third alternative: “my idea is not carried out,” 
she flatly declared, “if S[ylvia] & Moor settle down into a happy pair”—in which case, she insisted, 
“‘Moods’ will be an entire failure” (qtd. in Deese 452). 
In 1882, Moods was republished with significant revisions: namely, it concludes with scenario 
Alcott had dismissed as “an entire failure.” As Alcott writes in her preface to the revised version, 
initially, “death seemed the only solution for Sylvia’s perplexities”—but, she continues, “having 
learned the possibility of finding happiness after disappointment, and making love and duty go hand 
in hand, my heroine meets a wiser if less romantic fate than in the former edition” (vi). Healed 
through sheer force of will, Sylvia returns to Moor, asserting her newly-won “right” to marry, and, 
presumably, to reproduce without risk of transmitting her temperamental taint: “to live, not dream, a 
long and happy life, unmarred by the moods that nearly wrecked her youth” (359).66 Alcott’s new 
edition, then, is concerned not only with the “hard past” and “solemn present,” but with the 
promise of reproductive futurity. 
                                                 
solution” to the problem of white national reproduction more accurately relies on a strategic mobilization of mid-
century degeneration and miscegenation anxieties. As Alcott suggests, the degenerationist “solution” is also, perhaps, a 
queer future. 
66 In the 1882 edition, Alcott imbues Faith’s cautionary rhetoric with more specific degenerationist implications: in 1864, 
Faith declares that “subtle and dangerous” mental diseases should be “inexorably prevented from spreading”—a phrase 
that is amended to “inexorably prevented from increasing” in 1882. While the word “spreading” suggests a kind of 
nonspecific contagion, the word “increasing” suggests perpetuation in the population via unconscientious reproduction. 
In the first version, Sylvia’s question, “Faith, what comes next?” is met merely with a “motherly embrace” (181); in the 
second, her more specific question, “Faith, what must I do?” and is met with more specific response: “Your duty” (312). 
And as Alcott would assert in her Ladies Home Journal essay five years later, the “duty” of the nineteenth-century middle-





Unsurprisingly, this revision ultimately met with considerable disappointment from Alcott’s 
later feminist critics, who rued her seeming capitulation to the demands of the nineteenth-century 
literary marketplace; indeed, the little extant critical discussion of Moods has tended to ignore the 
1882 edition almost entirely.67 Yet rather than dismiss the 1882 edition out of hand, discounting her 
revision as a kind of unfortunate antifeminist concession, I suggest we might to take seriously 
Alcott’s claim to have crafted a “wiser” conclusion: read this way, Alcott’s revised ending does not 
only demonstrate her growing resignation to public opinion in the face of financial necessity, but 
also a shift in her “hygienic sentiments.” Specifically, in scrubbing her text clean of its sentimental 
ending, she also excised its deterministic implications—ideation that had grown increasingly suspect 
among the “American School” of evolutionary theory, which opposed the Darwinian theory natural 
selection, instead promoting a neo-Lamarckian model of agentive change.68  
When Alcott resurrected Sylvia Yule in 1882, she re-imagined an “afflicted” woman who was 
no longer “past help.”69 This anti-determinism is palpable in postbellum sexual hygiene guides like 
John Cowan’s The Science of a New Life (1870), which challenges the emphasis on “temperament” as a 
determinate of health: “If the causes of sterility, blindness, deafness, monstrosities, consumption, 
imbecility, etc., usually ascribed to mis-mated temperaments, would be thoroughly investigated,” 
                                                 
67 For instance, Rutgers American Women Writers series edition of the Moods (1991) presents the text of the 1864 version, 
gesturing toward Alcott’s 1882 revisions only in its introduction and appendix; editor Sarah Elbert argues that “it is the 
first version…which moves readers deeply, presaging all the themes and characters that were to make Little Women and 
its sequels classics of American fiction” (xv). Helen Deese, who brought Alcott’s archival letter to Dall to light in 2003, 
presumes that Alcott’s 1882 revision was primarily financially-motivated, an acquiescence to the “taste and convenience” 
of the public in the service of supporting her family (450).  
68 Founded by American paleontologist Edward Drinker Cope, neo-Lamarckism included paleontologists, geologists, 
and zoologists who sought to use the fossil record to refute Darwinian evolutionary theory. For more on neo-
Lamarckism in late-nineteenth-century America, see Bowler, Evolution (1983), 257-268; Cotkin, Reluctant Modernism 
(1992); and Webb, The Evolution Controversy in America (1994). For an analysis of the American School’s investment in 
sentiment, see Schuller, “Taxonomies of Feeling” (2012).  
69 The two versions of Faith’s advice to Sylvia aptly reflect this refashioning: in the 1864 edition, Faith says, “Could you 
have loved Geoffrey, it might have been safe and well with you” (176); in 1882, she offers Sylvia a slightly but 
significantly amended proposition: “Could you love Geoffrey, it would be safe and well with you” (306). This shift from 
the conditional perfect aspect (could have loved, might have been) to the present conditional (could love, would be) re-imagines 





Cowan asserted, “it would be found that the causes lay entirely outside of the temperamental 
conditions, and would be found in the wrong habits of life observed by the husband and wife.” 
Cowan’s insistence that the causes of disease and debility frequently attributed to hereditary factors 
(“temperamental conditions”) were more appropriately attributed to behavioral ones (“wrong habits 
of life”) suggests a hygienic (rather than prescriptively eugenic) solution; here, degenerative 
tendencies might be remediated by “continent and hygienic habits of life” (57). 
While Sylvia’s new emplotment in a heteronormative narrative70 may read as a “failure” of 
Alcott’s original vision, in its renewed emphasis on agency, it also challenges the social use value of 
“know[ing] how to die”— a suspect epistemology, indeed, for an author who had since established a 
reputation as the purveyor of didactic tales for youth. With the “wiser if less romantic fate” of 
compromise rather than resistance, Alcott suggests that death is not the “only solution” to the 
problem of the unruly body and “morbid mind.” In other words, the 1882 edition emphasizes a kind 
self-care—or what she would more particularly refer to in her 1887 essay “Early Marriages” as the 
nexus of “self-knowledge, self-control, self-help”—as a strategy for survival. 71  After all, to grant the 
new Sylvia Yule that which women in nineteenth-century novels are so often denied—“a long and 
happy life”—might be imagined as a radical act in its own right. 
  
                                                 
70 Michael Warner offers the neologism “repro-narrativity,” the formal expression of the ideology he terms 
“reprosexuality,” which “involves more than reproducing, even more than compulsory heterosexuality: it involves a 
relation to self that finds its proper temporality and fulfillment in generational transmission.” The attendant impetus for 
“repro-narrativity” accordingly suggests “our lives are somehow made more meaningful by being embedded in a 
narrative of generational succession” (“Fear of a Queer Planet” 9). However, as Alcott suggest, being embedded in a 
narrative of degenerative generational succession allows space for queer critique. For a related discussion of queer 
temporality and nineteenth-century bachelorhood, see Warner, “Irving’s Posterity” (2000). 
71 This decision met with a generally favorable response. “We cannot all die when death would be the easiest relief from 
our tragedies,” one reviewer noted, “but we may live and make them considerably less tragic if we will. Miss Alcott does 






Coda: “It should end with us” 
 In the midst of Moods’s two versions, readers are left with the specter of Alcott’s unwritten 
Sylvia: a born-again spinster, “alone, busy & happy” in spite of—even because of—the 
degenerationist prohibition against her “right” to a reproductive future. Public resistance to this 
vision of the self-fulfilled single woman would famously resurface four years later, after Alcott had 
penned the first volume of Little Women (1868): “Girls write to ask who the little women marry, as if 
that was the only end and aim of a woman’s life,” a frustrated Alcott wrote in her journal; “I won’t 
marry Jo to Laurie to please anyone” (Journals 167). She technically kept her word, although the title 
of the novel’s second volume—Good Wives—illustrates the ways in which she could not wrest free of 
the marriage imperative.72 The following year, Alcott would express her chagrin, issuing a 
preemptive apology to a correspondent for the novel’s forthcoming sequel: “publishers…insist on 
having people married on in a wholesale manner which much afflicts me,” Alcott complained. “‘Jo’ 
should have remained a literary spinster but so many enthusiastic young ladies wrote to me 
clamorously demanding that she should marry Laurie, or somebody, that I didnt [sic] dare to refuse 
& out of perversity went & made a funny match for her” (Letters 124-25).73   
 Feminist readings of Alcott’s novels have long grappled with how to approach the author’s 
obvious negotiations between a desire to resist the generic demands of domestic fiction and a desire 
to sell books. In a recent essay, for instance, Ivy Schweitzer suggests that the most pleasurable way 
to read Little Women is to “ignore all the marriages”—that is, to imagine an alternative in which Jo is 
chronically the “literary spinster” Alcott intended. Like other feminist critics, Schweitzer muses on 
Jo’s strange response when reality of marriage rears its head for the March sisters: “I just wish I 
                                                 
72 For further discussion of the feminist dimensions and disappointments of Little Women, see Alberghene and Clark, 
eds., Little Women and the Feminist Imagination (1999).  
73 The “perversity” of Jo’s pairing with the German immigrant Friedrich Bhaer perhaps lies not only in oddness of Jo’s 





could marry Meg myself,” Jo informs Marmee, “and keep her safe in the family.” Here, Schweitzer 
latches onto the rhetoric of “safety” in Jo’s suggestion to ask, “what is the “danger” that Jo senses in 
marriage?” (18). As Sylvia Yule’s resistance to cross the threshold of “woman’s love” (136) suggests, 
beyond the “dangers” of losing identity, property, and the freedom to pursue creative labor lurks the 
clear and present danger of heterosexual sex—and indeed, the perils inherent in nineteenth-century 
childbirth, from obstructed labor to obstetric hemorrhage to puerperal fever, should have been 
more than enough to give any eighteen-year-old pause.74 Yet of course, as we have seen, the 
“dangers” of marriage were also implicit in the wider cultural discourse of degeneration.  
 If the omnipresent threat of degeneration had enabled free love feminists like Nichols to 
argue for women’s autonomy in marriage, it also allowed authors like Alcott to launch a critique of 
heteronormative kinship—a critique she attempted in Moods, but ultimately more successfully in her 
1873 novel Work: A Story of Experience.  Its protagonist, Christie Devon, is briefly employed as a paid 
companion to an “invalid girl” (74), whom she initially believes is suffering from consumption. 
However, Christie soon learns that her charge is prey to a hereditary malady of another kind: the 
Carrols are “all mad, or shall be; we come of a mad race,” Helen explains, “and for years we have 
gone recklessly on bequeathing this awful inheritance to our descendants. It should end with us, we 
are the last; none of us should marry” (86). Forced to sever ties with her lover on account of her 
hereditary taint, the despondent Helen awaits the fulfillment of her fate, anticipating the 
development of a latent pathology. Plagued not by madness itself, but by genealogical knowledge of 
her impending destiny, she eventually commits suicide. “Death,” she insists, “is the only cure for a 
mad Carrol” (90). 
                                                 
74 In 1879, Alcott’s youngest sister, May, died shortly after giving birth at the age of thirty-nine. For the remaining few 





 Alcott’s subplot of hereditary insanity dramatizes the prophylactic imperative that 
characterizes much of the nineteenth-century medico-scientific writing on heredity,75 placing 
exceptional pressure on women’s reproductive prudence in particular. Although Helen has received 
her “awful inheritance” from her father, she unequivocally blames her mother, since to have 
knowingly married a man with madness in his family—one whose offspring “were sure to inherit the 
curse”—constitutes an unconscionable prophylactic failure: “ambition made her wicked,” Helen 
asserts; “I have her to thank for all I suffer, and I cannot love her though she is my mother” (87). 
A character who professes to “hate [her] mother” (85) indeed disrupts the logic of maternal love 
that informs the nineteenth-century sentimental novel in general, and Little Women in particular. 
Here, Alcott cunningly shows how the requisite heteronormative plot of the nineteenth-century 
domestic novel can in fact become a Gothic tale of horror, replete with insanity and suicide.  
Although mother and daughter eventually arrive at a deathbed détente, the Carrols’ tale 
illuminates “the awful responsibility that lies on every man and woman's soul forbidding them to 
entail upon the innocent the burden of their own infirmities” (87). With “awful inheritance,” Alcott 
suggests, comes “awful responsibility”: a refusal to reproduce “the burden of…infirmities.”  Yet 
what remains for the “innocent” who have already inherited this burden? In Work, Alcott explores 
available strategies of queer resistance, ultimately casting the “short-gevity” of hygienic 
sentimentality—the strategy she had previously employed in Moods—as an unsatisfactory solution. 
While for the suicidal Helen, death affords “the only cure,” Alcott uses Helen’s sister Bella to 
                                                 
75 Physicians had long noted the tendency of mental illnesses such as insanity to run in families, as surely as physical 
maladies like consumption or gout. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, in particular, medical, anthropological, 
and sociological writings attended to the hereditary potential of mental illness and criminal behavior. On year after the 
publication of Alcott’s Work, the British psychiatrist Henry Maudsley would publish his popular treatise Responsibility in 
Mental Disease, in which he proposed a program of “selective breeding” (23) to obviate “neurotic heritage” (41). 
Cautioning against the perpetuation of what he called “the insane temperament,” Maudsley asserted, “we must 
acknowledge that the hereditary predisposition has assumed the character of deterioration of race, and that the individual 
represents the beginning of a degeneracy which, if not checked by favourable circumstances, will go on increasing from 





imagine productive and ethical alternatives to the nineteenth-century marriage experiment. Helen 
Carrol’s annihilative injunction—“It should end with us”— promotes not the end of the family per 
se, but a symbolic end to the ideologies and institutions that had hitherto limited the sphere of 
women’s influence to their biological children. 
Chastened by her sister’s suicide, the formerly-frivolous, oblivious, and coquettish Bella 
acquiesces to celibacy. With Christie’s guidance, however, Bella eventually comes to embrace the 
productive possibilities of spinsterhood. Having “read many books” and consulted a physician about 
“this sad affliction,” Christie counsels Bella that she and her brother Harry “may escape it,” since 
they “have self-control, strong wills, good nerves, and cheerful spirits.” Through self-destructive 
behavior, Harry “is willfully spoiling all his chances,” Christie warns; however, she suggests that 
Bella might “save” him, “and, in the endeavor, save [her]self.” Thus, with “the haunting shadow of 
her race lurking in the background” (99), Bella recycles her sexual energy into Harry’s salvation. If 
this reconfiguration of domestic sentiment “raises the threat of incest,” as Glenn Hendler has 
observed (126),76 importantly, Alcott illustrates that this sympathy is not limited to the confines of 
the family; instead, this reconstituted kinship becomes the basis for a more wide-reaching social care.  
Although their heredity pathology prohibits/recuses them from heteronormative marriage 
experiment, Harry and Bella do not renounce futurity, but re-imagine both the method and scope of 
their influence: motivated by “the hope that he might spare other families from a curse like ours” 
(335), Harry becomes a physician. Bella, too, extends her sympathies beyond this fraternal affinity, 
becoming the consummate nineteenth-century social reformer who finds “something to do in in her 
                                                 
76 Alcott’s novels are rife with quasi-incestuous affinities: Jo wants to marry Meg; Moods’s Sylvia Yule, like Bella, re-
directs the energy she might otherwise have expended on her husband into a different sort of domestic arrangement: 
“[i]ntent on making a blessing, not a reproach to her father,” she “live[s] for him entirely” (190). However, the Carrols’ 





own sphere” (341).77 At Christie’s insistence, Bella agrees to open her home as a kind of salon, 
encouraging people to engage in “the healthy stimulus of nobler pleasures” by “creating a purer 
atmosphere for them to breathe.”  Bella’s task in this “social experiment,” as Christie explains it, is 
not “to try to reform society at large,” but rather “to quietly insinuate[e] a better state of things into 
one little circle” (339), much as her physician-brother works toward a healthier social body, one 
anatomical body at a time. As Christie analogizes, Bella too has “patients”: “get them out into the 
air; and cure their ills by the magnetism of more active, earnest lives” (341). If the Gothic subplot of 
hereditary insanity perverts the paradigm of republican reproduction, it tacitly enables the formation 
of alternative, nonbiological, and ultimately more ethical kinds of kinship.  
As this chapter has shown, mid-century writings on marriage are plagued with the phantasm 
of the “tainted” child whose incipient inheritance of American futurity forebodes a biopolitical 
crisis. As Russell Thacher Trall declared in his 1866 manual Sexual Physiology (a text that would be 
targeted by Anthony Comstock in his crusade for moral purity in American print), “[a] vicious, 
malformed, diseased or perverted child can not exist in the family without ‘rendering evil for evil,’ 
any more than a vagrant or imbecile person can exist in society without, to some extent, 
contaminating the whole social atmosphere” (249). As Trall suggests, the deleterious effects of 
                                                 
77 Here, Alcott perhaps puts us in mind of the critique of “the limits of woman’s sphere, and woman’s mission” (17) 
Margaret Fuller had launched in Woman in the Nineteenth Century (1844). “As every Man is of Woman born,” Fuller writes, 
“she has slow but sure means of redress; yet the sooner a general justness of thought makes smooth the path, the better” 
(27). Yet although American ideology had long championed mothering as the primary “slow but sure means of redress,” 
Fuller intimates the possibility of alternative methods. Indeed, as Wai Chee Dimock has argued, Woman in the Nineteenth 
Century disrupts the logic of biological reproduction, offering instead “a model of large-scale causation, based on remote 
agency, unforeseen effects, action at a distance” (53), one that envisages kinship as “a populational effect”: “The tyranny 
of biology, in other words,” Dimock explains, “has been upstaged by a mathematical law that performs the same 
reproductive function, doing so not through female anatomy but through the law of probability” (57). For Alcott, 
authorship itself afforded an alternative form of reproduction—this, at least, is what she seems to suggest in the final 
line of her preface to the 1882 edition of Moods, in which she seeks to “reintroduce my first-born to the public which has 
so kindly welcomed my later offspring.” Harkening to Anne Bradstreet’s metaphor for women’s literary production, 
Alcott expresses hope that her readership will “sympathize with the maternal instinct which makes unfortunate children 
the dearest” (vi). If humans, as Dimock reminds us in her discussion of Fuller, “are the only creatures on the planet who 
reproduce through archives” (58), then is perhaps not only with the unwritten Sylvia Yule that Alcott’s readers are left to 





degeneration were perpetuated not only by hereditary transmission, but by a kind of miasmatic 
mediation, an infection threatening “the whole social atmosphere.” If degenerative tendencies 
contaminated the “social atmosphere,” Alcott’s Work proposes a remedy that relies not on the 
purification of bloodlines, but on the construction of a “purer atmosphere” through cultural work. 
In Alcott’s ambivalent oeuvre, ambitious spinster-specters surface amid a population of 
imperfect Doppelgangers: the tragic Helen and the pragmatic Bella; the sentimentalized Sylvia of 
1864 and the more “hygienic” Sylvia of 1882; the Jo she wrote and the Jo she never did. Alcott hints 
at this version of Jo, perhaps, in “Happy Women,” an 1865 sketch featuring four contented 
spinsters, including a writer who “has seen so much of what a wise man has called ‘the tragedy of 
modern married life’ that she is afraid to try it. Knowing that for one of a peculiar nature like herself 
such an experiment would be doubly hazardous,” Alcott notes, “she has obeyed instinct and become 
a chronic old maid” (xvii). Citing that preeminent philosopher of the nineteenth-century marriage 
experiment, the “wise man” Adam Warwick, Alcott claims chronic spinsterhood as a hygienic 
remedy; heteronormativity, she suggests, could be hazardous to health. 
Alcott would take the same tack, somewhat more subtly, in her Ladies’ Home Journal essay 
two decades later. On the one hand, it might appear that the hygienic problem of (hetero)sexuality is 
a problem of temporality: these “early marriages,” like Sylvia Yule’s “too early womanhood,” are 
destructive in their prematurity. In this view, self-care is the particular imperative of the young, who, 
once properly developed and suitably enlightened, embark upon the project of marriage and 
parenthood in the service of population regeneration. And yet, at the same time, Alcott tentatively 
extends a different possibility: “Spinsters,” she reminds her readers, “are a very useful, happy, 
independent race” (3). Beyond the appeal to marriage as a method for racial progress in the face of 
its progressive declension, then, Alcott proposes membership in another “race” entirely, and in 




Why Literature?  
 
 
In the age of the neoliberal university, humanities scholars are pressed to justify their 
existence amid an ongoing discourse of crisis. Literary scholars, in particular, often seem plagued 
with an impulse for anxious rationalization, striving to answer the demand, implicit or explicit: why 
literature? Of course, the question is often more precisely how literature: how does it work in the world; 
how does it represent, imagine, and create this world; what is its function, its utility, its target? 
Sometimes we instinctively bristle at this line of interrogation, as it smacks uncomfortably of 
quantification. We go on as if the answer ought to be self-evident, or the question irrelevant. But 
humanists are not the only ones to have recognized the import of the humanities. Over the past 
several decades, humanistic inquiry has been integrated into medical education with increasing 
frequency: a number of American medical schools—including, as of recently, the University of 
Michigan—offer programs in the medical humanities, incorporating the study of literature, history, 
philosophy, and the visual and performing arts into traditional clinical curricula. Since 2000, the 
number of baccalaureate programs in the health humanities in the United States has expanded from 
fourteen to fifty-five;1 researchers at the Mt. Sinai Medical School have demonstrated that medical 
students trained in the humanities excelled in clinical settings.2 It is the interdisciplinary nature of 
                                                          
1 See Berry, Lamb, and Jones, “Health Humanities Baccalaureate Programs in the United States” (2016).  
2 See Rifkin, et. al., “The Mount Sinai Humanities and Medicine Program” (2000). 
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fields like the medical or health humanities that enable us to demonstrate in concrete and convincing 
ways how literature lives in the world.3  
This dissertation began as an attempt to contribute to an understanding of nineteenth-
century literature: to illustrate and analyze the ways in which American authors engaged with the 
discursive, epistemological, and ethical dimensions of medicine. Like many academic projects, its 
primary mode has been critique: fundamentally, it casts suspicion on the ways in which the heralding 
of self-health as a democratic ideology has masked the abnegation or absence of state responsibility, 
the failure of therapeutic medicine, and the institutional neglect of disenfranchised subjects. The 
more I have pursued this argument, though, the more I have become concerned with how to think 
about “care” not only as an object of scholarly critique, but as a method. 
In its orientation toward care, (some iterations of) medicine might just be more “human” 
than (some iterations of) the humanities, since a fundamental goal of medical science is to 
understand and alleviate human suffering. And iwould embarrass me to admit how few living human 
beings I have interacted with during the two years of fellowship that enabled me to write this 
dissertation. Of course, this time has been invaluable, and I am profoundly grateful for it. But to 
repay this debt of gratitude, I think the next step must be to take seriously the why and how of 
literature: to translate scholarly “knowledge production” into an actionable politics of care. This, 
after all, is the ongoing project of the “public humanities,” a collaborative, engaged model of 
scholarship that can inform what we might call a (public) health humanities.   
                                                          
3 John McGowan has similarly responded to “how truly difficult it is to provide evidence (or even arguments) about the 
value of the humanities that go beyond vague platitudes unlikely to satisfy the hostile or indifferent” by suggesting that 
“[t]he medical humanities are attractive in part because they do offer a path toward supporting claims about the 
beneficial results of the humanities in practice” (137). As McGowan suggests, the decline of “critique” indexes “a 
general, dare we call it ‘democratic,’ sensibility among those in the ‘helping professions’—education, health care, social 
work—toward deemphasizing expert hierarchies in favor of participatory or collaborative modes of interaction” (133). 
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By this I do not mean that the time has come to forfeit critical rigor for “relevance.” Indeed, 
I believe it is precisely the critical aspects of literary and cultural study that are most valuable to the 
future of fields like the health humanities as they seek to address complex biosocial problems like 
the racialized disparities of care in the United States. While early iterations of the medical humanities 
tended to approach literature primarily as a useful tool for the cultivation of empathy (an approach 
that tended to invoke the “human condition,” whatever that may be), the fetishization of literature 
and the humanities—the valorization of art as a way to save science from itself—risks forgetting the 
way the humanities themselves have historically imagined a “human” subjectivity that is white, male, 
heterosexual, and able-bodied. If interdisciplinary fields like gender studies and ethnic studies have 
helped to reorient the humanities by exposing the fiction of this supposedly-disembodied subject, 
the health humanities afford us a greater understanding of how bodies have been situated within (or 
excluded from) structures of care.  
Inevitably, the question why literature gives rise to another: why the nineteenth century?  To this, I 
can only say that I have not been able to escape the sense that we are still living out the “long 
nineteenth century” in the United States in our attitudes toward health care as in myriad other ways; 
as we are wont to say with a mix of despondency and genuine bafflement: What year is it?  This is the 
question Hortense Spillers voiced at the Futures of American Studies Institute at Dartmouth College 
in the summer of 2015, one week after the mass shooting at Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal 
Church in Charleston. 1960? 1860?  “In any given year,” she said, “we are living in all the years.”  
Writing this dissertation, I have felt this compendious and simultaneous temporality keenly. 
While I drafted chapters on epidemic discourse, American news media tracked the spread of Ebola 
across West Africa. I wrote on antebellum reproductive politics amid widespread public outcry for 
the defunding of Planned Parenthood.  And while I was analyzing neglect and environmental 
injustice as nineteenth-century technologies of racism, a federal state of emergency was declared in 
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Flint, Michigan, as thousands of the city’s predominantly African American residents faced 
environmental violence in a disastrous failure of care. Living in all the years, yes—and dying in them 
too.  
When I first began pursuing a Ph.D. in English, my answer to the question why literature was 
thoroughly unsatisfactory. It was, I said, as good a way as any to spend the time before I died. And I 
was certain that this would be sooner rather than later, having spent what would have been my first 
year in the PhD program in treatment for invasive breast cancer. I spent that year poring over a 
syllabus of another sort—Susan Sontag, Audre Lorde—which showed me how literary analysis can 
be brought to bear on medical experience; it has been, perhaps not coincidentally, poets and literary 
critics who have most cogently probed the cultural meanings of illness. But it took me some time to 
come to terms with this, for I harbored a kind of superstition of affiliation: shortly after I had my 
first chemo treatment, Eve Sedgwick died of metastatic breast cancer. I worried, perversely, that to 
identify too closely with criticism was to somehow invite my own death. But of course, the question 
is never whether, it is only when; and so the problem is only ever what one does until then.  
Productive work can come from what the threat of death engenders; change often finds its 
roots in indignation and grief. But as an inveterate pessimist, I find that as often as my own work is 
incited by either, it is hampered by despair. Ultimately, I find that the health humanities can offer 
something other than a politics of anger, a politics of loss, or a politics of fear; it can help us to 
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